Part 2

General Early was on board the first train, but so indifferent was the motive power, and so bad the condition of the track, that he and the first half of his corps did not reach Lynchburg until the afternoon of the 17th, and the rest of his small army did not arrive until nearly night the next day--too late to take part in the engagement. Early found Breckinridge in bed suffering from the injury to which reference is made above, and as Breckinridge could not go out to reconnoitre, he had called upon General D.H. Hill, who happened to be in the city, to ascertain and define the best lines of defence. This duty was performed by General Hill, with the assistance of General Harry T. Hays, of Louisiana, who was also in town disabled by a wound received at Spottsylvania Courthouse. Hill established the line close to the city in breastworks, which had been thrown up on College Hill. These were at once occupied by the disorganized infantry force which had been defeated at Piedmont under Jones, the Virginia Military Institute Cadets, and the invalid corps. To this was added Breckinridge's small command, when it arrived on the 16th, and Douthat's battery.

Early, on his arrival, thought this line too near the city for the main defence. He feared that in case of battle the shot and shell of the enemy would do damage to the property and the people of the town; consequently a new line, further out, was established, to which were taken the troops with Early, Breckinridge's men and the artillery.

When he reached the field on the afternoon of the 17th, Early found Imboden with his small remnant of cavalry, and McCausland with his little brigades, occupying the hill at the old Quaker Meeting House, on the Salem Turnpike. This cavalry, with their gallant leaders, was holding the enemy in check, which was a great achievement, and was one absolutely essential to the safety of the city. They were, however, very slowly driven back as the main body of Hunter's army advanced.

The small force under Ramseur, which arrived on the evening of the 17th, was at once thrown forward and occupied the new line established by Early, across the Salem Turnpike, about two miles from the city and a mile and a half beyond Hill's line on College Hill. This force, with two guns of Breckinridge's command, in charge of Lieutenant Carter Berkeley, of Staunton, now Dr. Carter Berkeley, of Lynchburg, two guns of Lurty's battery, some of the guns of Floyd King's battalion and two of Douthat's battery, were placed in the redoubt near the toll-gate and stayed the advance of the enemy until dark closed the engagement for the day.

These guns of Lieutenant Berkeley had done good service in the Valley and rendered themselves and their young commander very famous. They reached Lynchburg by forced marches, through the upper part of Amherst County, on the evening of the 16th of June. On their arrival at the bridge across James River, they were urged forward, as it was supposed Hunter was even then in sight. The general direction in which the enemy was expected was pointed out to Berkeley, who was ignorant of Lynchburg and its topography. He was told to go directly out from the bridge to the hills west of the city, so he urged his weary horses up Ninth street, passed the old market house to the foot of Courthouse hill. There even his nerve was daunted, and he turned up Church street to Eighth. He halted a moment, wondering what sort of teams and conveyances they had in Lynchburg, but noticing that Eighth street was the nearest route to the enemy, he urged his horses up the steep declivity, putting several men at each wheel. One-third of the hill was thus surmounted, but there is a limit to human and equine endurance, and the two guns and their caissons stalled hopelessly. Fortunately some of Imboden's cavalry were just passing at the foot of the hill on Church street. They saw the trouble, and knowing how important it was to get those useful guns into action, jumped from their horses, reinforced the storming party and soon had the guns at the top of the hill; thence, at a gallop, they moved forward into the line of battle.

The line then selected extended from a point some distance to the left of the turnpike through the toll-gate into what is now known as Langhorne's field. The residue of Early's command did not reach Lynchburg until late on the afternoon of the 18th, when it was hurried through the city at a double quick, much to the relief of the citizens, who cheered them on their pathway. During the night of the 17th a yard engine, with box cars attached, was run up and down the Southside Railroad, making as much noise as possible, and thus induced Hunter to believe and to report that Early was rapidly being reinforced.

Senator John W. Daniel, then a Major on Early's staff, though at the time disabled from duty by a very dangerous wound, describes the entrance of these troops upon the scene as follows:

"In this condition Tinsley, the bugler of the Stonewall Brigade, came trotting up the road sounding the advance, and behind him came the skirmishers of Ramseur's Division with rapid strides. Just then the artillerists saw through the smoke the broad white slouch hat of 'Old Jube,' who rode amongst them....

Poor Tinsley! His last bugle call, like the bagpipes at Lucknow, foretold the rescue of Lynchburg, but on that field he found, in a soldier's duty and with a soldier's glory, a soldier's death."

Up to that time Hunter's army was several times larger than that opposing him. The addition of Rodes' command and the residue of Gordon's to the Confederate forces the next night diminished the disparity, but made our army but little over one-half as large as that under Hunter. Yet Hunter did not make any serious demonstration on the 17th, nor until after two o'clock on the 18th. There was firing along the picket line and much cannonading, but no serious fight until that hour.

Half of the Second Corps and Breckinridge's command, with some fifteen guns, occupied the front line, while the cadets, the dismounted cavalry and the invalid corps occupied the inner line established by Hill.

On the 18th General Duffie's division of the enemy made some attack on Early's right. This attack by Duffie with his division of two brigades of cavalry and a battery of artillery is described by him in a report made in the field to General Hunter on June 18. He says:

"I have carried out your order in engaging the enemy on the extreme left. I attacked him at 12:30 and drove him into his fortifications. Have been fighting ever since. Two charges have been made and the enemy's strength fully developed in our front. His force is much superior to mine. All my force is engaged. The enemy is now attempting to turn my right. I shall send a force to check him. I do not communicate with Averell on my left." (70 W. of R. 650.)

This force which Duffie describes as so superior to his consisted of two small brigades of infantry under General Gabe C. Wharton and the cavalry under General John McCausland. It is impossible that the whole force was half the size of Duffie's. Wharton's command was but a remnant left from Gaines' Mill and Cold Harbor, and McCausland's had been in one continuous fight for ten days, and was therefore much dismounted, worn and weary. Of the two so-called brigades under Wharton, one was commanded by our gallant comrade, Colonel Aug. Forsberg, and had, under his leadership, been more than decimated in the fights around Richmond during the four weeks immediately preceding.

Had Hunter made a vigorous assault on the line through Judge Daniel's Rivermont farm, he could have marched directly into Lynchburg and burned the railroad bridges without successful resistance, for Early could not have spared a man from his line to oppose him. Wharton's two brigades were both east of the Blackwater, and between that stream and James River there was only the skirmish line of McCausland's cavalry, and a few old men in the trenches across the Rivermont farm. These old citizens, however, though entirely "muster free" either from age or physical infirmity, did good service. They remained in the trenches, though without equipment or even the scant comforts of the regular soldier, and were anxiously and gallantly awaiting the anticipated attack. Had it been made, they were ready to die in defence of their homes.

A reconnoissance was made by Averell on the 18th in the direction of the Campbell Courthouse Turnpike. It amounted to nothing, and he soon returned to the main lines. Beyond these two movements, picket firing and artillery duels, nothing was done until about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon, when the infantry divisions of Sullivan and Crook commenced their advance upon Early's centre. This brought about for a short time a very active engagement. Our skirmish line was driven in upon the main body, as is usual in such cases, and the engagement was fairly general and, for a time, very sharp. The enemy soon fell back into a new line, and there each side rested on their arms apparently for the night.

Early scarcely felt himself strong enough, before Rodes arrived, to attack the enemy on ground selected by them, but was courting an attack all day. The enemy's forces showed no signs of weakness or timidity, but the indications were that its movements were lacking in well defined purpose, and there was obviously want of confidence on the part of the subordinate Brigadiers in the Major-General commanding. That this feeling prevailed amongst the division and brigade commanders is clearly observed on reading their official reports, in which they differ with him as to what was done and the causes of the failure to do more.

The report of General Crook, who was a very excellent officer, is particularly striking. After telling of his march and the occupation of his corps on the 17th, he says (70 W. of R. 121):

"Next morning I was sent to the right with my division to make a reconnoissance for the purpose of turning the enemy's left; found it impracticable after marching some three or four miles, and just returned with my division and got into position to support Sullivan's division when the enemy made an attack on our lines."

Having said this, and without further word of explanation or description of the result, he continues:

"_On the retreat this evening_ my division brought up the rear. When I reached Liberty, I found General Averell had gone into camp on the edge of the town. The infantry were going into camp some mile and a half further on."

He sings no paean of victory, as did Hunter, but preserved a silence which is suggestive, if not eloquent.

General Sullivan made no report. All that General Averell says about the movements is an elaborate analysis of the causes of the failure, chief amongst which he asserts was General Hunter's delay at Lexington (70 W. of R. 148). Colonel Frost, who commanded a regiment in Crook's division, reports that on the 18th--

"His command marched three miles to the right, and on the afternoon was ordered again to the front of the enemy's works, and were afterwards formed in line on our left under a heavy fire of artillery. Our brigade charged the enemy and drove them back to his rifle-pits.

Here the right gave way, and our brigade being exposed to a close firing of musketry, grape and canister, we were obliged to retire about thirty paces to a new line of battle, which was held _until orders were received to fall back. Marched all that night_, and reached Liberty about 3 p.m. on the 9th." (70 W. of R. 135.)

Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United States, in reporting the battle of the 18th, says:

"Pursued the retreating rebels and drove them from their rifle-pits to the protection of their main works. The works being too strong to be carried by the force then before them, the regiment _retired in some disorder_, but was promptly reformed before reaching our own lines. After leaving Lynchburg the officers and men of the First Brigade sustained themselves through the hardships and privation of the retreat like good soldiers." (70 W. of R. 123.)

Other quotations from other reports might be made to the same effect.

That these reports may have their true significance it is necessary that we note what General Hunter himself says of what took place on the 17th and 18th. It will be found difficult to understand where all the glory comes in. He writes:

"Early in the morning of the 17th orders were given for the troops to move, but the march was delayed for several hours at the Great Otter River, owing to the difficulty in crossing the artillery, and in consequence we did not overtake the enemy until four o'clock in the afternoon. At that hour Averell's advance came upon the enemy, strongly posted and intrenched at Diamond Hill, five miles from Lynchburg. He immediately attacked, and a sharp contest ensued. Crook's infantry arriving at the same time, made a brilliant advance upon the enemy, drove him from his works back upon the town, killing and wounding a number and capturing seventy men and one gun. It being too late to follow up this success, we encamped upon the battle-field. The best information to be obtained at this point of the enemy's forces and plans indicated that all the rebel forces heretofore operating in the Valley and West Virginia were concentrated in Lynchburg, under the command of General Breckinridge. This force was variously estimated at from ten thousand to fifteen thousand men, well supplied with artillery, and protected by strong works.

"During the night the trains on the different railroads were heard running without intermission, while repeated cheers and the beating of drums indicated the arrival of large bodies of troops in the town, yet up to the morning of the 18th I had no positive information as to whether General Lee had detached any considerable force for the relief of Lynchburg. To settle the question, on this morning, I advanced my skirmishers as far as the toll-gate on the Bedford Road, two miles from the town, and a brisk fire was opened between them and the enemy behind their works. This skirmishing with musketry, occasionally assisted by the artillery, was kept up during the whole of the forenoon. Their works consisted of strong redoubts on each of the main roads entering the town, about three miles apart, flanked on either side by rifle-pits protected by abatis. On these lines the enemy could be seen working diligently, as if to extend and strengthen them. I massed my two divisions of infantry in front of the works on the Bedford Road, ready to move to the right or left as required, the artillery in commanding positions, and Averell's cavalry division in reserve. Duffie was ordered to attack resolutely on the Forestville Road, our extreme left, while Averell sent two squadrons of cavalry to demonstrate against the Campbell Courthouse Road, on our extreme right. This detachment was subsequently strengthened by a brigade. Meanwhile I reconnoitred the lines, hoping to find a wreak interval through which I might push with my infantry, passing between the main redoubts, which appeared too strong for a direct assault. While the guns were sounding on the two flanks, the enemy, no doubt supposing my centre weakened by too great extension of my lines, and hoping to cut us in two, suddenly advanced in great force from his works, and commenced a most determined attack on my position on the Bedford Turnpike. Although his movement was so unexpected and rapid as almost to amount to a surprise, yet it was promptly and gallantly met by Sullivan's division, which held the enemy in check until Crook was enabled to get his troops up. After a fierce contest of half an hour's duration, the enemy's direct attack was repulsed; but he persistently renewed the fight, making repeated attempts to flank us on the left and push between my main body and Duffie's division. In his effort he was completely foiled, and at the end of an hour and twenty minutes was routed and driven back into his works in disorder and with heavy loss. In the eagerness of pursuit, one regiment (One Hundred and Sixtieth Ohio) entered the works on the heels of the flying enemy, but being unsupported, fell back with trifling loss. Our whole loss in this action was comparatively light. The infantry behaved with the greatest steadiness, and the artillery, which materially assisted in repelling the attack, was served with remarkable rapidity and efficiency. This affair closed about two p.m. From prisoners captured we obtained positive information that a portion of Ewell's corps was engaged in the action, and that the whole corps, twenty thousand strong, under the command of Lieutenant General Early, was either already in Lynchburg or near at hand. The detachment sent by General Averell to operate on our right had returned, reporting that they had encountered a large body of rebel cavalry in that quarter, while Duffie, although holding his position, sent word that he was pressed by a superior force. It had now become sufficiently evident that the enemy had concentrated a force of at least double the numerical strength of mine, and what added to the gravity of the situation was the fact that my troops had scarcely enough of ammunition left to sustain another well-contested battle. I immediately ordered all the baggage and supply trains to retire by the Bedford turnpike, and made preparation to withdraw the army as soon as it should become sufficiently dark to conceal the movement from the enemy. Meanwhile, as there still remained five hours of daylight, they were ordered to maintain a firm front, and with skirmishers to press the enemy's lines at all points. I have since learned that Early's whole force was up in time to have made a general attack on the same afternoon (18th)--an attack which under the circumstances would probably have been fatal to us; but, rendered cautious by the bloody repulse of Breckinridge, and deceived by the firm attitude of my command, he devoted the afternoon to refreshment and repose, expecting to strike a decisive blow on the following morning. As soon as it became dark I quietly withdrew my whole force, leaving a line of pickets close to the enemy, with orders to remain until twelve o'clock (midnight), and then follow the main body. This was successfully accomplished without loss of men or material, excepting only a few wounded who were left in a temporary hospital by mistake."

By a critical examination and comparison of these reports it will be seen that the men who did the fighting say nothing of the Confederate force being "disgracefully routed," or of their "overwhelming numbers," and maintain a prudent silence as to the cause of Hunter's withdrawal. No one can read the whole correspondence without being satisfied that such men as Averell, Crook, Sullivan and Hayes, who seemed to have all been gallant soldiers, were much discouraged and had no faith in Hunter. They believed they could have forced their way through our lines and were anxious to do so, for they knew that they had force superior both in numbers and equipment. Believing this, they were chagrined that a retreat was ordered just as victory was apparently within their grasp.

Hunter claimed that he was overwhelmed by numbers, and that he was short of ammunition. That he was not outnumbered the official reports plainly show. He had two full divisions of infantry, each with three brigades, two of cavalry, composed in the aggregate of five brigades and thirty-two guns. Early, on the other hand, had only the small though very efficient force belonging to Breckinridge's department, McCausland's and Imboden's cavalry, the corps of cadets, the Silver Grays of the city, the invalids, and about one-half of Ewell's corps; the second half did not reach Lynchburg in time to take active part in the battle on the 18th. Opposed to Hunter's thirty-two guns, Early had none of the artillery attached to the second corps and only the guns under Major Floyd King belonging to Breckinridge's command, Douthat's battery, two of Berkeley's and several of Lurty's, some fifteen or twenty all told. King had four companies of four guns each in his command, but Otey's battery was on duty elsewhere. The batteries with him were Chapman's, Bryant's and Lowry's. Doing good service in Lowry's company was our townsman M.H. Dudley, of the Glamorgan Works.

Early's cavalry, opposed to the elegant divisions of Averell and Duffie, consisted of Imboden's remnant, one-half of which was dismounted, and all of which, though it did good service, was disorganized by the defeat at Piedmont, and, in addition, the gallant little brigade so admirably handled by General McCausland.

If General Hunter did not know all this, it was his fault, for it was his duty to know, and he had ample opportunity to acquire the information. He had scouts on both railroads and the country was filled with the vigilant spies who prided themselves on their cleverness. They were famous under the name of "Jessie's Scouts"; a name assumed in honor of Mrs. General Fremont, who was a daughter of Senator Thomas H. Benton. He also had the aid of several notorious local traitors, who affected to keep him informed. The truth is he had all the necessary information, but lacked the nerve to act on it.

The other excuse made by General Hunter that his army was out of ammunition, is equally untenable. It cannot be believed that a corps was short of ammunition which had been organized but a few weeks, a part only of which had been engaged at Piedmont, and which had fought no serious pitched battle, and the sheep, chickens, hogs and cattle they wantonly shot on their march could not have exhausted their supply. The corps would not have started had the ammunition been so scarce. It would have been against all precedent, and any thinking man must know that the Ordnance Department of the United States army, always full-handed, had well supplied ammunition to an army about to start on so important an undertaking. No brigade or division commander in his correspondence or in his report made any such complaint. It would have given them pleasure to have had some excuse for retreating. They undertook to give no excuse, and their silence is so logical that it points out with great effect the fact that they had no belief in Hunter's excuses, and laid the real blame of the ignominious failure upon the incompetence of Hunter himself.

The obvious cause of Hunter's failure was that he did not reach Lynchburg on the 16th, the day upon which, according to Averell's plan, he was due. Had he reached his destination on the 16th he could have occupied the town without opposition. General Breckinridge was there, an invalid, and his troops were there in small numbers, much wearied, and they, with a few Silver Gray home guards, and the boys from the Institute, constituted the sole garrison opposing his army of twenty-five thousand men. Why he did not come up is accounted for upon two grounds. The first of which was the unnecessary delay at Lexington.