Part 2

“_Sergeant Manuel Gonzales_, upon landing, discovered the position of a German ‘88’ in the sand dunes near the beach. This gun was firing on the assault boats as they landed. The Sergeant crept around the position under machine-gun fire which set his pack on fire, and despite the hand grenades being thrown at him. He then calmly tossed several hand grenades into the gun emplacement, killing the crew and blowing up their ammunition.

“Near PAESTUM _Sergeant John Y. McGill_ jumped on an enemy tank and dropped a hand grenade into the open turret, killing all the crew.

“_Private Clayton I. Tallman_, on HILL 424, observed that the enemy was attempting an envelopment of the left flank of his company. Taking up a better position, he killed an enemy machine-gun crew with three carefully aimed shots. In a few minutes he repeated the same action when another enemy machine-gun crew appeared. He alone protected the left flank of the company until the rest of the platoon arrived.

“_Private Burrell B. Reitch_ discovered that he and a group of five men had been cut off from his company. He immediately organized them in a defensive position on a small knoll. They repulsed three rushes by the enemy, who were attempting to establish machine-gun positions on the flank. Private Reitch was completely in command of the situation, giving fire orders and shouting encouragement.

“_Staff Sergeant Quillian H. McMitchen_ was shot in the chest and shoulder before his assault boat reached the shore. When the boat beached, the landing ramp stuck and would not drop. The Sergeant, despite his wounds, kicked the ramp loose and then led his section ashore, continuing to direct their operations until he received a fatal shot from enemy gun fire.

“Our men steadily moved ahead in the face of the intense fire and cleared the beach as soon as possible. _Lieutenant Carey_, soon after reaching the shore, was fired upon by three Germans armed with machine pistols. He returned the fire, but his carbine jammed after killing one of his adversaries. He then grasped his weapon as a club and advancing in the face of their fire clubbed the second. He then physically tackled, subdued, and disarmed the third German, taking him prisoner.”

=COMMENT: The ability of the individual soldier to grasp the implications of the situation and take the necessary action should be fully exploited. The results of combat are the fruits of the combined efforts of individuals. ~Every soldier should be indoctrinated with the idea that his individual action may be the decisive factor in the final result.~=

ACTION ON ATTU

_Operations report, Regimental Combat Team_: “To fight the Japs in this country our troops must stick to the high ground and not only outflank but ‘out-altitude’ the enemy.

“Continuous movement is necessary to keep the spark in an attack. If a machine gun covers one point, then a group not at that point must continue to advance. When fire is shifted, the original group must move. If even a platoon is entirely halted by the fire of enemy guns, then the commitment of additional troops results, whereas by proper coordination some portion of the platoon can be kept moving and the force committed kept to a minimum.

“The tendency of lower commanders to commit reserves too early must be curbed.

“Security cannot be overemphasized. Any movement or group on the battlefield, even in rear areas, is subject to enemy action. In this connection, consideration must be given to the protection of medical installations. At present these are left unprotected, without even individual arms for their personnel. In the event of any enemy penetration through our front-line positions it is practically certain that these installations will be hit.

“Aggressive patrolling, particularly to maintain active contact, is of vital importance and can mean the difference between defeat and victory. However, mere numbers of patrols will not solve the problem. Special training in patrolling and organizing patrols must be initiated. Commanders must plan to have reasonably fresh men available for night contact. It is vital to organize patrol activity carefully to insure that all lines are familiar with the routes of returning patrols so that the danger of mistaken identity in the darkness will be minimized.”

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_Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General, ~Alaskan Department~_: “It was apparent that the enemy was particularly vulnerable to attack by units of our infantry which pushed forward vigorously while the enemy was held down by artillery fire. Those units which had learned to advance closely behind their own artillery supporting fire had the greatest success.

“The Japs do not like our coordinated artillery fire nor do they like our attacks with the bayonet. When under fire from small arms they stay down in their holes and are easily approached. When attacking small groups of foxholes, our troops were able to keep the Japs down by fire from rifles and the Browning Automatic Rifle while some of our men approached and dropped hand grenades into their holes. This was our favorite mop-up method.

“When about to be run out of a position, the Japs seemed to feel it necessary to counterattack. These attacks were not well coordinated and were welcomed by our troops, who were able then to shoot down the enemy in great numbers. These Jap counterattacks were of a suicidal character and were pressed home regardless of losses until practically all of the counterattacking troops were exterminated.

“The enemy may believe that, in such terrain, he can hold up the advance of an entire battalion with three men and a light machine gun. In fact, however, he is critically vulnerable to intelligent action by officers and men who understand the necessity for immediate maneuver against small parties of the enemy seeking to hold them up. The fact was that small maneuvering patrols easily disposed of machine-gun positions on reverse slopes behind mountain spurs, whereas any tendency to lie down and call for artillery support would have resulted only in tremendous wastage of artillery fire in attempting to seek out targets which, in fact, were inaccessible to artillery fire.

“The ATTU action likewise indicated that standard Japanese infiltration tactics can be offset by a system of ‘anti-termite’ patrols organized behind our lines, protecting our artillery, command posts, and supply lines. Wherever troops know that these friendly patrols are behind them, fire in their rear will mean to them simply that our patrols are exterminating the infiltrating Japs. This feeling was well expressed by General Nathan Bedford Forrest [Confederate cavalry commander, Civil War], when one of his staff officers approached him in great excitement and said, ‘General, the enemy is in our rear.’ Forrest calmly replied: ‘If they’re in our’n, we must be in their’n.’”

THE SOUTH PACIFIC

SECURITY IN THE JUNGLE

=In Bivouac= _Report of Commanding General, 43d Division, ~New Georgia~ Campaign_: “Security in bivouac was a big problem in this New Georgia operation. The Japs conducted harassing raids against our bivouac areas with some success for a period of about a week. Our initial plan had been adopted on the advice of other units experienced in jungle warfare. It called for complete immobility at night, with grenades and bayonets as the only defense weapons. Gun crews were directed to fire only in the event of a major attack. However, we found that small parties of Japs were able to filter into the battle areas and cause some casualties without being seriously opposed.

“This situation was effectively corrected by using a close perimeter defense. Men occupying these perimeter lines were ordered to fire at known targets. Machine guns were so laid that final protective lines covered the perimeter. The nature of the terrain and the type of night tactics employed by the Japanese made the establishment of outposts for security purposes inadvisable as visibility was limited to a few feet from any given outpost. Two men occupied each foxhole, one remaining awake and alert to all activity in his vicinity. Within the perimeter, machetes were used from the foxholes against any enemy raiders who were able to penetrate. This system effectively discouraged night raids.

=On the March= “March security adhered to established doctrine except that distances between the elements of the column were greatly reduced. Extremely limited visibility and the difficulty of moving through the jungle off the trails nearly always prevented close-in security detachments.”

★

JUNGLE NOTES

=Aggressive Action, Flexible Plans= _Report of 43d Division, ~New Georgia~_: “Aggressive action is necessary. Never relax the pressure. Maneuver of small units at the risk of temporary loss of communications is important. Plans and orders must be so flexible as to permit prompt maneuver change.

=Feeding the Troops= “The serving of any hot meals in jungle fighting is often impracticable. A hot drink or hot soup serves the same purpose and is much more within the realm of possibility.

“An issue of two canteens per man relieves the water problem a lot in jungle operations.”

★

=Counterintelligence= _First Marine Division, ~Guadalcanal~_: “Due to the amount of vital information we had taken from captured Japanese message centers we decided at once that we wouldn’t make the same mistake. Command post installations were usually in the foxhole of the unit commander. Papers of possible value to the enemy were destroyed or sent to the rear.”

SCOUTING AND PATROLLING

=Patrolling in the Jungle= An officer with considerable experience in jungle patrolling gives this advice:

“Patrols are most likely to give away their presence in an area by their footprints.

“Shine from the smallest metal surface, such as a belt buckle, or a watch, must be avoided. A luminous watch constitutes a real danger.

“A white skin is most conspicuous, and _the practice of some patrol members marching stripped to the waist is inviting trouble_.

“Dark clothing is essential.

“Any noise, such as talking, coughing, spitting, etc., has to be treated as the greatest of all dangers.

“A man on patrol must learn to move silently, making every possible use of natural cover.”

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=Don’t Forget the “Where”!= _Colonel Liversedge, U. S. Marine Corps, ~New Georgia~_: In many cases patrol leaders were able to report what they saw, but not _where it was seen_. In general, _such information was valueless_ as locations could not be plotted on a map or aerial photo. This should be emphasized in training programs and is worth a special directive.”

★

=----or the “What”!= _Seventh Army Report, ~Sicily~_: “Men must be taught _to recognize what they see_ when they are scanning the landscape. Unless properly trained they will not recognize enemy gun emplacements, strong points, and machine-gun nests.”

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=Patrol Tips= _Staff Sergeant Richard E. Deland, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “I was not taught to observe properly nor how to use the message blank.

“Position and camouflage are more important than I learned in the States. In training bear down on cover and concealment; bear down on the avoidance of the blundering approach, on patrols, on fire and maneuver--which are equally important.

“Battles move slowly; patrols can’t dash about.

“My battalion, instead of using ‘Scouts Out,’ used a full squad in wedge formation to do the job.”

★

=Size of Patrols= _Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Walker, Tank Destroyer Battalion Commander, ~Tunisia~_: “Many men were lost in Tunisia by using squad patrols. The Germans used stronger patrols and just gobbled them up. A patrol should be either a sneak patrol, small enough to escape detection, or a combat patrol, large enough to fight its way out of difficulty. Never allow one man to go out alone.

=Say It With Pictures!= “The value of hasty sketches illustrating reconnaissance reports was proved many times during this campaign, but it is difficult to get such sketches out of untrained personnel. All reconnaisance personnel should receive sketching training.”

INFANTRY WEAPONS

IN JUNGLE WARFARE

The following comments on the use and effectiveness of infantry weapons in jungle warfare appear in the report of the 43d Division on the MUNDA Campaign--NEW GEORGIA:

=Basic Weapons= “The ~M1 rifle~ is doubtless the best all-around weapon possessed by our troops. Its serviceability under existing campaign conditions is excellent. Ammunition supply was adequate, since the rifle was normally fired only at observed targets. The Japs possessed a number of our M1 rifles, apparently considering them a superior weapon to their own.

“The ~fragmentation grenade~ was used frequently against suspected areas of heavy jungle growth and on some occasions for the destruction of booby traps around perimeter defenses. Its effect when used as a booby trap is questionable because of the long fuze time. _The Japs used our grenades extensively in their night harassing raids against our bivouacs._ Rifle grenades were used on some occasions with success against enemy pillboxes.

“In spite of its handicap of sounding like a Jap .25-caliber light machine gun, the ~Thompson sub-machine gun~ proved very satisfactory for specialized personnel such as linemen, artillery forward observers, vehicle drivers, and reconnaissance personnel. Its limited range made it especially useful in combat in rear areas.

“The ~Browning auto rifle~ gave excellent service. This weapon has high jungle mobility and provides excellent fire power for the short-range targets frequently encountered. It has been used many times to reinforce the final protective lines at night, to establish trail blocks, to cover patrol advances, and to destroy snipers.

“The ~light machine gun~ proved very effective in the night security of bivouacs. At other times, it was used to cover the advance of attacking echelons by placing heavy fire in the direction of suspected pillboxes. Since fields of fire and visibility were so limited the effectiveness of such support was questionable.

“We did not use the ~heavy machine gun~ to any extent in the attack in the jungle. This was mainly due to its weight and to its heavy ammunition supply requirements. It was used primarily for the defense of beachheads and water passageways, also to some extent in the defense of regimental and battalion command posts.

“The ~60mm mortar~ was not effective against enemy pillboxes, although it unquestionably contributed by its demoralizing effect on the enemy. After we reached the outer taxiways of the airfield, we had excellent visibility from ideally situated OP’s, and the disorganized enemy presented many profitable targets for this weapon. _The exceptional accuracy of the weapon made it very valuable in close support, and its use during the assault on the revetments and shell craters at_ MUNDA FIELD _and_ KOKENGOLO HILL _is credited with saving many lives_.

“The ~81mm mortar~ proved to be one of the most important single weapons contributing to the success of this offensive. Because of the difficulty of supply only two mortars were taken forward with each heavy-weapons company, the balance of the personnel being used as ammunition carriers. Troops frequently remarked that if given the choice of rations or 81mm mortar ammunition, they would gladly take the latter.

“While the ~37mm AT gun~ is admittedly a weapon of opportunity in jungle warfare, there were two occasions on which it served us handsomely. The Nips had a field piece located where it could interdict our beachhead at LAIANA. Scouts located the gun, but our mortar fire couldn’t silence it. We disassembled a 37mm gun and carried it forward under cover of the dense foliage. The gun was then assembled under cover and moved rapidly to a point in the open from where it could command the target. _Three accurately aimed rounds destroyed the gun and killed its crew._

“On another occasion we picked up an enemy occupied pillbox about 600 yards from one of our OP’s. The 37mm gun was manhandled to a position on the forward slope in only partial concealment. It placed accurate and intense fire on the pillbox and completely destroyed it.

“The value of the 37mm gun was also proved by two episodes when the enemy attempted to make night landings. First, one enemy barge was fired on as it neared a landing on BOMBOE PENINSULA. Both HE and AP ammunition were used, and the barge was heard to limp away, sputtering badly. On another night a group of Japs approached the north coast of SAGEKARASAS ISLAND in an assault boat. Antitank gunners held their fire until the boat was nearly ashore, then fired several rounds of canister. The boat was seen to sink and several bodies floated ashore the next day.

=4.2″ Chemical Mortar= “The 4.2-inch chemical mortar company was placed under the control of the Division Artillery and the fires of the chemical mortars coordinated with artillery fires. These mortars, employing a 25-pound high-explosive shell, were used successfully with the artillery in firing preparations prior to an attack and in firing prearranged fires such as area barrages to block enemy routes and to disrupt barge traffic near WESTERN SAGEKARASAS ISLAND. One prisoner stated that the mortar barrages were more feared by them than artillery. The only criticism of the weapon is that the shell has no delayed fuze; consequently, a great many tree bursts result from its use.”

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IN SICILY

=Advance Guard= _Captain Reed, Infantry_: “We have had considerable success in using a platoon of heavy machine guns with each advance or assault company. You need this increase of fire power right up there in front. With the advance guard we put a platoon of machine guns right up in the forward support. We also put a section of 37mm AT guns right behind the advance party. The remaining section of AT guns is placed behind the support of the advance guard. We place the 57mm’s and the cannon company in the center of the main body.”

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=Pyrotechnics= _Staff Sergeant Robert J. Kemp, Infantry_: “We want lots of pyrotechnics for use in all kinds of situations to include bedeviling the enemy. Sometimes Jerry puts on a pyrotechnic show that just scares hell out of us; it would work on him too.”

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=Miscellaneous Comment= _Various Small Infantry Unit Commanders_: “~81mm mortar~: A perfect weapon. I like to use the alternate traversing method.

“~60mm mortar~: We kept them right up in front and used them often.

“~Bazooka~: We have had no trouble with our bazookas. Have gotten several tanks with them.

“~37mm AT gun~: Very mobile. It’s artillery; good against anything--vehicles, pillboxes, personnel, houses. Gets in faster than the mortar. If I had to throw away any heavy weapons, the ‘37’ would be the last to go.

“~75mm self-propelled cannon~: Excellent for coordinated attack--perfect. Too vulnerable to get very close initially.”

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AT SALERNO

=The “Bazooka” Worked= _Operations report, --th Infantry_: “Several tank attacks occurred which the Infantry fought off with their ‘bazookas.’ It became more and more apparent that this was really an effective weapon. During this one day it destroyed seven enemy tanks.”

=COMMENT: Numerous reports indicate the effectiveness of the “Bazooka” when used by trained personnel. It has been used successfully against pillboxes, machine-gun nests, and personnel.=

INFANTRY-ARTILLERY TEAM

=Artillery “Close” Support= _Lieutenant Colonel McCormick, Field Artillery, ~New Georgia~_: “Our infantry, finding themselves with a mobile enemy on three sides and a swamp on the fourth, called for defensive fires. A horseshoe of concentration fires was laid down around them. Infantry commanders stated their willingness to accept responsibility for any casualties resulting from these fires, which were adjusted so close to the defensive positions that fragments were received within the perimeter. The fires were continued throughout the night with no casualties to friendly troops. _This fire was credited with probably saving the force from disaster._ For some time ‘Concentration 110’ became a by-word with all infantrymen.”

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=----and How It Worked= _Report of Operations, Munda Campaign, ~New Georgia~_: “The best cure for the whistle-blowing, howling night attack was a closely adjusted system of night fires placed around our troops. The all-night firing of single batteries and sometimes a single gun discouraged these attacks. What few were attempted after this system was inaugurated were quickly stopped by short bursts of fire at maximum rate in the vicinity of the unit being attacked and along the front of adjacent units.”

=Massed Fires= _Lieutenant Colonel James, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “Our division artillery was never out of support for more than five minutes throughout the whole campaign. We’ve got a wonderful set of battalions in our division artillery, and we have worked so closely together that they are as much a part of our outfit as our own battalions. They keep right up on our heels all the time, and that is just what we have got to have. I don’t know what we could have done without them. They leapfrogged their batteries continually and went into some of the damndest positions I have ever seen, and delivered the goods. We just can’t praise them too much. They were always right there when you needed them.

“In one place where we just couldn’t get forward because the Heinies were on superior ground and had us pinned down with rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire, the division artillery massed nine batteries on them and plastered them with 1,500 rounds in less than thirty minutes. We then walked through that position without a scratch, and the German dead were all over the place.”

INFANTRY-TANK TEAM

=Opportunity Lost= _Captain Putnam, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “The infantry should be given practical training in cooperation with tanks. I don’t mean the armored infantry--they’re part of the armored division and work with them all the time. I mean ordinary infantry like us. I know our regiment didn’t have any training with tanks in preparation for combat. At BRANIERI we just didn’t know how to work with the attached tank unit. When our tanks came up to support us after we had broken up the German attack, we did not follow up the tanks properly as they went forward. _Had we done so we could have cleaned out almost a battalion of Germans._ We had not been trained to work with tanks, and we remained in position after they went forward. _If we had known how to go forward with them we could have done a much better job and could have gotten all of the Germans’ vehicles and matériel._ After this experience, we strongly recommend that all infantry be given practical training in cooperation with tanks in action. Get the infantrymen used to tanks and how to fight together with them.”

=Lesson Learned= _First Marine Division, ~Guadalcanal~_: “The initial assault by our five tanks across the field east of our 3d Battalion lines at the ‘Battle of Bloody Ridge’ on GUADALCANAL was entirely successful. They caused much havoc among the enemy and returned unharmed. Within an hour, they attacked again over the same terrain. Meanwhile, the Japs had had time to move 37mm AT guns into position along the edge of the woods at the eastern side of the field. These guns knocked out three of our tanks during the second assault. It thus proved extremely unwise to launch a second attack over the same route and terrain. This is especially true if there is sufficient elapsed time for the enemy to move AT guns into position.”

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