Part 13

If there are embarrassments in the other case, and what theory of mind or matter has not its _inexplicables?_--these embarrassments are evidently of another kind; it is not the want of light to see how two antagonist principles can agree, the repugnancy of which must be the more apparent as light increases, but it is from the known limits to human knowledge. The principal embarrassment to the theory we defend is, we cannot understand the _manner_ in which this faculty of the mind operates. But this is no more difficult than to understand the manner in which other faculties of the mind operate. To make this last statement clear, the reader is desired to recollect that the mind is not divided into parts and members like the body. When we talk of the _faculties_ of the mind, we should understand the power that the entire mind has to act in this or that way. Thus we say, the mind has the faculties of will and of memory, that is, the mind, as a whole, has the powers of choosing, and of calling up its past impressions. Now if any one will tell me _how_ the mind remembers, I will tell him how it wills; and I have the same right to ask him what causes the memory to remember, as he has to ask me what causes the will to will. In both cases it may be said, the mind _remembers_ and _wills_ because this is its nature--God _made it so_. When you analyze until you come to the original elements, or when you trace back effects until you come to first principles, you must stop.--And if you will not receive these first principles because you cannot explain them farther, then indeed you must turn universal skeptic. I frankly acknowledge I cannot tell _how_ the mind acts in its volitions. And let it be understood that the motive theory, with all its other embarrassments, has this one in common with ours.--Can its advocates tell me _how_ motives act upon the mind? True philosophy is an analysis of constituent principles, or of causes and effects, but the origin of these relations and combinations is resolvable only into the will of the Creator. _It is so, because God hath made it so_. And the nature of these relations is beyond the reach of the human mind. However impatient we may be at these restrictions, they are limits beyond which we _cannot_ go; and our only duty in the case is, submission.

I am aware, however, that what I have now said may, without farther explanation, especially when taken in connection with a principle of philosophy already recognized, be considered as an important concession to my opponents. I have before stated, in substance, that in the material world there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as _power;_ that the efficiency of the laws of nature is, in fact, the Divine energy operating in a uniform way. "Let it be granted," a Calvinist might say, "that what we call the operation of second causes is universally the supreme Intelligence operating in a uniform way, and it is all we ask to defend our system. Then it will be granted, that in each volition of the human mind the operation of the will is nothing more than the energy of the Divine mind operating in a uniform way."

To this I reply, Though matter, on account of its inertia, cannot in any proper sense be said to have power, yet the same is not true of mind. If any one thinks it is, then the supreme Mind itself has not power. In other words, as both matter and mind are inert, and cannot act only as acted upon, there is no such thing as _power_ in the universe! and thus we again land in atheism. But if _mind_ has power, as all theists must grant, then the _human_ mind may have power. If any one can prove that it is impossible, in the nature of things, for the Supreme Being to create and sustain subordinate agents, with a spontaneous power of thought and moral action, to a limited extent, in that case we must give up our theory. But it is presumed no one can prove this, or will even attempt to prove it. We say, God has created such agents, and that they act, in their responsible volitions, uncontrolled by the Creator, either directly or by second causes. We are expressly told, indeed, that God made man "in his own image;" his _moral_ image doubtless. Man, then, in his own subordinate sphere, has the power of originating thought, the power of spontaneous moral action: this, _this only_, is the ground of his responsibility. Will it be said that this puts man entirely out of the control of his Creator? I answer, By no means. It only puts him out of the control of such direct influences as would destroy his moral liberty. Does the power of moral action, independent of the magistracy and the laws, destroy all the control of the civil government over malefactors? How much less in the other case? God can prevent all the mischief that a vicious agent might attempt, without throwing any restraint upon his responsible volitions. It is thus that he "makes the wrath of man praise him, and the remainder of wrath he restrains."

Let it be understood, then, from this time forward, by all, as indeed it has been understood heretofore by those who have carefully examined the subject, that when the Calvinists talk about "free will," and "human liberty," they mean something _essentially different_ from what we mean by these terms; and, as it is believed, something essentially different from the _popular_ meaning of these terms. They believe in human liberty, they say, and the power of choice, and we are bound to believe them; but we are also bound not to suffer ourselves to be deceived by terms. _Theirs_ is a liberty and power of a moral agent to will _as he does_, and _not otherwise_. _Ours_ is an unrestricted liberty, and a spontaneous power in all responsible volitions, to _choose as we do_, or _otherwise_.

Thus far I have examined the mind in its power of choosing good or evil, according to its original constitution. How far this power has been affected by sin, on the one hand, or by grace, on the other, is a question that will claim attention in my next.

NUMBER X.

MORAL AGENCY AS AFFECTED BY THE FALL, AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROVISIONS OF GRACE.

MY last number was an attempt to prove that God created man with a spontaneous power of moral action; and that this was the only ground of his moral responsibility. It is now proposed to inquire how far this power has been affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions of grace. The doctrine of the Methodist Church on these points is very clearly expressed by the 7th and 8th articles of religion in her book of Discipline.

1. "Original sin standeth not in the _following_ of Adam, (as the Pelagians vainly talk,) but it is the corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually."

2. "The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, (going before to assist us,) that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will."

It is not pretended here that any intellectual faculties are lost by sin, or restored by grace; but that the faculties that are essential to mind have become corrupted, darkened, debilitated, so as to render man utterly incapable of a right choice without prevenient and cooperating grace. As muscular or nervous power in a limb, or an external sense, may be weakened or destroyed by physical disease, so the moral power of the mind or an inward sense may be weakened or destroyed by moral disease. And it is in perfect accordance with analogy, with universal language, and with the representations of Scripture, to consider the mind as susceptible, in its essential nature, of this moral deterioration. If any one should say he cannot understand what this moral defect is, I would answer by asking him if he can tell me what the essence of mind is? And if he chooses to object to this kind of depravity, because he cannot understand it, in its essence, he should turn materialist at once; and then, as he will find equal difficulty to tell what the essence of matter is, and in what its weakness and disorder essentially consist, he must turn universal skeptic.--The simple statement is, _the soul has become essentially disordered by sin;_ and as no one can prove the assertion to be unphilosophical or contrary to experience, so I think it may be shown from Scripture that this is the real state of fallen human nature. And it may also be shown that this disorder is such as to mar man's free agency. There is a sense, indeed, in which all voluntary preference may be considered as implying free agency. But voluntary preference does not necessarily imply _such a free agency_ as involves moral responsibility. The mind may be free to act in one direction, and yet it may so entirely have lost its moral equilibrium as to be utterly incapable, of its own nature, to act in an opposite direction, and therefore not, in the full and responsible sense, a free agent. It is not enough, therefore, to say, "Free agency (of a responsible kind) consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will;" (see Christian Spectator for September, 1830;) unless by _will_ is meant the spontaneous power already alluded to. The understanding may be darkened, the conscience may be seared or polluted, the will, that is, the power of willing, may, to all good purposes, be inthralled; and this is what we affirm to be the true state and condition of unaided human nature.

It will be farther seen that the above account of human nature does not recognize the distinction of _natural_ and _moral_ ability. The fact is, man's inability is both natural and moral; it is natural, because it is constitutional; and it is moral, because it relates to the mind. To say a fallen man has natural power to make a right choice, because he has the faculties of his mind entire, is the same as to say that a paralytic man has the natural power to walk, because he has his limbs entire. It appears to me that the whole of this distinction, and the reasoning from it, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind and an unwarranted definition of terms. The simple question is, Has fallen man, _on the whole_, the power to make a right choice, or has he not? We say without grace he has not. And therefore fallen man is not, in the responsible sense of that term, a free agent without grace.

This view of the subject is not novel in the Church. I readily acknowledge that a doctrine is not therefore true, because it has been held by many, and can be traced back to antiquity, unless it can be proved to be Scriptural. The fact, however, that a doctrine has been generally received in the Church, entitles it to respect and to a careful examination, before it is discarded. Hence to those who have only read modern Calvinistic authors on this subject, it may be a matter of surprise to learn that not only the more ancient fathers, but even St. Austin himself, the introducer of predestination into the Church, and Calvin, and the synod of Dort, were all supporters of sentiments substantially the same as are here vindicated--I say, those who have only read modern Calvinistic authors will be surprised to learn this, because these authors treat this doctrine as though it were so unreasonable and absurd as scarcely to be tolerated in the view of common sense. Though it may have an influence with some, in a paucity of better reasons, to scout a doctrine from the Church by calling it absurd, yet the candid will not readily give up an old doctrine for a new, without good reason.

I had at first thought of quoting pretty freely from some of the fathers, and especially from the early Calvinists, to show their views on this point. But it may not be necessary, unless the statements here made should be denied. Let therefore one or two quotations from Calvin and from the synod of Dort, both of which I think Calvinists will acknowledge as good Calvinistic authority, suffice. Calvin denies all power to man, in his apostasy, to choose good, and says that, "surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, he (man) should nevertheless be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is destitute, and to _the liberty of which he is deprived_." The synod of Dort decided thus:--"We believe that God--formed man after his own image, &c, _capable in all things to will_ agreeably to the will of God." They then speak of the fall, and say, "We reject all that is repugnant to this concerning the free will of man, since man is but a _slave to sin_, and has nothing of himself, unless it is given him from heaven." And speaking of the change by grace, they add, "The will thus renewed is not only actuated and influenced by God, but _in consequence of this influence becomes itself active_." And to show that Calvin did not consider the voluntary acts of a depraved sinner as proof of free will, he says, "Man _has not an equally free election of good and evil_, and can only be said to have free will, because he does evil voluntarily, and not by constraint;" and this he ironically calls "egregious liberty indeed! if man be not compelled to serve sin, but yet is such a willing slave that his will is held in bondage by the fettors of sin." These quotations, I think, show satisfactorily that the early Calvinists believed man to have lost his power to choose good by apostasy, and can only regain it by grace. It is true, they generally believed that whenever this grace was imparted to an extent to restore to the mind the power of choosing good, it was regenerating grace. And herein they differ from the Arminians, who believe that grace may and does restore the power to choose good before regeneration. This, however, does not affect the point now under examination, but involves a collateral question, which will be examined in its proper place. One thought more, and I pass to the arguments on the main questions in the articles quoted above. These articles are taken from the 9th and 10th of the articles of the Church of England. Our 8th is indeed identically the same as the 10th of the Church of England; and the latter part of that article, commencing, "Wherefore, &c," is taken substantially from St. Austin himself. Thus much for the Calvinistic authority of the doctrine we defend. To which, if it were necessary, we might add quotations from Beza, Dr. Owen, a decided Calvinist, and many of the ancient fathers. Nay, the Remonstrants declared, in the presence of the synod of Dort, that this was "the judgment of all antiquity."

Let us now notice some arguments in favour of this doctrine.

1. The doctrine above stated, and now to be defended, must be true, as is believed, since only this view of man's condition will accord with the Scripture account of depravity. If the Scriptures teach that man is constitutionally depraved, that a blight and a torpor have come over his moral nature, comparable to sleep, to disease, and to death, how can it be otherwise than that this should affect his power to choose good? Had man any too much moral power in the first instance to constitute him an accountable moral agent? And if he had not, has he enough now that his mind has become darkened, his judgment perverted, and his moral powers corrupted and weakened? Or will it be denied that the moral energies of his nature have been impaired by sin? If not, how has he been affected? Let any one spend a thought on this question, and decide, if he can, what definite vicious effect can be produced on man's moral nature which will not necessarily imply a weakening and an embarrassment of his original power to a right choice. Should it be said that his power is somewhat weakened, but he has enough left to constitute him free to choose good, this would imply that before the loss he had more than enough! Besides, such an idea would rest on the principle that man's moral nature was not _wholly_ vitiated. It is said, I know, that all the embarrassment which man has to a right choice is a disinclination to moral good. But if this disinclination to good be derived and constitutional, it exists in the mind previous to any act of choice, and is therefore the very thing we mean--it is this very thraldom of the mind which utterly incapacitates it to choose good. If it be asked whether disinclination can ever be so strong as to destroy the freedom of the will to act in one particular direction? I answer, most unhesitatingly, Yes; and if that disinclination is either created or derived, and not the result of an antecedent choice, the possessor is not morally obligated to act in opposition to it, unless he receive foreign aid to help his infirmities, and to strengthen him for a contrary choice.

It follows then, I think, that we must either give up constitutional depravity, or discard the notion that we can make a right choice without Divine aid. And here, if I mistake not, we shall find the precise point on which modern Calvinism has verged over into the New Divinity theory of depravity. Perceiving that to acknowledge any depravity of man's moral constitution would either imply the necessity of supernatural aid in order to a right choice, or else free man from responsibility, Dr. Taylor and his associates have resolved all depravity into _choice_ or _voluntary preference_. They deny that there is any thing in the nature of man, antecedently to his act of willing, that possesses a moral character. Their idea is perfectly consistent with the notion of natural ability; and that the advocates of the New Divinity have embraced this idea is evidently a proof that they think closely and are seeking after consistency, let it lead them where it will. The only wonder is, that all who cleave to the dogma of natural ability do not follow them. The doctrine of natural ability, if it is any thing more than a name, appears evidently to be a part of the old Pelagian system, and should never be separated from its counterpart--the doctrine of self conversion and the natural perfectability of the human character. But this clearly implies that there is no serious derangement or radical viciousness of the moral man. Here, then, is another instance in which Calvinists in general revolt at the legitimate results of their own system.

But while the New Divinity advocates have fearlessly removed an important objection to their doctrine, they have, by this very act, as it is believed, however little they may have designed it, set themselves in fearful array against the Scripture doctrine of depravity and salvation by grace, and have opened a wide door for the introduction of numerous and dangerous heresies. It is true, they will not own that they have gone very far from the old system. They think the doctrine of natural depravity is asserted when they say, "nature is _such_ that he will sin, and only sin, in all the appropriate circumstances of his being." (See Dr. Taylor's Sermon.) But what this "nature" is, we are at a loss to determine; as also what the "_such_" is that is predicated of this nature; nor has Dr. T. told us how he knows that all men will sin and only sin, when in fact they have natural power to avoid it; or in what other than "the appropriate circumstances of their being" those are who become regenerate. In fact, while this theory claims to be orthodox, and thus to assimilate itself with the old theory, it has only exchanged one inconsistency for a half score. Its advocates, to be consistent, must come out plain and open Pelagians, and then meet the Scripture doctrine of depravity and salvation by grace as they can, or they must go back to their old ground, and endure the manifest inconsistency they are now endeavouring to avoid; or, what seems to me better than either, come on to the Arminian ground, which shuns all these difficulties, while it maintains constitutional depravity and salvation by grace from the foundation to the top stone, including of course a gracious ability to choose life and gain heaven.

2. Another argument in favour of the _necessity_ of Divine grace, in order to a right choice, is the fact, that God actually gives grace to those who finally perish, as well as to those who are saved. Of this fact the Scriptures afford decisive proof. They speak in general terms. Jesus Christ "is the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." "The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared unto all men." They speak in special terms of the unregenerate--that they _grieve_, _resist_, and _quench_ the _Spirit_ of _grace_, which certainly they could not do if they had it not. But if they have the operations of the Spirit, what are these operations? What is the Spirit doing to the inner man? Will it be said he is bringing motives to bear upon the mind? But what motives other than those found in the Gospel? These the sinner has without the Spirit. If these motives can convert sinners, any of us can convert our neighbours. "But," it is said, "the Spirit makes the heart _feel_ these motives." Aye, truly he does, and that not by operating upon the motives, but upon the _heart_, and this is the very work we contend for. It is thus that the Spirit graciously arouses and quickens the dead soul, and brings it to _feel_, and excites it to _act_, in the great work of salvation.

Since, then, it must be granted that unregenerate sinners, and those who are finally lost, have the operations of this Spirit of grace, let me seriously inquire, For what purpose is this grace given? On the Calvinistic ground it cannot be that they may have a chance for salvation, and thus be without excuse; for this is secured without grace. Since they have natural ability to come to Christ, the abuse of that ability is sufficient to secure their just condemnation. So say the Calvinists; and on this ground they maintain that the reprobates are justly condemned. For what purpose, then, is this grace given? If we may establish a general principle by an induction of particulars; if we may judge of the design of the God of providence or grace, by noticing, in any given case, the uniform results, then we can easily determine this point. _God gives grace to the reprobates that their condemnation may be the more aggravated_. The argument stands thus: God gives grace to the reprobates for some important purpose. He does not give it that salvation may be possible to them, for they are able to be saved without it; he does not give it to make salvation certain, for this it does not effect; nevertheless he gives them grace, the invariable effect of which is to increase their condemnation. The only consistent inference; therefore is, that he gives grace to the reprobates that they may have a more aggravated condemnation. Here, then, we trace the Calvinistic theory to one of these _logical consequences_ charged upon it in the sermon, and which has been so strenuously denied by the reviewers--a consequence which, revolting as it is, must nevertheless be charged upon it still, unless its advocates can show why grace is given to the reprobates when they have all necessary ability to repent and believe without it.