Category: History - Medieval/Middle Ages

Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)

The first period embraces a space of one thousand years—from Thales, 550 B.C., to Proclus, who died 485 A.D., and until the disappearance of pagan philosophy as an outward institution, 529 A.D. The second period extends to the sixteenth century, and thus again embraces a thous...

Chapters

7. PART TWO

The first period embraces a space of one thousand years—from Thales, 550 B.C., to Proclus, who died 485 A.D., and until the disappearance of pagan philosophy as an outward insti...

19. CHAPTER II

The decadence which we find in thought until the philosophy of Kant is reached, is manifested in what was at this time advocated in opposition to the metaphysic of the understan...

23. c. Practical reason comes next; the point of view from which it starts

is that “The ego posits itself as determining the non-ego.” Now the contradiction has thus to be solved of ego being at home with itself, since it determines its Beyond. The ego...

10. c. The third stage is that this union itself which is to be brought

about, and which is the only subject of interest, comes to consciousness and becomes an object. As principle the union has the form of the relationship of knowledge to the conte...

24. Part VI. Section I. pp. 363, 364; Tiedemann: Geist. d. Spec. Phil. Vol.

[68] Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio et uno, Venetia 1584, 8, which was certainly not really printed at Venice, since both it and the following work, De l’infinito, Unive...

12. c. What comes third is thus the transition of this certainty into

truth, into the determinate; Descartes again makes this transition in a naïve way, and with it we for the first time begin to consider his metaphysics. What here takes place is...

14. c. When Spinoza passes on to individual things, especially to

self-consciousness, to the freedom of the ‘I,’ he expresses himself in such a way as rather to lead back all limitations to substance than to maintain a firm grasp of the indivi...

22. c. The highest form in which the conception of the concrete comes

into Kant’s philosophy is this, that the end is grasped in its entire universality; and thus it is the Good. This Good is an Idea; it is my thought; but there exists the absolut...

18. c. The universal itself, absolute essence, which with Leibnitz is

α. That universal is God, as the cause of the world, to the consciousness of whom the above principle of sufficient reason certainly forms the transition. The existence of God i...

17. c. Hobbes finally passes to the laws of reason which preserve

tranquillity. This condition of law is the subjection of the natural, particular will of the individual to the universal will, which, however, is not that of all individuals, bu...

20. c. The third faculty Kant finds in reason, to which he advances from

the understanding after the same psychological method; that is to say, he hunts through the soul’s sack to see what faculties are still to be found there; and thus by merest cha...

15. c. As regards the turning of the soul to God, Malebranche says what

Spinoza said from his ethical point of view: “It is impossible that God should have an end other than Himself (the Holy Scriptures place this beyond doubt);” the will of God can...

11. CHAPTER I

Metaphysics is what reaches after substance, and this implies that one unity, one thought is maintained in opposition to dualism, just as Being was amongst the ancients. In meta...

21. c. The third point is the highest concrete, the Notion of the freedom

of all men, or the natural world has to be in harmony with the Notion of freedom. That is the postulate of the existence of God, whom Reason, however, does not recognize. Will h...

13. d. In the fourth place Spinoza defines attributes, which, as the moment

coming second to substance, belong to it. “By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the essence of substance;” and to Spinoza this alone is true....

16. c. Since the universal as such, the idea of species, is, according to

Locke, merely a product of our mind, which is not itself objective, but relates merely to objects which are germane to it, and from which the particular of qualities, conditions...

8. PART THREE

If we cast a glance back over the period just traversed, we find that in it a turning-point had been reached, that the Christian religion had placed its absolute content in the...

9. c. The third form of opposition is that of the freedom of man and

α. The individual is clearly not determined in any other way than from himself, he is the absolute beginning of determination; in the ‘I,’ in the self, a power of decision is cl...

3. PART TWO

6. CHAPTER II.—TRANSITION PERIOD 360

5. CHAPTER I.—THE METAPHYSICS OF THE UNDERSTANDING 220

2. VOLUME THREE

4. PART THREE

1. VOLUME THREE