Chapter 20
POLITICAL REFLECTIONS.
In the foregoing chapters I have endeavoured to describe the present condition of Cyprus, exhibiting the actual resources of the island, together with the numerous disadvantages resulting from a peculiarity of climate, and the total neglect of all public works during the Ottoman rule of three centuries. It will be remarked that nothing of value exists beyond the agricultural productions, which are now precarious through the uncertainty of seasons; the metallic wealth has either been exhausted by the ancient miners, or it remains to be developed; the forests have been destroyed; the harbours have been clogged by silt; the communications are confined to pack animals in the general absence of roads and bridges. Yet, notwithstanding this neglected condition of the island, the revenue has yielded an average of about 200,000 pounds annually, or as nearly as possible one pound sterling per head of the entire population.
An increase of revenue can only result from a corresponding advance in material prosperity, which must depend upon an influx of capital that will develop the agricultural resources upon which Cyprus will mainly depend. There are some few collateral profits that may perhaps increase, such as the sponge fisheries, and a probable discovery of red coral by the employment of the helmet-diving apparatus. At present the condition of the sea-bottom is little known; the sponges, of an inferior-quality, are collected by dredging, and the boats pay a fixed sum for a licence according to the size and construction of the dredging apparatus, varying from 5 to 20 pounds per annum; this yields a small annual revenue of about 1600 pounds, which embraces the entire coast of Cyprus. By careful management the salt might exhibit an increase, but on the other hand, the wine, if relieved from the present extreme taxation, would for the first two or three years ensure a considerable reduction.
No increase of imports can be expected until the general advance of internal prosperity shall enable the population to extend their demand for foreign manufactures. We have seen that the peasantry are contented with the home-made cotton stuffs which they produce without an expenditure of money; and the habits of the agricultural classes are simple, and independent of external aid. It will require many years before the customs of the Cypriotes shall be changed by the intercourse with strangers, and the increase of their wealth, commencing from the zero of poverty, must be the base of future expectations. We generally remark in the advancing desires of communities that women exert a powerful influence in the development of manufactures. The wholesome, and to a certain extent civilising, attention to personal appearance, creates a demand for articles of dress and other little vanities which encourage trade, and by degrees the improvement in every household expands into a new birth of external relations with foreign countries, which induces an increase of imports. The women of Cyprus are completely subjugated to their husbands, and although exempt from the cruelty unfortunately so prevalent among a similar class in England, they are seldom indulged in the love of finery which in our own country is carried to an excess. The baggy trousers and the high hob-nailed boots of the Cyprian Venus will hardly excite the ambition of British manufacturers, and for many years the females will remain in their present position. There are already soap manufactories in the island, and the first groundwork for improvements in personal habits will be ensured by their extension, before the exterior fineries of more civilised communities shall be introduced. We may therefore omit the Cyprian female from the class that would benefit the island commercially, but she will perform her duty in a sensible and simple manner as a good housewife, and thereby assist in the prosperity of her husband the agriculturist. The more pains that we may bestow upon an examination of the resources of Cyprus, the more certain becomes the conclusion that the present and the future depend entirely upon agricultural development.
This fact is patent to all who can pretend to a knowledge of the island, and the question will naturally intrude, "Was Cyprus occupied for agricultural purposes?" Of course we know it was not: but on the other hand, if we acknowledge the truth, "that it was accepted as a strategical military point," it is highly desirable that the country should be self-supporting, instead of, like Malta and Gibraltar, mainly dependent upon external supplies.
If Cyprus belonged to England or any other Power, it would be a valuable acquisition. We have seen that under the Turkish administration it was a small mine of wealth, and remains in the same position to its recent masters.
We pay 96,000 pounds sterling per annum to the Turks, out of an assumed revenue of 170,000 pounds. Therefore, without any trouble or risk, the Turk is receiving 3.25 per cent. interest upon three millions. This establishes an unfortunate precedent in the valuation of the island should England eventually become a purchaser.
If Cyprus can, without undue taxation, afford a revenue of 170,000 pounds, it is palpable that a large margin would be available for those absolutely necessary public works--irrigation, the control of the Pedias river, road-making, harbour-works, bridges, extension of forests and guardians, and a host of minor improvements, such as district schools for the teaching of English, &c. &c. In fact, if we held Cyprus without purchase as a conquered country, such as Ceylon, Mauritius, or other of our colonies, it would occupy the extraordinary position of a colony that could advance and pay its way entirely by its own surplus revenue, without a public loan! This is a fact of great importance--that, in spite of the usual Turkish mal-administration, the island has no debt, but that England has acknowledged the success of the Turkish rule by paying 96,000 pounds per annum as the accepted surplus revenue of this misgoverned island!--which holds upon these data a better financial condition than any of our own colonies.
If the total gross revenue is 170,000 pounds a year, and we can afford to pay 96,000 pounds to the Porte, and at the same time allow the home government to boast in the House of Commons of "a surplus," Cyprus is one of the most lucrative positions, and the Turks can fairly claim a success instead of admitting the blame of mal-administration.
If the Turks by mismanagement can obtain a nett revenue of 96,000 pounds a year, how much should England obtain by good management?
The fact is that, as usual, the English government has been hoodwinked in their hasty bargain. The island can pay its way, and, if free from Turkey, would become most prosperous; but we have inherited an estate so heavily mortgaged by our foolish Convention, that the revenue is all absorbed in interest, which leaves nothing for the necessities of development. The commissioners of districts are over-worked and ill-paid, their allowance of interpreters is quite insufficient to secure the necessary check; and their position is incompatible with the importance of their official status. There is no money for any improvements, and the boasted surplus will just suffice for the payment of salaries and the absolutely necessary items of carrying on a government more in accordance with the position of Greece or Denmark than with the historical reputation of Great Britain.
This financial embarrassment has disappointed the expectations of the inhabitants, who naturally had anticipated brilliant advantages from the reform between Turkish and English administrations. My own opinion may be valueless, but it is shared by many; Cyprus should belong absolutely to England, or we should have nothing to do with it. I repeat the dictum expressed in the introduction; if England is the ally of Turkey and she can depend upon the integrity of that defensive alliance against Russia, there is no need for any station that incurs the obligations of Cyprus; all the Turkish ports would be open to our ships. The occupation of Cyprus would therefore suggest that a far-seeing government had doubted the integrity of Turkey, and had therefore determined to secure a pied-a-terre in a strategical position that would command the east of the Mediterranean. Upon this point opinions will again differ, and I quote the words of one of the most experienced statesmen and an ex-minister of the Upper House, who writes:--
"The objections to Cyprus as a military and naval station are shortly these. It will oblige us to establish a garrison, and therefore to increase and divide our forces in the Mediterranean. There must be barracks, hospitals, store-houses, &c. After all this expenditure Cyprus will weaken rather than strengthen our power.
"Famagousta may be made a good harbour; but how can it be defended? The ships will not be, as in Malta, defended by batteries projecting far beyond the anchorage; Famagousta will require ships of war to defend it, or batteries constructed on the breakwater--a most costly undertaking. As a coaling-station it is not wanted, because colliers accompanying the fleet are much more convenient. If, in short, we are supreme at sea, Cyprus is not wanted; if we are not supreme, Cyprus will be an incumbrance."
I acknowledge the force of a portion of the argument, and no one can more highly respect the distinguished authority I have quoted, who, as an ex-First Lord of the Admiralty of practical experience, must carry the great weight of his ability and position; but I would suggest that Famagousta is underrated. I have already described that powerful fortress, and in its present condition, if mounted with forty-ton guns upon the sea-face, I doubt the possibility of an attack from seaward. The natural reefs which form the sea-wall afford the greatest facilities for batteries a-fleur-d'eau, as their solid foundations require the simple levelling of cement, and a facing of steel plates would complete an impregnable line of casemates that would render the approach by sea impossible.
The advantages of attendant colliers is great as a continuous coal-supply to a fleet, especially during the blockade of an enemy's port; but for a cruising fleet, or for independent vessels, the speed of the colliers would be insufficient, and a line of coaling-stations, at intervals of five days' steaming is in my opinion highly important, in addition to the necessity of docks where ironclad vessels could obtain the necessary repairs after a naval engagement. It is a serious result of modern improvements that the cumbrous and complicated ironclads cannot be repaired in a few days after an action with the enemy by their own carpenters and crews, like the wooden vessels of old, but that docks must be within reach, and all the appliances of the engineers' yards and an arsenal. Without this advantage, Famagousta would be a useless acquisition, and Cyprus would be worthless as a strategical position.
In my opinion the entire question hangs upon the integrity of Turkey as an ally. England has done but little for her, and we may expect too much. The Turks are thoroughly aware that an Anglo-Turkish defensive alliance, and the "Protectorate of Asia Minor by Great Britain," are political arrangements based upon self-interest, for which they owe us no personal gratitude; in the hour of their distress we declined material assistance, but seized the opportunity for occupying one of their important positions--Cyprus; their only satisfaction remained in the knowledge that they had "done us" in the bargain. We have quickly discovered the painful fact, and one party to the alliance already feels aggrieved, and seeks for an alteration in the terms of the Convention.
I cannot conceive any more dangerous risk to friendships than an interference in the private affairs of individuals, or in the public administration of governments. We have assumed the enormous responsibility of the Protectorate of Asia Minor under conditions which we must know will never be fulfilled; Turkey promises to reform the abuses of her internal administration, &c. &c.! Anybody who knows Turkey must be aware that such a reform is impossible: the honest administrative material does not exist in the Ottoman Empire, and the promises of the Porte have been tolerably exemplified since the Crimean war. Under these circumstances the Anglo-Turkish alliance is in a questionable position. We have assumed the Protectorate of Asia Minor conditionally; we occupy Cyprus conditionally; and should Turkey fail to perform her promises in the government of her Asiatic provinces, we have a back-door for an escape from our onerous engagement. Unfortunately English diplomacy is celebrated for back-doors. In the Berlin Treaty we entered Cyprus through a back-door, and we may possibly retire by the same exit; but there is little doubt that the Turk does not believe in our professed determination to defend him by force of arms in the event of a future conflict between Russia and the Sultan in Asia Minor. Notwithstanding our professed sincerity, the Turk has become an unbeliever in the faith of treaties and political engagements; he believes most thoroughly that should "British interests" require the sacrifice of honour, England will somehow or other manage to slip through the Ottoman fingers, and escape from her alliance when called upon to meet Russia in the field. Of course the ignorant Turk is wrong, and his suspicions are unfounded.
With a mutual want of confidence in the integrity of an alliance, it would hardly be surprising should the Sultan attach more importance to the practical force of Russia than to the moral rectitude and high political principles of England. The power of Russia has been felt, and the position of European Turkey is that of a dislocated and dismembered Empire, which upon the next explosion will reduce the Sultan to the small extremity on the Bosphorus between Constantinople and the lines of Tchataldja. Turkey will cease to be a European Power, and upon the outbreak of the next Russian war she will be discovered as represented by Asia Minor, in which the claws of the Eagle are already fixed in the vital points--Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan. A Russian advance from those positions will, according to the terms of the alliance, compel Great Britain to exhibit herself as the champion of Turkish rights in armed defence of Asia Minor.
When we reflect upon the prodigious responsibility of such an alliance with a crippled Power that has been completely subdued, the victorious army of the Czar retired from the gates of the capital, the nation bankrupt beyond all hopes of liquidation, the various states in chronic discontent both in Europe and in Asia, and the claims of Greece threatening to explode the combustible materials, we may well appreciate the back-door that has so frequently afforded a retreat from an untenable position.
If it is necessary for England to form a defensive alliance with Turkey as a crippled Power, with Russia actually established in Asia Minor, why should we have waited until Turkey was mortally stricken, when by an earlier alliance we could have at least saved Asia Minor in its integrity? We have let the lion into the house with a boast that we will turn him out in the event of further roaring, instead of having prevented his entry in the first instance.
Under all the circumstances of the risk and responsibility assumed by England in a defensive alliance with Turkey under the title of a Protectorate of Asia Minor, the Cyprus Convention is highly unfavourable in its conditions. The island should have been simply conveyed from Turkey and transferred as a free gift to England, as a position necessary for her occupation under the probable contingencies of the Anglo-Turkish alliance, and it should have at once become a portion of the British Empire. Had this course been pursued a mutual confidence would have been established; on the other hand, all back-doors would have been sealed, as we should have been bound by all the laws of honour to defend Turkey to the last extremity in Asia Minor.
Russia, in Kars, occupies a position which affords an unbounded horizon for political intrigue. The various Turkish Pachas and other district authorities throughout Asia Minor have witnessed the irresistible advance of Russia, while England stood afar off, and only assisted Turkey with her good counsel. The same authorities now see Russia in possession, while England, who has not assisted during the bloody struggle, appears upon the scene as a political Paul Pry, and intrudes upon the mysteries that surround Pachas, Governors, and various functionaries, who, from the highest to the lowest official, mainly exist upon extortion.
It is hardly necessary to explain that British assistance in such a form will be most unwelcome, and will increase our reputation for intermeddling while in the hour of extremity we withhold the required aid. Any interference on our part with the administration of Asia Minor will cause an extreme jealousy and suspicion throughout all classes of Turkish officials, who will be rendered the more amenable to the guiles of Russian intrigues from Kars and Ardahan. A very slight knowledge of Turkish character would induce the natural conclusion. The English would be suspected of coveting Asia Minor, as they had already obtained Cyprus, and Russia would have gained her end in destroying all confidence that might possibly have existed, and thus endanger the defensive alliance.
There are serious risks that might enforce the advance of Russian troops beyond the defined frontier. Already there are reports of general discontent and threatened disturbances. In the event of a mutiny of Turkish troops on the Russian border, the Russians might be invited to assist by the Pacha in command. Sometimes such revolts are factitious, for political purposes. In all cases the position of Russia in Asia Minor is one of extreme danger to Turkey, and it is far from improbable that activity on her side, and passiveness upon ours, may terminate in a friendship between the Russians and the Turks to the detriment of British interests, and to the confusion of the assumed Protectorate. This document distinctly states:--If "Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any further attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia as fixed by the definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms."
In a despatch from Lord Salisbury to Sir A. H. Layard, dated 30th May, 1878, these ominous words are contained:--
"Even if it be certain that Batoum and Ardahan and Kars will not become the base from which emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due time followed by invading armies, the mere retention of them by Russia will exercise a powerful influence in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte."
In the same lengthy despatch the conditions are described which Turkey must fulfil in reforming the abuses of the present administration, &c. &c., and there can be no doubt that the British government contemplated the necessity of supplanting a considerable number of the peculant Turkish officials by experienced English officers, whose supervision would ensure the necessary reforms. If such a course should have been accepted by the Porte there could be no question of the salutary effect, as the presence of British officials in actual authority throughout the provinces of Asia Minor would have proved to the various races our positive determination to uphold their rights, and to defend them from the oppression and extortion to which they had been subjected. Such a position would have given England the control that is absolutely necessary to effect the reforms in the administration of Asia Minor, without which the result will be anarchy and revolution within a few years, fostered by Russia precisely in accordance with the policy that has terminated in the disruption of Turkey in Europe.
In the same despatch of 30th May, 1878, Lord Salisbury continues:--
"Her Majesty's Government intimated to the Porte on the occasion of the Conference at Constantinople that they were not prepared to sanction misgovernment and oppression, and it will be requisite before they can enter into any agreement for the defence of the Asiatic territories of the Porte in certain eventualities, that they should be formally assured of the intention of the Porte to introduce the necessary reforms into the government of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those regions. IT IS NOT DESIRABLE TO REQUIRE MORE THAN AN ENGAGEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS, FOR THE SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN COULD ONLY BE DEFINED AFTER A MORE CAREFUL INQUIRY AND DELIBERATION THAN COULD BE SECURED AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE."
The italics are my own, for the weak point of the Convention is exhibited by this sentence.
No "general terms" should ever be mentioned in a communication with Orientals, and no convention should have been concluded with the Porte, unless every detail had been previously considered and specially agreed upon between the contracting parties. When this Convention was made public, I concluded that the British government contemplated the official employment of a certain number of their own officers to carry out the spirit of the agreement, without which the Convention would be a farce; at the same time I was convinced that the suspicions of the Turkish government and the stubborn pride of the race would resist any such direct interference upon the part of England. Under these conditions Asia Minor would remain exactly where it was. A grand scheme which would have had immense political results, had the Turks accepted our interference in the honourable spirit of our intentions, has been frustrated by their want of confidence, and the Convention remains, containing an agreement of stupendous importance, by which England is committed to a military undertaking of the first magnitude, while Turkey risks nothing except her "PROMISES OF REFORM in the administration of her Asiatic provinces."
"British interests" in this transaction are represented by Cyprus, which we occupy as tenants--paying 96,000 pounds a year for the ruined house, and leaving ourselves no balance from the revenue for the necessary repairs.
There is no more difficult political associate than the Turk; his defensive weapon is delay, and in moments of the greatest emergency his peculiar apathy or patience never forsakes him. Proud and haughty to a superlative degree, in his heart he detests all extraneous counsel and interference, and would rather glide onward to destruction than grasp the hand stretched out to save him. Turkey has expected much from England, and has made a poor return for our sacrifice of blood and treasure during the Crimean war. She obtained an ephemeral financial reputation through the aid of France and England in becoming guarantees for a public loan; upon this false position she traded until the inevitable bankruptcy plunged her into ruin, and opened the gate for the entrance of her enemies, at the same time that dishonesty entailed the severance of friends. England has from mutual interests endeavoured to preserve her from absolute dissolution, and the Protectorate of Asia Minor was a step of political audacity in her favour that surprised the world. This extraordinary offer of material aid has been met by the same want of confidence that has marked the decline of the Turkish Empire; the only extra interference in Asia Minor has been the appointment of a few additional British consuls. These gentlemen will report long lists of abuses, and the general mal-administration of the Turkish officials; they will be hated accordingly, and being absolutely powerless for good, they will simply keep the Foreign Office informed of what was thoroughly well known before. Remonstrances upon our part will be made to the Porte, who will deny the accuracy of the consular reports, and ultimately a special commission will be sent out, which will prove their correctness; the Porte will again promise amendment, but will not sanction the appointment of British officials. In this old-fashioned course, so thoroughly understood by all who have any knowledge of Turkey, the affairs of Asia Minor will be conducted, until revolution shall bring Russia upon the scene at the most favourable opportunity; and England, who has been thwarted by the Power she has endeavoured to save, will, by the terms of the Convention, be compelled to appear in arms as the defender of the remnant of the Turkish Empire.
Common sense would suggest the absolute necessity of special and clearly defined conditions in concluding an alliance with Turkey which may at any moment demand our military interference. If we are bound to assist by force of arms in the defence of Asia Minor, it is equally necessary that Turkey should be bound to qualify herself for resistance to an attack from Russia. It should have been distinctly agreed that Turkey should raise a territorial army of an estimated strength for the protection of Asia Minor, and that a certain number of British officers should hold important commands, to ensure the regular payment of the troops and to maintain the necessary discipline. Had such conditions been defined, and the civil courts been placed under the supervision of British officials, the Protectorate of Asia Minor would have become a practical combination that would have been an effectual check to Russian encroachments; but as the affair now stands, the alliance is fraught with extreme danger to ourselves. I cannot conceive the possibility of a credulity that would induce experienced statesmen to believe in the assurances given either by Turkey or by Russia. The history of the past is sufficient to prove the utter fallacy of assertions, promises, and treaties; Turkey will persist in mal-administration; Russia, who is now marching upon Merv in spite of former assurances, as she advanced on Khiva under similar pretexts, will at the moment of her own selection assuredly break through her boundaries in Asia Minor. The position of England will be contemptible. We have thrown down the gauntlet to Russia by an ostentatious alliance with Turkey, but we hesitate to insist upon the overwhelming necessity of British official and military officers to organise the civil administration and an army of defence; thus, when the sudden emergency shall arise, Turkey will be totally unprepared; the various races that comprise her Asiatic dominions will already have been poisoned by intrigue, and the only defence that can be offered to a Russian advance will be afforded by Turkish neglect, which has left the country devoid of roads.
Under these inevitable circumstances, England will probably accuse Turkey of neglecting to fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance, and the "back-door" will offer a convenient exit from the difficulty; in which case, Turkey will be compelled to make terms with Russia that will probably terminate in a Russo-Turkish alliance AGAINST England, who will be accused of having treacherously deserted her after breaking a solemn engagement--and obtaining Cyprus.
This may be a gloomy prospect, but it is not one shade darker than the reality of the position, unless the Porte will sanction the assistance of a British administration that would entirely change the political aspect. A reform of administration in Asia Minor to be effective, should be based upon the judicial system pursued by the English in the courts of Cyprus--where the Turkish laws remain undisturbed, but they are administered under the supervision of specially appointed officers. For the most part Turkish laws are based upon pure equity, and leave little to be desired beyond their faithful execution. The oppression and extortion prevalent throughout the Turkish dominions are directly contrary to the laws, and are the result of personal tyranny on the part of the authorities.
In the event of a rupture with our ally that would result in a Russo-Turkish combination, Cyprus would exhibit its importance as a strategical position that would entirely command the coasts of Syria and the approach to Egypt. As I have already stated, the value of the island is conditional upon the permanence of the Turkish alliance; should Turkey and England remain friends and allies, Cyprus is quite unnecessary as a British military station; but our possession will probably ENTAIL THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF TURKISH GOOD FAITH, as the restored arsenal and harbour of Famagousta would complete a position that would dominate the whole of the Turkish shores upon the Mediterranean, and in conjunction with Greece, which would assure the refuge of Corfu to our fleets, the naval power of Great Britain would be absolute to the east of Gibraltar.