Part 13

“I. That on the morning of the 27th of July, 1778, having a fleet of thirty ships of the line under his command, and being then in the presence of a French fleet of the like number of ships of the line, the said admiral did not make the necessary preparations for fight, did not put his fleet into a line of battle, or into any order proper either for receiving or attacking an enemy of such force; but, on the contrary, although his fleet was already dispersed and in disorder, he, by making the signal for several ships of the vice-admiral of the blue’s division to chase to windward, increased the disorder of that part of the fleet, and the ships were, in consequence, more scattered than they had been before; and whilst in this disorder, he advanced to the enemy, and made the signal for battle.

“That the above conduct was the more unaccountable, as the enemy’s fleet was not then in disorder, nor beaten, nor flying, but formed in a regular line of battle, on that tack which approached the British fleet (all their notions plainly indicating a design to give battle), and they edged down and attacked it whilst in disorder. By this unofficer-like conduct a general engagement was not brought on, but the other flag-officers and captains were left to engage without order or regularity, from whence great confusion ensued; some of his ships were prevented getting into action at all, others were not near enough to the enemy, and some from the confusion, fired into others of the king’s ships, and did them considerable damage; and the vice-admiral of the blue was left alone to engage singly and unsupported. In these instances the said Admiral Keppel negligently performed the duty imposed upon him.

“II. That after the van and centre divisions of the British fleet passed the rear of the enemy, the admiral did not immediately tack and double upon the enemy with those two divisions, and continue the battle; nor did he collect them together at that time, and keep so near the enemy as to be in readiness to renew the battle as soon as it might be proper; but, on the contrary, he stood away beyond the enemy to a great distance, before he wore to stand towards them again, leaving the vice-admiral of the blue engaged with the enemy, and exposed to be cut off.

“III. That after the vice-admiral of the blue had passed the last of the enemy’s ships, and immediately wore and laid his own ship’s head towards the enemy again, being then in their wake, and at a little distance only, and expecting the admiral to advance with all the ships to renew the fight, the admiral did not advance for that purpose, but shortened sail, hauled down the signal for battle; nor did he at that time, or at any other time, whilst standing towards the enemy, call the ships together, in order to renew the attack, as he might have done; particularly the vice-admiral of the red, and his division, which had received the least damage, had been the longest out of action, were ready and fit to renew it, were then to windward, and could have bore down and fetched any part of the French fleet, if the signal for battle had not been hauled down, or if the said Admiral Keppel had availed himself of the signal appointed by the thirty-first article of the fighting instructions, by which he might have ordered those to lead who are to lead with the starboard tacks on board by a wind, which signal was applicable to the occasion for renewing the engagement with advantage after the French fleet had been beaten, their line broken, and in disorder. In these instances he did not do the utmost in his power to tack, sink, burn, or destroy the French fleet that had attacked the British fleet.

“IV. That instead of advancing to renew the engagement, as in the preceding articles is alleged, and as he might and ought to have done, the admiral wore and made sail directly from the enemy, and thus he led the whole British fleet away from them, which gave them the opportunity to rally unmolested, and to form again into a line of battle, and to stand after the British fleet: this was disgraceful to the British flag, for it had the appearance of a flight, and gave the French admiral a pretence to claim the victory, and to publish to the world that the British fleet ran away, and that he pursued it with the fleet of France, and offered it battle.

“V. That on the morning of the 28th of July, 1778, when it was perceived that only three of the French fleet remained near the British, in the situation the whole had been in the night before, and that the rest were to leeward, at a greater distance, not in a line of battle, but in a heap, the admiral did not cause the fleet to pursue the flying enemy, nor even to chase the three ships that fled after the rest; but, on the contrary, he led the British fleet another way, directly from the enemy.

“By these instances of misconduct and neglect a glorious opportunity was lost of doing a most essential service to the State, and the honour of the British navy was tarnished.”

The trial lasted thirty-two days, and the evidence was very extensive and very minute; but, after all was heard, it left the affair much as stated by Mr. Yonge in his account of it. The following incidents from the testimony adduced may be read with interest.

_Captain Marshall_, of the _Arethusa_ frigate, the first witness called, stated in answer to the question, whether Admiral Keppel conducted himself unbecoming a flag-officer; “No, as God is my judge!”

_Captain Sir William Chaloner Burnaby_, Bart., of the _Milford_, in his evidence, informed the court, that when he first perceived the French fleet, the afternoon of the 23rd, they were to eastward of our fleet, nearly a-head, or rather leeward, standing towards us, and appearing to be in great disorder; that, the _Milford_ having received orders from the admiral to reconnoitre the enemy, he made towards them. That at half past four he tacked and stood towards the _Victory_, the French fleet nearly then beginning to form a line a-head, seeming to direct their course to leeward of our fleet, and very little from the wind. About half past eight o’clock the British admiral made signal for the fleet to bring to, and, to the best of his recollection, it continued in that situation all night. Upon further interrogations it appeared from Sir William that the French fleet were all that day forming in line of battle; that on the 25th and 26th the weather was squally, with fresh gales, that occasioned such a northwest swell as is usual with such winds; that they kept the weather-gauge of us all the time, generally observing their line of battle, and rather gained upon our fleet, sometimes carrying a pressing sail, at other times under an easy sail, for the better perfecting their line of battle; and that during all that time, had they been ever so much disposed to attack our fleet, they could not have done it without disadvantage, as they could not, without risk, fight their lee lower-deck guns, whilst we could fight our weather lower-deck guns. Sir William was cross-examined by Admiral Keppel as to the vice-admiral’s situation and conduct after the engagement; when it appeared, that from the natural superiority of the _Victory_ over the _Formidable_ in sailing, and the damage the latter had sustained, Sir Hugh Palliser could not accompany the admiral; but that he did not see him make any signal of his disability.

In the course of the admiral’s questions to Sir William he asked, did I not pursue with a press of sail, conformable to my worst sailing ships, to close and get up, until the moment I brought them to battle, except the two times after the 24th that I made the signal for the line? Sir Hugh objected to this as a leading question.

_Admiral Keppel_: “I desire I may not be interrupted by the accuser. I am trying for my life, and for my honour, which is dearer, and I hope for the protection of the court.” Soon after he said, “I would have fired at the French if they had not fired at me.” Sir William Burnaby concluded by saying, Admiral Keppel always pressed sail, and gave every proof of a great desire of bringing the French to battle.

_Captain Digby_, of the _Ramillies_, was called: Sir Hugh Palliser began to interrogate him with regard to the business of the 23rd, when Admiral Keppel begged the Court to take notice, that, for the purpose of shortening, if possible, the length to which he saw the trial would necessarily extend, if they still went over the same ground, and questions were repeatedly asked which he had admitted, he again told them that he admitted that the French fleet put themselves into order of battle when we discovered them. When Captain Digby mentioned, that from squally weather there was a swelling sea, and was asked whether the ships could then fight their lower-deck guns; he said, he could not have fought all his.

_Admiral Montagu_: In both articles of the charge, Admiral Keppel is charged with running away from the French fleet. Did you that day see him run away from them, instead of advancing to renew the engagement, as he might and ought to have done, which are the words expressed in the charge?

The charge was then read, and an objection started by Sir Hugh Palliser to the question, as contrary to law. Upon which several members of the court-martial said, “We do not care sixpence in this case for the law; we are come here to do justice, and hope, in God’s name, it will be done.”

_Admiral Montagu_: If Admiral Keppel ran away, Captain Digby did so too; and I suppose every part of the fleet followed their leader. Did you that day run away from the French fleet?—No.

_Captain Hood_, of the _Robuste_, was called upon and examined. _Admiral Arbuthnot_ asked him if the admiral had thought fit to have renewed the attack when the French line was broke, could you have obeyed his signal and gone down to the enemy in the condition you were in?—I could not.

_Admiral Montagu_: From their relative situation, as you have described them, do you think the British admiral was running away from the enemy?—At that time there was no appearance of a flight.

Did the admiral run away any other time?—There was nothing in his conduct at any time which indicated, in the most distant manner, a flight. In the morning he pursued them.

_Captain Allen_, of the _Egmont_, was called, and he was finally put these questions. Sir, was it not more proper and prudent in the admiral to lay to, and repair his disabled ships before he renewed the attack, than to have returned to the engagement immediately?—Assuredly it was.

Then, sir, upon the whole did it appear to you, as an old experienced officer, that Admiral Keppel did by his conduct, either on the 27th or 28th of July, tarnish the honour of the British navy?—No; and I should not take upon me to say thus much, if I had not been forty years at sea, and three-and-thirty years an officer. I look upon it, the admiral did much honour to, instead of tarnishing, the British navy.

One circumstance showed very strongly the animus of Sir Hugh Palliser. It was discovered in the course of the trial, that some leaves had been taken out of the log book of the _Formidable_, containing the work of the 26th, 27th and 28th July, and the master of the _Formidable_ was required to attend to explain.

Now such a witness should not be interfered with before coming to court by the prosecutor; yet that Sir Hugh Palliser did so interfere, appears by the following incident. _Vice-admiral Palliser_ to the President: Sir, the cutting leaves out of the _Formidable’s_ log-book, is a fact of which I was totally ignorant, until it was perceived by a member of this court; nor could any person be more astonished at it than myself. It is my most anxious wish to have this matter fully investigated; and, for that purpose, I have ordered the master of the _Formidable_, and the mate who made the entries, to attend here this morning; and, that they may be more strictly interrogated upon the matter, I desire that they may be examined by the court and Admiral Keppel, without any previous question from me.

_Mr. Forfar_, the master of the _Formidable_, being then called and sworn, and his former oath read to him, respecting the originality of the log-book, Admiral Keppel observed, that his reason for wishing to trouble the court the preceding day, when he requested the master of the _Formidable_ might be immediately interrogated respecting that alteration, was to prevent any intermediate communication between him and others upon that subject; he, therefore, desired to know who was the person who first acquainted him, that the court had discovered any extraordinary circumstance relating to the book; and whether, and with whom, he had any conversation on that subject before the rising of the court the evening before? The witness answered, that he had heard a woman mention it to another in a shop where he had been; that it was between one and two o’clock, at that time, and he immediately came to the witnesses’ room that he might be ready to attend the court if he should be called; that in his way, he met the master of the _Foudroyant_, who told him he thought he would be wanted on that business; that he spoke to no other person till he came into witnesses’ room, where he saw Captain Walsingham, who told him he supposed he was come about the log-book; that he had no other conversation about it, till after the court broke up, when he conversed upon it with Captain Bazeley, at his lodgings, next door to the vice-admiral’s; shortly after which he went to Sir Hugh Palliser’s house.

Sir Hugh Palliser here observed, that in order to save the court trouble, he readily admitted that he had not only conversed with the witness before on the subject, but had interrogated him very strictly indeed on the subject. The master of the _Formidable_ then made a very lame explanation as to the cutting out of the leaves in question.

The evidence being concluded for the prosecution, Admiral Keppel addressed the court in his defence, in a speech, in the composition of which he is said to have been assisted by his illustrious friend, Edmund Burke. Keppel spoke as follows:—

SIR,—After forty years spent in the service of my country, little did I think of being brought to a court-martial to answer charges of misconduct, negligence in the performance of duty, and tarnishing the honour of the British navy. These charges, sir, have been advanced by my accuser. Whether he has succeeded in proving them or not, the court will determine. Before he brought me to trial, it would have been candid in him to have given vent to his thoughts, and not, by a deceptions show of kindness, to lead me into the mistake of supposing a friend in the man who was my enemy in his heart, and was shortly to be my accuser. Yet, sir, after all my misconduct; after so much negligence in the performance of my duty; and after tarnishing so deeply the honour of the British navy, my accuser made no scruple to sail a second time with that man who had been the betrayer of his country. Nay, during the time that we were on shore, he corresponded on terms of friendship, and even in his letters he approved of what had been done, of the part which he now condemns, and of the very negligent misconduct which has since been so offensive in his eyes!

Such behaviour, sir, on the part of my accuser, gave me little reason to apprehend an accusation from him. Nor had I any reason to suppose that the State would criminate me. When I returned, His Majesty received me with the greatest applause. Even the first lord of the Admiralty gave his flattering testimony to the rectitude of my conduct, and seemed with vast sincerity to applaud my zeal for the service. Yet, in the moment of approbation, it seems as if a scheme was concerting against my life; for, without any previous notice, five articles of a charge were exhibited against me by Sir Hugh Palliser, who, most unfortunately for his cause, lay himself under an imputation of disobedience of orders at the very time when he accused me of negligence. This, to be sure, was a very ingenious mode of getting the start of me. An accusation exhibited against a commander-in-chief might draw off the public opinion from neglect of duty in an inferior officer. I could almost wish, in pity to my accuser, that appearances were not so strong against him. Before the trial commenced, I actually thought that my accuser might have some tolerable reason for his conduct. But from the evidence even as adduced to account for the behaviour of the honourable gentleman in the afternoon of the 27th of July; from that evidence, I say, sir, I find that I was mistaken. The trial has left my accuser without excuse, and he now cuts that sort of figure which I trust in God all accusers of innocence will exhibit!

I have observed, sir, that the opinions of officers of different ranks have been taken. I trust that the court will indulge me in the liberty in the evidence for my defence. Some have refused to give their opinions. I thought it strange, as plain speaking and a full declaration are the best of evidences in a good cause.

I would wish, sir, the court to consider that in all great naval, as well as military operations, unless the design be fully known, the several manœuvres may have a strange appearance. Masters have been called to give their opinions on the higher departments of command. Higher authorities should have been taken. Such authorities are not scarce; for I am happy to say, there never was a country served by naval officers of more bravery, skill and gallantry, than England can boast at present. As to this court, I entreat you, gentlemen, who compose it, to recollect that you sit here as a court of honour, as well as a court of justice, and I now stand before you not merely to save my life, but for a purpose of infinitely greater moment—to clear my fame.

My accuser, sir, has been not a little mistaken in his notions of the duty of a commander-in-chief, or he never would have accused me in the manner he has done. During action, subordinate officers either are, or they ought to be, too attentive to their own duty to observe the manœuvres of others. In general engagements, it is scarcely possible for the same objects to appear in the same point of view to the commanders of two different ships. The point of sight may be different. Clouds of smoke may obstruct the view. Hence will arise the difference in the opinions of officers as to this or that manœuvre, without any intentional partiality. Whether I have conceived objects in exact correspondence with the truth—whether I have viewed them unskilfully (or as my accuser has been pleased to term it, unofficer-like), these are matters which remain to be determined. I can only say, that what Sir Hugh Palliser has imputed to me as negligence, was the effect of deliberation and choice. I will add, that I was not confined in my powers when I sailed; I had ample discretion to act as I thought proper for the defence of the kingdom. I manœuvred; I fought; I returned; I did my best. If my abilities were not equal to the task, I have the consolation to think that I did not solicit, nor did I bargain for the command. More than two years ago, in the month of November, 1776, I received a letter from the first lord of the marine department, wherein he observed, that, owing to motions of foreign courts, it might be necessary to prepare a fleet of observation. My reply to this letter was, That I was ready to receive any command from his majesty, and I begged to have the honour of an audience. This request was complied with. I was closetted, and I told the king I was willing to serve him as long as my health would permit. I heard no more till the month of March 1778, at which time I had two or three audiences, and I told his majesty that I had no acquaintance with his ministers, but I trusted to his protection and zeal for the public good. Here were no sinister views; no paltry gratifications; I had nothing—I felt nothing, but an earnest desire to serve my country. I even accepted the command in chief with reluctance. I was apprehensive of not being supported at home. I foresaw that the higher the command, the more liable was I to be ruined in my reputation. Even my misfortunes, if I had any, might be construed into crimes. During forty years’ service, I have not received any particular mark of favour from the crown. I have only been honoured with the confidence of my sovereign in times of public danger. Neither my deficiencies, nor my misconduct, were ever before brought forward to the public. And it is now somewhat strange, that so well acquainted as my accuser must have been with my deficient abilities, it is strange, I say, sir, that he should be the very person who brought me the message to take the command upon me! Nay, further, sir, he brought that message with great seeming pleasure! There was, or there was not, reason at that time to doubt my ability. If there was reason, how could my accuser wish me to accept a command for which I was disqualified? If there was not any reason to doubt my professional abilities sixteen months ago, I have given no reason why they should since be called in question. When I returned from the expedition, I did not complain of anything. I endeavoured to stop all murmurings. I even trusted the first lord of the Admiralty in the same manner as I would have done my most intimate friend. This might be imprudent—it might be dangerous; but, sir, I am by nature open and unguarded, and little did I expect that traps would be artfully laid to endeavour to catch me on the authority of my own words.

It was in the month of March, 1778, that I was told a fleet lay ready for me to command. When I reached Portsmouth, I saw six ships ready, and, on viewing even those with a seaman’s eye, I was not by any means pleased with their condition. Before I quitted Portsmouth, four or five more were ready, and I will do the persons in office the justice to say, that from that time they used their utmost diligence in getting the fleet ready for service.

On the 20th of June, I sailed with twenty ships of the line, and very fortunately I fell in with the _Belle Poule_, and other French frigates, and the letters and papers found on board them were of material service to the state. Captain Marshall distinguished himself with the greatest honour. I confess that when I fell in with those frigates, I was at a loss how to act. On the one hand, I conceived the incident to be favourable to my country; and, on the other, I was fearful that a war with France and all its consequences might be laid to my charge. For anything I can tell, this may be the case. It may be treasured up to furnish another matter for future accusation. To this hour I have neither received official approbation, nor censure for my conduct. With twenty ships of the line I sailed. Thirty-two ships of the line lay in Brest water, besides an incredible number of frigates. Was I to seek an engagement with a superior force? I never did, nor shall I ever fear to engage a force superior to the one I then commanded, or that I may hereafter command. But I well knew what men and ships can do; and, if the fleet I commanded had been destroyed, we must have left the French masters of the sea. To refit a fleet requires time. From the situation of affairs, naval stores are not very soon supplied. Never did I experience so deep a melancholy as when I found myself forced to turn my back on France! I quitted my station, and my courage was never put to so severe a trial.