Part 15

3. A third and intermediate theory on the subject of depravity and human responsibility is the one presented and advocated in the preceding number. This system is presented, in part, in the very language in which the Ultra-Calvinists present theirs. Arminians, as well as "Calvinists, say that the sin of Adam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and depravity that it is impossible for his descendants [who, it is believed, are propagated in the moral likeness of their fallen ancestor] to make any voluntary efforts [unassisted by grace] toward piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their moral and religious character." Thus far we go together; but this is a point of divergency, from which we take very different directions. Instead of going on to say "that the Christian graces are communicated by the irresistible operation of the Spirit of God, without any endeavour or concurrence on the part of man," we say that "the saving grace of God hath appeared unto all Men;" and that this grace so enlightens, strengthens, and aids the human mind, that it is thereby enabled to make that choice which is the turning point, conditionally, of the soul's salvation; and that it is by this same gracious aid that the man, when he has this good will, is enabled "to work out his salvation" unto the end. It is in this latter part of the statement that we are at issue with the Calvinists; but we are at issue on both parts with the Pelagians of every grade, including, of course, the advocates of the New Divinity in our country.

To the foregoing statement of our doctrine it is proper to add that we believe that the merits of the atonement are so available for and in behalf of the whole human family, that the guilt of depravity is not imputed to the subject of it until, by intelligent volition, he makes the guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the Gospel; and that being thus by grace in a justified state, the dying infant is entitled to all the promised blessings of the new covenant, and will, of course, have wrought in him all that meetness necessary to qualify him for the gracious rewards of the saints in glory. Thus, according to this system, the dying infant, as well as the dying adult believer, is sanctified by the blood of the covenant, and saved by grace.

These are the three systems which are presented to the inquirer after truth as the alternatives, and perhaps I may say the only alternatives of choice, in reference to this subject. It is true, the doctrine of _natural ability_ has been proposed as another alternative, holding an intermediate place between the doctrines of native impotency as first stated and of Pelagianism. And it may therefore appear to some, that I ought, in my enumeration, to have given this as a separate and distinct theory. My reason, however, for not doing this is, that there cannot, in my opinion, be such a resting place between the doctrines of derived constitutional depravity and Pelagianism. Natural ability that is any thing more than a name--that is, in fact, an _ability_, destroys the idea of constitutional depravity; and depravity that is any thing more than a name--that is, in fact, _constitutional depravity_, destroys the idea of natural ability. A striking proof of this is found in the fact that a great portion of those divines in the Calvinistic Churches who have been most decided in preaching up natural ability, have gone over and embraced the New Divinity, which, as we have seen, abjures the doctrine of constitutional depravity. The New-Haven divines are certainly gentlemen of talents and of close thought; and they have been following up this doctrine for a number of years, and it has landed them upon the logical conclusion that _there is no such depravity_. But we need not trust to the conclusions of the New Divinity advocates, to show that the notions of natural ability and natural freedom from guilt and sin necessarily and reciprocally imply each other. Why have Calvinists left their old ground of natural impotency, and resorted to the dogma of a natural ability? It is for the avowed reason that there can be no guilt without an ability to avoid it. But since the sin of his nature is unavoidable to the new-born infant, of course he can have no guilt, and by consequence _no sin_, until he is capable of an intelligent moral choice. Again: this same theory tells us that where there is no natural ability there is no moral character. But as the infant cannot be reasonably supposed to have ability to put forth an intelligent holy volition, he can have no moral character, and of course no sin.

The only way to avoid this conclusion in connection with the assumed premises is, to maintain that "the infant, from his birth, is a voluntary agent; and thus, in fact, to a certain extent, sinful." And would you believe, reader, that any reasonable man would resort to such an idea for the sake of helping out a theory? _And yet it is even so_. A paper lately published under the sanction of the New Divinity, purporting to be an inquiry into "what is the real difference between the New-Haven divines and those who differ from them," says, "The ground has of late been taken (if we understand the discussions on this subject) that mankind are literally _at birth_ voluntary and accountable agents, and actual sinners against God; that the new-born infant is a responsible subject of God's moral government, and actually sins with a knowledge of his duty, and in the same sense with the adult sinner violates moral obligation, does wrong, ought to be penitent, and to change its moral character." And as a proof that this is the ground now assumed, the same writer gives us a quotation from Rev. Mr. Harvey, who has been one of the most active in this state in opposition to the New-Haven divines, in which he says, "A moral being, for aught we know, may commence his existence in an _active_, _voluntary_ state of the will; he may be a voluntary agent from his birth, and thus, in fact, to a certain extent sinful, and that without supposing that _depravity is seated in any thing but the will_." This same writer also states that Dr. Spring, in a treatise on "native depravity," a work which I have not at hand, has advanced and defended the sentiment of "_actual_ sin from birth." And has it indeed come to this at last, that this natural ability, for which Calvinists have so strenuously contended, is nothing more than the power the new-born infant has to commit actual sin on the one hand, or "make himself a new heart" on the other! Alas for Calvinism! To what miserable shifts--yes, I must call them _miserable_ shifts--is this system driven! On this subject I will not express myself in accordance with my feelings. The respect I have for the intelligent, learned, and pious gentlemen who have advanced this idea, restrains me in this matter. Such a result, in the advocacy of a favourite theory, is however in strict accordance with the known obliquity of the greatest and purest minds. But while we respect the authors of such a theory, and while we feel the necessity of taking heed to ourselves, lest we also fall by the same example of prejudice, we cannot suffer our common sense to be imposed upon by such gross absurdities. In this, however, we see that, as before, in trying to maintain their _ability_, they gave up their _depravity_: so here, in trying to establish their _depravity_, they destroy their _ability_. Nay, what is still worse for this theory, this very attempt to prove that infants are "_actual_ sinners from their birth," is an indirect denial of the doctrine of derived depravity. Why do these gentlemen wish to establish this point? Why, forsooth, in order to show that men are _guilty_ from their birth, which is an acknowledgment, of course, that they cannot prove them guilty only by proving that they have intelligent moral exercise. Consequently it is a concession that this exercise is the occasion and origin of their guilt. This is not the first time that Calvinism, in trying to save itself, has gone over and joined the ranks of its opposers. Can the reader see the difference between this doctrine of actual sin from the birth, viewed in connection with its origin and bearings, and the New Divinity, which makes sin consist exclusively in moral exercise? Let these old-side Calvinists, then, sheath the sword of controversy which they have drawn against their brethren, and join in with them to defend, if possible, the Pelagian doctrine which, it would seem, after all, they hold in common stock. Has the Rev. Mr. Harvey been so active in getting up an opposition theological school in Connecticut to teach that the infant "commences his existence in an _active voluntary_ state of the will, and is thus (_on this account_) to a certain extent sinful?" This is clearly a work of supererogation--a useless expenditure of money and of talents. The New-Haven Theological School is capable--alas! too capable of carrying on this work, especially if Mr. Harvey and his friends will cease their opposition, and unite in their assistance. Does Mr. Harvey fear that the New-Haven divines will not begin their "_moral exercise_" early enough to make it _natural depravity?_ They have given assurances that they will not be particular on that point. Only allow that there is no sin previous to the first intelligent act of choice--previous to the corresponding power to make themselves new hearts, and they will be satisfied. They have said already that "this capableness of sinning, if it is not at the exact moment of birth, [and they do not affirm that it is not,] commences so early in their existence, that it is proper, for all the great purposes of instruction, to speak of it as existing from the beginning of their days." Hence we see nothing between these gentlemen on this point worth contending about. It will, however, be important that all who hold to conversion by motives and mere moral suasion should not put the commencement of these "moral exercises" so far back that the subject cannot understand Gospel truth; otherwise they may yet get into another difficulty as serious as the one they are trying to avoid. But to the subject. It has been very distinctly shown, I think, from the reasoning of the Calvinists themselves, and from the nature of the case, that there can be no such intermediate theory as they contend for, between the native impotency of old Calvinism and Pelagianism. But as this is an important point, I will illustrate it farther by an examination of the _seat_ of this Calvinistic depravity. It is seen, by the quotation above from Mr. Harvey, that he considers "depravity as seated in nothing but the will." And this is avowedly the sentiment of at least all those Calvinists who believe in natural ability. It is on this ground that they reiterate incessantly, "You can if you will;" "There is no difficulty except what is found in a perverse will." It is on this ground, also, that they tell us "a right choice is conversion." They do not say a right choice is a _condition_ or a fruit of the new birth; but _it is itself the new birth_. But to understand this subject clearly, it is important to know what they mean by the will. It appears to me they use this term with great indefiniteness, if not latitude of meaning. If they mean by this what I understand to be the legitimate meaning of the term "the mental power or susceptibility of putting forth volitions;" then to say that all depravity is seated in the will, is to be guilty of the gross absurdity of teaching that the affections have not a moral character. If by the will, however, they mean, as they frequently seem to mean, the affections themselves going out in desire after some proposed good, then indeed they establish the New-Haven theory, that all sin consists in moral exercise. Thus by placing all depravity in the will, whether by this is meant the power of willing, or the exercise of the affections, they, in the one case, exclude sin from the affections altogether, and in the other affirm the doctrine of Pelagianism. But if by the will they mean something different from either of the above definitions, then I frankly confess I know not what they mean. Should they however, change their ground, and place the seat of this depravity in the constitution of man's moral nature, as it exists anterior to any act of volition, then and in that case they throw the subject back on the old ground of natural impotency; for to talk of a natural power to change the moral constitution, as it existed prior to choice, and which constitution must, by the law of its nature, exercise a controlling influence over the mind, is the same as to talk of a natural power to alter one's own nature, or to unmake and remake himself. In this case we must have supernatural aid, or we must remain as we are.

We shall not be fully prepared to judge correctly on this subject until we have examined one more preliminary question, viz. What is the precise meaning that we are to attach to the terms, _natural_ and _moral ability_, as used by the Calvinists? To ascertain this, I have examined such authors as I have had access to, with care; and I have been particular to consult _recent_ authors, that I might not be accused of charging old and exploded doctrines upon our opposers; and _various_ authors, that I might ascertain any varieties that appertain to the different Calvinistic schools. In particular, the author of "Views in Theology;" Dr. Griffin, in a late work on "Divine Efficiency;" Rev. Tyler Thatcher, of the Hopkinsian school; and a doctrinal tract, entitled, "Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," written, it is presumed, by one of the divines of the New-Haven school have been consulted. There is among them all a remarkable uniformity on this point. If I understand them, the substance of what they say is, "Natural power consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will; and moral power is the _exercise_ of these faculties." Mr. Thatcher says this in so many words.--The tract alluded to gives this definition of natural power. Dr. Griffin says "their [sinners'] faculties constitute a natural ability, that is, a full power to love and serve God, if their hearts are well disposed." It certainly must appear, at the first glance, very singular to every mind not embarrassed by theory, that either the _possession_ of faculties, or the _exercise_ of faculties, should be called _power_. The idea of _power_ is supposed, by the best philosophical writers, to be undefinable, from the fact that it is a simple idea; but here, strange to tell, we have it analyzed in two different forms. Faculties are power--the exercise of faculties is power. Now, although we cannot define power, every one doubtless has a clear conception of it; and I humbly conceive that the common sense of every man will decide that neither of the above definitions embraces the true idea of power. The _exercise_ of faculties _implies_ power, it is granted; but every one must see that it is not power itself. And although the _faculties_ of the mind are sometimes called the _powers_ of the mind by a kind of borrowed use of the term power, just as the limbs or muscles are called the _powers_ of the body, yet it requires very little discrimination to see that as we may possess these powers of the body entire, and yet they be defective from some cause, as to some of their appropriate functions, so we may possess these powers or faculties of mind entire, and yet they may be defective in that moral strength necessary to a holy choice. Hence the possession of these faculties does not even _imply_ power adequate to a holy choice; much less are they _power itself_. I marvel therefore at these definitions of moral and natural power, and am thereby confirmed in the opinion advanced in my former number, viz. "That the whole of this distinction (of natural and moral ability) and the reasoning from it, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind, and an unwarranted definition of terms." This may seem a strong statement from so humble an individual as myself, in view of the many able minds that have adopted the opinions here opposed. But neither their opinion nor mine will weigh much, in this controversy, except as sustained by reasonable arguments; and by such arguments the present writer expects to stand or fall. Look then, reader, to both sides of this subject. Dr. Griffin himself seems to be at a loss how to explain himself on this subject. When he wishes to oppose the New-Haven divines, and guard against their error, he says, "If you mean by power, an ability that works without Divine efficiency, I hope I shall be the last to believe that." "And every body knows that the mass of the New-England divines, from the beginning, have acknowledged no such doctrine."

And why is _Divine efficiency_ necessary?--Because man has no ability that will "work," without it. Thus the moment he sets up a guard against Pelagianism, he throws himself back either upon our doctrine, or upon the old Calvinistic doctrine of "native impotency." There is no standing place any where else. The New-Haven divines are right, if natural ability is right; and the time cannot be far distant when the love of consistency will drive all, who hold to natural ability, either on to the New Divinity ground, or back to old Calvinism. From this remark the reader will see how much depends, if my views are correct, upon the proper adjustment of this question. It is in fact the turning point, which is to give a character to the theology of the Churches. Let us not then be in haste to pass over it. Hear Dr. Griffin farther. "Now if you ask me what is that power, which is never exerted without Divine efficiency? I can only say, that, in the account of the Divine mind, it is the proper basis of obligation, and therefore by the decision of common sense, must be called a power." The doctor had a little before told us, that this power was faculties--he is not satisfied with this; and what well instructed mind, like the doctor's, could be? It is something that forms the "basis of obligation," he knows not what it is. He merely infers there is such a power, because men are held responsible. But this inference will flow quite as naturally, by taking the Arminian ground of gracious ability, and save the other difficulties beside. At any rate, it will save the absurdity of holding to an ability, that will not "work," without being strengthened by Divine aid, and yet that this same ability is sufficient for all purposes of obligation without that aid.

We shall find equal difficulty, if we take up and examine this definition of _moral_ power. It is "the exercise of natural power." But these same writers tell us that, while we have this natural power sufficient without Divine grace to form a basis of obligation, "we are entirely dependent upon God's grace for moral power"--in other words, according to the definition of moral power, we are dependent upon grace for the _exercise_ of our natural power--and since natural power means the faculties of the understanding, will, and conscience--the statement is simply and evidently this: we are dependent upon Divine grace for the exercise of our understanding, conscience, and will, in making a holy choice. Why? Because the understanding, conscience, and will are so depraved by nature, that it is not in their nature to "work" in this exercise, without this Divine grace. Is not this holding the gracious ability after all? Is it singular then that Dr. Griffin should say, in another place--"They (sinners) are bound to go forth to their work at once, _but they are not bound to go_ alone: it is their privilege and duty to cast themselves _instantly_ on the Holy Ghost, and not to take a single step in their own _strength?_" Or is it any wonder that the Christian Spectator should say, that "this statement of Dr. Griffin brings him directly on the ground of evangelical Arminianism?" And is this the ability that "the mass of the New-England divines have held to from the beginning?" Not exactly. They only slide over on this ground occasionally, when they are pressed hard with Pelagianism on the one hand, and the old doctrine of passivity on the other. For the truth is, as before remarked, they have not a single point to balance themselves upon between these two, only as they light upon our ground.

There is still another difficulty in this moral power, as it is called. It implies the absurdity, that power to obey God is obedience itself. For a right exercise of our natural powers is obedience. But the right exercise of our natural power is moral power--therefore

Our moral power to obey God is obedience!! And this will give us a clue to the proper understanding of that oft-repeated Calvinistic saying--"You have power to obey God, if your heart is rightly disposed," or in short hand--"You can if you will." Now the verb _will_ here evidently means the right _exercise_ of the natural faculties--that is, as shown above, it means obedience. Hence the whole and proper meaning of this notable saying is--"You have power to obey God, _if you obey him_." "You _can_ if you _do_." This is a sort of logic which, when scanned down to its naked character, one would get as little credit in refuting, as its abettors are entitled to for its invention and use. And yet this is the logic which, in its borrowed and fictitious costume has led thousands in our land to suppose that Calvinism, as it is now modified, is the same, or nearly the same with Methodism.

There is still another striking solecism, necessarily connected with this definition of power. It supposes it to have no actual existence, until the necessity for it ceases. For in the order of cause and effect, natural power effects the act of obedience; and this effect of natural power, producing obedience, gives existence to moral power. Thus we have power to obey, super-added to the power that has actually obeyed! If, however, Calvinists say this is treating the subject unfairly, because their very definition shows that they do not mean by it any thing which _enables_ man to obey--I answer, that my reasoning went upon the ground, that it was what they call it--_power;_ and if they do not mean power, that is only acknowledging the position I started upon, that this Calvinistic power is no power at all. And here I ask, in the name of candour, What is the use of calling things by wrong names? What confusion and error may not be introduced by applying common and well defined terms in such a manner, that, when the things to which they are applied, are defined, it is seen that the terms thus applied are worse than useless; they directly mislead the mind! It is the direct way to bring Christian theology and Christian ministers into distrust and reproach.