Part 11

XI. But not to leave the reader in suspence, or not to give him occasion to think that I propose these three opinions as problems, I will here declare the judgement I entertain of them. The first is false, shocking, abominable, and only worthy of a second Machiavel. What reason, I won’t say can dictate, but even endure the detestable maxims, that a prince owes more to himself than to the republic? that this last was instituted by nature for the convenience of the prince, and not the prince for the good of the republic? that the right to govern with tyrannic sway, is an appendage, appertaining to the prerogative of the crown? that the untimely and disgraceful deaths of tyrants, ought to be attributed to chance, and not to the divine vengeance or judgements? with others of the same sort.

XI. The second apology, is contradicted by the literal and natural sense of the author’s writings; for if he intended to convey a meaning which was different from these, it is not easy to ascertain what that meaning was. I will admit as good and conclusive, all the arguments that are used to prove Machiavel was an enemy to tyranny. There is no man whatever who does not abhor tyranny, while he contemplates it as a restraint on his own person, or while he is apprehensive part of the weight of it may be loaded on his own shoulders. But many of those who abhor it in general, are friends to it in particular, and especially, if they entertain hopes that the favour of the tyrant will better their fortunes. It is very natural to suppose, this was the state and situation of Machiavel’s mind when he wrote his book. The Medicis at that time ruled the city of Florence; and he imagined that he should sooth and flatter them, by approving and recommending a government, that dispensed with all law, as the means the best calculated to pave the way for the introduction and establishment of despotic power. Perhaps also, he might entertain hopes, that some prince who read his book, might be induced to make him his prime minister, from an expectation, that by having the author of these maxims at his elbow, he might be able to raise his power to the highest pitch of uncontroul and grandeur.

XIII. The excuse, with which it is attempted to defend Machiavel by the third supposition, is manifestly sophistical. It cannot be denied, that we read in a variety of authors, of numbers of princes who have put in practice the doctrine of Machiavel, but there is this great difference between those authors and Machiavel, that they condemn the doctrine, which he adopts and enforces. They, at the same time that they inform you of the fact, inspire you with horror of the maxim; he, when he teaches the maxim, exhorts to the execution of it. How great must his zeal have been to recommend and persuade tyranny, when he had the presumption to propose Moses and David, as examples of tyrannic government? but to this execrable degree of impiety, did Machiavel carry his daring blasphemy.

XIV. With regard to the peculiar defence which Bocalina makes for Machiavel, it is easy to see, at whom his malignant expressions point; which he might very well have omitted, because without alluding to any one in so elevated a form of life, he had very near at hand in the person of Cæsar Borgia[2], a man furnished with all the requisites for his purpose, and whom he did not run much hazard of announcing. I mean, that in order to excuse Machiavel from being the inventor of the maxims he published, and to point out some person under whom he had studied and learned them, he could have fixed on no one more proper than that prince, because Cæsar Borgia was without doubt, a man of most iniquitous and tyrannic politics, and capable of committing all sorts of wickedness, provided his doing it would contribute to advance his grandeur; for he was fiery, daring, and cruel, and was besides so furiously ambitious, that were it in his power, he was capable of burning the whole world, for the sake afterwards of domineering absolutely over the ashes of it.

XV. Hermanus Coringius, a protestant author, says, that Machiavel was some time in the service of this prince. If this be true, it is easy to guess from whom he learned what he afterwards committed to writing; and I believe the Italians would not disdain to acknowledge, that their Florentine politician had been instructed by a Spanish master.

XVI. But the truth is, that Machiavel had no occasion to seek for an example, either in him, or in any other of the princes of his own time; for as he was a man pretty well read in history, every age had furnished him with examples in plenty. They mistake little less, who suppose Machiavel learned his maxims from the politicians of his day; than those do, who believe the politics, posterior to Machiavel, were taken from his doctrines.

XVII. But notwithstanding all that can be urged in opposition to it, this second opinion is much entertained and received by people of little reading and short reflection, in which group we may suppose to be comprehended the bulk of mankind. Not a few, when they converse upon this subject, add with a mysterious gravity, and as if they were extracting a profound apophthegm from the inmost recesses of their understandings, that although Machiavel was the master who introduced this doctrine, it has since his time been so much improved upon in courts, that if the master could now come back into the world, he would find it necessary to go to school again.

XVIII. I cannot refrain from laughter, when I hear men discourse in this manner, who, from their education, ought to know and reason better. The maxims of tyrannic policy are as antient in the world, as government or dominion. Machiavelianism owes its first existence to the most antient princes of the earth, and only to Machiavel its name. It is rooted in our nature, and it does not require ages, as moments, when fit occasions present themselves, are equal to bring forth its malignant productions. Nor is the passion of domineering more natural to man, than that of amplifying and extending his dominion. An ambitious man, by attaining to be a prince, does not find his ambition satisfied; but is always desirous of extending his power, exteriorly with respect to the subjects of other states, and interiorly with regard to his own. The love of independence can seldom be contained within reasonable bounds. He who is free from all subjection to other men, aspires at being independent of the laws also.

SECT. IV.

XIX. I am so far from thinking that Machiavel has made the world worse in this respect, or from supposing that the princes of these times, have refined upon the iniquitous politics of Machiavel, that I firmly believe, if we limit our enquiries precisely to Europe, we shall find the sovereigns of it in general, much better than those of the remote ages.

XX. Now-a-days, if it is in contemplation to impose some new burthen on the subject, or to wage war with a neighbouring state, divines and lawyers are consulted upon the justice and propriety of the measure; an enquiry is made, how the laws stand with respect to the subject matter in question, and the archives and records are examined and turned over; and although it often happens, that from the ambitious adulation of the people consulted, a right is attributed to their prince, which in reality does not belong to him, their malice does not impeach his good faith. In former times this was not the case. If a prince was disposed to trample on the rights of his subjects, or to subdue his neighbours, he consulted nobody, nor made any other enquiry or examination, than whether he had force and power sufficient to accomplish what he meditated; and the question was always decided, by his ability or inability to execute what he designed. In times not very distant from our own, and even in the most polished kingdoms, where the true religion has humanized people’s minds, when the person invaded by a powerful prince his neighbour, has represented to him, that his pretensions to what he possesses are just and legal; the invader has laughed at the representation, and answered savagely, in the language that was then become proverbial in the mouths of kings and ministers of state, that the rights of princes were not to be determined by old rolls of parchment, but by burnished arms.

SECT. V.

XXI. The further our memories carry us back through the series of past times, we find this evil the greater; and from hence proceeds that ill opinion, which in early ages was generally entertained of kings. The Romans were struck with amazement, to find the Cappadocians, upon their offering to make their country a free republic, instantly request, that they would permit them to remain under kingly government; which amazement, was occasioned by their considering in a rigorous or strict sense, that mode of rule, as a mark or type of slavery. Cato said, this animal which is called a king, is a great devourer of human flesh; _Hoc animal rex carnivorum est._ And Flavius Vopiscus, tells us of a Roman buffoon, who pleasantly and keenly remarked, that the effigies of all the good kings that had ever been known in the world, might be carved on a ring. Plato, in his Georgiac dialogue, represents kings as appearing before Rhadamanthus in hell, loaded for the most part with injustices, perjuries, and other wickedness. Aristotle, in his third book on politics, recognizes as tyrannical, the exercise of the regal power, by all, or nearly all, the Asiatic princes; and Livy says, that the most sagacious and penetrating Hannibal, never confided in the promises of kings: _fidei regum nihil sane confisus_; a legate of the Rhodians also, according to the said Livy, observed, that kings were always desirous of making slaves of their subjects. Thus we have the greatest reason to conclude, that it was a common practice with the princes of those times, to pay no regard to any law, whenever an opportunity offered of augmenting their authority.

SECT. VI.

XXII. But we should not conclude that this was all done by main force, without the intervention of art or stratagem. The same contrivances, the same artifices, which we read of in Machiavel, and which have been practised by the most crafty tyrants of these latter ages, were exerted in the early ones. Cast your eyes on Romulus, seeking for a specious pretence of justice for taking away the life of his brother, in order to remove this obstacle to his reigning without the danger of a rival, and in security: view his successor, Numa Pompilius also, who was a most consummate hypocrite, affecting exteriorly to appear religious and devout, and to pay a great respect to rites and ceremonies. He pretended to receive visions and revelations from the goddess Egeria, in order that the Roman people, looking upon him as a man favoured in an especial manner by heaven, should not only not dare to entertain thoughts of dethroning him, but permit him to aggrandize himself at his discretion; we have another example of the same sort of policy, in Tullius Hostilius, who succeeded Numa, and introduced with great art, those ostentatious outside appearances, which dazzle the eyes of the world, and are the most efficacious means to make majesty formidable and respectable; for he likewise sought out deceitful pretences, for making war on the neighbouring states: we see Tarquin the Proud also, availing himself of the stratagem of his son Sextus, who, under the pretence of being a fugitive from his father’s cruelty, fled to, and entreated refuge among the Gabians, on whom, after their receiving him kindly, he artfully prevailed to make him their generalissimo, veiled with an absolute power; in consequence of which, he was enabled to fell and betray them. He did so, and they became an easy prey to the Romans.

XXIII. Is not that famous precept of Machiavel’s, that with an enemy reduced to great straits or difficulties, you should take no middle course, but, according as you find it most for your interest, should either ruin him totally, or give him your hand to extricate him out of his danger; punctually conformable to the advice which Herennius gave to his son Pontius, who was general of the Samnites? When this general had shut up the Roman army within the Caudine Forks, he sent information of it to his father, and at the same time desired to have his advice, respecting how he should act by them. The old man answered, that he should generously open the pass, and let them go free, without any condition or limitation whatever, that might be injurious to, or affect either their lives, their liberty, or their honour. Pontius, and all the principal people of the republic who were with the army, believed, that Herennius had not well understood or considered the information that had been sent him, nor apprehended, that the whole Roman army were entirely at their mercy. They therefore sent other messengers or deputies, with instructions to inform him minutely, of the unhappy situation and state of the Roman army, whose lives, without remedy, were at their discretion and disposal. To this he answered, that they should cut all their throats, and not spare a single man of them. Two answers so diametrically opposite, made some of them suspect that the old man was not in his right senses; but notwithstanding this suspicion, as they had for many years respected him as the oracle and soul of the republic, the major part of them began to conjecture, and not without reason, that there was some mystery contained in these contradictory replies, which they did not comprehend, or were not aware of; and they therefore desired, that he would come to the camp and explain himself. He came accordingly, and told them his sentiments; which were, that they should adopt one or other of the extremes, and either gain their affections by an heroic act of generosity, or extirpate them totally, to prevent their ever being able to revenge themselves for whatever indignity they should impose on them. Pontius did not follow the advice of the old man, but took a middle way, which was, to spare their lives, but dismiss them with the loss of their honour, by obliging consuls, officers, and soldiers, to submit to the signal disgrace of _passing under the yoke_. The result of this was, what might easily have been foreseen and expected, the Romans, stung with the ignominy they had undergone, could not divert their thoughts from meditating revenge, which they after a while determined to take; and breaking through the stipulated conditions, they renewed the war with stronger army, and totally routed and overthrew the Samnites.

XXIV. We must allow, that the determination Pontius took was imprudent; but it does not follow from thence, that we should approve the advice of Herennius; for although the first was insecure, the other was cruel in extreme. He might have fallen upon other expedients, better suited and proportioned to the nature of the case; such as taking hostages, and before permitting the army to depart, obliging them to deliver into their possession, certain towns and districts as pledges, for the faithful performance of their engagements; but the supposing that the faith of stipulations or compacts, would have more influence upon a vain, proud, warlike people, than the indignation conceived for a gross affront offered to their honour, was very idle, and very silly confidence.

XXV. Neither, as I have already said, do I think there was any security in the extreme benign advice of Herennius; for with the Romans, ambition was more powerful than public faith, or the obligations of gratitude. A good testimony to this truth, was their behaviour to the Numantians, which was a true sample of the politics of those times.

SECT. VII.

XXVI. I say of those times, to avoid censuring the Romans singly; for in Greece also, the not performing a promise given, or even sworn to, when the observance of it clashed with the interest of the state, was so common, that a sovereign for having done it, was hardly looked upon to have impeached his character as a just prince, or an honest man.

XXVII. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, was one of the most celebrated princes of antiquity; and although he was an eminent warrior, placed his principal glory in being thought a lover of virtue and justice. To one who called the sovereign of Persia the great monarch, he answered sharply, _he who is not better than me, is not a greater king than myself_. He was exceedingly sober, patient of labour, and such a respecter of the Gods, that he would not permit even his enemies, who had taken refuge in the temples, to be forced from their sanctuary; and was besides, so averse to dress and finery, that there was scarce a soldier in his army, more humbly or simply cloathed than himself. But this saint of Paganism, made not the least scruple of violating the public faith, when by the violation he expected to derive some advantage to the state. By means of one of his emissaries he, in profound peace, surprized and seized on the city of Thebes; and although in Sparta, the justice of the action was somewhat disputed, as soon as it was shewn, that the keeping the place was of importance to the kingdom, they immediately consented to send a garrison to maintain the citadel. In his expedition to Egypt, he abandoned king Taco, in whose pay and service he and his Lacedæmonian troops were engaged, and joined the rebel Nectanebus, without making any other excuse for this treachery, than that he found it for the interest of his country.

XXVIII. Aristides, the Cato of the Athenians, who by way of eminence they called the Just, having caused his country to swear to a certain thing, and having in the name of it sworn to it himself likewise, persuaded them afterwards to violate the oath, because the observance of it would be productive of some inconvenience to them. Plutarch, who cites Theophrastus as his author, adds, that to serve his country he did many iniquitous things. Such were the just men of Greece, and such was their policy.

SECT. VIII.

XXIX. I well know, that in the opinion of many people, this political money is current in our times, and that it is frequently said, the words and promises of those who have the supreme management of affairs, should not remain in force for any longer time than they are found not to clash with the interests of the state. I have read of an Italian prince, who, when he was negotiating a peace with a powerful monarch, requested among other conditions, the restitution of a large part of his territories, which had been taken from him during the war, to which request, the ambassador of the monarch answered, _what reliance can the king my master place on the fidelity of your highness, in case he gives you all you ask?_ to which the prince replied:--Assure him, that I will pledge my word to him to fulfil my engagements, not in quality of a sovereign, for in that capacity, whenever favourable opportunities offer, it behoves me to sacrifice every thing to my grandeur, and the interests of my state; but as a gentleman, and a man of honour.

XXX. But after all, this assurance contains in it a large portion of hyperbole; for I firmly believe, the majority of the princes of this day, are scrupulous about breaking the treaties they have entered into; although it be true, that at every turn, you will hear them reciprocally accusing each other of being the infringers of them; but it seldom happens, that either of the parties can so clearly make out the justice of his cause, as not to leave room for a difference of opinion on the subject. Thus they both go upon probabilities, and also upon the strength of probabilities, accuse each other. If either of them happens to be a person of so enlarged a conscience, as knowingly, and without scruple, to trample on all the obligations of equity, justice, and public faith, he endeavours notwithstanding to save appearances, and to seek some specious pretence for his behaviour. This shews, that he is ashamed of what he does, and would gladly hide the odium of his actions for fear of being pointed at, which would not happen, if breaking their words was so common among princes, and so little scrupled by them, as some would persuade us.

XXXI. I know very well, that an anonymous French author, asserted a few years ago, that Don Ferdinand the Catholic, being told that Louis the twelfth of France complained he had twice deceived him, replied, _By the Lord! the French man lies, for it was not twice, but ten times that I deceived him._ If such a thing ever happened, we may suppose, that our Don Ferdinand prided himself in perfidy. But these are mere gossips tales, and such as prudent people pay no regard to. I suppose, that before this joke or tale, could arrive at the ears of the French man who wrote it, from the mouth of Don Ferdinand, it must necessarily pass through the mouths of a hundred different people; and we may conclude, that out of that hundred, at least ninety of them were more capable of framing it, than Don Ferdinand was of uttering it.

XXXII. But admitting this was true, all that can be inferred from it is, that among a great number of princes of our times, here and there one of them, has without shame or blushing, practised lying and deceit in the affairs of state; whereas among the antients, this was very frequent and common; for all, or nearly all of them, seem to have stamped on their hearts, that sentence of Chorebus: _Dolus, an virtus, qius in hoste requirat?_ or some other like it.

SECT. IX.

XXXIII. But our surprize will cease at their acting in this manner, when we reflect, that that great philosopher and oracle of antiquity, the divine Plato, by his doctrine, taught, that it was lawful for those who had the management of public affairs, to lye, whenever it could be of use to the interests of the state. _Igitur rempublicam administrantibus præcipue, si quibus aliis, mentiri licet, vel hostium, vel civium, causa ad communem civitatis utilitatem. Reliquis autem à mendacio abstinendum est._ (lib. III. de Repub.) If the princes of antiquity had so able a master, and one of so great authority, what loss could they be at for want of a Machiavel?

XXXIV. It is true, that Plato only allowed lying to be lawful, in cases where it might be conducive to advance the public good; Machiavel advises it, whenever it can be useful to serve the particular interests of a tyrant. Thus Plato was a bad moralist, and Machiavel a bad man. But this difference in the character of the matters, does not prevent tyrants from making the same use of the doctrine of Plato, for the purpose of serving their particular conveniencies, that disinterested princes may do for the good of the public, because a tyrant, always endeavours to make the people believe, that every thing he does to advance his own grandeur, is transacted with a view of promoting their interest; and if at any time he is detected in a lye, he will pretend that he lyed for the public good, and quote the doctrine of Plato to justify his conduct; but in case this doctrine of Plato’s should appear too limited or confined for tyrants, as in truth it is, they may be supplied with a much more copious and enlarged system, in the writings of Plato’s disciple Aristotle.