Part 1

Transcriber’s Note

Italic text is enclosed in _underscores_; boldface text is enclosed in =equals signs=; underlined text is enclosed in ~tildes~.

COMBAT LESSONS

NUMBER 1

_Rank and file in combat: What they’re doing How they do it_

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UNCLASSIFIED

XXXXXXXXXXXX _DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER_.--The information contained in restricted documents and the essential characteristics of restricted material may be given to any person known to be in the service of the United States and to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating in Government work, but will not be communicated to the public or to the press except by authorized military public relations agencies. (See also par. 18b, AR 380-5, 28 Sep 1942.)

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of “Combat Lessons” is to give to our officers and enlisted men the benefit of the battle experiences of others. To be of maximum benefit these lessons must be disseminated _without delay_. They do not necessarily represent the carefully considered views of the War Department; they do, however, reflect the actual experiences of combat and, therefore, merit careful reading. For this reason also no single issue can cover many of the phases of combat; lessons will be drawn from the reports as they are received from the theaters of operation and quickly disseminated so that others may apply them. The suggestions which are made or implied are not intended to change the tactical doctrine by which our Army has been trained but rather to elaborate thereon. Much of the subject matter has been covered in training literature, but the comments show that shortcomings continue to manifest themselves on the battlefield.

The paramount combat lesson learned from every operation is the vital importance of _leadership_. Our equipment, our supply, and, above all, our men, are splendid. Aggressive and determined leadership is the priceless factor which inspires a command and upon which all success in battle depends. It is responsible for success or failure.

CONTENTS

SECTION ONE--INFANTRY Page Battle Leadership 1 Junior Officer in Battle 1 Hate Your Enemy 2 Leaders in Front 2 Keep Them Moving 3 NCO Leadership 3 Keep Your Mission in Mind 3 Team Up 6 Rally Point 6 Fear is Normal 6

Sicily--Italy--Attu 7 Night Attack 7 Surprise Saves Lives 7 Hand-to-Hand Fighting 8 Small Arms Against Armor 9 Platoon Action 9 Knocking Out Pillboxes 12 Individual Initiative 14 Action on Attu 16

The South Pacific 19 Security in the Jungle 19 In Bivouac 19 On the March 20 Jungle Notes 20 Aggressive Action, Flexible Plans 20 Feeding the Troops 20 Counterintelligence 20

Scouting and Patrolling 21 Patrolling in the Jungle 21 Don’t Forget the “Where”! 21 --or the “What”! 21 Patrol Tips 22 Size of Patrols 22 “Say It With Pictures” 22

Infantry Weapons 23 In Jungle Warfare 23 Basic Weapons 23 4.2″ Chemical Mortar 26 In Sicily 27 Advance Guard 27 Pyrotechnics 27 Miscellaneous Comment 27 At Salerno 28 The Bazooka Worked 28

Infantry-Artillery Team 29 Artillery “Close” Support 29 --and How it Worked 29 Massed Fires 30

Infantry-Tank Team 31 Opportunity Lost 31 Lesson Learned 31 Infantry-Tank Attack 32

Ranger Training 33 Buddy System 33 Realism 33 Recognition 34 Formations 34 Cooking 35 Physical Conditioning 35 Discipline 35

SECTION TWO--FIELD ARTILLERY

Artillery in the Jungle 37 Antipersonnel Fire 37 Dealing with Tree Snipers 37 Adjustment of Fire 38 Morale Effect 38 Ammunition and Fuzes 40 Disposition 40 Liaison 40

Ideas from Italy 41 Reinforcing Fire 41 Transportation 41 Fire Direction Center 41 Pack Boards for Observers 43

SECTION THREE--MISCELLANEOUS

Booby Traps 45 Timeliness of Orders 45 Maps 46 AA Fire 46 Security 47 Strafing Aircraft 47 “Gas!” 47 Counterattack Foiled 48 Room for Improvement 49

SECTION FOUR--NOTES ON THE NIPS

Japanese Pillboxes 51 Superman Myth Exploded 51 Jap Trap 52 Defensive Action 52 Vine Entanglements 52

SECTION FIVE--HINTS ON THE HEINIE

Reverse Slope Tactics 53 Don’t Gawk! 53 Traps and Mines 53 Minor Tactics 54 Typical Attack and Withdrawal 55 Rearguard Action 55

_Prepared from Combat Reports and published by direction of the Chief of Staff by Operations Division in collaboration with other Divisions of the War Department General Staff, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces._

SECTION I

INFANTRY

BATTLE LEADERSHIP

Again and again reports from the battlefields confirm the importance of leadership in every grade, whether it be Corporal or Colonel. Other combat lessons are important; the exercise of leadership in battle is vital. Leadership has often been defined in theory. Here are some instances of its application or its absence on the battlefield. These are but a few examples; there are many others.

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=Junior Officer in Battle= _Captain William T. Gordon, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “Since November 8, I have had seventeen officers in my company, and I am the only one who started out with it who is left in the fight. In Tunisia, from troops pinned down in the dark, I have heard enlisted men call out such things as ‘Where is an officer to lead us?’--‘We don’t want to lie here--we want to attack--where is an officer?’... In each case an officer or officers have risen to the occasion, but this nevertheless shows beyond anything else the demand for battle leadership.

“A company officer must build a legend about himself. He must take calculated risks. He must, on the other hand, do what he expects his men to do: he must always dig in; always take cover. His men must know that when he ducks they must duck; on the other hand, they must not believe that when the officer ducks they must run away. The officer must come through every barrage and bombing with a sheepish grin and a wry remark. Masterly understatement of hardship and danger endured plus a grin always pays dividends.

=Hate Your Enemy!= “Our men do not ordinarily hate. They _must_ hate. They are better soldiers when they hate. They must not fraternize with prisoners--must not give them cigarettes and food the moment they are taken. Hate can be taught men by meticulous example. The Rangers are so taught.”

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=Leaders in Front= _Staff Sergeant Richard E. Deland, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “We want our Captain out front; we don’t care much about the position of our battalion commander.”

=Keep Them Moving!= _Operation Report, Seventh Army, ~Sicily~_: “During an attack officers and non-commissioned officers must never allow men to lie prone and passive under enemy fire. They must be required to move forward if this is at all possible. If movement is absolutely impossible, have the troops at least open fire. The act of firing induces self-confidence in attacking troops. The familiar expression ‘Dig or Die’ has been greatly overworked. Attacking troops must not be allowed to dig in until they have secured their final objective. If they dig in when momentarily stopped by enemy fire, it will take dynamite to blast them from their holes and resume the advance.”

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=NCO Leadership= _Staff Sergeant Robert J. Kemp, Platoon Sergeant, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “NCO leadership is important. Leaders, NCO’s, and officers should be taken to an OP for terrain instruction and study before an attack. This has been possible in my outfit about one-fourth of the time. We have what is called an ‘Orders Group,’ which consists of that group of officers and NCO’s that must be assembled for instruction before any tactical move.”

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=Keep Your Mission in Mind!= _Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Thayer, Field Artillery, Observer With Fifth Army, ~Italy~_: “Difficulty was experienced in making patrol leaders realize the importance of bringing back information by a specified hour, in time to be of value. Patrols often returned, after encountering resistance, without accomplishing their mission. Sending them back to accomplish their mission, despite their fatigue, seemed to be the most effective solution to the training problem involved, although the information required often arrived too late.”

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_Lieutenant Colonel T. F. Bogart, Infantry, Observer With Fifth Army, ~Italy~_: “Greater emphasis must be placed on inculcating in junior officers and NCO’s the will to accomplish assigned missions despite opposition. A few accounts of patrol actions illustrate this point:

“(1) A reconnaissance patrol consisting of a platoon was sent out at about 1900 one evening to determine the strength if any of the Germans in two small towns, the first about two miles away and the second about three miles farther on. The patrol reached the outskirts of the first town and met an Italian who told them there were no Germans in the town and then started to lead the patrol into town. A few hundred yards farther a German machine gun opened up, the Italian disappeared, three of the patrol were killed, and the others dispersed. They drifted back to our battalion during the night, and it was not until nearly daylight that the practically valueless report of the action was received. Not the slightest conception of the strength in the first town was obtained and no information of the second town. It was necessary to send out another patrol with the same mission.

“(2) A patrol was sent out with the mission of determining the condition of a road, especially bridges, over a three-mile stretch to the front. When this patrol had covered about a mile it ran into a motorized German patrol. Two of the Americans were killed, and the platoon leader claimed six Germans. The patrol leader forgot his mission, returned to the battalion CP with the remainder of his patrol, and had to be sent out again with a great loss in time in getting the information desired.

“(3) On several occasions patrols were sent out on reconnaissance missions with instructions to get certain information by a specific time. The hour would pass and sometimes several others without a word from the patrol. Sometimes it was due to difficulties encountered, sometimes to mistakes in computation of time and space factors, but in all cases there was no good reason why _some_ information did not get back _by the specified time_.”

=COMMENT: The failure of patrols in these instances stems from a lack of appreciation on the part of NCO’s and junior officers of their ~missions~. In patrol actions, as in the operations of larger units, the ~mission~ must be kept uppermost in the minds of all ranks, and no action should be undertaken which does not contribute directly to the accomplishment of that mission. Conversely, no incidental or inadvertent contact with the enemy should deter or divert patrols from the complete accomplishment of their missions, to include compliance with ~all~ instructions given, where humanly possible.=

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=Team Up!= _Captain William T. Gordon, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “I have found that men in position must fight in pairs; an order that 50 per cent stay awake is thus easily enforced; it bolsters morale and nerves.

=Rally Point= “In every company attack order a reserve force must be prescribed; I always do even though sometimes this force consists only of myself and my First Sergeant. Often a soldier who a moment before has run away is converted into a fighter by leadership. A reserve force gives him a rallying point.”

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=Fear is Normal= _Colonel George Taylor, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “_Fear of being afraid_ is the greatest obstacle for the new man in battle to overcome. There is no reason for shame in being afraid. Men who have had excellent battle records freely admit they are scared stiff in battle. The important thing is that every soldier must be taught all he needs to know so well that battlefield thinking is reduced to a minimum; automatic, disciplined reactions to battlefield problems must be the rule.

“In battle the worst element is mental and nervous exhaustion. There is no real rest under fire. The ability to withstand fire is more important than all the knowledge in the world.”

SICILY--ITALY--ATTU

NIGHT ATTACK

=Surprise Saves Lives= _Major John R. Patterson, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “The mission of our battalion after landing south of GELA in Sicily was to capture the airport at BISCARI. The battalion used the _silent night attack_. The three rifle companies were in line with the heavy-weapons company in reserve. To reach its line of departure, the battalion crossed two precipitous ridges using two control lines, then climbed the cliff at the airport to the line of departure. All this was done silently under cover of darkness.

“The attack was started with a hand grenade. We didn’t fire until the Germans counterattacked. We went in with bayonets and hand grenades and caught some of the Germans undressed and dressing. The MK IV tanks fired their guns but wouldn’t close on us. The enemy knew their men were all about, so fired their machine guns and rifles mainly into the air.

“The first counterattack came in two hours, and there was one about each hour thereafter until 1600. They had all emplacements wired and fixed with trip-wire booby traps. We removed the traps and used the emplacements during counterattacks.

“We found a line of airplane bombs wired to blow up the area; we de-activated them. A German plane landed just as we were ready to leave the line of departure. Later, one of our men grenaded it.

“The battalion took no transportation. I had with me the S-3, one runner, and one 511 radio.[A] The wire came up thirty minutes later, but was not necessary.

[A] A twenty-pound, battery-operated, short-range transmitter-receiver.

“I estimate the enemy had a reinforced battalion. His tanks and self-propelled’s came up later. Some of the enemy were air personnel, and there were about eleven AA guns set up for antipersonnel use.

“Our attack lasted thirty minutes. We had no casualties during the attack; two were killed during the counterattacks.”

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=Hand-to-Hand Fighting= _Captain Jarrold, Infantry_: “At BISCARI AIRPORT I used my trench knife twice. One of my men got three with his bayonet. He shot one, then another tried to grab his bayonet. He got this one with the bayonet. That got him started, so he got three in all before it was over.

=Small Arms Against Armor= “We found that caliber .30 AP pierces enemy armored half-tracks at close ranges.”

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=Platoon Action= _Lieutenant Hollerich, Infantry_: “Company A, moving forward in darkness to participate in the BISCARI AIRPORT fight, ran right into the enemy position. Before the fight started, my platoon crossed the road just above a culvert and reached the south edge of the airport, but I was ordered to take it back to a position just east of the culvert. I wish I could have stayed where I was because it was a perfect place from which to envelop the resistance in front of my company.

“When the enemy machine guns opened up we threw grenades. The machine guns pulled back out of grenade fire. Then NCO’s and Browning Automatic Riflemen went up over the embankment, through and beyond the initial enemy positions. Eventually we had a base of fire of about twenty men including the BAR’s.

“During the enemy counterattacks we did pretty well with other fire, too. Lead was flying fast and furiously at twenty to thirty yards. We fire at flashes. In this kind of firing _you learn to fire and roll to one side or they’ll soon get you_.”

“One of the corporals sneaked up on a dug-in vehicle and got it with an ’03 rifle grenade at 25 yards.

“The ‘bazooka’ man of my platoon heard ‘Tanks to the right,’ went around a bend in the road, and fired at about 35 yards. He got the first of a pair of vehicles. A German officer tried to capture him with a pistol, but he gave the officer an uppercut and then killed him with his helmet. I don’t know how the other vehicle was knocked out, but one of the BAR men got its driver.

=COMMENT: In these accounts of a successful night attack by a small unit the application of the following principles is worthy of note:=

=_a._ Close control during the approach by the use of control lines adjusted to difficult terrain features.=

=_b._ Designation of a Line of Departure as close to the objective as possible and after all major terrain obstacles had been passed. This is essential to assure proper organization of the unit immediately prior to the assault.=

=_c._ Attainment of the vital element of surprise (Germans caught undressed and dressing, airplanes landing on the field).=

=_d._ Use of the bayonet and hand grenades with no weapon firing permitted. It may often be advisable to prohibit the loading of rifles.=

=_e._ Use of frontal attack only. Any attempt at envelopment tends to cause disorder and confusion. Note that one platoon which had advanced ahead of the general line was pulled back to conform.=

=_f._ A definite and limited objective--capture of an airfield, in this case--in which the entire front could be covered by manpower rather than fire-power.=

=These are the major elements of a successful night attack brought out in the foregoing account. Others not mentioned but which were undoubtedly contributing factors in this operation are:=

=Careful planning in minute detail.=

=Precise, specific orders.=

=Careful arrangements for maintenance of direction.=

=Thorough daylight reconnaissance by as many of the leaders as possible.=

=Use of compact columns in the approach formation until the Line of Departure is reached.=

KNOCKING OUT PILLBOXES

_Colonel Rogers, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “The neutralization and reduction of concrete pillboxes played an important part in the Sicilian campaign. In the initial landing phases alone, this regiment cleaned out over thirty of these pillboxes. They were located all over the place as we went inland.

“They were cleverly constructed and elaborately camouflaged. Many were covered with brush, grass, straw, or other natural stuff. Others had cane houses built over them to represent peasant outbuildings or huts. All those we encountered in and about villages and towns were covered over with some kind of house to conceal them. Most of these were cane or wood shacks, though some were actually covered with plaster or stucco to represent real houses. Many had dummy houses built right over the pillbox, and windows arranged to give full freedom of fire from the embrasures of the pillbox inside the shell of the building. In the open country a number were also built with hay ricks and straw stacks over them, all very natural and innocent looking.

“Reduction of these often proved very simple, and in many cases the enemy simply dug his own grave in his efforts at camouflage. When we learned not to be surprised by them and recognized them for what they were, we developed a very simple method of dealing with the ones concealed by straw, hay, cane, and other inflammable material. We dosed them freely with white phosphorus, especially from the attached chemical mortars, and this did the work to perfection. We set the camouflage on fire, blinded the gunners inside, and choked them with the phosphorus and the smoke from the burning hay, straw, and other material. The fire and heat, too, made the interiors untenable, and the occupants would become terrified and come out and surrender in a bunch.

“In one place near LICATA there were several of these straw- and hay-covered pillboxes, also some concealed with cane huts, arranged at key positions in country covered with wheat fields and terraced grain plantings. We simply set a first-class prairie fire with our white phosphorus, and burned out a position over 2,500 yards long. We waited until the wind was right and let them have it. Every pillbox was burned out. The more difficult pillboxes that wouldn’t burn we attacked with massed fire from mortars of all types, AT guns, and heavy machine guns. In the case of very tough ones that were reinforced, we used ‘bazooka’ rockets and at times sent men up close under heavy covering fire and knocked them out with bangalore torpedoes.”

=COMMENT: The use of fire is, of course, dependent on favorable weather conditions. Careful coordination is also necessary to insure that the resulting smoke does not interfere with the operations and observation of adjacent units.=

INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE

The following cases of individual initiative and heroism during the SALERNO landing were reported by the --th Infantry: