Book III., chs. xiii. and xiv.; Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, Book II.,

ch. iv.; Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_, Book III., ch. i.; Gizyeki, _A Student's Manual of Ethical Philosophy_; Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, pp. 163-177, 226-240, 374-388; James, _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II., pp. 549-559; Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, Vol. II., Part II., Book II., Branch iv.

For the history of hedonism, see Wallace, _Epicureanism_; Pater, _Marius the Epicurean_; Sidgwick, _History of Ethics_, ch. ii., _passim_ and ch. iv., § 14-17; Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, Book III., and the references to Bentham and Mill in the text; Watson, _Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer_.

For the utilitarian standard, see Lecky, _History of European Morals_, Vol. I., ch. i.; Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, chs. iv. and v.; Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, Part I.; Höffding, _Ethik_, ch. vii., and _Monist_, Vol. I., p. 529; Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, pp. 222-286, and 404-414; Grote, _Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy_; Wilson and Fowler, _Principles of Morals_, Vol. I., pp. 98-112; Vol. II., pp. 262-273; Green, _Prolegomena_, pp. 240-255, 399-415; Martineau, _Types_, pp. 308-334; Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_, pp. 204-211; Seth, _Principles of Ethics_, pp. 94-111; Sidgwick, _The Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau_, Lectures I.-IV. of the Criticism of Spencer. Compare the references _sub voce_ Happiness, 899-903, in Rand's _Bibliography_, Vol. III. of Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.

FOOTNOTES:

[134] Later we shall see reasons for discriminating between happiness and pleasure. But here we accept the standpoint of those who identify them.

[135] The context shows that this "party" may be either the individual, or a limited social group or the entire community. Even the pleasures and pains of animals, of the sentient creation generally, may come into the account.

[136] These quotations are all taken from Bentham's _Principles of Morals and Legislation_; the first, third, and fourth from ch. i.; the second from ch. xiii.; and the last from ch. ii.

[137] With these statements may he compared Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, pp. 30-32: Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, pp. 42. Sidgwick, in his _Methods of Ethics_, holds that the axiomatic character of happiness as an end proves that the position is not empirical but intuitional or _a priori_. Only as we base ourselves on certain ultimate deliverances of conscience can we he said to know that happiness is the desirable end and that the happiness of one is just as intrinsically desirable as the happiness of another. (See his _Methods of Ethics_, Book III., chs. xiii. and xiv.)

[138] This ambiguity affects the statement quoted from Bentham that pleasure and pain determine what we shall do. His implication is that pleasure as _object_ of desire moves us; the fact is that _present_ pleasure, aroused by the idea of some object, influences us.