Part 12

XXXV. I do not mean to say, that Aristotle was an abettor of perverse policy, or that he wrote with a design of instructing tyrants in the methods by which they might make themselves absolute, and support themselves by tyrannic rule, but only mean to declare, that in the fifth book of his Politics, cap. 11. he did it without intending it, or without being aware that he was doing it. In this chapter, which is a pretty long one, not only those two famous maxims, _Oderint dum metuant, Divide ut imperes_, are exactly pointed out and applied; but all, or very near all the others, which are published by the Florentine author, in his book intitled Il Principe, are to be found in this chapter of Aristotle’s. I have never seen Machiavel’s book, but only the capital maxims of it, as they are cited by other authors; but hear Hermanus Conringius, who has read both that and Aristotle. He says, Nicholas Machiavel, that trumpeter of political arts, cannot, nor does not, teach his prince any arcana or secrets, for promoting or maintaining tyrannic dominion, which many hundred years before, had not been taught by Aristotle in his fifth book of Politics; and it is not improbable, but that cunning teacher and promoter of wickedness, transcribed from Aristotle, although he concealed the plagiary, all that he published in his own book; but there is a remarkable difference in the application the two masters make of their doctrine, which is, that Machiavel advises all princes without distinction, to pursue and practise what he teaches; whereas Aristotle declared more justly and frankly, his to be fit and necessary for tyrants only. (Conring. Introduct. ad Politic. Aristotelis, cap. III.)

XXXVI. But let the truth prevail. I say the same of both Aristotle and Machiavel, which is, that neither of them were the inventors of systems of perverse policy; for that they copied them, from the actions of the kings of Persia and Egypt; from the Archelaus’s and Philips of Macedon; from the Phalaris’s, the Agathocles’s, the Hierones, and Dionysius’s of Sicily; from the Perianders, from the Pisistratus’s, and other political pests of Greece.

SECT. X.

XXXVII. Nor can I perceive such profundity or acuteness, in these so much applauded maxims, either of Aristotle, or Machiavel, as may render it worth the while of a politician of special perspicuity, to bestow much time in reading or studying them; as a moderate understanding, without their help, will enable a man to acquire all they teach; nor is there any thing necessary to carry them into execution, but a hardened and a perverted heart.

XXXVIII. The maxim, that a tyrant must be supported by making himself feared, and not trust to the love of his subjects, is as clear as day-light; for how can those, whom he is continually oppressing with a hard slavery, have any love for him? And it follows of course, that he must treat them as he would enemies, and endeavour to keep them poor, as every one knows, that the more you impoverish your enemy, the more you deprive him of the means of injuring you.

XXXIX. It is also an immediate consequence deducible from the same principle, that it will be proper for him to put more confidence in strangers, than his own subjects; for who but a stupid person, would confide in one, who he knows is fired with indignation against him? The necessity of keeping a number of emissaries in such a situation, to inform him of the words and actions of those whom he suspects are not his friends, would occur to every rustic, and is what is daily practised by rustics in their way; for if one of these suspects any man to be his enemy, he is continually observing his conduct, watching his motions, and as far as he is able, prying into his designs. The advantages of religious and virtuous appearances, to command respect, are manifest to every young girl; and the art of fomenting discords, and encouraging opposite factions in a state, in order to preserve the balance of power equal between them, may be learned from the tumblers and rope-dancers, who support themselves, by keeping the weights at the opposite ends of their poles in equilibrio.

XL. It was said of Catherine of Medicis, who with the nicest caution, and greatest vigilance, continued to put this contrivance in practice for a long time, that she studied Machiavel every day, and that she had always his book in her hand, or else laying by her, which occasioned a satyrical writer to call it the New Testament of the queen; but perhaps this was said of her, on account of her being obliged to have recourse to the before-named arts. But in order to do this, what necessity was there for her having such a master at her elbow? The posture and situation of affairs, pointed out sufficiently to a person of the abilities and penetration of that queen, the utility of dispensing some favours to the heretics, and by conciliating their good-will, causing their weight to serve as a counterpoize to the power of the catholics, of whom she was jealous and apprehensive, but always taking care at the same time to declare and profess, that in point of faith she was a catholic, to prevent the affections of that party from being weaned and estranged from her.

XLI. There have not been wanting those, who have attributed the same policy to Constantine the Great, who, at the same time that he was favouring Christianity, kept Gentiles in his ministry, and filled posts of importance with them. But this we should suppose was an act of necessity, because it was incumbent on him to proceed with caution, in so great and arduous a work, as that of the conversion of the whole Roman empire. If he had endeavoured to beat down Paganism at a blow, and by open force and violence, he might possibly never have been able to accomplished it.

SECT. XI.

XLII. I say the same, of all the other rules of practices of tyrannic and deceitful policy. What ability or penetration does it require, to invade with an armed force, the territories of a neighbouring prince or republic, and surprize some of the fortified towns of those, who thinking themselves secure, and relying upon the faith of an established peace, are off their guard, and not prepared to resist the attack? To accomplish this, requires nothing more, than for a man to become compleatly callous to the fear of God, and to have lost all sense of shame of the world. To find a plausible pretence for doing it, is the most easy thing imaginable, for a child of ten years old, is never at a loss for such a one, whenever he is disposed from motives of interest, or through fickleness, to break a little friendship or connexion he has engaged in.

XLIII. The barbarous maxim, of getting rid of brothers or relations, to remove the most dangerous apprehensions of, or incitements to, insurrections, does not require ingenuity to execute it, but cruelty only. We see the Ottoman emperors have practised it in a variety of ways; some have taken away the lives of their brothers and relations, others have deprived them of sight, and others of liberty, by shutting them up in close confinement. They were all equally apprized of the importance of preventing the danger, but they were not all equally fierce and cruel. Thus in proportion to the degrees of their barbarity, or their fears, their rigour in the practice of the maxim, was greater or less. Mahomed the third, when he mounted the throne, not satisfied with putting to death his whole twenty-one brothers, ordered ten Sultanas, likewise, who were then pregnant, to be thrown into the sea and drowned; whereas others, have contented themselves with confining those who were related to them in a prison, with reasonable accommodations appertaining to it. This great difference in their conduct, did not proceed from their distinct political ideas, but from the diversity of their tempers and dispositions.

XLIV. As we are now treating on this subject, this seems a proper occasion, for taking notice of a common error and opinion, which prevails among many people with respect to the Ottoman emperors, viz. that the bloody maxim of sacrificing their own brothers to their safety, in order to their possessing the throne in security, is peculiar to the Ottoman race. This barbarous and atrocious policy, is much more ancient than the stock of Ottoman princes, and was more generally practised by other royal families than by them. Plutarch, speaking of those kings who were the successors of Alexander, and among whom the vast conquests of that hero were divided, says, that cruel maxim was so universally adopted by their descendants, that they considered it as an invariable political axiom, and as a self-evident first principle, indispensably necessary to be adhered to, and which followed of course, with as much certainty as geometrical postulata. _Fratrum parricidia, ut petitiones geometræ fumunt, sic concedebantur, habitanturque, communis quædam petitio ad securitatem, & Regia._ Plutarch. in Demetrio.

XLV. I do not know whether the soil and climate of Asia is not more naturally adapted for the production of these political monsters, than that of Europe, for we have seen in all times, the princes of the Asiatic regions, more addicted to pursue tyrannic and cruel maxims than those of Europe. By confining one’s attention immediately to the present times, what appears to me is, that the Europeans, who for the most part have some knowledge of Machiavel, commonly found their governments upon principles of justice and moderation; and that the oriental people, who do not know that there ever was such a man as Machiavel in the world, most frequently, practise the very same perverse maxims, which this master of wickedness taught; and I think the Chinese, are the only orientals who are an exception to this general rule.

SECT. XII.

XLVI. I would not have it understood by what I have said, that I think the reading of Machiavel would not be pernicious; for it would without doubt be so to many, and especially if their dispositions incline them to the side of ambition. There have been, and ever will be, an infinite number of tyrants, who never heard of, or read Machiavel’s book, intituled The Prince; but that book may probably have made tyrants of many, who never would have been such without perusing it; and it would have the same effect in the hands of a weak prince, that the mouth of an evil counsellor would have applied to his ear.

XLVII. One of the most atrocious and treacherous acts ever recorded in history, and one that has made the greatest noise in the world, was, the unworthy putting to death of the great Pompey, which was occasioned intirely, by young Ptolemy who was then king of Egypt, having at the time it was committed, a Machiavel by his side, in the person of the depraved Theodotus.

XLVIII. Pompey, after being routed in the battle of Pharsalia, and becoming a fugitive from Cæsar and his fortune, thought no asylum could be more convenient and safe for him, than the kingdom of Egypt; because the prince who then reigned there, was indebted to him, for the great favour of having reinstated his father on that throne, from whence he had been cast down by his own subjects. On the confidence of this service, he steered for Alexandria, and upon entering the port, sent to inform the king of his arrival, and beg that protection from him, which he had so just a right to demand. The king summoned a council to deliberate on the matter, in which the majority of votes, were for doing what was honourable and right, and gave it as their opinion, that the unfortunate hero should be entertained and protected. But Theodotus, who had got the ascendency over the young king, and who had more influence with him than every body else, suggested to him, that he should not only not grant Pompey his protection, but that he should take away his life also.

XLIX. But let us hear from Lucan, the reasons of convenience, on which that depraved politician grounded his advice for perpetrating so horrid and atrocious an act of treachery, in order, that by comparing them with those of Machiavel, we may discern, whether the principles of the Florentine master were well understood in those times. But it is proper to observe, that Lucan makes the eunuch Photinus the author of the advice, instead of Theodotus; whereas other writers do not make Photinus the adviser, but assisted by the general Aquilas, the executor of the wickedness; and some others again, attribute to this last, a great part, if not the whole of the suggestion.

L. But whether Theodotus, Aquilas, or Photinus, was the first who suggested the treacherous cruelty, is not material to the main question. The arguments used with Ptolemy, to incite him to the deed, were as follow: That great as his father’s obligations were to Pompey, he ought to consider, that he owed more to himself than he did to him; that Fortune had declared itself in favour of Cæsar, and against Pompey, and that it would be the height of imprudence to take part with that side, to whom Fortune was averse; that although it was true, the affording Pompey an asylum had the appearance of an honest action, still, princes ought not to attend to what was honest, but to what was useful; that the monarch, who is desirous of confining his operations within the limits of justice, is more a slave of the laws, than a master of his dominions; that the supreme power is paramount to all law, nor can it acknowledge any subjection; that it was beyond a doubt, the affording Pompey protection in his kingdom, would soon bring on him, the invincible arms of Cæsar, and the power of the whole Roman empire; against which attack, he would be unable to make the slightest resistance; that he already, as far as his ability went, had complied with his obligations to Pompey, by wishing that he might be victorious; but now that Cæsar had won the day, he ought to attach himself to die conqueror, and endeavour to court his favour, by taking away the life of Pompey; that pursuing the medium, of neither receiving nor destroying him, would be the worst resolution they could take, for that by such a determination, they would lose the useful, without attaining the honest; that Cæsar would always look upon him as an enemy, who having had it in his power, should neglect to destroy his rival, although all the rest of the world should regard him as ungrateful, for refusing to protect his benefactor. It was also suggested, that it would not be difficult to assign a religious motive for destroying Pompey, and to cover the cruelty of the action under that pretence; for it might be alledged, that he was sacrificed to the goddess of Fortune, who had already declared herself adverse to the unhappy hero; that this sacrifice seemed not only to be dictated by religion, but justice also; for that protecting Pompey under such circumstances, in the kingdom of Egypt, and in the manner he wished, would infallibly, by provoking the indignation of Cæsar, bring on it ruin and desolation, and that he ought therefore to be proceeded against with fire and sword, as against an avowed enemy of the state.

LI. I ask now, if Nicholas Machiavel, placed at the ear of the king of Egypt in that conjuncture, and under the like circumstances, could have said more? Thus there always were Machiavels, and they were always pernicious and did mischief, when concerned in the administration of public affairs, not only to the people at large, but most commonly to the princes themselves, whose exaltation or security they endeavoured to promote, by the practice and adoption of impious and cruel maxims.

LII. I believe, that although all who read the relation we have just been discussing, will abominate the advice of Theodotus, as base, tyrannical, violent, inhuman, and atrocious; there are many of those who attend to nothing but temporal convenience, will think it salutary; but observe, that instead of this, it was extremely hurtful and injurious. They perpetrated the murder of the great Pompey, by adding to the act of cruelty, another of treachery, which was coaxing him to come ashore, by an assurance, that the king had engaged his royal word that his life should be safe. What was the result of all this? That Ptolemy obtained the hoped for friendship of Cæsar? That Theodotus, Aquilas, and Photinus, were rewarded for the great service they had done him, by freeing him for ever from the apprehension of so formidable an enemy as Pompey? No, nothing of this sort fell out in consequence of the base act; but it happened, that in a few days after, Ptolemy in a most tragical manner, lost his kingdom and his life, and that the three authors and executors of the murder of Pompey, Theodotus, Aquilas, and Photinus, died miserably; which consequences are produced, either by impious maxims tending naturally to bring on misfortunes, or by the interposition of the Supreme Providence, which superintends and watches over human affairs, and with an especial design, fulminates his wrath on the authors of such wickedness, in a manner, that serves to make them scarecrows to terrify, as well as examples to warn others.

SECT. XIII.

LIII. I am fully persuaded, that if the case on which the council of king Ptolemy deliberated, had been referred to the politicians of our Europe, and in our age, that not one of them would have advised the putting to death of Pompey; but it is likely there would have been very few of them so generous, as to recommend the receiving and protecting him. In truth, although not only generous, but hazardous resolutions, may be appendages to the punctilios of princes, and may spring from that source, they are very rarely suggested to them by their counsellors. Thus, if a point of this sort was to be discussed by the council of a king now-a-days, the consideration of the danger of protecting Pompey on the one hand, and the scandal of sacrificing him to the resentment of Cæsar on the other, would most probably have determined them to pursue the middle way, of neither entertaining nor injuring him, and would have left to his own election, the choice of another asylum, and to his fortune, the good or bad exit from his troubles; nor do I doubt but that in the court of Ptolemy there were some, and possibly the major part, of this opinion. Notwithstanding this, if I had been a member of that council, I should have given my vote for the most benign, not only as the most honest, but the most useful and beneficial resolve they could have fallen upon; and I even think, it would have had great weight with the king, if any one of those who assisted at it, had recommended to him the protection of Pompey, for the reasons, supported with some such arguments as follow, which altogether I shall call

A declamation on behalf of Pompey.

LIV. Whoever tells you, sir, that from an apprehension of Cæsar, you should destroy Pompey, would persuade you to fear men more than the gods. I will suppose Cæsar to be so unjust, as to be capable of thanking you for putting Pompey to death, and of being irritated against you for not doing it. This same act of flattery to Cæsar, is so palpable an offence against heaven, that he who advises you to it, cannot possibly entertain a doubt of its being such; for if he should tell you, that by such a conduct you would conform to the will of the gods, who have declared themselves favourable to Cæsar, he would advance a sophistry unworthy to be heard in so august and solemn an assembly; for what delirium is it to imagine, that we may continue to oppress those, who groan under the weight of adverse fortune, upon a pretence, of co-operating with the Supreme Providence? According to this mode of reasoning, it would be right to give a sick man poison instead of medicine, instead of binding up the sores of the wounded, to cut and stab him afresh, and instead of succouring the poor, to take from him the little he has. The gods are able to make people unhappy, for this is a prerogative annexed to their sovereign power, which they sometimes exert, by way of exercising the patience and constancy of those they afflict, and with a view of affording to others an opportunity of manifesting their clemency, and of administering to the misfortunes of the distressed. Thus he who lends a compassionate hand to assist those whom the gods have thought fit to make unhappy, does not counteract their dispensations, but rather shews a compliance with, and an obedience to, the immutable principles of their laws.

LV. To insinuate to you, in order to make Pompey a delinquent, that by seeking an asylum here, he sought the ruin of your kingdom, amounts to the same thing, as saying he meditates burning the temple, who from the fury of his enemies, takes refuge at the altars of it. Pompey does not pretend to compel, but only intreats you; neither, in his intreaty, does he point out the bounds to which you should extend your protection to him; nor although he should point them out, could any consequences be deduced from thence to your disadvantage; for that cannot take away from you, neither now, nor at any time after he shall have put himself into your hands, the right of deliberating upon, and after a just estimation of your power, your obligation, and your risk, of determining to act by him, as the urgency of your affairs may make it necessary. Furthermore, if you reflect, you will find that he has a right to demand your protection, although it may be dangerous for you to afford it him. You owe to him the sceptre you now sway, which he restored to your father; nor is the probable hazard of the same crown, which was certainly restored to you, an adequate recompence to the man who restored it.

LVI. Having hitherto endeavoured to shew, that it would be just and right to protect Pompey; my next argument shall be to prove, that it would be convenient and advantageous also; although I am very well aware, that in the eyes of an ordinary politician, this will appear an extravagant paradox.

LVII. I shall begin with asking, what opinion ought we to entertain of Cæsar, to think that he would look with benign eyes, and a grateful heart, on a horrible act of perfidy, although it was committed to disincumber him of that enemy, who has already disputed, and may perhaps contend again with him for the empire? It seems to me, sir, that this is the light in which it is laboured to represent Cæsar to you; but if he truly is not such a sort of man, the treachery which Theodotus proposes to you, will be very useless; but I will add, that although he is that sort of man, you will not avoid, but rather augment the danger of losing your crown, by being guilty of it. If Cæsar is blinded by the passion of ambition to such an extreme degree, that it would excite him, for the sake of gratifying it, to trample every sort of duty and obligation under foot; this vile piece of service, will not exempt or protect you from his despoiling you of your kingdom; his ambition, if this is his only idol, will prompt him to extend his dominion by all possible ways and means, whether just or unjust; and the opulent kingdom of Egypt, is not so contemptible an acquisition, that an ambitious man will forbear to seize it, for the sake of rewarding a perfidious one with its possession.