Part 1

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been placed at the end of the book.

All changes noted in the ERRATA on page 68 have been applied to the etext. The erratum for p. 21 should have said l. 34, not l. 3.

Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PRESENT PEACE,

As far as it is relative to the

COLONIES,

AND THE

AFRICAN TRADE.

_Magna est veritas & prævalebit._

LONDON: Printed for W. BRISTOW, at the West End of St. Paul’s Church-yard. MDCCLXIII.

[Price One Shilling.]

TO THE

BRITISH PLANTERS.

GENTLEMEN,

An uninterested desire of rendering service to the public, and not an idle whim, or vanity to appear in print, has induced the editors of the following facts to publish them. Author is a title they lay no claim to.

By their unornamented energy alone is meant to gain the reader’s attention, and to enforce the facts advanced; therefore, without further apology, they are presented to you in a plain dress, to point out some measures that were taken to mislead the legislature, whereby the African trade, in the year 1750, was put upon such a plan, as, by the event, has proved extreamly detrimental to the British colonies. On that account, the following sheets can be addressed to none so properly as to you.

We flatter ourselves it will evidently appear by the contents of the following pamphlet, that the forts on the coast of Africa, are by no means upon a proper establishment; likewise that the present method of carrying on the African trade to those parts where the forts are situated, by the very high price given for Negroes there, which occasions the profit arising to be divided between the _European_ merchants and the _African_ traders, but must become extreamly burthensome and disadvantageous to you, we believe every _real planter_ will allow.

We cannot admit certain individuals to be esteemed _real planters_, notwithstanding they may have _one_ or _more plantations_, when at the same time they are concerned as merchants in the colonies, who procure the ships from the coast of Africa to be consigned to them; of which it is conjectured (and not without foundation) many of them are part owners; for these apparent reasons, it being their interest to keep up the price of Negroes so consigned to them, as all such advance encreases their commissions. Therefore, in our humble opinion, no attention ought to be paid to any remonstrance from people so much interested, or from those merchants who reside in Europe, that are connected with them, against any proposals that may be offered for the general utility of the colonies, which has been the case; and in consequence, very detrimental measures have been pursued through the misrepresentation of such opponents.

Should such destructive measures be continued, an absolute diminution of the annual income from your estates in the colonies must inevitably ensue, whether from the want of Negroes, or your purchasing them at too high a rate. In either case, it will prevent your being able to raise as much sugar, and other plantation-product you would otherwise do, or to take off as great a quantity of the manufactures of the mother-country, as were you to have a sufficient number of Negroes at reasonable prices. Relying upon the above allegations, with those you will find in the course of the following pamphlet, the editors presume you will think it most expedient and conducive for your interests, without loss of time, to apply to the legislative power, in order that some speedy and effectual measures be taken and carried into execution for _retrieving_, better _regulating_ and _extending_ that valuable branch of the _British_ commerce, the _African trade_.

The present seems the most proper time for so great a national purpose, in order to prevent the _French_ getting the start of you, which they will exert all their _power_ and _abilities_ to _effect_; for they are now not only making great preparations to carry on that trade themselves, but they have already made several _contracts_ with _British_ merchants to supply them with _Negroes_. So intent are they to secure, by every method they can contrive, as great a number as possible of those useful people, on which the prosperity of the _French_ colonies depend: besides, as _peace_ is concluded, his majesty’s ministers, in whose department it is, will have leisure to examine minutely into the reasons that induced you to make such application. Therefore there cannot be a doubt from their known _abilities_, and willingness to promote the _public good_ by their care of the _trade_ and _commerce_ of these _kingdoms_, but they will give their most serious attention to any proposal you may lay before them for so good a purpose, as the _extending_ and _preserving_ the _African trade_; and will be as desirous as yourselves to pursue such plan as appears to them most reasonable for promoting the general advantage of the _British colonies_, and consequently the _mother-country_. The editors will not intrude farther on your time, than to hope something will be done to secure that valuable branch of commerce to the _British subjects_, they being very desirous to promote the prosperity of the _British colonies_, and to assure you that they are with great respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient, and most

Humble servants,

London, 11 April, 1763.

The EDITORS.

Considerations on the Peace,

As far as it is relative to the

Colonies, and the African Trade.

Since the preliminary articles of peace were published by authority, we have heard many persons in coffee-houses and other places, censure and blame our negotiators, for their not having obtained better terms.

They say, that our acquisitions in North America are of little consequence: yet when these acquisitions were in possession of our enemies, they thought them of inestimable value. Can the mere alienation of any property cause so sudden a diminution of its original worth? Surely then pique or dislike to some of our peace-makers, or private interest to have the war continued, must have hurried these men beyond the bounds of reason. For if they would give themselves the least time to reflect seriously, and judge dispassionately, they would find, that by retaining our conquests in North America (which are extended beyond our most sanguine expectations) the greatest benefit and utility must arise to this the mother-country; inasmuch as we have put ourselves in such a situation not only in the north, but also in the southern parts, that it is to be hoped our inland settlers will live in a perfect state of tranquillity; and his majesty’s subjects carry on and cultivate that great branch of the British commerce, without dread of the Indians, or interruption from the subjects of any foreign nation. This good effect surely must be allowed to be of immense importance and advantage to Great Britain; and would not have been the case if we had kept the sugar colonies ceded to France, instead of part of our continental conquests.

What was the occasion of the war but the negotiators of the last peace not settling the distinct limits and boundaries of the territories we and the French were to have in North America? We rejoice those limits are now settled, and hope so effectually as to prevent future disputes.

Among the many altercations concerning the preliminary articles, and the abilities of our negotiators, it must be allowed, with respect to the commercial interest of this country, there is a noble Lord in high office, and of the cabinet, whole acknowledged capacity, great application, and long experience, at a board where he so judiciously and eminently presided, made him a most competent judge what measures were proper to be taken for the security, improvement, and extension of the trade and commerce of Great-Britain and her colonies. Therefore, we cannot doubt, but his majesty has been well and faithfully advised as to that part of our pacific negotiations; because the patriotic spirit, honour and integrity of that nobleman are universally known and approved. It is not amiss to lay down as a maxim, that in general the information of merchants is not to be depended on by the legislature, with respect to trade and commerce, for many other, besides this principal reason; to wit—A trade may be very profitable to a particular merchant, city or town, and, at the same time, be very pernicious to the general interest of the nation, is a most notorious fact. Have we not heard many falsehoods asserted, and seen many erroneous calculations laid before the public, with an interested view of obtaining such private ends, and of defeating in some very essential points the public welfare?

Whatever self-interested people may clamour to the contrary, there cannot be a doubt but his majesty and his ministers, in their negociations, have given the most serious attention to the universal good of this country, without confining their views, or partially regarding whether _North America_ is more valuable than the _Sugar Islands_, because each merited their notice and care, being both of inestimable value to the mother-country, and reciprocally so to each other; and all three so essentially connected, that whatever happens to the disadvantage of the one, must in proportion affect the other. For the West India islands depend upon _North America_, in a great measure, for provisions, mill, and other timber; as well as for horses, cattle, and many things absolutely necessary for the use of the plantations; which are paid for in _specie_, _sugar_, _rum_, melasses, and other plantation-produce: moreover, the melasses being distilled into rum in _North America_, are of great advantage to the merchants there, in carrying on the African trade directly from thence, which enables them to make returns for those manufactures, _&c._ they receive from hence with greater facility. All possible care should be taken to prevent his majesty’s subjects purchasing sugar, rum, and particularly melasses, in the French islands, by prohibiting their importation into North America, by laying a higher duty upon those articles than that laid by an act, made in the sixth year of his late majesty’s reign, entitled, “An act for the better securing and encouraging the trade of his majesty’s sugar colonies, _&c._” whereby such high duties were laid on all foreign sugars, rums, and melasses, to be imported into any of his majesty’s colonies in America, as, it was thought, would answer all the ends of a prohibition.

But experience has shewn that law, and also those passed in the 12th and 15th _Car._ II. are too weak to answer the purposes for which they were designed; and that some more effectual remedies must be found to prevent the British traders of North America importing foreign sugar, rum, and melasses, which was a great trade carried on by them from the French islands before the war; and by that means the commodities from North America, wanted in the sugar islands, were greatly advanced to the British planters. And as the northern traders often refused to take any thing from them but ready money, which drained them of almost all their gold and silver, for want of which they were often brought into great distress; therefore all the money the North American traders used to receive from the British planters, was carried to foreign sugar colonies, and there laid out in the purchase of sugar, rum, and melasses, which were carried to our northern colonies, and there supplied the place of sugar, rum, and melasses from the British sugar islands; and consequently robbed them not only of the consumption of so much of their product, but also of their gold and silver too.

Whereas if the planters in the foreign colonies were obliged to purchase what they want from the British subjects with ready money only, and not allowed to give their sugar, rum, and melasses in barter for the same, it would make the balance of that trade for the future much more in our favour than it has been against us; because we having so greatly extended the British dominion on the continent of America, the French in their sugar islands cannot be supplied with what they want from thence but by the English; therefore the British traders may chuse to be paid for their merchandizes in such manner as they shall please, which the French will be under a necessity of complying with.

It is well known to those who are acquainted with the sugar islands, that the profits of the planter depend upon the vent he finds for his rum and melasses; for if sugar only, and no rum and melasses could be produced from the sugar cane, it would hardly pay the expence of culture, and manufacturing it into sugar. Therefore as the consumption of rum and melasses is stopped or increased, the sugar colonies (whether English or foreign) must respectively thrive or decline. And as rum is not allowed to be imported into old France, or any of its colonies (because it interferes with brandy, which is the product of the mother-country) this evidently shews how much it is in the power of Great-Britain to check the progress of the French sugar islands, and advance that of her own. For if the bringing French rum and melasses into any of the British dominions, can be effectually stopped, all the profits made by rum and melasses, in the French sugar colonies, would be lost to them; because they could find no vent for it in any other part of the world.

This point strictly attended, and invariably adhered to, and the African trade secured to the British subjects, to the extent of their natural and undoubted right, would diminish the growth of sugar in the French islands, and increase it in our own; and might, with the addition of our new acquisitions, very probably in the course of some years, be a means of enabling the English to undersell them at all foreign markets in Europe, and confine them to their own consumption. Therefore it is humbly submitted to the consideration of the legislative power, whether this trade, so apparently hurtful to the national interest of this kingdom, (which will most certainly be carried on in the same manner it was before the war) ought not to be stopped without delay; and the importation of foreign sugar, rum, or melasses, into any of the British colonies in North America, prohibited under such penalties, and with such encouragements to inform and seize, as may be adequate to the crime, in order to put an effectual stop to such a pernicious and destructive commerce.

From what has been before observed, it will, it is presumed, evidently appear how necessary it must be for the advantage of the British sugar colonies, to promote as much as possible the sale and consumption of rum and melasses, upon which, in a great measure, the well-being and prosperity of the planters depend. On that account, and in order to promote such desirable purpose, suppose the duties on melasses, and the excise on rum, were to be lowered, such procedure would favour our plantations in their rivalship with France, and the lessening these duties will, in a great measure, prevent the smuggling of foreign brandy to such a degree, as may probably augment the revenue arising therefrom, by a greater quantity of rum and melasses being disposed of, which consequently must considerably encrease our navigation; and the disadvantage to our rivals in trade will be in proportion to our success. Besides, rum, if it can be got at a reasonable rate, will greatly increase the consumption of malt spirits, by mixing them in such proportion as are suitable to the palate of an infinite variety of people. This is evident from the great quantities, and the various prices that spirits are sold for under the denomination of rum, which are from 5_s._ or 7_s._ to 10_s._ _per_ gallon.

The trade carried on between Great Britain, Ireland, North America, the West India islands and Africa, is of greater advantage to this country, than all our other trades whatsoever, arising from the great exportation of _British_ manufactures, _East India_ goods, provisions as well as _linens_ from _Ireland_, which are paid for with _specie_, _sugar_, _tobacco_, _rice_, _cotton_, and other plantation-produce; and with the commodities of _Africa_, such as _gold dust_, _bees wax_, _elephants teeth_, _gum Senegal_, various sorts of _dying woods_, and particularly _Negroes for the plantations_; whence it manifestly appears, upon the African trade, and the invaluable commerce of our colonies, above two-thirds of the British navigation depends; and for this very obvious reason it may be asserted, that in the vessels employed for said traffic, the most useful sailors for manning his majesty’s navy (the great bulwark of this nation) are bred; because they are inured to the manner of living on board ships, as well in the hot as in the cold climates; which is not the case of sailors taken out of coasting vessels, colliers, and traders to the north seas, as hath been frequently experienced by the many (very useful) lives in our expeditions to the East and West Indies being lost; and that fatality was chiefly owing to their not having been accustomed to live on salt provisions, and to bear the excessive heat of the climate, which they were unacquainted with, and unpractised in.

To prevent the like catastrophes hereafter, when occasion shall require, we would propose the chusing out of the several ships that may lie in the harbours of Great-Britain, such sailors only as shall have been a voyage or more to the hot countries, to man such expedition fleets for those parts of the world, where the sun’s power is strong, as the more probable means of preserving the lives of a great number of those valuable sailors, who may not have had a seasoning, and have been mostly employed in the coasting trade and short voyages.

We have been induced to throw out this hint, in hopes that it may engage the attention of some more able pen, to form a scheme for such a good, humane, and noble end, before the commencement of another war.[1]

It must be allowed by those who have a general knowledge of the trade and commerce of _Great-Britain_ and _Ireland_, that the _Negro-trade_ on the coast of _Africa_, is the chief and fundamental support of the _British colonies_, by supplying them with that race of useful people called Negroes, to be employed in cultivating the lands. But when there is either a deficiency of them, or that they are purchaseable but at high prices, then such checks must greatly impoverish our British planters; and in consequence, considerably diminish the wealth, power, trade and navigation of these kingdoms, the encrease of which has been, in a great measure, owing to the extensive commerce to and from our colonies and plantations: therefore their not being properly supplied with Negroes, must be extremely detrimental to them; which induces us to make some observations upon a memorial taken notice of in the _Public Ledger_, of the third of November last, wherein it was asserted, that sir _William Meredith_, one of the representatives in parliament for the town of _Liverpool_, had presented a memorial to the right honourable the earl of _Egremont_, one of his majesty’s principal secretaries of state, “setting forth the great advantages of the trade of _Guadaloupe, where they received_ 334,605_l._ 11_s._ 2_d._[2] for 12,347 slaves, the cargoes of 41 ships, purchased in Africa with British manufactures; praying that the possession of that island might be thought of in the negotiation for peace, if not incompatible with the general scheme of affairs.” This memorial we could not have expected from that quarter, recollecting that the great _Hardman_ is no more. Had he been living, it would not have been wondered at, as he was noted for his contriving, and being industrious at procuring and presenting, memorials and petitions. He even influenced some _merchants_ of the town of Rippon in Yorkshire, to petition the parliament, when that great and important trade to Africa was under its consideration. He likewise prevailed on many other towns to petition, all as little interested and connected with the trade of Africa, as Rippon; and said Rippon was never famous for any other manufactory, that we could hear of, but that of making spurs; and the cream of the jest is, that not a single pair, as a commercial article, was ever sent to Africa; at the same time many other measures were pursued, very singular methods taken, and absolute untruths asserted as facts, to mislead the legislature, in order, as it is supposed, to prevent the forts and settlements being put upon a proper establishment, that were all as inconsistent as the Rippon petition.

It was at that period boldly advanced at the bar of the house of Commons, and with great industry propagated among the members, that the forts in _Africa_ were only useful, as marks of possession and sovereignty; which, if true, why has 19,565_l._ 14_s._ 2_d._ sterling been expended in building part of a fort at _Anamaboa_, to the 30th June, 1756, as appears by the African committee’s accounts to that time, when the further building of that fort was put under the direction of the board of ordnance[3]? which sum has been since paid by the public more than the annual grant of 10,000_l._ then insisted as sufficient for the support of the forts. But we have been informed, those prevaricating advocates have since altered their opinion, and think it a very inadequate sum for such purpose: and it appears by the votes of the honourable house of Commons, application has been made to parliament to enlarge the annual grant; and there was granted for the year 1761, 13,000_l._ and for the year 1762, the like sum, by which it is conjectured the said advocates have found it absolutely necessary that the forts ought to be kept in a better state than that of marks of _possession_ and _sovereignty_ only.

But that cannot be done, when we consider in what manner the money granted by parliament to the African committee, is appropriated in Africa, which the government never receives any account of.

The great argument made use of to the then ministers[4], to obtain a dissolution of the late African company, by the advocates for the present system, was, that 10,000_l._ was quite adequate and sufficient for the support and maintenance of the forts. This, we believe, was one of the strongest reasons for those ministers adopting their scheme, which had as much truth in it, as many other assertions at that time made use of.

The late company, from their experience, insisted that sum was very insufficient; which it really was, even to give in presents annually to the principal natives, to cultivate such an interest as is not only necessary, but absolutely essential to support and promote the honour, power, jurisdiction, and trade of Great Britain on the coast of Africa. However, there has been granted, since the forts were put under the care of the present Africa committee for their support, from 2d February, 1751, to 2d February, 1763, 136,000_l._ which is 11,333_l._ 6_s._ 8_d._ _per annum_, exclusive of what was expended in building the fort at Annamaboa. Notwithstanding said grants, the forts have not been kept even[5] as marks of possession and sovereignty; which undeniable truth the editors are ready to prove, if called upon.