Part 200

"July 23d Napoleon intrusted the regency to the empress for the period of his absence from Paris. ... On the 28th, ... accompanied by his son, [he] left for Metz, to assume command of the army. ... The army consisted of eight corps. Of these, the 1st, under Marshal MacMahon, was stationed at Strasburg; the 2d, under General Frossard, at St. Avold; the 3d, under Marshal Bazaine, at Metz; the 4th, under General Ladmirault, at Diedenhofen (Thionville); the 5th, under General Failly, at Bitsch; the 6th, under Marshal Canrobert, in the camp at Châlons; the 7th, under General Felix Douay, at Belfort; the 8th,--the Imperial Guard--under General Bourbaki, at Nancy. Accordingly, the French forces were divided into two groups, the larger stationed on the Moselle, and the smaller in Alsace. To the latter belonged the 1st and 7th corps, both of which were placed under the command of Marshal MacMahon, with orders to prevent the crown prince's army from entering Alsace. The larger group comprised the 2d, 3d, and 4th corps. ... The 6th and 8th were to have formed the reserve; but the greatly superior numbers of Prince Frederic Charles and Steinmetz, who were advancing against this larger group, necessitated the immediate bringing of those corps to the front. The connection between the two groups was to be maintained by the 5th corps, stationed at Bitsch. Skirmishing of the advanced posts and collisions between reconnoitering parties began on the 19th of July. The most important of these minor engagements was that at Saarbrücken, on the 2d of August [the French claiming a victory]. ... August 4th the crown prince crossed the French frontier and attacked the town of Weissenburg, on the little river Lauter. ... Weissenburg was successfully carried by Prussian and Bavarian battalions combined, and the Geisberg by sixteen battalions of Prussians alone. ... August 5th MacMahon with his corps took up his position at Wörth, fortifying the heights westward from Sauerbach, together with the villages of Froschweiler and Elsasshausen, in the intention of meeting at that place the advancing columns of the crown prince, whose attack he expected on the 7th. To strengthen his army sufficiently for the task required of it he endeavored to bring up General Felix Douay's corps from Belfort and Mühlhausen, and that of General Failly from Bitsch; but only one division of the former arrived in time, and a division of the latter which was sent to his support did not reach the neighborhood of the battle-field until the evening of the 6th, in time to afford a partial protection on the retreat. Consequently, MacMahon was left with not more than 45,000 men to face the crown prince's whole army. ... On the morning of the 6th the advance guard of the 5th corps became involved in a sharp action with the enemy," and "from a mere skirmish of the advance guard resulted the decisive battle of Wörth. ... After Wörth itself had been carried, the fighting was most severe around the fortified village of Froschweiler. This was finally taken, and a desperate charge of the French cuirassiers repulsed. Thereupon MacMahon's army broke and fled in wild confusion, some toward the passes of the Vosges, others to Strasburg or Bitsch. ... The trophies of victory were numerous and valuable: 200 officers and 9,000 men prisoners. ... The French lost 6,000 dead and wounded; the German loss was 489 officers and 10,153 men--a loss greater than that of Sadowa. ... MacMahon, with about 15,000 of his defeated troops, reached Zabern on the morning of the 7th, and set out thence for Châlons, whither Generals Douay and Failly were also directed to lead their forces. A new army was to be formed at that point, and northern Alsace was abandoned to the crown prince's victorious troops. The Badish division received orders to march against Strasburg, and by the 9th the whole corps was assembled before that city, Hagenau having been taken by the cavalry on the way. ... Preparations for a siege were made, a regular siege corps being formed ... and placed under the command of General Werder. With the remainder of the third army the crown prince left Wörth on the 8th of August, marched through the unguarded passes of the Vosges, and entered Nancy on the 16th. ... Detachments were left behind to blockade Bitsch and Pfalzburg. At Nancy the prince rested for a few days and waited for decisive news from the Saar and Moselle. A second victory was won on the 6th of August at Spichern [or Forbach]. Like the battle of Wörth, this action was not the result of a strategical combination, but rather of a misunderstanding. ... Frossard [whose corps was encountered at Spichern] fell back on Metz by way of Saargemünd. Bazaine, who, although not more than seven or eight miles from the field of battle, had made no attempt to come to Frossard's assistance, led his corps to the same place. In this battle, owing to the unfavorable nature of the ground, the losses of the conquerors were heavier than those of the conquered. The Germans had 223 officers and 4,648 men dead, wounded, and missing; while the French, according to their own reports, lost 249 officers and 3,829 men, 2,000 of whom were taken prisoners. August 7th the victors continued their forward march, capturing great stores of provisions in Forbach. On the 9th St. Avold was taken, and foraging parties advanced almost to Metz. {1382} Marching through the Rhenish Palatinate, part of Prince Frederic Charles's army directed its course toward Metz by way of Saarbrücken, and part through Saargemünd. ... In the imperial head-quarters at Metz the greatest consternation prevailed. ... It was [finally] decided to concentrate five army corps on the right bank of the Moselle, at Metz, and to form a second army, consisting of four corps, under MacMahon's command, in the camp at Châlons. The first line of defence on the Rhine and Saar had been abandoned, and France was to be defended on the Moselle. By this decision Alsace and Lorraine were surrendered to the foe at the very outset." On the 9th of August the French emperor transferred the chief command from himself to Marshal Bazaine, while Lebœuf at the same time withdrew from the direction of the staff. Simultaneously, at Paris, the Grammont-Ollivier ministry resigned, and was succeeded by a cabinet formed under the presidency of Count Palikao (General Montauban). "New levies were called into the field, comprising all unmarried men between the ages of 25 and 30 not already enrolled in the 'garde mobile.' ... In the German head-quarters ... it was resolved in some way to make Bazaine's army harmless, either by shutting him up in Metz or by pushing him northward to the Belgian frontier. ... The task was a difficult one. ... All depended upon what course Bazaine might conclude to pursue, and the energy with which he executed his plans. It was his purpose to leave Metz with the field army and join MacMahon at Châlons. There would then be 300,000 French at that place to block the German march to Paris. In that event the Germans would have to leave 60,000 men before Metz ... and Diedenhofen, and would not have enough left to venture an attack on the united and well-intrenched armies at Châlons. Accordingly, the union of those two armies must be prevented at any price, and Bazaine be attacked before Metz. The execution of this plan led to the severe fighting near that city--the battle of Colombey-Nouilly (Borny), on the 14th, Vionville on the 16th, and Gravelotte on the 18th." The battle of Gravelotte was "the first battle in the war in which a pre-arranged plan [Moltke's] was actually carried out. ... It was a brilliant victory, and followed by important results. Bazaine's army was shut up in the fortress and among the outlying forts, and rendered unavailable for further service in the field. The losses of the French amounted to about 13,000 men, including 600 officers; the German loss was 899 officers and 19,260 men, of whom 328 officers and 4,909 men were killed outright. The number of combatants on the side of the French was about 140,000, on the side of the Germans 178,818, the former having 550, and the latter 822 cannon. It must be remembered, however, that the French occupied a position very much of the nature of a fortress, which had to be carried by storm."

_W. Müller, Political History of Recent Times, section 25._

ALSO IN: _Count H. von Moltke, The Franro-German War of 1870-71, section 1._

_Colonel A. Borbstaedt and Major F. Dwyer, The Franco-German War, chapters 10-29._

FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (August-September). Investment of Metz by the Germans. Disastrous attempt of MacMahon to rescue Bazaine. The catastrophe at Sedan.

"The huge, stubborn, vehement and bloody conflict waged in the rural tract between the northern edges of the Bois de Vaux and the Forest of Jaumont, which the French Marshal called the 'Defence of the Lines of Amanvillers,' the French Army, 'the Battle of St. Privat,' and the Germans the battle of 'Gravelotte--St. Privat,' established the mastery of the latter over 'the Army of the Rhine.' Marshal Bazaine had not proved strong enough to extricate the Army he was suddenly appointed to command from the false position in which it had been placed by the errors and hesitations of the Emperor and Marshal Lebœuf. ... The German leaders forthwith resolved, and acted on the resolve, to take the largest advantage of success. When the broadening day showed that the French were encamped under the guns of the fort, and that they did not betray the faintest symptom of fighting for egress on any side, the place was deliberately invested. ... Soon the blockade was so far completed that only adventurous scouts were able at rare intervals to work their way through the German lines. As early as the forenoon of the 19th, the King had decided to form what came to be called the 'Army of the Meuse' out of the Corps which were not needed to uphold the investment of Metz, and thus place himself in a condition to assail the French Army collecting at Chalons. ... This formidable force was put under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, who had shown himself to be an able soldier. Consequently, there remained behind to invest Bazaine, seven Corps d'Armée and a Division of Reserve under General von Kummer. ... One Army had been literally imprisoned, another remained at large, and behind it were the vast resources of France. Three Marshals were cooped up in the cage on the Moselle; one, MacMahon, and the Emperor were still in the field; and upon the forces with them it was resolved to advance at once, because prudence required that they should be shattered before they could be completely organized, and while the moral effect of the resounding blows struck in Alsace and Lorraine had lost none of its terrible power. Therefore the King and General von Moltke started on the morrow of victory to march on Paris through the plains of Champagne."

_G. Hooper, The Campaign of Sedan, chapter 10._

"While the German invasion had thus been rolling from Lorraine into the flats of Champagne, the shattered right wing of the army of the Rhine, with reinforcements sent off from Paris, had been drawn together in the well-known plains made memorable by the defeat of Attila. By 20 August the first and fifth French corps marched rapidly from the Upper Moselle to the Marne, had been joined by the seventh corps from Belfort and by the twelfth formed in and despatched from Paris; and this force, numbering perhaps 130,000 men, with from 400 to 500 guns, had been concentrated round the great camp of Châlons. Macmahon was given the supreme command, and the first operations of the experienced chief showed that he understood the present state of affairs, and were in accord with the rules of strategy. Bazaine, he knew, was in peril near Metz, and certainly had not attained the Meuse; and he was at the head of the last army which France could assemble for the defence of her capital. {1383} In these circumstances, impressed perhaps by the grand memories of the campaign of 1814, he most properly resolved to fall back towards Paris; but as Bazaine was possibly not far distant, and a position on the flank of the German advance might afford a favourable opportunity to strike, he withdrew northwards on the 21st to Rheims, in the double hope that he would approach his colleague and threaten the communications of the advancing enemy. This, we repeat, was following the art of war, and had Macmahon firmly adhered to his purpose, there would have been no Sedan and no treaty of Frankfort. Unhappily the marshal, a hero in the field, was deficient in real strength of character, and at this critical moment evil counsels and false information shook, and at last changed, a resolve that ought to have never faltered. A new administration had been formed in Paris, and Palikao, the minister of war, devoted to the Empire, and especially bent on satisfying the demands of the excited capital, which passionately insisted on the relief of Bazaine, had conceived a project by which he hoped that this great object would be effected and the 'dynasty' be restored in popular opinion. The army of the Meuse, he argued, was near that stream, round Verdun; the third army was far away to the south; there was a considerable interval between the two masses; and the army of Châlons, then at Rheims, was not far from the Upper Meuse. In those circumstances it was quite practicable, should Macmahon rapidly advance to the Meuse, to overpower with his largely superior force the army of the Meuse before support could be sent from the distant third army; and the enemy in his path being swept aside, the marshal could then descend on Metz, fall with the collected strength of the army of Châlons on the divided fragments of the investing force, and triumphantly effect his junction with Bazaine, having routed, perhaps, the first and second armies before the third could appear on the scene. The defiles and woods of the Argonne and the Ardennes, stretching between the French and the German armies, Palikao insisted, would form a screen to conceal the advance of the army of Chãlons, and would greatly facilitate the proposed movement. This project reached Macmahon on 21 August, and may be pronounced one of the most reckless ever designed by a desperate gambler in war. ... Macmahon at first refused to listen to what he condemned as a hopeless project; but bad advisers found their way to him, and his resolution was already yielding when a calamitous event fixed his shifting purpose. A despatch from Bazaine, obscure and untrue, announced that he was on his way northward. Macmahon inferred that his beleaguered colleague had left Metz and eluded his foes, and, thinking that he would reach Bazaine before long, in an evil hour for France and for himself, he consented to attempt the march to the Meuse."

_W. O'C. Morris, The Campaign of Sedan (English Historical Review., April, 1888)._

"It was not until the afternoon of August 23 that MacMahon's army passed through Rheims. Anxious, and knowing that everything depended on speed, he addressed some columns as they toiled onwards, reminding them that French soldiers had marched thirty miles a day under the sun of Africa. The difference, however, was great between raids made by a few light regiments and the advance of a raw unwieldy mass; and though the marshal endeavoured to hurry them forward, he was confronted with almost insurmountable obstacles. Scarcely had the army made a march towards establishing itself at Bethniville, on the Suippe, when commissariat difficulties obliged him to re-approach the line of the railway. He made a movement on his left, and reached Rethel on the 24th, in order to obtain for his troops several days' subsistence. This distribution occupied the whole of the 25th. ... As the direction of the French movement could not now be concealed, at this point MacMahon made arrangements for marching with all possible rapidity. It may be doubted, however, whether Napoleon himself, at the head of the grand army could have made the haste which the marshal designed with his raw and partly demoralized troops. ... His army was altogether unequal to forced marches, and moved at this critical moment with the sluggishness inherent in its defective organization. Encumbered with stragglers, badly pioneered, and checked by hindrances of every kind, it made hardly ten miles a day; and it was the 27th of August before its right column, still far from the Meuse, passed through Vouziers, and the left reached Le Chêne. ... On the 27th it was openly boasted of in Paris that MacMahon had gained at least forty-eight hours' start of the Crown Prince, and his coming success was firmly counted on by the imperialist cabinet, whereas, in reality, the whole scheme was foiled beforehand by Von Moltke's and General Blumenthal's prompt combination. ... If in fighting, in the boldness of their cavalry, the activity of their staff, the cool firing of their infantry, and the skilful tactical use of their guns, the superiority of the Germans to their antagonists had been already proved; it only required the contrast now presented between the movements of the two armies to show, that in no point had the difference of training and moral feeling told more in favour of the invaders than in that of the marching, on which the elder Napoleon so often relied for his advantage over these very Germans. ... Between the 27th and the morning of the 29th, the right column of the French army had only its outposts at Buzancy, while the left, though its outposts touched Stenay, was only at Stonne and Beaumont, both columns spreading a long way backward; in other words, they were still a march from the Meuse, which they ought to have passed three days before, and their rearward divisions were yet distant. The German armies, from the 26th to the 29th, made astonishing exertions to close on MacMahon as he crossed towards the Meuse, and success was already within their grasp. The force of the Crown Prince of Saxony, in two columns, had reached the Meuse at Dun on the 27th, and was thus in a position to arrest and retard the vanguard of the French whenever it attempted to cross the river. Meanwhile the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, hastening forward by Varennes and Grand Prè, and to the left by Senuc and Suippe, had arrived close to the line of march of MacMahon's right column, and by the evening of the 28th had occupied it about Vouziers. A step farther, and this immense army would be upon the positions of the luckless French, who, assailed in flank and rear by superior numbers, could not fail to be involved in terrible disaster. ... MacMahon [on the 27th], observing that the enemy so completely surrounded him, felt more than ever satisfied that it would be impossible to carry out the plan which had been prescribed to him at Paris; and to save, if possible, the sole army which France had at her disposal, he accordingly resolved to turn back in a westerly direction. ... {1384} The same evening he sent ... [a] telegram to the Count Palikao, at Paris. ... In reply to this, the government sent a telegram to the emperor at eleven o'clock the same night, telling him that if they abandoned Bazaine there would certainly be a revolution in Paris, and they would themselves be attacked by all the enemy's forces. ... The emperor admits that he could unquestionably have set this order aside, but 'he was resolved not to oppose the decision of the regency, and had resigned himself to submit to the consequences of the fatality which attached itself to all the resolutions of the government.' 'As for MacMahon, he again bowed to the decision intimated to him from Paris, and once more turned towards Metz. These orders and counter-orders naturally occasioned further delay, and the French headquarters had reached no farther than Stonne on the 28th. ... On Monday, August 29, De Failly occupied the country between Beaumont and Stonne, on the left bank of the Meuse; while the main body of the French army, under MacMahon in person, had crossed the river, and were encamped on the right bank at Vaux, between Mouzon and Carignan, and on the morning of the 30th the emperor telegraphed to Paris that a brilliant victory might be expected. MacMahon's position was in a sharp wedge of country formed by the confluence of the rivers Meuse and Chiers, and it was his intention to advance towards Montmèdy. The other part of his army was close to the river on its left bank. ... The battle--or rather series of battles, for the fighting extended over three days--which was to decide whether or not he would reach Metz and liberate Bazaine, began in earnest a little before noon on Tuesday, August 30."

_H. M. Hozier, The Franco-Prussian War, volume 1, chapter 13._