Part 2

Mourn! mourn! O _Liverpool_, for the loss of thy great hero and champion, who was at all times ready to enter the lists in defence of thy trade and commerce. But, Britain rejoice; for what may have been for the advantage of the town of _Liverpool_, might be greatly detrimental and prejudicial to the general trade and commerce of this country and its colonies; which surely must clearly appear from the beforementioned memorial. For we believe it will be allowed, if we were to encrease and extend the number of our colonies in North America, and the West Indies, it would be disadvantageous to Great Britain, unless they can be supplied with a sufficient number of people for their defence and cultivation, at as reasonable an expence as possible; without taking the hands that are useful and necessary in husbandry, and the several manufactures of the mother-country.

Then surely, as Guadaloupe was surrendered by capitulation to the British arms, no longer than since the 4th day of May, 1759; and as the merchants of _Liverpool_ had imported 12,347 Negroes into that island some months ago, which must have been the case, or they could not have had so exact an account; we may well conclude that a great number of Negroes have also been carried to _Guadaloupe_, and the other conquered islands, by the merchants of _London_, _Bristol_, and other ports, that carry on a trade to _Africa_, and have been carrying negroes from the time they had the last accounts, which we may suppose to be at least six months preceding the merchants of _Liverpool_’s memorial being presented to lord Egremont.

This must be undoubtedly of great advantage to the _French_ planters, and extremely detrimental to our North American and West India colonies, for want of the _Negroes_ that have been sold to those conquered islands; which must consequently cause a scarcity, and enhance the price of those carried to the real colonies of Great Britain. Because the merchants of _Liverpool_, and others concerned in the _African_ trade, must be truly sensible, that they can find beneficial markets in our colonies for treble the number of Negroes they can purchase with _British_ manufactures. So that the consumption of those manufactures is not encreased, as they would insinuate, by their selling Negroes to the _French islands_ (for so we must call them while they have _French inhabitants_) when the selling such Negroes is so apparently disadvantageous to our colonies that are inhabited by British subjects; on which account we submit, whether as we are to give back to France _Martinico_, _Guadaloupe_, _Marigalante_, _Deserade_, and _St. Lucia_, orders should not be immediately sent to the governors of such islands, to prevent _British_ subjects selling any Negroes to the _French_, which it would be impolitic to do, even were we to have kept possession of them.

The ships that have been fitted out, and are upon their voyages with an intention to sell Negroes on the _French islands_, may dispose of them in the adjacent _British colonies_, where they will meet with purchasers for any number, at such prices as will make their voyages profitable. Therefore such order will not be hurtful to the merchants, but of great advantage to the _British planters_, and consequently so to this country.

It is for that reason we insist it was our interest to return those islands to France, to whom (if proper steps are pursued by us) they must and will become a continual expence, burthen and incumbrance; nor would our retention of them have been an advantage to us: for as the inhabitants are _French_, we must always have kept a military force there at a very great expence, of which recruiting would be no small part. And one great consideration ought to be, the _number of British subjects that would die in that unhealthy climate_, if they were only the soldiers that must annually be sent to complete the regiments necessary to be kept on that service. That service alone would be productive of a great expence; and the loss of so many subjects would prove very detrimental to _Great Britain_.

Besides, for argument’s sake, let us suppose we had kept _Martinico_, _Guadaloupe_, _St. Lucia_, _Marigalante_ and _Deserade_, it would have been highly disadvantageous to the _British planters_, and must prejudice them much in their circumstances, so as in a short time to reduce the old _British_ sugar islands, now so populous and flourishing, to such a state, that it made us tremble to think of it; because the British _African_ traders would supply those islands taken from the French with Negroes, in preference to the old _British_ colonies; which fully appears by the number they have been supplied with already; and as those islands are now ceded to France, will be of great advantage to the planters therein, by their having been in our possession, on account of the Negroes they have purchased to cultivate their plantations. And had we kept said islands, as soon as they had been sufficiently stock’d, they would have carried on a trade for the redundant Negroes with their countrymen at _St. Domingo_. Hence it appears, that great care must be taken to prevent their having it in their power so to do after those islands are restored to France; as we do not in the least doubt, but from the intercourse our countrymen have had with them for the sake of profit, contracts will be made for such anti-national purpose. And such a commerce would enable them and the planters of _St. Domingo_ to cultivate sugar and other plantation-produce sufficient to supply all Europe; and by such means prevent Great Britain’s reaping the advantage that she derives from the exportation of the produce of her colonies: which is so essential a benefit to her, and is one of the first causes of our receiving a balance of trade from foreign countries, and in which the landed interest, merchants and manufacturers of _Great Britain_ and _Ireland_, as also the _planters_ and _merchants_ in our _colonies_, are so materially concerned and interested. For the lands in Britain must always rise and fall in proportion as our manufactures and navigation prosper or decline, and the national revenue encrease or diminish, as the trade of our colonies is in a more or less flourishing way.

Therefore is it not evident, that there is not a man in this kingdom, who, in proportion to his possession and property in the community, does not partake of the benefits and advantages accruing from the _African_, _North American_, and _West Indian_ trades; and who would not be a sufferer in proportion to his situation in life, should they diminish, by falling into the hands of people belonging to any other nation? where, supposing it to be the case, the profit of those valuable trades must consequently center.

For notwithstanding the advantage the French inhabitants would have had by our retention of those islands, they would take nothing from us for the use of themselves, or their plantations, but what they were obliged to out of the greatest necessity; as we have no wines to supply them with, which are proper for that country: so that they would have their wines, and every thing else they could possibly procure, from France; having been accustomed from their infancy to wear French, which they would ever look on as their own native manufactures. And sorry we are to say, too many of them are used in the British colonies, as well as in this country. For which reason they would always have a dislike to British manufactures, and that would induce them to pursue every measure to smuggle their own into those islands; and for the sake of profit, many English traders would be induced to carry them from the Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, and other places, in preference to those of their own country, which has already been the case. But supposing it not so, the real profits of those islands, while possessed by French inhabitants, would not center in Great Britain, but in France; because, on account of the difference in religion, they would send their children thither for education, and make provision for themselves to retire there, always looking upon it as their home. Even so our planters do in regard to Great Britain; for all those who go to the West Indies, or are born there, have no intention to end their days in that climate, but are always aiming to lay by a sufficiency to go home, as they call it; that is, the _English_ planters to come to _Great Britain_, and the _French_ to _France_.

By what has hitherto been advanced, surely it will evidently appear to every impartial reader, that had we retain’d the French sugar islands, they would not have been of any advantage to this country, but on the contrary. It is not the number of islands, where sugar, tobacco, rice, and other plantation-products are raised, that will be advantageous to this or any other country, without they can be supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for their cultivation; the land being all tilled by hand-labour with the hoe, as there is no ploughing with oxen and horses in the West Indies, except in Jamaica, where two or three planters have used the plough to some part of their plantations, where the soil was light, and of a sandy nature; and all other work is done by _Negroes_, as Europeans cannot do any laborious work there.

Their field _labourers_, sugar _boilers_, _distillers_, _coopers_, _mill-wrights_, _carpenters_, _masons_, _builders_, _smiths_, and house _servants_, are _blacks_; therefore it is not the number of islands, but the greatest number of the _best Negroes_ that benefit the mother-country, _which sort_ we can make appear, the French since the year 1729, in times of peace, to the commencement of the present war, have been constantly supplied with. That is one of the true causes why they have produced such quantities of sugar, and other plantation-product; that for several years before the war, they were become our rivals at foreign markets, so far as to draw from thence a great annual balance of trade in favour of France.[6] But this _effect_ would have been prevented, if proper measures had been pursued by us for the preservation of the _African_ trade, to that part of _Africa_ where the hardy Negroes, who are inured to labour in their own country, were to be purchased.

The French, from the year 1729, to the end of the year 1738, carried from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_ and _Whydah_, _fifteen_ or _seventeen thousand_ of those valuable people annually; when _four thousand_, in any one year during that period, were not carried to the British plantations; which is the truest reason that can be assigned for the prosperity of the French colonies, and the main spring of the great increase of their product. For they do not understand the cultivation and management of a plantation in any degree equal to the British planters: therefore their advantage and success has been owing, in a great measure, to the good and hardy labourers they have had to till their land, and manufacture the product of it.

We doubt not but the merchants trading to Africa will say, they have imported since the year 1729, more Negroes into the _British_ sugar islands, than the _French_ have to theirs in time of peace (to the commencement of the present war). We admit they have, of Negroes from _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, _Benin_, the _windward coast_, and _Angola_. But we take upon us to assert, they cannot with truth say, they have imported to the colonies as many Negroes from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_, which are the most valuable for the laborious cultivation of the sugar cane, and other plantation-product, and manufacturing it into sugar and rum, for the following seasons.

The _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_ Negroes are born in a part of Africa that is very barren; a small bullock carried thither from another part, when fatted, will sell for near 32_l._ a sheep for 20_s._ four small fowls for 4_s._ sterling, and all other provisions in proportion, except fish; and their coarse kind of bread, which is their chief food. On that account, when able to take the hoe in hand, they are obliged to go and cultivate the land for their subsistance. They also live hardily; so that when they are carried to our plantations (as they have been used to hard labour from their infancy) they become a strong, robust people, and can live upon the sort of food the planters allow them; which is, bread made of Indian corn, and fish, such as herrings and pilchards sent from Britain, and dried fish from North America, being such food as they lived upon in their own country. Indeed they live better in general in our plantations; and they are always ready, on their arrival there, to go to the hard work necessary in planting and manufacturing the sugar cane.

On the other hand, the _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, and _Angola_ Negroes are brought from those parts of _Africa_, that are extremely fertile, where every thing grows almost spontaneously; and where a bullock may be bought for less than 20_s._ a sheep for 1_s._ and a dozen of fowls for the same. They have every other necessary of life in great plenty. On that account, the men never work, but lead an indolent life, and are in general of a lazy disposition and tender constitution; for the necessary work among them is done by the women, which is little more than fetching wood to dress their victuals: so that when those people are carried to our sugar islands, they are obliged to be nursed, to be taken great care of, and brought to work by degrees.

The planters, when the _Gold Coast_ and _Whidah_ Negroes were carried to the sugar colonies, before the _French_ interfered in that trade, found there was not a sufficient number to extend their cultivation, by carrying on all the different planting business, and therefore were accustomed to purchase those tender (the worst sort of) Negroes, and employ them for household servants, to raise corn, aloes, look after cattle, bring them up to trades and easy labour, knowing them unfit for the hard work necessary in sugar-plantations.

The Negroes of the river _Gambia_ are better than the last-mentioned; both of which are much more proper for the North American planters, as they have plenty of provisions at a small expence, and, on that account, can use them to gentle labour, and inure them, by degrees, to work with the same sort of food they were accustomed to in their own country.

But that is not the case of the planters in the sugar islands; which sufficiently proves how disadvantageous it must be to have such imported there, in preference to those that would be so immediately useful and serviceable, or to let the French purchase the better sort.

Yet such has been the case, it being for the interest of the African merchants to supply the _British_ planters with the inferior sort, as each Negro costs much less on the coast of _Angola_, &c. than those from the _Gold Coast_, &c. which saves a great deal in the outset of the cargoes sent to _Africa_, and consequently greatly encreases the net profit on the voyages, as the tender and worst sort of Negroes will sell in the sugar islands for near as great a price each as the best, provided there is none of the latter at market; and a greater number of the former being subject to die, must encrease the demand.

This we thought proper to take notice of, to shew how necessary it will be for the interest of this country, that the French should not for the future be allowed to trade in _Africa_, at cape _Appollonia_, or between it and the river _Volta_, where, and at _Popo_ and _Whidah_, to the eastward of that river, the valuable Negroes beforementioned, adapted by their natural constitution for cultivating the sugar plantations, are to be purchased; otherwise in times of peace, they will be constantly making encroachments as heretofore; so that when the late company’s governor at _Cape Coast Castle_ saw a _French_ vessel upon the Gold Coast, he used to order an officer to go on board with a message to the following purport.

“You are ordered on board the _French_ vessel, to tell the master, the governor and council do not make trade with the subjects of _France_,[7] nor do they suffer the natives to trade with them. But as there subsists a good friendship and alliance between the king of Great Britain and the French king, if the master should be distressed for water, or such like necessaries, he might have it upon application, by admitting an officer on board, to prevent his having intercourse with the natives, or others, till he should have received such supplies; but that he should not be allowed to trade to the westward of the river _Volta_, which if he attempted, proper measures would be taken to prevent and obstruct his commerce. Therefore, should he neglect those orders, and receive any damage thereby, it would be his own fault; as the governor and council held the trade of the _Gold Coast_, the indubitable right and property of THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY OF ENGLAND.”

This warning sometimes had the desired effect; at others, the governor and council were obliged to arm vessels to drive them off, which occasioned the masters of French ships to protest against the said governor and council. The protests were sent to them by the chevalier _Glandeuves_, commodore of _le Content_ and _Oriflamme_, two French men of war, in his letters dated _Annamaboa Road_, the 9th and 12th of February, 1751, wherein he insisted that the French had an undoubted right to trade to any part of Africa, out of gun-shot of any European fort.

How far the then governor and council were justifiable, in arming private ships to defend and preserve the trade and commerce under their care in time of peace, or any future council may be for exerting themselves in a like manner, we will not undertake to say; but are fully satisfied the French will go thither, and that the governor of the fort at Annamaboa will not be able to prevent their having intercourse with the natives, but by arming vessels to see them to the eastward of the river _Volta_. For we are of opinion, property and right are not to be tamely given up in that part of the world, in hopes of relief from our administration at home; it being so remote from the giving of immediate redress, and distant from appeal; or at least, it has happened so in all complaints made to former ministers. Many instances thereof can be given, which induced us to lay before the public the foregoing observations, as the present seems the most proper time to have such rights settled, to prevent future disputes between the subjects of both nations, which if not prevented in an effectual manner, by putting the forts upon an establishment, that the officers commanding them may be in such situation, as to protect the trade under their care from the encroachments of any foreigners, will inevitably happen.

It is also necessary to remark, that the French should not be permitted to re-settle a factory they had before the war at _Abreda_, about a league below _James Fort_, in the river _Gambia_, which was destroyed by that gallant sea officer, and brave commander Sir George Pocock, in the year 1744, but settled again after the peace; and again destroyed this war by Capt. Marsh, commander of his majesty’s ship Harwich.

If they are not permitted to re-establish that factory, and the trade of _Gambia_ and _Senegal_ rivers are pursued in a proper manner, _Goree_ will be of no consequence, but an expence to France, for many good reasons we think it improper at present to enlarge upon; knowing there is a work in hand that will soon be published, wherein all the advantages of the _African trade_ are fully considered from the time LETTERS PATENT were granted by king Charles the second, the 27th day of September, 1672, to establish and incorporate the late royal African company of England; shewing how the trade was carried on by that company, and the true cause of their having been rendered unable to support their forts and settlements without the aid of government, with the ill consequences that attended the decay of that valuable branch of British commerce, on which the prosperity of our colonies, and so many branches of our manufactures, depend; followed by observations on the qualities of manufactures sent thither, and the regulations that it is necessary should be made regarding the same. To which will be added, a plan to revive and extend that trade to the inland parts of _Africa_, so as the most valuable Negroes may be secured for the British planters, as the only means to prevent the growth of the French colonies, or at least to make them extremely expensive and burthensome to their mother-country; and, on the contrary, ours to become of the greatest benefit and advantage to Great Britain and Ireland.

Senegal is most certainly a great and valuable acquisition to this country, if put upon a proper establishment, as it will secure to us all the gum trade, so useful in our manufactures, and will greatly encrease the slave, gold and ivory trades in _Gambia_ river. For when Senegal was in possession of the French, by means of a fort they had at _Gallam_, about five hundred miles from the sea up that river (since the decline of the late Africa company, by no factory being kept at _Fatatenda_, about the same distance up _Gambia_ river) intercepted the greatest part of the slave, ivory and gold trades, that came from the several inland countries to the north east of those rivers: therefore, if proper steps are taken, those trades may be greatly encreased and extended at an inconsiderable expence, not having the subjects of any foreign nation to interest themselves against such a scheme.

The African merchants, to vindicate themselves in carrying on the trade for the _worst Negroes_ in preference to the other, give out, that the better sort are not to be come at. But there is no other grounds for such an assertion, than that the roads to those great and populous inland countries lying at the back of the forts and settlements on the _Gold Coast_, have been stopt since the year 1738, which has prevented all intercourse with the natives, except those who live within about fifty miles of the sea-coast; whereby a stop was put to that great trade which came down, when the roads were kept open by the power and influence of the company’s officers, and by their alliance and friendship with the several princes and people in power, living in the different _countries near_, and in the _towns_ on the said _roads_, that were opened and settled by the late company’s officers at a very great expence.

One great reason for the decline of their power and influence was, by the masters of private trading vessels putting in practice every measure they could invent to vilify and render the company’s officers insignificant and contemptible to the inland people and Negroes under their command.

By which sinister machinations, they lost that weight and authority so necessary for them to act as protectors of the injured, and mediators in adjusting and deciding disputes that frequently happen between _African_ princes; which if the company’s officers cannot accomplish by policy, presents, or amicable measures, they should be maintained in such a respectable situation, as to be able to join the injured party, and to compel the refractory to accommodate matters[8], so as to procure peace, and bring the country to a state of tranquillity.