Category: Philosophy & Ethics

Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)

Ever since there has been philosophy, that is, ever since men first reflected on themselves and the beings around them, they have been engaged with those questions which have for their object the basis of human knowledge, and this shows that on this subject serious difficultie...

Chapters

86. CHAPTER XXXIV.

262. Before passing to another subject, let us fix our attention for a few moments on the nature and origin of the idea of extension. We shall thus collect the fruit of the prec...

7. CHAPTER VII.

70. The testimony of consciousness is sure and irresistible, but it has no connection with that of evidence. The object of the one is a particular and contingent fact; that of t...

20. CHAPTER XX.

189. Before examining the value of the principle of contradiction as a basis for our cognitions, it will be well to fix its true and exact sense. This renders necessary some con...

29. CHAPTER XXIX.

278. The great importance attributed by the German philosopher to his imaginary discovery, requires us to examine it at length. This importance may be estimated from what he him...

30. CHAPTER XXX.

294. The doctrine of Vico on the criterion of truth is connected with the matter of the preceding chapters on immediate and mediate evidence. This philosopher thinks that the cr...

83. CHAPTER XXXI.

219. Having treated of passive sensibility in the order of possibles, a similar question naturally arises with respect to the active sensibility of beings subject to different c...

34. CHAPTER XXXIV.

337. In concluding this book, I wish to give a summary of my views on certainty, wherein I shall show the connection between the doctrines exposed in the different chapters.

32. CHAPTER XXXII.

313. _Common sense_ is an exceedingly vague expression. It should, like all expressions which contain many and different ideas, be considered under two aspects: that of its etym...

15. CHAPTER XV.

143. We have not been able to discover, either in the real or the ideal order, a truth, the origin of all other truths to our intellect while in this life. Therefore it stands p...

3. CHAPTER III.

16. Certainty does not originate in reflection; it is the spontaneous product of man's nature, and is annexed to the direct act of the intellectual and sensitive faculties. It i...

55. CHAPTER III.

13. In order to understand the superiority of the idea of extension over mere sensations; or rather, in order to understand that there is a true idea of extension considered in...

25. CHAPTER XXV.

247. The transition from subject to object, from subjective appearance to objective reality, is a problem which vexes fundamental philosophy. Consciousness will not permit us to...

4. CHAPTER IV.

38. Philosophers have sought a first principle of human knowledge; each has assigned his own, and now after so much discussion it is doubtful who is right, or even if any one is...

46. CHAPTER XII.

64. I have, I believe, made the inferiority of touch to sight and hearing palpable, and have, consequently, shown the extravagance of endeavoring to make it the basis of all cog...

36. CHAPTER II.

12. The phenomenon of sensibility reveals to us the existence of an order of beings distinct from matter. However perfect we may suppose material organization, it cannot rise to...

18. CHAPTER XVIII.

170. Descartes did not always express himself with, sufficient accuracy when announcing and explaining his principle; and hence his words have been misinterpreted. In the passag...

68. CHAPTER XVI.

104. We have already shown that extension considered in us, is something more than a mere sensation, that it is a true idea, the basis of some sensations, and at the same time a...

19. CHAPTER XIX.

178. We have already seen that Descartes' principle, considered as an enthymema, cannot aspire to be fundamental. In every argument there are premises and a consequence; and to...

8. CHAPTER VIII.

85. In order to give unity to science, some appeal to universal identity; this, however, is not to discover unity, but to take refuge in chaos. Universal identity is not only an...

2. CHAPTER II.

5. That we have certainty, common sense assures us, but what is its basis, and how it is acquired, are two difficult questions, which it is for philosophy to answer.

79. CHAPTER XXVII.

190. Is it necessary that whatever exists should be in some place? This question may seem strange, but it is profoundly philosophical. _To be_ is not the same as _to be in a pla...

31. CHAPTER XXXI.

304. If the Neapolitan philosopher's criterion be anywhere admissible, it can only be in ideal truths; for as these are absolutely cut off from existence, we may well suppose th...

27. CHAPTER XXVII.

269. It is even ridiculous to say that the cognitions of the sublimest philosophers may be reduced to this equation: A is A. This, absolutely speaking, is not only false, but co...

43. CHAPTER IX.

49. Having proved the testimony of the senses sufficient to assure us of the existence of bodies, we now come to examine how far the ideas it makes us form are correct. It is no...

12. CHAPTER XII.

120. Neither active nor passive representation can be predicated of all things; we mean to say, that there are some beings which are not endowed with intellectual activity, and...

71. CHAPTER XIX.

133. That which is extended is not one being only; it is a collection of beings. Extension necessarily contains parts, some outside of, and consequently distinct from, others. T...

38. CHAPTER IV.

24. Have our sensations any relation to external objects, or are they merely phenomena of our nature? Can we infer the existence of an external world from the existence of that...

85. CHAPTER XXXIII.

249. There are two things in extended objects: multiplicity and continuity. The first is absolutely necessary to extension; it supposes distinct parts, and that which is distinc...

23. CHAPTER XXIII.

225. Having established the worth of the principles of consciousness, of evidence, and of contradiction, in relation to the dignity of fundamental, we will now examine the intri...

13. CHAPTER XIII.

126. Besides the representation of identity, there is what I have called the representation of causality. A being may represent itself, a cause its effect. Productive activity i...

59. CHAPTER VII.

42. It may have been remarked in the preceding chapters that the idea of extension is always united with that of space, and when we endeavor to determine the _real_ nature of th...

21. CHAPTER XXI.

204. Having cleared up the true sense of the principle of contradiction, let us now see whether it merits to be called fundamental, whether it possesses all the characteristics...

35. CHAPTER I.

1. Sensation considered in itself is simply an internal affection; but it is almost always accompanied by a judgment. This judgment may be more or less explicit and more or less...

53. CHAPTER I.

1. Having seen that among the objects of our sensations, extension alone has any external existence for us as any thing more than a principle of causality, let us now try to und...

45. CHAPTER XI.

58. That superiority, or rather that exclusive privilege, conceded by Condillac and other philosophers to touch, not only has no foundation, as we have just seen, but seems to b...

57. CHAPTER V.

31. The disagreement which we discover between the phenomena and the geometrical theory makes us apt to think that reality is rough and coarse, and that purity and exactness are...

33. CHAPTER XXXIII.

329. The instinctive faith in human authority, of which we have just treated, is a fact attested by experience, and one which no philosopher has presumed to call in doubt. This...

17. CHAPTER XVII.

163. Am I certain that I exist? Yes. Can I prove it? No. Proof supposes reasoning; there is no solid reasoning without a firm principle on which to rest it; and there is no firm...

63. CHAPTER XI.

72. Clarke's opinion is very similar to that of Fenelon, who in his _Treatise on the existence and attributes of God_, explains immensity in a very surprising manner. He says: "...

24. CHAPTER XXIV.

239. There are two species of evidence, mediate and immediate. We call immediate evidence that which requires only understanding of the terms; and mediate evidence that which re...

49. CHAPTER XV.

85. I said that the observer could not distinguish between his own motion and that of the object; sight alone can not give us a true idea of motion. Thus in a boat, although we...

47. CHAPTER XIII.

75. Cheselden's blind man, of whom Condillac spoke, in confirmation of his opinions, presents no phenomenon upon which they can rest. This blind person was a youth of thirteen o...

64. CHAPTER XII.

77. Descartes' opinion wholly confounds space and bodies, making the essence of bodies consist in extension, and asserting that wherever there is space, there is body. This opin...

5. CHAPTER V.

53. In the human intellectual order, such as it is in this life, there is no one truth from which all others flow: philosophers have sought one in vain; they have found none, fo...

26. CHAPTER XXVI.

264. Immediate evidence has for its objects those truths which the intellect sees with all clearness, and to which it assents without the intervention of any _medium_, as its na...

28. CHAPTER XXVIII.

274. We will now explain how the doctrine of identity is applied in general to all reasoning, whether upon mathematical objects or not: with this view we will examine some of th...

22. CHAPTER XXII.

216. Among the principles which, by their pretensions to the title of fundamental, have most figured in the schools, is one called the principle of the Cartesians: "whatever is...

60. CHAPTER VIII.

Can we say that space is only the extension of bodies; that conceived in the abstract it gives us the idea of what we call pure space; and that the different points and position...

51. CHAPTER XVII.

98. Is it certain that we have only five ways of sensation? I have some doubts on this point. In order to present them with the greatest clearness, and solve the questions which...

72. CHAPTER XX.

144. The preceding doctrine will seem much more probable if we reflect that all purely intellectual perceptions of extension may be reduced to the knowledge of order and relatio...

11. CHAPTER XI.

111. All our knowledge is by representation, without which it would be inconceivable; and yet what is representation in itself considered? We cannot say: it enlightens us as to...

48. CHAPTER XIV.

78. It has been asserted that sight can not give us the idea of size or of a solid, but that this can be obtained only by the help of touch. I believe the contrary may be proved...

67. CHAPTER XV.

96. Since space is only the extension of bodies, and there is no space where there are no bodies, it follows that the extension which we conceive distinct from bodies, with fixe...

73. CHAPTER XXI.

152. Objects in themselves do not change their nature, by the variety of appearances which they produce in us. A polygon turning with rapidity has the appearance of a circle; th...

10. CHAPTER X.

105. The pretension to find a real truth, the fountain of all others, is dangerous in the extreme, however indifferent it may at first sight appear. Pantheism, and the deificati...

41. CHAPTER VII.

37. Is the external world such as we believe it to be? Are the beings, called _bodies_, which cause our sensations in reality what we believe them? May we not, even after having...

65. CHAPTER XIII.

84. If space is the extension of bodies, it follows that extension has no recipient, that is to say, no place in which it can be situated. This seems to be in direct contradicti...

6. CHAPTER VI.

64. We have thought proper briefly to refute Condillac's system, not on account of its intrinsic importance, or because it was not before in sufficiently bad repute, but in orde...

50. CHAPTER XVI.

91. Lamennais writes: "Who can say that a sixth sense would not disturb the harmony of the others by a contrary impression? On what foundation could he deny it? If we suppose ot...

77. CHAPTER XXV.

178. We may consider two natures in the external world, the one real, the other phenomenal; the first is particular and absolute, the second is relative to the being which perce...

37. CHAPTER III.

20. The fact of sensation is connected with many others, and from this connection results a great part of our knowledge. It has been said in a tone of great confidence, that it...

58. CHAPTER VI.

We find extension in bodies and also in space because in both we find that which constitutes its essence, which is dimension. Is the extension of bodies the same as the extensio...

42. CHAPTER VIII.

43. Two of our senses perceive extension; sight and touch. Sound, taste, and smell accompany extension, but are something different from it. The sight perceives nothing not exte...

1. CHAPTER I.

Ever since there has been philosophy, that is, ever since men first reflected on themselves and the beings around them, they have been engaged with those questions which have fo...

76. CHAPTER XXIV.

171. The arguments for or against unextended points, for or against the infinite divisibility of matter seem equally conclusive. The understanding is afraid that it has met with...

44. CHAPTER X.

54. It has been said that touch is the surest, and perhaps the only witness of the existence of bodies; for without it, all sensations would be nothing more than simple modifica...

82. CHAPTER XXX.

210. Active sensibility, or the faculty of perceiving by the senses, has been a subject of great dispute among philosophers. Passive sensibility, or the capacity of an object to...

16. CHAPTER XVI.

160. There are, in our opinion, various principles, which, with regard to the human intellect, may be called equally fundamental, both because they serve as foundation in the co...

62. CHAPTER X.

67. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, and unable to reconcile the reality which space offers us with nothing, or to conceive in any thing created the immobility, infinity, and...

75. CHAPTER XXIII.

166. There are two strong arguments against the existence of unextended points: the first is, that we must suppose them infinite in number, for otherwise it does not seem possib...

14. CHAPTER XIV.

138. We shall in vain seek in the region of ideas for that which we could not find in that of facts, for there is no ideal truth, the origin of all other truths.

80. CHAPTER XXVIII.

199. Position in place is the relation of a body to other bodies. Is this relation necessary? I distinguish: conditionally, yes; essentially, no. God has established this relati...

81. CHAPTER XXIX.

206. Must not the theory which supposes the relations of bodies to be variable, put an end to all the natural sciences? Can there be science without a necessary object? and can...

74. CHAPTER XXII.

162. The divisibility of matter is a question that torments philosophers. Matter is divisible because it is extended, and there is no extension without parts. These parts are ex...

69. CHAPTER XVII.

118. I think that Kant's _Transcendental Æsthetics_, or theory of sensibility, is not sufficiently transcendental. It is too much confined to the empirical part, and does not ri...

39. CHAPTER V.

29. The system of the Idealists cannot stand without supposing the connection and dependence which we refer to external objects, to exist only within us, and the causality which...

54. CHAPTER II.

9. Extension has the remarkable peculiarity of being perceived by different senses. As regards sight and touch this is evident; it is also true as far as concerns the other sens...

40. CHAPTER VI.

32. A difficulty, at first sight serious, but in reality futile, may be brought against the existence of bodies. Who knows, it may be asked, but what some cause, not at all rese...

9. CHAPTER IX.

100. These systems, as absurd as they are fatal, although under distinct forms, and by various means, they tend to prepare the way for pantheism, contain a profound truth which,...

84. CHAPTER XXXII.

245. The more we meditate on the corporeal world, the more we discover the contingency of many of its relations, and the consequent necessity of recourse to a higher cause which...

66. CHAPTER XIV.

89. I now proceed to deduce the last consequence of the principle explained above. It is of the greatest importance, and seems to deserve the careful attention of all those who...

70. CHAPTER XVIII.

124. The great problem of philosophy does not consist in the explanation of the possibility of experience; but in establishing the reason of the consciousness of experience, as...

52. CHAPTER XVIII.

106. From the preceding observations we shall now deduce an important consequence,--the solution of the difficulty presented by Lamennais. The existence of new senses would invo...

56. CHAPTER IV.

27. We now come to more difficult questions. Is extension any thing in itself, abstracted from the idea of it? If any thing, what is it? Is it identified with bodies, or is it c...

61. CHAPTER IX.

62. The preceding considerations seem to me to establish beyond any question, that space and nothing are contradictory terms. If space is a capacity with dimensions that can be...

78. CHAPTER XXVI.

186. Is the agreement of the idea, the phenomenon, and the reality necessary, is it founded on the essence of things, or has it been freely established by the will of the Creator?