PART II

THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE

X. THE MORAL SITUATION 201

Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, 201; Traits of voluntary activity, 202; The good and bad in non-voluntary behavior, 203; Indifferent voluntary conduct, 205; The moral is introduced when ends have conflicting values, 207; Selection then depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self, 209.

XI. PROBLEMS OF MORAL THEORY 212

Theory grows from practical problems, 212; Three typical problems of reflective practice, 213; Corresponding problems of theory, 214; Their historical sequence, 215; Growth of individualism, 220; The two types of individualism, 221.

XII. TYPES OF MORAL THEORY 224

§ 1. _Typical divisions of theories_:--Teleological and jural, 224; individual and institutional, 225; empirical and intuitional, 226. § 2. _Division of voluntary activity into Inner and Outer_:--The "how" and the "what," 227; attitude and consequences, 228; different types of each theory, 229; bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control, 231. § 3. _General interpretation of these theories_:--Ordinary view of disposition and of consequences, 232; advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences, 234; for emphasis upon disposition or attitude, 236; necessity of reconciliation of these theories, 237.

XIII. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER 240

Problem of their relation, 240. § 1. _The good will of Kant_:--Emphasis upon motive, 241; motive with or without consequences, 242; necessity of effort, 243; overt action required to prove motive, 245. § 2. _The "Intention" of the Utilitarians_:--Emphasis upon consequences, 246; distinction of intention from motive, 247; they are really identical, 248; motive as blind and as intelligent, 249; practical importance of insistence upon consequences, 251; foresight of consequences depends upon motive, 252. § 3. _Conduct and character_:--The nature of disposition, 254; partial and complete intention, 256; complexity of motives, 257. § 4. _Morality of acts and of agents_:--Subjective and objective morality, 259; the doer and his deed, 260; summary, 261.

XIV. HAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND DESIRE 263

Residence and nature of goodness, 263; happiness as the good, 264; love of happiness as the evil, 265; ambiguity in conception of happiness, 266. § 1. _The Object of Desire_:--Is it pleasure? 269; desire presupposes instinctive appetites, 270; and objects of thought, 271; happiness and desire, 272; need for standard, 274. § 2. _The Conception of Happiness as a Standard_:--Utilitarian method, 275; Difficulty of measuring pleasure, 276; character determines the value of a pleasure, 277; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure, 279. § 3. _The constitution of happiness_:--Pleasures depend upon objects, 281; they are qualitative, 282; they vary with disposition, 283; happiness as the moral good, 284.

XV. HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS 286

Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, 286; value as a theory of social reform, 287; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory of motive, 289; Bentham's method of reconciling personal and general happiness, 291; Mill's method, 293; sympathy and the social self, 298; the distinctively moral interest, 300; equation of virtue and happiness, 301; moral democracy, 303.

XVI. THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE: MORAL KNOWLEDGE 306

§ 1. _Problem of reason and desire_:--Nature of a reasonable act, 306; theories about moral knowledge, 307. § 2. _Kant's theory of practical reason_:--Traits of morality, 309; reason as _a priori_ and formal, 310; true meaning of generalization, 313; the general and the social, 314. § 3. _Moral sense intuitionalism_:--Function of reason, 317; habit and sense, 319; invalid intuitions, 321; deliberation and intuition, 322; the good man's judgment, 324. § 4. _The place of general rules_:--Their value, 325; casuistry, 326; and its dangers, 327; secondary ends of utilitarianism, 329; empirical rules and customs, 330; distinction of rules and principles, 333; sympathy and reasonableness, 334.

XVII. THE PLACE OF DUTY IN THE MORAL LIFE: SUBJECTION TO AUTHORITY 337

Conflict of the rational with the attractive end, 337. § 1. _The subjection of desire to law_, 339; cause of conflict of desire and thought, 342; demand for transformation of desire, 343; social character of duties, 345; the social self is the "universal" self, 346. § 2. _Kantian theory_:--Accord with duty versus from duty, 346; the two-fold self of Kant, 347; criticism of Kant, 348; emphasis falls practically on political authority, 351; "Duty for duty's sake," 351. § 3. _The Utilitarian theory of duty_:--The hedonistic problem, 353; Moral sanctions, 354; they are too external, 355; Bain's account, 356; Spencer's account, 358; such views set up a fictitious non-social self, 361. § 3. _Final statement_:--Growth requires disagreeable readjustments, 362.

XVIII. THE PLACE OF THE SELF IN THE MORAL LIFE 364

Problems regarding the self, 364. § 1. _The doctrine of self-denial_:--Explanation of its origin, 365; four objections to doctrine, 366. § 2. _Self-assertion_:--Ethical dualism, 369; "naturalistic" ethics, 369; false biological basis, 371; misinterprets nature of efficiency, 373. § 3. _Self-love and benevolence; or egoism and altruism_:--The "crux" of ethical speculation, 375; are all motives selfish? 376; ambiguity of term selfish, 377; are results selfish? 379; self-preservation, 380; rational regard for self, 382; regard for others, 384; the existence of "other-regarding" impulses, 385; altruism may be immoral, 387; social justice necessary to moral altruism, 389. § 4. _The good as self-realization_:--Self-realization an ambiguous idea, 391; true and false consideration of the self, 393; equation of personal and general happiness, 395.

XIX. THE VIRTUES 399

Introductory--virtue defined, 399; natural ability and virtue, 400; evolution of virtues, 401; responsibility for moral judgment, 402; futility of cataloguing virtues, 402; their cardinal aspects, 403. § 1. _Temperance_:--Greek, Roman, and Christian conceptions, 405; negative and positive aspects, 407; pleasure and excitement, 408. § 2. _Courage or persistent vigor_:--Dislike of the disagreeable, 410; "dimensions" of courage, 411; optimism and pessimism, 412. § 3. _Justice_:--Three meanings of, 414; justice and love, 415; justice and punishment, 416. § 4. _Wisdom or conscientiousness_:--Importance of intelligent interest, 418; Greek and modern ideas of moral wisdom, 419; ideals and thoughtfulness, 420; ideals and progress, 422.