Part 9

"The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. Fisk, in the sermon we reviewed." The writer goes on farther to say that his objection to this is, "that it is utterly deficient"--"that it passes over in silence all those acts of God in creation and government by which he determines character." Of course he means to say that the _sermon_ advocated a theory which left out of the question all the Divine influence in determining character. How strangely he has misunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have read it. It teaches that God hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world: that he has a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and contingencies of government; that God gives the sinner power to choose life; that his grace enlightens and strengthens the sinner to seek after and obtain salvation. In short, it must be obvious that no man who believes in the Divine government and in Gospel provisions can leave this influence out of his system. I will therefore venture upon the following declaration, which it is presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay, namely, Dr. F. _never saw a man and never heard of a man_ that was a believer in revelation, who left out of his creed all that conduct in God which determines character. That such was not the character of my creed, the reviewer might have learned in my reply to his first review, if he could not from the sermon. In the reply it is said, "As God foresaw men would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue in reference to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own infinite mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to 'make the wrath of man praise him,' and _deduce the greatest possible good from the best possible system_."--And yet, strange to tell, in his answer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were an undisputed truth, "Dr. Fisk advocates the first," (meaning the first view of the Divine purposes given above.) "We brought forward the third," (meaning the third view.) "Now since the third upholds the fact of foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we have succeeded in upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, denies, and which Calvinists maintain." Whereas he ought to have said, for he had my statement for it directly before him, "Dr. Fisk advocates the third," and then he might have added, "Now since the third destroys the Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore in assisting Dr. Fisk to sustain the third we have succeeded in disproving the doctrine of foreordination, which Arminians deny, and Calvinists have attempted to maintain." In fact, as the reviewer says, there can be but those three views taken of the Divine purposes; and since neither I nor any other Arminian ever believed in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself acknowledges we are directly opposed to the second, it follows that we must believe the third. But the third is the reviewer's creed: therefore on this point he is an Arminian, or we are Calvinists.

That the reviewer's theory on predestination is about the same with the Methodists' appears evident from the following quotations from Mr. Wesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley's creed include all the Divine influence that goes "to determine character," but also that God "pursues measures which will certainly lead to the best possible results;" nay, that he does all that he _wisely can_ to exclude sin from the moral universe. These are points for which the advocates of the New-Haven theory strongly contend. Let them see, then, how in this matter they have identified themselves with Arminians.

"To God," says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, "all things are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power, as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only he that can do all things else cannot deny himself--he cannot counteract himself or oppose his own work. Were it not for this, he would destroy all sin, with its attendant pain, in a moment. But in so doing he would counteract himself, and undo all that he has been doing since he created man upon the earth. For he created man in his own image--a spirit endued with understanding, with will or affections, and liberty, without which he would have been incapable of either virtue or vice. He could not be a moral agent, any more than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence be it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus contradict himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it would imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence. Whereas all the manifold wisdom of God (as well as all his power and goodness) is displayed in governing man as man--as an intelligent and free spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil."

Again. In the sermon entitled, The Wisdom of God's Counsels: "In the moral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine will, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full scope for the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the subtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, the salvation of lost mankind." Now let me ask the reviewer, is this leaving out all the Divine influence that determines character? Is not this maintaining that, "in view of the measures that it was possible tor God to take, he purposes to pursue those measures that will certainly lead to the best possible result?" Is Dr. Fitch ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or is he unwilling to identify himself with us? Ignorant of _my_ views he could not be, I think, after reading my reply.--Why, then, does he persist in talking of a difference where there is none?

Mr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After reading my reply, he says, "if you will preach this doctrine to your Methodist brethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the strong arguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it Calvinism, I will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I do. And if you will preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they too do not call it Calvinism, I will grant that even _they_ too sometimes differ about terms. If you will take this course, I think when you shall see what the doctrine will be called, the astonishment you express that it should be regarded as Calvinism will wear away." Now how surprised Mr. M. will be when he learns that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly and forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever suspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him incorporated it into their creed, and _for some reason_ unknown to us, called it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that he who was so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and Journal, for the purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, and of disabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this subject, himself understands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet so it is, Calvinists themselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author of "Views in Theology," the author or authors of the pamphlet by an Edwardian, all condemn the New-Haven theory of predestination as anti-Calvinistic, and as being essentially Arminian.

Dr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first principles. In reply to my answer he says, "It was certainly our intention to place this contested doctrine on grounds which our Wesleyan brethren _could not_ dispute, and it gives us pleasure to find that in this we have had complete success!" There are two things a little remarkable connected with this sentiment. One is, that the writer should so express himself as to convey the idea that _he_ has traced up the subject to first principles with much care, and, to his _great satisfaction, has succeeded in convincing us_ of the correctness of his premises. Whereas it is evident from the passages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from the universal sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven doctors have _at length_ come on to our ground; and it gives _us great pleasure_ to find that, from _some source_, arguments in favour of our system have with them met with _complete success_. The other thing that strikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had acknowledged that we were agreed in these first principles, he should immediately go on to say, as has already been mentioned, that I and the Arminians hold to the first view he has given of the three possible views that might be taken of predestination, and deny the third; when at the same time the third contains _those very first principles_ in which he says we are agreed. This looks so much like a contradiction, almost in the same breath, that I really know not what other name to give it. If these gentlemen are disposed to come into the fortress of truth, and assist us in manning our guns and working our artillery against error, we certainly can have no objection. We are fond of help. But they must pardon us if we revolt a little at the idea of their taking the lead in this business, and accounting us as mere novices who have only learned, and that too from themselves, some of the _elementary principles_. Nay, they must not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our present commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed in front of our own batteries, merely to give our _new allies_ an opportunity to blow us up _with our own ordnance!_

In reply to my objection to the reviewer that "it was an abuse of terms to call the _permission of sin, not hindering it_, &c, a foreordination or purpose that it shall be," &c, he has said, "If an evil, unavoidable and hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come into his kingdom, in one place and time rather than any other, and is thus _particularly disposed of_ by his providence, because it is a disposition of it the best possible, is there no purpose of God in relation to the thing? In doing his own pleasure, in this case, does he not decide on the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom just when and where it does?" Now I beg the reader to go over this last paragraph once more, and then say if he does not agree with me in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely occurs in any writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a contested question as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between a "purpose in relation to a thing," and the foreordaining or decreeing that the thing shall be? And pray what is meant by God's "deciding on the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?" You can make it mean almost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch's theory on the subject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin was unavoidable, God determined to restrain and control it so as to suffer it to do the least harm possible--preferring holiness in its stead in every place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining sin!! This is predestination!! Let us illustrate this by a case in point. Cicero, a Roman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting treason against the commonwealth. Cicero perceived that this _hated treason_, though unavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He determined therefore to "make a disposition of it the best possible." He took his measures accordingly. By these Cataline and the principal conspirators were driven out of the city, and compelled, before their plans were matured, to resort to open hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and united, and the state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy were suffered to come upon the commonwealth "in one place and time rather than any other," and "were thus _particularly disposed of_" by Cicero. In this case the consul had a special "purpose about the thing." He determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than suffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the city with fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not to the reviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but it is put to the common understanding of community, Did the Roman consul ordain or foreordain, or predestinate the treason of Cataline? If by common consent all answer, No, such a statement is a libel upon the consul; and if, in addition to this common understanding of the term, the theological use of the term will not bear such a construction; if the great body of the Calvinists of the present day, and of New-England even, use the term in a different sense, it remains to be seen how the New-Haven divines can stand up before the world and say, "We believe God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass."

Before closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if not in the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning in the sermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is antecedent to foreordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have objected because, say they, God must first have determined to make moral agents before he could know they would sin: therefore his knowledge or his foreknowledge in this case must depend upon his determination. This objection, at least so far as the New-Haven theology is concerned, is founded in error. What says Dr. Fitch? "That God, _foreseeing_ the conduct which will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to take, _purposes_," &c. The sermon says, "God knows all that is, or will be, or might be, under any possible contingency," and that "his plan is the result of his infinite knowledge--the decrees of his throne flow forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom." Where is the discrepancy here? God saw this general plan, as a whole, before he resolved upon its adoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) he saw, if he made free moral agents, and governed them as such, sin would ensue. And he also saw what he might do in that case to counteract and overrule it to his own glory and the good of the universe.--And he judged, in his infinite wisdom, that such a moral universe, notwithstanding the sin that would certainly result from it, would, on the whole, be the best; and therefore upon this _foreknowledge_ of the whole, God _founded_ his determination to create the universe, and govern it as proposed. God's foreknowledge of the _certainty_ of any event in this universe, it must be acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern the universe. And in _this sense_ his purpose was _causa sine qua non_, a cause without which any given event would not have happened, and therefore could not have been foreseen as _certain_. But then it should be remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all this, and which was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent instances of knowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense in which the sentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that "God foreknows in order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) predestinate in order to foreknow."

To conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one class of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable with all that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a rapidly increasing class, have given up Calvinian predestination, and, in all but the name, have in that point come on to the Methodist ground. There is still another class, who are evidently not Arminians, but still deny the correctness of my definition of their doctrine. They say they are not chargeable with such a doctrine, either directly or by inference. In the next number, therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from their own positions this definition.

NUMBER VII.

PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED.

From my last number the reader will perceive that there are two classes of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one there is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the doctrine; and with the other there is no _need_ of controversy, because their plain manner of avowing the doctrine, _logical consequences and all_, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too monstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a larger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven divines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are nevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They deny, as appears from some public intimations and many private statements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine. They appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea, that "the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and efficiently produced by the purpose and decree of God,"--that these acts "are the result of an overruling and controlling power,"--"that the will, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement." Hence, I suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least, be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our own cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are these, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I shall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the candid judge.

1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians themselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect to anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging these things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system. And will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of understanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume that they are free from blinding prejudice in _favour_ of their own doctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be asserted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the pride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what ought first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism--a spirit that says to a brother, "Stand by, for I am holier than thou!" There have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and how is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to them as to be able to see it free from these charges?

But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will, by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley's day--and quotations have also been given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they held that God moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To these we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly acknowledge "that those scriptures which teach that God has decreed the sinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral evil." (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied Calvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding it, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to holiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections brought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the Methodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated predestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers for the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be. The Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand that this doctrine necessarily implies the _Divine efficiency_ in producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is not angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his decrees.

Suppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments on either side, should be informed of what is true in this case, viz. that a great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest portion of predestinarians, and _all_ anti-predestinarians, understood the doctrine of absolute predestination, as involving directly, or by consequence, certain specified principles; but that a portion of predestinarians persisted in denying that these principles were involved in the doctrine; and suppose this intelligent person should be informed of the additional facts, that these predestinarians had tried all their skill at explanation and argument, generation after generation, but had never succeeded in the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from these charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very many were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, for the _very reason_ that they could not rid the system, in which they had been educated, from those principles which were charged upon it--and that even among those who had adhered to the old doctrine there were new modes of explaining and stating the theory, constantly springing up, until finally numbers of them _had explained themselves entirely out of the doctrine_, and into the opposite sentiment; and that very many others, by adhering to the doctrine, and following out the principles involved in it, had come to the conclusion that there was "no hell"--no judgment, and "no angry God." Suppose, I say, this intelligent man should be informed of all these facts, and then be requested to _presume_ whether or not these contested principles were involved in the doctrine--what would be his judgment? I need not answer this question. There is _strong_ presumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are correct.