Part 12

In 1755, he sailed as commodore in the _Centurion_, for Virginia, having on board General Braddock, and under his convoy a fleet of transports, with 2,000 troops, to drive the French from their encroachments on the Ohio. The event of that expedition, as is well known, was unfortunate, and would have been more so, but for the co-operation of Keppel. During his absence he was elected to Parliament for the city of Chichester, in the room of his brother, who had succeeded to the earldom of Albemarle at his father’s death. In January, 1757, Keppel was the junior member of the memorable court-martial, at Portsmouth, which tried Admiral Byng; and (for the law gave him no alternative) he was obliged to concur in the sentence which adjudged the admiral to be shot to death. He, however, strenuously endeavoured to save him; and in his place in the Commons, applied to the House on behalf of himself, and several other members of the court-martial, praying the aid of Parliament to be released from the oath of secrecy imposed on courts-martial, in order to disclose the grounds on which that sentence was passed. The obvious intent of this leave to disclose, was to allow the members of the court-martial to openly comment on and protest against the monstrosity of a law which compelled them to an award of death for an error in judgment; and thus might they avert its effects. The Commons listened to the prayer; the sentence was for the moment respited, and a bill passed the House to release the members of the court-martial from the obligation of the oath of secrecy. But the upper House was less merciful; after examining the several members of the court-martial, the Lords unanimously rejected the bill. To the third question, among those, which the Lords put to the members of the court-martial on that occasion, viz., the question,—“Whether you are desirous the present bill should pass?”—Keppel, with Rear Admiral Norris, and Captain (afterwards Sir John) Moore, answered in the affirmative; and to the fourth question,—“Whether you are of opinion that you have any particulars to reveal relative to the case of, and the sentence passed upon, Admiral Byng, which you judge necessary for His Majesty’s information, and which you think likely to incline His Majesty to mercy,”—Keppel replied, “I think that I cannot answer that question without particularising the reasons for my vote and opinion.” The House, by not passing the bill, would not allow him to do so, and the shameful sentence was, despite of his humane endeavour, carried into execution. Commodore Keppel, in 1758, sailed from Spithead with a squadron and land forces, on an expedition against the French settlements at Goree, on the coast of Africa, which he reduced by a vigorous attack. In Hawke’s memorable naval victory over the French armament under Conflans, Captain Keppel, in the _Torhay_, had a brilliant share; he sunk the enemy’s ship, _Thésée_, of equal force to his own vessel, at the second broadside. Again, while in command of the _Valiant_, he victoriously served under Sir Edward Hawke in Quiberon Bay. In October following, just before King George II.’s death, he was appointed to command the fleet on an intended expedition, in which General Kingsley was to command the troops; and His Majesty saw a battalion of the foot guards march by Kensington Palace for that purpose two days only before his death. The royal demise occasioned a suspension of the expedition. In 1761, Commodore Keppel commanded the British fleet at the celebrated reduction of Belleisle; and in 1762, he contributed greatly to the reduction of the _Havannah_, being second in command under Sir George Pocock, who said, “that Keppel executed the service under his direction with the greatest spirit, activity, and diligence.” In 1763, he was a Lord of the Admiralty; in 1765, he was appointed rear, and in 1770 vice, admiral of the blue. Keppel had thus risen to the very highest repute, and deservedly so. He was a man of cultivated mind and generous soul, and was a thorough British sailor,—brave, prudent, energetic, and indefatigable. His frankness, affability and good humour, won him the unbounded love of the seamen, who gave him the affectionate and familiar title of “Jack’s protector.” It was in the very midst of this credit and popularity that the Government of the day—the disastrous administration of Lord North—sought to re-enact against Keppel the tragedy of Admiral Byng. The occasion was this:—

The court of France having, in February, 1778, acknowledged the independence of America, proceeded to make an open avowal of the hostile sentiments they had long entertained against England, by detaining all British ships to be found in the French ports. Orders were, in consequence, given by the British ministry to fit out a fleet of twenty sail of the line with the utmost expedition; the command of which was offered to Admiral Keppel. As the ministry had, in a great measure, lost the confidence of the country, the eyes of the whole nation were turned on Keppel, in whose appointment every one seemed to feel his own security included. On this occasion, therefore, he had a great deal to risk. His well-earned fame was now to be staked on the doubtful issue of a single battle. The part he had taken in politics, and the close friendship in which he lived with the leading members of the opposition, augmented these difficulties, and even rendered the command that was offered him extremely hazardous; for the ministers were his political enemies, and political hostility at this time was carried to a very great height. Any failure, therefore, whether proceeding from unavoidable accident, or those misfortunes which the wisest and bravest cannot repel, might attach censure on him, and be attended with disagreeable, if not with dangerous, consequences. A due consideration of all these incidental difficulties made him hesitate in accepting an appointment so pregnant with danger from the hands of ministers; but in consequence of a royal message delivered to him through the first lord of the admiralty, he attended in the closet to receive the commands of his sovereign; and in that and the subsequent royal audiences, he delivered himself with that plainness, candour, and sincerity, which so strongly marked his character. He particularly took the liberty of observing, that he served in obedience to His Majesty’s commands, that he was unacquainted with his ministers _as ministers_, and that he took the command as it was, without making any difficulty, and without asking a single favour, trusting only to His Majesty’s good intentions, and to his generous support and protection. Keppel sailed from St. Helen’s on the 13th of June, 1778, with a naval force and with unlimited discretionary powers. But this force was of no more than twenty sail of the line, many of which were in a bad state of equipment, and was extremely inadequate for the important service which was entrusted to him. On the one hand, it was well known that France had a large fleet at Brest ready for sea; and, on the other, the great commercial fleets of England were on their passage home from the East and West Indies. Besides, the defence of these fleets, he had to protect the extensive coast of Great Britain, together with those invaluable reservoirs of her naval power, in which were equally included her present strength and her future hope.

After much mature consideration, Keppel finally resolved to yield everything to what he conceived to be a faithful discharge of the great trust reposed in him. He wisely thought that the only fleet which was then prepared to protect the commerce and the coast of his country, ought not to be hazarded against vast odds, either upon personal or professional punctilio. His conquest over the feelings of pride, was so extremely difficult, that he afterwards declared, “he never in his life felt so deep a melancholy, as on finding himself even for the moment obliged to turn his back on France; and that his courage was never put to such a trial as in that retreat; but that it was his firm persuasion his country was saved by it.” The fleet returned to Portsmouth on the 27th of June, and being joined by such ships as were ready, the admiral sailed again on the 9th of July, with twenty-four sail of the line, and two days afterwards was joined by six more. In all, therefore, he had now thirty sail of the line, four frigates, and two fire-ships. The day before Keppel’s departure from Portsmouth, the great French fleet, amounting to thirty-two sail of the line, and a vast number of frigates, sailed from Brest, under the command of the Count d’Orvilliers.

The actual encounter with the French cannot be better described than in the narrative of it given by Mr. C. D. Yonge, in his “History of the British Navy:” he writes thus:—

“On the 9th of July, 1778, Keppel again put to sea with a splendid fleet of thirty sail of the line and four frigates. With him were the Vice-Admirals Sir Hugh Palliser, Bart. (a Lord of the Admiralty at the time), and Sir Robert Harland, Bart.; and, among his captains were, John Jervis, of the _Foudroyant_, 80 (afterwards Earl St. Vincent), and in the _Robust_, 74, Captain Alexander Hood, afterwards Viscount Bridport. The French fleet had quitted Brest the day before; the commander-in-chief was the Comte d’Orvilliers; and among the subordinate admirals was a prince of the royal blood, the Duc de Chartres, subsequently known as that Duc d’Orleans who voted for the murder of his relation and king, the hapless Louis XVI. The Duc de Chartres was one of the vilest of cowards;[15] and being also given, as such people sometimes are, to boasting of the exploits he intended to perform, he had lately announced to Admiral Sir George Rodney, at Paris, his appointment to a command in the fleet which was to combat Keppel. Rodney predicted that the result of the meeting would be that His Royal Highness would be conducted to England to learn English; but he and his commander did their best to defeat the prophecy by avoiding the battle for which he had professed so much eagerness.

Before he regained his old station off Brest, Keppel learnt that the French were at sea; and accordingly he kept off the land to search for them. The weather was so hazy that the two fleets nearly passed one another unconsciously; but on the afternoon of the 23rd the fog suddenly cleared off, and, to the surprise of both, they found themselves within a few miles of each other, some leagues to the west of Ushant. D’Orvilliers had probably been ignorant of Keppel’s return to England for reinforcements. At all events, he believed him to be far weaker than he really was, and at first showed every inclination to fight; but when, on approaching nearer, he ascertained the real strength of the British fleet, he showed that he had no idea of engaging on equal terms. He resolved to decline the battle; and his possession of the weather-gauge enabled him to do so. His conduct was a practical acknowledgment of the inferiority of French to British sailors; for more equal fleets could not be found. The French line-of-battle ships exceeded the English in number by two; but the English ships were rather the larger; and the English had two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight guns, to two thousand two hundred and seventy-six, that composed the armament of the French. In frigates, D’Orvilliers had a decided advantage; but however useful they might be before or after the battle, in the actual conflict they were not likely to have much weight. A fairer opportunity of testing the naval merits of the two nations could not be imagined. D’Orvilliers, however, kept away, and the next day was seen moving off in full retreat. Keppel, signalling to his fleet to form in fine of battle, and to chase, pursued with every sail his ships could carry; and, as two of the Frenchmen had fallen to leeward, he endeavoured to cut them off, in the hope of thus forcing his antagonist to a battle in order to save them. D’Orvilliers thought more of saving himself, and left the stragglers to their fate: their speed enabled them to escape, but they were unable to rejoin their comrades. The 24th, the 25th, the 26th, passed without any variation of the circumstances or relative positions of the two fleets. The French continued their retreat; we continued our pursuit. In the afternoon of the 26th, Keppel, thinking he was losing time by keeping his fleet in line of battle, hauled down that signal which had been constantly flying from the time he first saw the enemy, but still he kept up the signal to continue the chase.

“The French ships, however, as has been mentioned before, were generally superior to ours in sailing qualities, so that the chase would in all probability have been entirely fruitless, had not the wind suddenly shifted on the morning of the 27th from south-west to west-south-west; and, though this does not appear a very great change, it was sufficient to prevent the French admiral from any longer having the entire option of engaging in or avoiding a battle. It put in Keppel’s power to force on at least a partial action, and he instantly availed himself of the chance thus unexpectedly afforded him; but he found himself in some difficulty. The eagerness with which he had hitherto pressed on the chase had somewhat scattered his fleet. Harland was four miles off, on the _Victory’s_ weather quarter; Palliser, in the _Formidable_, was three miles or more to leeward, and as the way in which he handled his ship seemed to show a disposition to increase that distance, Keppel, desiring to unite his squadron to his own, signalled to Palliser to chase to windward. Finding an action inevitable, D’Orvilliers, to preserve his line of battle unbroken, caused his fleet to wear; but that and some other evolutions threw them into great disorder, and brought them nearer to the enemy whom their chief object was to avoid. These manœuvres had occupied nearly four hours. At last, a little before noon, Keppel made the signal to attack, and Sir Robert Harland, who commanded the van division, led the fleet gallantly into battle, passing along the French line, receiving their fire without returning it till he came up to their leading ships. Keppel followed with the centre, in like manner reserving his fire till he got alongside the French admiral himself, whom he had marked for his own especial antagonist, and was soon joined by Palliser and his squadron. For nearly two hours both fleets were hotly engaged. The loss of life was lightest in ours; but, from the French practice of aiming chiefly at the rigging, many of our ships were far more crippled than any of theirs. Keppel’s own flag-ship, the _Victory_, had received great damage; and five more of our ships were so much disabled that the admiral was not altogether without apprehension of losing some of them. Palliser’s ship, the _Formidable_, had suffered as severely as any, and Sir Hugh had been the first to quit the line. When the battle had lasted nearly two hours, with a view of enabling him to renew the action, and also of protecting the crippled ships, Keppel made the signal to wear. Harland and his division obeyed; but Palliser took no notice of the signal, making no attempt to renew the action himself, and, as was afterwards alleged, by his example preventing the rest from going to the admiral’s support. Later in the afternoon, Keppel sent a frigate to him with an express order to bear down; but the sun went down, and it was not till daylight the next morning that the _Formidable_ again took up the station assigned for her. But long before daylight all hope of renewing the battle was past. The lights of the enemy had been visible to our men all night; but, when day broke, it was discovered that they proceeded from only three ships. D’Orvilliers had stolen away with his main body, and, to prevent any suspicion of his flight from occurring to the British admiral, he had left three of his fastest sailers to keep up the same lights that were shown by the flag-ship, with instructions to set all sail and rejoin him as soon as daylight should reveal to the English the delusion that had been practised. Once more Keppel chased for an hour or two, and then, finding his efforts to overtake the enemy perfectly fruitless, he returned to Plymouth to repair the damage he had received.

“No ship was taken on either side, the number of our killed and wounded did not amount to above three-fourths of the loss sustained by the French; but the question of who were the victors was most clearly determined by a proof far more incontestable than any such minute calculation. The flight of the French, for their course on the 28th can be called by no other name, acknowledged their defeat in the most forcible manner. But, after having made such efforts to fit out a sufficient fleet, the British nation was not contented with a victory which required arithmetic and logic to prove it to have been one. Murmurs soon began to be heard, which presently assumed the definite shape of complaints that Palliser, by his disobedience to his commander’s signals, had prevented the renewal of the action, and by so doing had enabled the French to escape. In his official despatch Keppel was so far from having complained of Palliser’s behaviour, that he expressly named him as, “by his spirited conduct, having deserved much commendation.””

Before proceeding further, however, it should be here stated in fairness to the Count D’Orvilliers, (whom Keppel himself, in his defence, does not blame,) that Mr. Yonge seems to have taken rather a severe and incorrect view of the Count’s conduct in evading an engagement: D’Orvilliers, on the contrary, had great reasons for avoiding a battle, and his retreat was really a success. Another writer, the author of an excellent “British Naval Biography,” to whom I am much indebted in this article, puts the point very clearly, thus:

“It must not be attributed to any want of spirit in D’Orvilliers that he thus obstinately declined a battle. The motives of both commanders exactly corresponded with the different lines of conduct they pursued. Our East and West India convoys, of immense value, were on their return home, and hourly expected. The position maintained by the French fleet was extremely favourable for intercepting those convoys in the course they were expected to hold; and from the situation of the hostile fleets, and the state of the wind, they might have been captured in the English admiral’s sight, without a possibility of his preventing it. On the other hand, Keppel’s fleet effectually cut off that of his adversary from the port of Brest. It was, therefore, no less the object of Keppel to bring the enemy to an immediate action, than it was that of D’Orvilliers to avoid it.”

It was so, in fact, understood by the British public, who felt, at once, that the French had gained a great advantage, and that this action of July, 1778, had not been of that bold and decisive character which the country was used to expect from the navy.[16] The event gave rise to much animadversion, and at last was discussed by the newspapers and periodicals of the day with furious animosity. Party feeling embittered the question; for though Admiral Keppel was employed on account of his ability and experience, he was hostile to the then administration, so that any attempt to disparage him was attributed to the malevolence of the government.

In the House of Commons, of which both Admirals Keppel and Palliser were members, a motion was made for an inquiry, whereupon Admiral Keppel rose, and gave an account of his conduct from the time he assumed the command of the fleet. He declared, “That if he was again to go over the business of the 27th of July, he would conduct himself in the same manner. He said, everything he could do against the enemy had been done; but observed, at the same time, that the oldest and most experienced officers would discover something in every engagement, with which they were previously unacquainted; and he acknowledged that that day had presented something new to him.” Sir Hugh Palliser defended himself with much warmth, and accused Keppel of inconsistency in having officially commended his conduct, and in now wishing to insinuate that he had neglected to perform his duty. To this the admiral replied, “That the official praise which he had bestowed on all the officers under his command, to obviate discord, did not oblige him to authenticate statements which would impeach himself; but now, when called upon to speak out, he would inform the House, and the public, that the signal for coming into the _Victory’s_ wake, was flying from three o’clock in the afternoon till eight in the evening unobeyed; at the same time he did not charge the vice-admiral with actual disobedience, because he was fully persuaded of his personal bravery, and believed that if any inquiry was considered necessary that he would be able to justify himself.” This altercation led to a great deal of mutual recrimination between the two admirals, until at length Sir Hugh Palliser, on the 9th of December, delivered in an accusation to the Board of Admiralty, of which he was himself one of the lord commissioners. This accusation consisted of five separate charges against Keppel, for misconduct and neglect of duty in the action of the 27th of July; and the Board immediately ordered the admiral to be tried by a court-martial.

On the 7th of January, 1779, the signal was made for all the admirals and captains of His Majesty’s fleet to come on board the _Britannia_ in Portsmouth harbour.

Then the Judge-Advocate General, Sir Charles Gould, LL.D., read the order sent by the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir Thomas Pye, admiral of the white, to hold the court-martial, dated the 31st of December, 1778, signed Sandwich, T. Buller, Lisburne: and for adjourning to the Governor of Portsmouth’s house.

The court-martial consisted of the following members:—

President, Sir Thomas Pye, Kt., admiral of the white; Mathew Buckle, vice-admiral of the red; John Montagu, vice-admiral of the red; Mariot Arbuthnot, rear-admiral of the white; Robert Roddam, rear-admiral of the white; Captains Mark Milbank (afterwards an admiral), Francis Samuel Drake (afterwards an admiral and a baronet), Taylor Penny, John Moutray, William Bennet, Adam Duncan (afterwards an admiral and a viscount, the hero of Camperdown), Philip Boteler, and James Cranston.

Pursuant to the Admiralty order, the court adjourned to the house of the Governor of Portsmouth, and there the trial was held.

Keppel appeared before the court attended by a galaxy of friends; among them were some of the most illustrious personages in the kingdom, viz., the Dukes of Cumberland, Richmond, and Bolton; the Marquis of Rockingham, the Earls of Effingham and Albemarle, Edmund Burke, Charles James Fox, and Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Keppel’s counsel was Erskine—the Hon. Thomas Erskine, the future Lord Chancellor, then in the first year of his call to the bar, and already becoming famous as an advocate.

The proceedings commenced by the President desiring the Judge-Advocate, Sir Charles Gould, to read the charge, which was as follows:

“A charge of Misconduct and Neglect of Duty against the Honourable Admiral Keppel, on the 27th and 28th of July, 1778, in divers instances undermentioned.