Part 3

He says in his report, after giving the detail of his performance there, "I delayed one day in Lexington" (70 W. of R. 97). Colonel Hayes says _two_ days. (Id. 122.) Had he marched without delay he would have been in Lynchburg before Early or any part of his troops left Charlottesville, and the town would have surrendered without firing a gun. He delayed at Lexington that he might vent his personal ill-will upon the State of Virginia. He says in his report that he ordered the Virginia Military Institute, a college for the education of youth, to be burned, and that he also ordered the burning of the residence of Hon. John Letcher, formerly Governor of Virginia, alleging as his reason for this latter act of barbarity that the governor had urged the people to rise in arms to repel the invasion. In burning both places he gave no time for anything to be saved. The family of Governor Letcher barely escaped with the clothes upon their persons, and the torch was applied to the Institute without the opportunity to save its library, its philosophical apparatus, its furniture or its archives. All alike were consumed to appease his vindictive spite. The statue of the Father of his Country, belonging to the Institute, was stolen and sent to be erected upon the grounds at West Point. (Id. 640.) It was returned after the war.

General Early in his memoirs says:

"The scenes on Hunter's route to Lynchburg were truly heart-rending; houses had been burned, and helpless women and children left without shelter. The country had been stripped of provisions and many families left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding had been cut to pieces, and old men and women and children robbed of all the clothing they had except that on their backs. Ladies' trunks had been rifled and their dresses torn to pieces in mere wantonness; even the negro girls had lost their little finery.

* * * * *

"Hunter's deeds were those of a malignant and cowardly fanatic, who was better qualified to make war upon helpless women and children than upon armed soldiers. The time consumed in the perpetration of these deeds was the salvation of Lynchburg, with its stores, foundries and factories, which were so necessary to our army at Richmond."

There was, however, another more potent influence which stayed Hunter's advance. General John McCausland had been operating against the enemy in Southwest Virginia with a body of cavalry. When Hunter reached Staunton he was ordered across the country to meet him. When near Staunton, McCausland was joined by a small brigade under the command of Colonel William E. Peters, now professor of Latin at the University of Virginia, who was then Colonel of the Twenty-first Virginia Cavalry. These two brigades, aggregating some sixteen hundred men, under McCausland's leadership, ably seconded by Peters, at once commenced to worry Hunter and to keep his whole force in a constant state of alarm. This force was so ubiquitous that it was estimated by the enemy as being five times its real size. Amongst the officers in the force under Colonel Peters was his nephew, and our fellow-citizen, Major Stephen P. Halsey, who did good service and distinguished himself for his active gallantry.

As Hunter moved from Staunton to Lynchburg these brigades were ever in his front, one hour fighting and the next falling back as the main column would appear, but ever causing delay and apprehension. The tireless little band performed deeds of gallantry as they hung upon Hunter's front which entitled every officer and man to a cross of honor.

When Hunter's army reached Buchanan, McCausland had been hovering in front of his vanguard for many miles. There was a bridge at this point across James River, over which Hunter expected to cross. McCausland sent his men over the bridge, and from the south side of the river they opened fire on the head of Hunter's column as it appeared in sight, and thus checked their advance. McCausland had caused hay to be piled on the bridge, much of which was wet with coal oil. He, with Captain St. Clair, of his command, had remained on the north side for the purpose of setting fire to the bridge. The Federal cavalry charged up very close to him before McCausland applied the match, as he was desirous that every man of his command should get safely over. As fire was opened on him he applied the torch to the hay, and the coal oil at once flashed up in a furious blaze.

Captain St. Clair ran up the river bank, and the enemy was so occupied in the effort to kill him that they did not see McCausland, who escaped in a small boat under the burning bridge, and was not again under their fire until he was climbing up the opposite bank of the river.

This thoughtful and gallant conduct of McCausland delayed Hunter's column for a whole day, thus giving Lynchburg a better chance for defence and rendering Hunter's raid ineffectual.

In Early's dispatch reporting the battle at Lynchburg an expression is used which implies a doubt as to whether the cavalry would do its duty. Never did cavalry do better service than did that under McCausland, both as Hunter advanced and as he retreated. Had McCausland had the full command of the cavalry on the retreat, Hunter's wagon train and artillery would have fallen into the hands of the Confederates; but for some reason, which it is now unnecessary to explain, great opportunities were permitted to pass without advantage being taken of them. McCausland at Hanging Rock with his force was in a position to have attacked the retreating column of the enemy and to have cut off his wagon train and many of his guns. He begged to be allowed to attack, but was told to await the arrival of the infantry. While he waited the enemy discovered his position and so far withdrew that when the inhibition was withdrawn the great opportunity was gone, though, despite the delay, a number of guns, wagons and supplies were captured by his force.

During the second day that Hunter was in the lines around Lynchburg McCausland made a raid around his rear and attacked his train at Forest Depot, driving a guard of one regiment of infantry and one of cavalry back to the Salem pike. This gave Hunter much apprehension and threw his force into confusion; how much it contributed to his rapid flight that night can never be known. Due credit was not given McCausland for this, nor for many of his other valuable services.

Lynchburg owes much to Ramseur's division of the Second Corps and to the men who occupied the lines when Hunter arrived, but it was the skill of McCausland and Peters and the unflagging energy and courage of their officers and men, which so retarded Hunter's movements that when he did arrive there was force enough on our line to prevent his capturing the city. McCausland and his command were the real saviors of the city, and some lasting memorial of its gratitude should be erected to perpetuate their deeds.

McCausland proved himself a soldier of a high type. There were few officers in either army who, with such a force, could have accomplished as much. His little command had been in constant contact with the enemy for many days, had been continuously in the saddle and on exhausting marches, was badly mounted and badly equipped; everything about it was worn and weary but their dauntless spirit; that, under the example of their indomitable leaders, never flagged for an instant. The truth is, heroism was so common a quality amongst the "old Confeds" during that war that heroes were almost at a discount and heroic acts passed unnoticed, however great.

The services of this command were recognized at the time by a vote of thanks adopted by the City Council of Lynchburg on the 24th of June, 1864, "for their gallantry in opposing for ten days the march of a greatly superior force, thereby retarding the advance of the enemy on our city until a proper force could be organized for its defence." The citizens of the town at the same time presented General John McCausland with a sword and a pair of silver spurs in token of their gratitude.

It is not fair to close this special notice of the service rendered the city by McCausland's command without referring especially to the gallant conduct of Captain E.E. Bouldin, of the Charlotte cavalry, who commanded its rear guard as it fell back before Hunter's army. The records show that the numberless charges of Captain Bouldin and his valiant band upon Hunter's vanguard were conspicuous, even amongst the men of a command where each proved himself a hero. Captain Bouldin still survives, and is a useful and modest citizen of Danville, Virginia, and a learned and efficient member of its bar.

What General McCausland did in this defence was not the only service he rendered the city. When Lee surrendered he rode off with his men toward the mountains of Southwest Virginia for the purpose of there disbanding. As he approached Lynchburg a committee from the civil authorities met him, and, after telling him that the place was being looted by lawless squads of disbanded soldiers from Lee's army, asked his aid. He at once sent in a squadron which cleared the streets and soon restored order. He continued to preserve order until the civil authorities organized a force sufficient to maintain it.

When Hunter commenced his advance from Staunton our townsman, Colonel J.W. Watts, of the Second Virginia Cavalry, was at his home near Liberty, recuperating from severe wounds. Despite his disabled condition, he mounted his horse, joined McCausland and rendered him valuable aid. To him was assigned the duty of blocking the road from Buchanan to the Peaks of Otter. He did this work very thoroughly, but he states that so complete was the equipment of Hunter's pioneers that they cleared the road in less time than it took him to blockade it. Nevertheless the blockade was one of the causes which materially delayed the advance of Hunter, and therefore was one of the causes which led to the relief of the city.

Major Robert C. Saunders, of Campbell, was at the time of the attack by Hunter a resident of the city, being in charge of the Quartermaster Department for the collection of the tax-in-kind for this Congressional District. He had been in the field as captain of an infantry company from Campbell County, and as soon as Hunter's approach was a certainty General Nicholls sent for him and sent him out to bring him definite information of Hunter's position. He started immediately and soon was among Hunter's vanguard, but, though much exposed, he wonderfully escaped under cover of the night and brought accurate information which was very valuable. He was sent out again, and was in the sharp battle fought by General McCausland at New London and by McCausland and Imboden at the Quaker Meeting House, and then, as Hunter retreated, he was with McCausland and Peters and saw much hard service with those sturdy soldiers and their men. His manuscript account of what he saw is very interesting, and might properly be inserted in this paper but that it would make it too long for one evening's address.

Be the causes of General Hunter's failure what they may, the fact is he did fail, and failed disgracefully, where he should have succeeded, for he had every advantage of numbers, of guns and of equipment. There are many pages of reports of Federal officers about this campaign published in the Records of the War of the Rebellion by the United States Government, but the cotemporaneous literature on the part of Confederate officers is very scant; they fought better and longer than they wrote. As a specimen of the Confederate reports, that of General Early may fitly be taken. It contrasts strikingly with the ten-page document of General Hunter upon the same subject, found in the seventieth volume of the War of the Rebellion, page 94.

General Early's report is as follows:

"New London, June 19, 1864, 9:30 A.M.

"_General_:

"Last evening the enemy assaulted my line in front of Lynchburg and was repulsed by the part of my command which was up. On the arrival of the rest of the command I made arrangements to attack this morning at light, but it was discovered that the men were retreating, and I am now pursuing. The enemy is retreating in confusion, and, if the cavalry does its duty, we will destroy him.

"J.A. Early, "Lieutenant General.

"_General R.E. Lee._"

This report is brief and to the point. It has been construed as ignoring the troops belonging to the command of Breckinridge, and as doing injustice to the cavalry of Imboden and McCausland. General Early should have been more careful in writing it, but it must be remembered that when it was written he was not informed of the great service which had been rendered by the cavalry, or of the faithful work which had been done by the troops, other than those belonging to the Second Corps.

In his memoirs (on page 44) General Early says that some time after midnight it was discovered that Hunter was moving, but, owing to the uncertainty as to whether he was merely changing front or retreating, nothing could be done until daylight, when, the retreat being ascertained, the pursuit commenced. Early's army moved in three columns, the Second Corps on the Salem Turnpike, Breckinridge's command, under Elzey, on the Forest Road, and the cavalry, placed by Early under General Robert Ransom, on the right of Elzey. The enemy's rear was overtaken at Liberty by Ramseur's division and was driven through that place at a brisk trot.

It is not within the scope of this paper to follow up the retreat of Hunter, nor to narrate the incidents of Early's campaign in Maryland and the scare he gave the Government at Washington. What a commotion his little army created can be easily understood by inspecting the 70th and 71st volumes of the War of the Rebellion, a large part of which is taken up by the numberless orders and counter-orders, alarms and outcries incident to the fright then prevailing. General Grant seems to have been the only person in command on the other side who kept his equilibrium and acted with consistent courage and judicious poise.

But before we return to the scenes around Lynchburg incident to the attack, it may well be noted that Hunter, after reaching Salem, turned off to Lewisburg, West Virginia, and did not feel safe until he had placed his army far beyond the Alleghanies and upon the banks of the Ohio at Parkersburg. The effect of this remarkable line of retreat was that the Valley was left open, and Early seized the opportunity and at once commenced his march for the Potomac practically unmolested. On the 5th of July Hunter and his command were at Parkersburg, on the Ohio, while Early, whom he was to obstruct, was crossing the Potomac River into Maryland.

Poor Hunter! he seems to have had few friends, and it is almost cruel to recite his history, but men who undertake great enterprises must expect to be criticised when they fail. He got little comfort, and expected none, from the Confederate leaders, but he got even less from the Federal, except when it came in the form of such reports as that sent by Captain T.K. McCann to General Meigs, the Quartermaster-General, in which he says that "General Hunter fought four hours on the 17th; on the 18th the General ascertained that Rebel force at Lynchburg was fifty-thousand men, and from a prisoner taken it was reported that Lee was evacuating Richmond and falling back on Lynchburg, and consequently General Hunter was obliged to fall back." (Id. 679.) General Grant, however, on the 21st of June, wrote General Meade to know where Hunter was, and said, "Tell him _to save his army_ in the way he thinks best." (Id. 657.)

On the 17th of July Halleck wrote to Hunter, giving him some directions in regard to his future movements, saying that "General Grant directs, if compelled to fall back, you will retreat _in front of the enemy_ towards the Potomac, so as to cover Washington _and not be squeezed out to one side_, so as to make it necessary to fall back into West Virginia to save your army." This order he disregarded most ignominiously.

In the same letter Halleck wrote Hunter that General Grant said that in the marching _he does not want houses burned_, but "that he wants your troops to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they can, so that crows flying over it for the balance of the year will have to carry their rations with them." (Id. 366.)

C.A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote to Grant on the 15th of July (Id. 332): "Hunter appears to have been engaged in a pretty active campaign _against the newspapers_ in West Virginia." And Halleck on the same day wrote to Grant that he thought "_Hunter's command was badly used up in the Lynchburg expedition_." (Id. 331.)

These assaults, and many others of a like nature, wounded General Hunter so greatly that he not only asked to be relieved, but wrote a letter to Grant, in which, after speaking of the depressing effect upon him of these comments, he unstopped the vials of his wrath against his subordinates, upon whom he put the blame of his defeat.

In this letter he says that Sullivan, who commanded one of his divisions, was "_not worth one cent_; in fact very much in my way," and, again, he says: "I dashed on toward Lynchburg, and _should certainly have taken it if it had not been for the stupidity and conceit of that fellow Averell_, who unfortunately joined me at Staunton, and of whom I unfortunately had, at the time, a very high opinion, and trusted him when I should not have done so." (71 W. of R. 366.)

With these quotations from the correspondence of his associates, General Hunter may be left to the verdict which will be accorded him by the future historian of the stirring events in which he took part.

War is not a gentle occupation, and its customs are harsh. To make it effective, it is clearly within the rules of civilization to strip an enemy's country through which a hostile army is passing of everything which will sustain the life of either men or beasts. Hence Grant's historic order about the crow carrying his rations, while cruel, is within the line of legitimate warfare. But putting non-combatants to death, insults to women and children, the wanton destruction of household goods and clothes, the application of the torch to dwellings, factories and mills, or the destruction of public buildings, and especially of institutions of learning and their libraries, and works of art and science, is a style of warfare long since relegated to the savage. The disgrace of reviving this barbaric strife in modern times was reserved for Hunter. General Crook, one of his division commanders, a soldier brave and true, felt constrained to note the conduct of the troops, and published an order in which he says he "_regrets to learn of so many acts committed by our troops that are disgraceful to the command_." Hunter knew all this, but there was no word of protest or repression from him.

It is to be regretted that later in this campaign, when we carried the war across the Potomac, some of our troops retaliated for these brutal acts, upon innocent parties. That Hunter had set the example was no good excuse, though it was pled. (See General Bradley T. Johnson's Report, 90 W. of R. 7.)

General Early has been severely criticised for permitting the escape of Hunter. It is always much easier to criticise than to accomplish; to point out how a thing should have been done, after we know the result of what was done, than to do it at the time. The facts heretofore stated can leave no doubt that all was done, as far as the prompt pursuit of Hunter is concerned, which could have been done. Early's line of defence, owing to the smallness of his force, was not only thin but was short; he had therefore to keep in such a condition that by changing front rapidly with the troops he had, he could supply the place of those he did not have. Hence, when he noticed Hunter moving away from his immediate front, he did not suppose he was retiring, but merely withdrawing for the purpose of making his attack at another point, and prudence demanded that he should keep his troops in hand until the enemy's purpose was developed. To do this the delay until daylight was essential.

It is a subject of remark that with Hunter's army there were two men who very faithfully discharged their duties as soldiers and subsequently became Presidents of the United States--one Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, who commanded a brigade, and the other Major William McKinley, who was a staff officer.

The loss on neither side was very heavy, but it was very much greater on that of the invader than upon ours. Hunter left his dead on the field to be buried by his enemy, and his wounded in a field hospital; facts which show how precipitously he departed.

The Federal line of battle was formed on the left, directly through the yard of the residence of the late C.H. Moorman, whose farm lay on both sides of Blackwater Creek, and occupied most of what is now called West Lynchburg. When it was known that Hunter was approaching, Mr. Moorman packed several wagons with provisions, and, with his negroes and stock, moved down toward the Staunton River, leaving his house in charge of his young, unmarried daughter, now Mrs. Hurt, his wife, an old negro man and several negro women. Before Mr. Moorman cleared his own plantation, which was large, he found it necessary to lighten his load, and to that end selected a spot and buried his supply of well-cured and much prized hams. It turned out that the line of battle of Crook's division ran across the spot, and the buried treasure was discovered, much to the delight of the troops, who greatly enjoyed a very fine lot of old Virginia hams, always valuable, but especially so under such circumstances.

At sunrise on the morning of the 17th, Miss Moorman went out on a hill near her house to reconnoitre the military situation. She saw a column of Federal troops moving on the Salem Turnpike, and was looking at them very anxiously when she was shocked to see a line of blue coats crossing the field close to her home. She at once ran back, sheltering herself behind the fence, but the officer in command was at the door before she was, and very politely advised her to stay in the house while the fight was going on. The family were not molested during the two days that the troops were there. With exceptional visits to the front yard, she obeyed the officer's instructions very carefully. She heard the constant cannonading and the picket firing without cessation all of the 17th and until the evening of the 18th, when the sounds changed and indicated that a real battle was going on close at hand. She was naturally in a fever of excitement, but could hear nothing of the result. About midnight of the 18th, or more probably on the morning of the 19th, she heard the rumbling of wagons and artillery on the Salem Turnpike, and found the lines around her house were being withdrawn, but it was some time before she discovered that the Federal troops were retreating. It was then nearly daylight, and she slipped out of the house and ran down to the ford across Blackwater Creek and notified the cavalry at that point what she had seen. A company was at once sent off in pursuit to verify her statement. After they had gone, and as she returned home, she met a solitary Federal soldier on foot, who asked her what had become of his command. She told him they had been whipped and had retreated, and informed him that he was her prisoner. He stated he had fallen asleep and had been left, and at once surrendered to her.