CHAPTER V.

DUTIES TOWARDS THE LIBERTY AND TOWARDS THE HONOR OF OTHERS.--JUSTICE, DISTRIBUTIVE AND REMUNERATIVE; EQUITY.

SUMMARY.

=Liberty in general.=--Natural rights.

=Slavery.=--Arguments of J. J. Rousseau against slavery, servitude; oppression of work under divers forms.

=The honor of others.=--_Backbiting_ and _slander_.

=Rash judgments.=--Analysis of a treatise of Nicole.--_Envy_; _rancor_; _delation_.

=Justice, distributive and remunerative.=--To each according to his merits and his works. Equity.

After self-preservation, the most sacred prerogative of man is _liberty_--that is to say, the right of using his faculties, both physical and moral, without injury to others, at his own risks and perils, and on his own responsibility.

=51. Liberty--Natural rights.=--The word liberty sums up all that is understood by the _natural rights of man_, namely, the right to go and come, or _individual liberty_; the right to use his physical faculties to supply his wants, or _liberty of work_; the right to exercise his intelligence and reason, or _liberty of thought_; the right to honor God according to his lights, or _liberty of conscience_; the right to have a family, a wife and children, or the _family right_, and finally the right to keep what he has acquired, or the right of property.

=52. Slavery.=--The privation of all these rights, of all these liberties in an individual, is called _slavery_. Slavery is the suppression of the human personality. It consists in transforming man into a _thing_. It takes away from him the right of property and makes of himself a property. The slave is bought and sold as a thing. The fruits of his labor do not belong to him; he cannot come and go at will; he can neither think nor believe freely; in some countries he is interdicted the right of instructing himself; he has no family, or has one temporarily only, since his wife or children may be separately sold; and since the women belong to their masters as their property, there is no bridle against the license of passions.

Although slavery is at the present day well-nigh abolished in the world, still as it is not yet wholly so, and as this abolition is quite recent, and tends constantly to be renewed under one form or another, it is important to sum up the principal reasons that show the immorality and iniquity of this institution.

=53. Refutation of slavery--Opinion of J. J. Rousseau.=--J. J. Rousseau, in his _Contrat Social_ (I., iv.), combated slavery with as much profundity as eloquence. Let us sum up his arguments with a few citations:

1. Slavery cannot arise from a contract between the master and the slave; for to consent to slavery is to renounce one's manhood, of which no one can dispose at his will.

To renounce one's liberty is to renounce one's manhood, and the rights of humanity, even one's duties. There is no reparation possible for him that renounces everything. Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man, and is depriving his actions of all morality, and his will of all liberty.

2. Such a contract is contradictory, for the slave giving himself wholly and without reserve, can receive nothing in return.

It is a vain and contradictory agreement to stipulate an absolute authority on one side, and on the other unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that one can be under no obligation towards him of whom one has a right to demand everything? and does not this single condition, without equivalent, without exchange, carry with it the nullity of the act? For what right could my slave have against me, since all he has belongs to me, and that his right being my own, this my right against myself is a word without any sense.

3. Even if one had the right to sell one's self, one has not the right to sell one's children. Slavery at least should not be hereditary.

Admitting that one could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children; they are born men and free; their liberty is their own; no one has a right to dispose of it but themselves.

Before they have reached the age of reason, their father may, in their name, stipulate conditions for their welfare, but not give them irrevocably and unconditionally over to another; for such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature, and passes the rights of paternity.

4. Slavery, furthermore, comes not from the right of killing in war; for this right does not exist.

The conqueror, according to Grotius, having the right to kill the conquered enemy, the latter may ransom his life at the expense of his liberty: an agreement all the more legitimate, as it turns to the profit of both.

But it is clear that this pretended right to kill the conquered adversary does not result in any way from the state of war.... One has a right to kill the defenders of the enemy's State as long as they hold to their arms; but when they lay these down and surrender, and cease to be enemies, they become simply men again, and one has no longer a right on their life.

If war does not give the conqueror the right of massacring the conquered, it does not give him the right of reducing them to slavery.... The right of making of the enemy a slave, does not then follow the right of killing him; it is then an iniquitous exchange to make him buy his life at the price of his liberty, over which one has no right whatsoever.

Montesquieu has also combated slavery; but he has done it under a form of irony, which gives still greater force to his eloquence.

"If I had to defend the right we have had to make slaves of the negroes, this is what I should say:

"The peoples of Europe having exterminated those of America, they were obliged to reduce to slavery those of Africa in order to use them to clear the lands.

"Sugar would be too dear if the plant that produces it were not cultivated by slaves.

"The people in question are black from head to foot, and they have so flat a nose that it is almost impossible to pity them.

"One cannot conceive that God, who is a being most wise, could have put a soul, and above all a good soul, in so black a body.

"It is impossible for us to suppose that these people are men; because if we supposed them to be men, one might begin to think we are not Christians ourselves.

"Narrow minds exaggerate too much the injustice done to Africans. For if it were as they say, would it not have come to the minds of the princes of Europe, who make so many useless contracts among each other, to make a general one in favor of mercy and of pity?"[38]

=54. Servitude--Restrictions of the liberty to work--Oppression of children under age, etc.=--Absolute slavery existed in antiquity, and has particularly reappeared since the discovery of America, owing to the difference of the races: the black race being, seemingly, particularly adapted to the cultivation of the torrid zones, and endowed with great physical vitality, became the serving-race _par excellence_: it has even been hunted down for purposes of procreation; hence that infamous traffic, called slave trade, and which is to-day interdicted by all civilized countries.

But there existed in the Middle Ages, and has subsisted even to these days, in Russia, for example, a relative slavery, less rigorous and odious, but which, though circumscribed within certain limits, was not the less a grave outrage to liberty. The serf was allowed a family, and even a certain amount of money; but the ground which he cultivated could never belong to him; and above all he could not leave this ground, nor make of his work and services the use he wished. It was certainly less of an injustice than slavery; but it was still an injustice. However, this injustice exists to-day no longer than as an historical memory. Morality has no longer anything to do with it.

It is the same with the restrictions formerly imposed on the freedom of work under the old administration (_ancien regime_), the organization of _maitrises_ and _jurandes_,[39] namely, and that of corporations; the work was under regulations: each trade had its corporation, which no one could enter or leave without permission. No one was allowed to encroach upon his neighbor's trade; the barbers defended themselves against the wig-makers; the bakers against the pastry-cooks; hence much that was wrong, and which those who regret this administration have forgotten.

But here again, it is the object of history to inquire into the good or the evil of these institutions; and these questions belong rather to political economy than to morals.

It is not the same regarding the abuse made of the work of children and minors, or the work of women. Severe laws have forbidden such; but it is always to be feared that manners get the better of the laws. The work of children and women being naturally cheaper than the work of men and adults, one is tempted to make use of it; but the work of children is improper because it is taking advantage of and using up beforehand a constitution not yet established, and also because it is thus depriving children of the means of being educated. As to girls and women, in abusing their strength, one compromises their health, and contributes thereby to the impoverishment of the race.

Among the violations the liberty of work may suffer, we must not forget the threats and violences exercised by the workers themselves and inflicted upon each other. It is not rare, in fact, in times of strikes, to see the workmen who do not work try to impose, by main force, their will on those that are at work. Such violences, which have their source in false ideas of brotherhood (a mistaken _esprit de corps_), and in a false sense of honor, constitute, nevertheless, even when free from the coarse enmity of laziness and vice, waging war with work and honesty--a grave violation of liberty; and it may be considered a sort of slavery and servitude to suffer them.

It is the same with the attempts by which men try to forbid to women factory work, under pretext that it brings the wages down.

This reason, in the first place, is a bad one, because the woman's earnings come in the end all back to the family, increasing by that much more the share of each. But by what right should work be prohibited to woman more than to man? Certainly it would be desirable if the woman could stay at home, and busy herself exclusively with the cares of the household; but in the present state of things such an ideal is not possible. It is then necessary that woman, who has, like man, her rights as a moral personality, should be allowed by her every-day work to make a living, under the protection of the laws, and at her own risks and perils.

=55. Moral oppression--Inward liberty and responsibility.=--The question is not only one of corporal liberty, the liberty to work; the laws in a certain measure provide for that, and one can appeal to their authority for self-protection. But there may exist a sort of _moral bondage_, which consists in the subordination of one will to another. It is here that the respect we owe to others calls for a more delicate and a more strict sense of justice: for this sort of slavery is not so obvious, and the love we bear to others may be the very thing to lead us into error.

=56. Violation of the honor of others--Backbiting and slander.=--Among the first rights of a man, there is one sometimes forgotten, although it is one of the most essential, and this is his _right to honor_.

In our ignorance of most men's actions, and in all cases of the real motives of these actions, it is a duty for us to respect in others what we wish they should respect in us: namely, our honor and our respectability. In fact, it is very difficult for men to form true judgments regarding each other. For fear of committing an injustice, it is better not to judge at all than to judge wrongly.

There are two ways of violating other people's honor: _backbiting_ and _slander_. Backbiting consists in saying evil of others, either deservedly or undeservedly; but when undeservedly, and especially when one knows it to be so, backbiting becomes slander. Backbiting may arise from ill-will or thoughtlessness, and slander is the work of baseness and perfidy.

Backbiting which consists in saying evil of others deservedly, is not in itself an injustice: there is to be recognized the right and jurisdiction of public opinion. The honest man should be held in greater esteem than the rogue, even though the latter cannot be reached by the law. Nevertheless, backbiting becomes an injustice through the abuse that is made of it. It is not a question of severe judgments touching actions deserving blame and contempt. It is a question of thoughtless and unkind judgments, and which we are all too easily and readily inclined to pronounce upon others, forgetting that we deserve ourselves as many and severer ones. How shall we conciliate, however, the just severity which vice deserves, with the spirit of kindness which charity and brotherly love demand of us? On the one hand, an excess of kindness seems to weaken the horror of evil, to put on the same level the honest man and the rogue; on the other, the habit of speaking evil weakens the bonds of human society, sets men against each other, and is always, in a certain measure, a shortcoming of sincerity; for one hardly ever tells to people's faces the evil one says of them in their absence. It is not easy to find the just medium between these two extremes.

It may be laid down as a principle that, except the case where notorious vices, contrary to honor, comes into question, it is better absolutely to abstain from speaking evil of others. For, either the question is of persons one does not know, or knows imperfectly, and then one is never sure not to be mistaken; and most of the time one judges people on the testimony of others only, or one speaks of persons whom one knows, and with whom one stands in more or less friendly relations; and then backbiting becomes a sort of treason. Even deserved blame should not be a favorite subject of conversation: it is an unwholesome and ungenerous pleasure to lay any stress upon the weakness of others. If, at least, one accepted with it the right of others to judge us with the same severity, such reciprocal liberty might prove of some utility; but the backbiter nowise admits that he may be himself the subject of backbiting; and at the very moment when he criticises others, he would himself be very much offended if he learned that the same persons had, on their side, been doing the same in regard to him.

As to slander, it is not necessary to say much on the subject to show to what degree it is cowardly and criminal. What makes it, above all, cowardly is that it is always very difficult to combat and refute slander. Often, and for a long time, it is not known: at the moment when one hears of it, it has taken roots which nothing can destroy. One does not know who spread it, nor whom to answer. It is, besides, often impossible to prove a negative thing: namely, that one has done no harm, that one has not committed such and such an action, and said such or such a word. One always confronts the well-accredited saying: "There is no smoke without fire."

The wrong done by slander will be better understood by the description Beaumarchais has given of it:

"Slander, sir--you hardly know how great a thing you hold in contempt: I have seen the best of people crushed by it. Believe me, there is no flat malice, no hateful story, no absurd tale which a skillful mischief-maker cannot make the idlers of a large town believe.... At first, a slight report, just grazing the ground as a swallow does before the storm: murmuring _pianissimo_, and spinning away, it launches in its course the poisoned arrow. A certain ear is open to take it in, and it is deftly whispered _piano_, _piano_, to the next. The harm is done; it sprouts, crawls, makes its way; and _rinforzando_ from mouth to mouth, goes like wildfire; then all at once, you scarcely know how, you see the slander rise before you, whistling, blowing, growing while you look at it. It starts, takes its flight, whirls about, envelops, pulls, carries everything along with it, bursts and thunders, and becomes a general cry, a public _crescendo_, a universal chorus of hatred and proscription.[40]

=57. Rash judgments.=--We call rash judgments ill-natured remarks made about others without sufficient knowledge of facts. It is through rash judgments one becomes often the accomplice of slander, without knowing it and without wishing it. Nicole, in his _Essais de Morale_, has thoroughly treated the question of rash judgments. We have but to give here a short _resume_ of his Treatise on this subject.

1. Rash judgments are a usurpation of God's judgment.

Rash judgments being always accompanied by ignorance and want of knowledge, are a manifest injustice and a presumptuous usurpation of God's authority.

2. This sin has degrees according to the _quality_ of its object, the _causes_ from which it springs, and the _effects_ it produces.

The _quality_ of the object increases it or diminishes it, because the more things are important the more is one obliged to be circumspect and reserved in the judgments one pronounces.[41]

The _causes_ may be very different:

One falls into it sometimes simply from over-hastiness. Sometimes we are led into it through the presumptuous attachment we have for our sentiments. But the most ordinary source of this ignorance is the maliciousness which causes us to see stains and defects in persons which a single eye would never discover in them.... It causes us to feel strongly the least conjectures, and enlarges in our eyes the slightest appearances. We believe them guilty because we should be very glad if they were.

The _consequences_ of rash judgments are sometimes terrible and fatal.

The divisions and hatreds which disturb human society and extinguish charity come generally only from a few indiscreet words that escape us. Moreover, we do not always confine ourselves to simple judgments. We pass from the thoughts of the mind to the promptings of the heart. We conceive aversion and contempt for those we have thoughtlessly condemned, and we inspire the same sentiments in others.

Rash judgments are the source of what we call _prejudices_; or, rather, prejudices are but rash judgments fixed and permanent.... We portray human beings to ourselves from the inconsiderate remarks made about them before us, and we then adjust all their other actions to the ideas we have formed of them. It serves us as a key whereby to explain the conduct of these persons, and as a rule for our conduct towards them.

3. We are apt to delude ourselves as to the motives of the judgments we pronounce.

The manner in which we conceal from ourselves this defect is very delicate and very difficult to avoid. For it comes from the bad use we make of a maxim very true in itself when viewed generally, but which in private we imperceptibly pervert. This maxim is, that whilst it is forbidden to judge, it is not forbidden to see--that is to say, to give one's self up to convincing evidence. Thus, in making our judgments pass for views or evidences, we shield them from all that can be said against the rashness of our judgments.

To enable us to distrust this pretended evidence, it would only be necessary to call our attention upon those whom we think guilty of rash judgments in regard to us. They think as we do, that the rashest of their judgments are from observation evidently true. Who, then, will assure us that it is different with us, and that we are the only ones free from this illusion?

4. It is maintained that one cannot help seeing the faults of others: so be it; but one need not make it voluntarily an object.

It may be said that we cannot help but see. But that is not true. It is rare that our mind is so violently struck that it cannot help deciding. It is generally obliged to make an effort to look at things, and it is this voluntary looking at the faults of others which Christian prudence should correct in the persons whose function it is not to correct them.

5. Besides, even if we knew the evil for certain, it is not for us to make it known to others.

Whatever evidence we may think we have of the faults of our neighbor, Christian prudence forbids us to make these known to others when it is not incumbent on us or useful so to do.... This exercise does not only serve in regulating our speech and forestalling the consequences of rash judgments, but it is also of infinite service in regulating the mind and correcting the rashness of judgment at its very source; for one hardly ever allows one's mind to judge the faults of others, except to speak about them, and if one did not speak of them, one would insensibly stop trying to judge them.

6. But as it is not always possible to avoid judging, it becomes necessary to employ other remedies against the abuse of rash judgments.

(_a._) "The remedy for malignity is to fill one's heart with charity; to think often about the virtues and good qualities of others.

(_b._) "The remedy against haste is to accustom one's self to judge slowly and to take more time in looking at things.

(_c._) "The remedy against the too strong attachment to our own sentiments is to continually remember the weakness of our minds and the frequent mistakes we, as well as others, make."

Nicole goes so far in proscribing rash judgments, that he even forbids them regarding the dead (xxxv.), regarding ourselves (xxxvi.), even when they have good rather than evil for their object (xxxvii.), even regarding abstract maxims of morality (xli.); and he concludes by saying that the only reasonable method is silence! We recognize here the rigorism of the Jansenists.[42] It suffices to say that, as a general principle, one should neither judge nor pronounce without investigation; but one must allow a little more latitude and liberty than does Nicole; for if all men agreed to keep silent, human society would be nothing but a semblance, a word void of sense. How could men get to love each other if they did not know each other? And how could they know each other if they did not talk to each other? We must, therefore, adhere to certain general principles without pretending to bring all words and thoughts under regulations.

=58. Of envy and delation.=--Among the vices which may lead to the greatest injustices, and which already in themselves are odious as sentiments, the most blameworthy and the vilest is the passion of _envy_. We call envious him who suffers from the happiness of others, him who hates others because of the advantages they possess and the superiority they enjoy. In the first place, this sentiment is an injustice; for the happiness of one is not the cause of another's misfortune; the health of one does not make the other sick; Voltaire's wit is not the cause of the mediocrity of our own talents; beautiful women are not answerable for the ugliness of other women. Let the ill-favored one accuse nature or Providence, and there will be some reason in it, though it is a bad feeling; for it is a want of resignation to a wisdom the motives of which we cannot always divine; but to accuse the favored of fortune, is a shocking baseness of the heart. It is the hateful feature of a celebrated sect of these present days; they desire not the happiness of all, but the misfortune of all. Unable to procure the same advantages to all men, their ideal is general destruction. Their utopia is just the reverse of all other utopias. These believed they could secure to all the advantages reserved to a few. This new utopia, persuaded of the impossibility of the thing, have overthrown the problem and propose to reduce the more fortunate to the wretchedness of the less happy; and as among the number of heads they hit there are still some which retain a few advantages over the others, the work of destruction will go on till they shall have reached the level of universal degradation.

But, without speaking of the social envy, which has had so large a share in the revolutions of our time, what we ought above all to fight against is the individual envy which each of us has so much trouble in defending himself against in presence of the success of his neighbor. It is above all dangerous when _disputed_ goods are in question--things all cannot have at the same time--and which he who is in the enjoyment of them seems thereby to rob the others of: as, for instance, a situation one obtains at the expense of another, be it that he is more deserving of it, or more favored by fortune. In the first case, one should be just enough to recognize the rights of others to these things, and in the second, generous enough to forgive them the favors of chance. It is wanting in personal dignity to begrudge men their chances and good fortune; and even were these chances undeserved, it is still lowering one's self to do them the honor of envying them.

Envy comes close to another sentiment, less odious perhaps, and less unjust, but which is, nevertheless, unworthy of a right-feeling man; this is _resentment_, _rancor_, a _vindictive_ spirit. If we are commanded to return good for good, we are, on the other hand, forbidden to return evil for evil. For centuries it has been said: Eye for eye and tooth for tooth. This is called retaliation (_lex talionis_). Christian morality has reformed this law of barbarous times. "It is written: eye for eye, tooth for tooth; but I say unto you: Love those who hate you; pray for those who persecute you and speak evil of you." Without insisting here on the _love for enemies_ (which is a duty of charity and not of justice), we will simply say that the spirit of vengeance is even contrary to justice. Nature, when we have been offended, calls forth in our hearts a spontaneous emotion, which inspires in us an aversion for the cause of the offense. This is a mere revolt of nature, innocent in itself, since it is the principle of the right of self-defense. But we should not yield to this thoughtless impulse; we should combat the desire to return evil for evil; for otherwise we place ourselves on a level with him whom we hate. And here again we should distinguish between _anger_ and _rancor_. Anger is the immediate impression we receive from the wrong committed, and which may induce us to return evil for evil on the spot; but _rancor_ is hatred coldly kept up; it is the slow and calculated preparation for a revenge; it is the _remembrance_ of wrong carefully nursed: and it is this which is contrary to human dignity. Man should remember good, not evil: he who is capable of hatred is worthy of hatred, and would seem to have beforehand deserved the wrong he has been made to suffer. We do not go so far as to say that wrong must be pardoned as wrong, for that would be siding with injustice; but it should be pardoned to human nature, because it is weak, and we are no less liable to sin than others.

From these feelings of hatred, envy, rancor, covetousness, springs sometimes a vice which lowers the soul and corrupts it: this is _delation_. To report to one the wrong done by another; to superiors the wrongs done by our colleagues; to friends the evil said of them in their absence; to inform the authorities of the presence and lodgings of an outlaw, such are the faults designated by the term _delation_, and the essential characteristics of which are, that they are committed without the knowledge of the interested parties. It is evident, besides, that this term can nowise be applied to functionaries commissioned to watch and discover faults, or to those who complain of injustice done them, and finally where great crimes committed against society are in question, to those who, knowing the criminals, report them to the authorities.

=59. Distributive and remunerating justice--Equity.=--All the acts we have thus far enumerated, and which consist in doing no wrong to others, relate to what may be called _negative_ justice.[43]

There is another kind of justice, more positive, which consists, like charity, in doing good to others, not in the sense of liberality and a gift, but as a debt; only the question then is not a material debt, which obliges to return a thing loaned, or intrusted, or the venal value of that thing; but it is a moral debt in proportion to the merit and services it relates to. This kind of justice, which distributes goods, advantages, praises in proportion to certain efforts, capacities, virtues, is what is called _distributive_ justice, and, inasmuch as it rewards services, _remunerating_.

Distributive justice goes into effect every time when there is occasion to classify men, to distribute among them offices, ranks, honors, degrees, etc. It is that which especially administrators who distribute places, have to exercise; also, examiners who give diplomas, learned societies who grant prizes, or take in new members; finally, critical judges who appreciate the merit of books, works of art, dramatic productions.

The administrators who have to fill posts, must above all consider the interests of the situation which is to be filled. Favoritism should be strictly excluded: the misuse of testimonials has been often pointed out; it is the plague of our administrations. They have not always all the influence attributed to them; but it is enough that it is thought they have any, to give rise to bad habits and a very serious laxity of morals. They make you believe that success does not wholly depend on conscientious work, and that it requires, above all, the favor of the great (protections). It is, therefore, the duty of administrators to consider the merit of functionaries only, and not their patrons.

But even this rule is far from being sufficient: for personal merit is not everything; is not the only element to be considered; age, length of service, have also their value; for, in order that the State be well served, it is necessary that those who work for it, should have faith in the future; should know that their past services will be taken account of, that as they grow older and their burdens heavier, the State will come to their assistance in raising their functions. Thus must length of service be combined with merit and be itself a part of the merit. In many administrations, the division between these two elements is made by granting vacant posts half to length of service, half to choice. But the choice itself depends on various elements; for personal merit is itself composed of many elements: for example, which should be considered the higher, talent or work? A lively mind will accomplish more work in less time; but it may be negligent, forgetful, disorderly: a substantial mind, always ready, industrious, conscientious, offers better guarantees and more security; yet in difficult transactions, talent offers more resources. This shows how many practical difficulties have to be met in the choice of men. It is for experience and conscience to decide in each particular case. Morality can give no general rules, except negative rules: to avoid _nepotism_, _simony_,[44] guard against the arbitrary, against favor, testimonials, etc.

In examinations there are the same dangers to avoid: for here, also, it is unfortunately too much a general belief that favoritism is the rule, and that testimonials go for everything. The first duty is to set aside all personal interest, worldly influence, pressure from without. But all does not end here; for there remains to be seen what rule is to be followed in the choice of candidates.

If the number of those who are to be elected is fixed beforehand, as in contests, there is then already a great difficulty obviated: for there is but to be determined the order of merit of the candidates. But in many examinations the number is not fixed. It becomes then necessary to find a just medium between excess of severity and excess of indulgence. This medium is generally determined through the co-operation of different minds, of which some are inclined to severity and others to indulgence. But one must not trust to this co-operation of others to arrive at a strict justice. It is clear that each, for his own part, must fix upon a mean, and endeavor to adhere to it as strictly as possible. In cases where there is occasion for classification, one must, above all, consider the more substantial qualities, and not allow one's self to be too easily led away by mere appearances and surface-talent.

Thus, facility of speech, which in itself is a merit, should not have any advantage over sound learning, especially in regard to functions where speech-making plays no part. Presence of mind, ready wit, are also brilliant and precious qualities, but the absence of which does not always denote ignorance and incapacity.

In learned or political societies, which are recruited among themselves, the same principles of independence and impartiality should always predominate, except in cases of difference in circumstances. Talent is here the principal thing to go by, and which should prevail; length of service counts for nothing except where the merit is equal. The interest of science in learned societies, the interest of the State in political societies, should be the prime considerations.

Literary or artistic criticism comes under the same rules, only it has not for its object persons, but works. Here the danger to be feared is not exactly favor, but good fellowship: one upholds the other, the praise is mutual, and all severity is reserved for those who do not belong to the society. But, whether good fellowship or favor, all privilege-preference substituted for the esteem the thing should be held in for its own sake, is contrary to justice. Criticism may, of course, be more or less severe--more or less laudatory; there is as much impropriety in constant blame as in constant praise; one must strike as near as possible a just mean between the two, and this mean may not be the same with the different critics; here comes in the part which individual temperament plays in the matter. But whatever rule each may adopt for himself, they must all apply it to the same end: there must be no undue respect for the person, and the interest of art must be alone considered.