Part 6

Sir,[9] to the first complaint, which the Honourable Gentleman makes, of the Minister’s concealment from the Commissioners of the removal of the troops from Philadelphia, I shall only answer, that the importance of that proceeding required the nicest secrecy, and (though I do not mean to suggest the least idea disadvantageous to the confidence of the Commissioners) it is perhaps owing to the secret decision upon that matter, that the removal of the fleet and army from the Delaware was so timely, and so effectually executed. And I will add, that (whatever opinions may have been conceived either by the Commissioners or any other persons) the events, which have since happened, amply justify the wisdom of the measure.⸺With respect to the bad policy, as some Gentlemen have called it, of opening a negotiation with a retreating army, will any one tell me, that, had your army and navy been blocked up by Mons. D’Estaign’s fleet, with the prospect of all of the latter being utterly destroyed in the Delaware, the Congress would have been more inclined to treat with your Commissioners, than when all were safe at New-York?—Were they inclined to negotiate with Lord H[o]we and Sir William H[o]we, (who had sufficient powers) at Philadelphia, after the receipt of the bills, and before the arrival of the new Commissioners?⸺No, Sir—no appearances of reconciliation on the part of the Congress were shewn at that time:—their minds, worked up by their leaders to a spirit of enthusiasm, indulged the expectation of destruction to our fleet, at least, from the powers of France.—I am free to confess, Sir, that when I heard Mons. D’Estaign had arrived in America previous to Admiral Byron, (whose fleet had been so unfortunately dispersed) I had little hopes from the temper and inclinations of the Congress, that they would be induced to treat; until some blow had been struck, and that on our part, of a successful nature.—My confidence was, and still is, Sir, in the people there at large—groaning under the worst of all tyrannies, involved in a ruinous, and, I maintain, an unsuccessful war; and driven by their corrupted leaders into a most unnatural connection with France; I say, Sir, if one spark of British sense and honour yet remains, if one drop of blood of this country still flows in the veins of the Americans, they will avail themselves of our liberality, and return to their former happy and enviable subordination to this country.

With respect to the Fleet of Victuallers, which, the Honourable Gentleman observed, had a narrow escape from the Delaware, it was supposed they had sailed from Corke, some time before the orders were sent from hence for the evacuation of Philadelphia; and it is very lucky they did not sail for New-York; for, if they had, they would have met with Monsieur D’Estaign there.

It has been urged by the Honourable Gentleman, that the American war can be no longer made offensive; and therefore, if a defensive one has been adopted, why not leave a sufficient number of troops for the defence of New-York, Rhode-Island, Halifax, and the Floridas? and strike some blow at the French Settlements in the West-Indies.—Gentlemen will recollect the little time that has elapsed since the evacuation of Philadelphia, the attack and defence of Rhode-Island, and the transactions between Lord Howe’s and D’Estaign’s Fleet, and they will see how difficult it was to be at a great many places at the same time.—With respect to Dominica, Sir, the loss of it is certainly a misfortune, but, I trust, only a temporary one. There can be no blame laid upon the Ministers for that event, because, in the very beginning of the war with France, ships were sent sufficient to make at least a superior force to the French in the West-Indies. I am aware of the force of the argument that will be made use of upon this occasion—Gentlemen will say, You have so many places and possessions to guard, that many of them must be vulnerable; and therefore it is impossible to go on in a war with France and America at the same time, with any reasonable expectations of success.—This argument will lead me to enter a little into what I conceive to be our actual situation at home and abroad.—With respect to this country, Sir, it is protected by a fleet superior to the French.—It contains, to the honour of those who have sacrificed domestic ease to public spirit, a very fine army, including the regulars, of 50,000 men.—Your ships of trade and merchandise have arrived safe and unmolested; whilst the Privateers and Letters of Marque have made considerable havock upon the property of our enemies.⸺And here I must remark upon two observations which have fallen from the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last.—The first, with respect to the number of sailors who have entered on board these ships at a time when there was so much difficulty in manning the fleet, and which is a charge of ignorance in obtaining them upon the Admiralty.—Sir, the bounty which has been given to seamen by individuals, to enter on board Privateers and Letters of Marque, has been enormous—I have been told 10 l.—15 l.—and 20 l. a-man.—This, with the expectation of the larger share of prize-money received by lesser vessels, has been a sufficient inducement to men to enter on board those ships.⸺Upon the other observation, that the prizes we have taken consist chiefly of British property, and are insured here—I shall only remark, that the Merchant here who employs French shipping and French navigation, in preference to the British, ought to suffer.—But, Sir, with respect to insurance, let us see which of the two countries suffers most on that head.—The insurance upon French ships homeward bound has been very high.—Upon the French Indiamen, I have heard, so high as 75 l. per cent.—Then, Sir, this being the case, if the Frenchman arrives safe in France, the Englishman gets 75 l. per cent.—If he is taken, he loses but 25 l. per cent. whilst his neighbour shares the prize entirely.—Surely, therefore, Sir, this country has certainly much the best of the bargain.—This, however, Sir, great as these advantages are, is no reason nor no inducement with me for continuing the war.—I am obliged to recur so often to what has been said, that I beg pardon for deviating from the chief object, at least of my consideration—that of our actual situation at home and abroad.—I have already said, Sir, that we are sufficiently defended by our navy and army at home.—We have certainly a greater superiority of both in North America—of ships in the West-Indies—superior in the East-Indies, and shall be more so when the ships now ready to proceed thither, and with troops, are arrived there.—Sir, there is wealth, I trust there is likewise spirit enough in this country, to support us even in a more embarrassing situation than the present. And, though Gentlemen may have wished to impeach the security of this country, I will fairly tell them, that, such is the confidence, even in the hour of her distress, foreigners of all nations have given, and do give, the preference to our funds;—the falling of which, immediately after the opening of the last budget, is to be imputed entirely to the jobbing of a good purchase at a low bargain, and not to a want of confidence in the nation. I could deduce many reasons to justify me in this opinion; and I could call upon the Dutch, as the best politicians, in support of it.—Nor, Sir, will I admit the prospect of ruin to be before us, until I see that the justice of our cause has left us, and that there no longer exists that zeal and bravery which have distinguished the people of Great Britain, as superior to the rest of the world⸺Sir, a great deal has been said by Gentlemen (who have in my idea gone over, unnecessarily at this time, the whole of the American war) with respect to the conduct of it.⸺I believe, even the most inveterate enemies Ministers may have, will allow that there was transported to a greater distance, than ever was known before, the finest army; that you fed and maintained it at that distance; and that, from its excellence and its superiority, you had a right to expect the most happy advantages. So far the business, as it concerned Ministry, was well transacted. But, Sir, then comes the question—were the plans and the directions to execute them wise and practicable?⸺I cannot but say, Sir, for my own part, and, as far as my Judgment went, they were so⸺I do not mean to suggest any thing invidious towards the Officers to whom commands and responsibility were delegated⸺I am not one of those who easily condemn, certainly never will, before I have just grounds for doing so⸺If our Army and Navy have not done in every part of the world what was expected of them—Parliament can enquire, can approve, or censure⸺This however appears to me but a secondary subject for our consideration.

Sir, much has been said with respect to the Union of France and America, and the probability there is that Spain will soon be a party in it. I will not rob many honourable Gentlemen of the gift of prophecy, of what Spain will do in this conjuncture; but, Sir, surely her interest and her policy should be to resist the Independance of America—She will never, by protecting rebellion in our colonies, hold out encouragement to her own to follow their example. It is idle, Sir, to indulge the idea of the Spanish settlements in South America trading with the North Americans, by purchasing, with Spanish Bullion, North American commodities. The Court of Spain is much too wise, I think, to adopt such a measure. What, Sir, might be the consequence? An intercourse and trade between the extremes of that great quarter of the globe might at last be united by a centre, and establish the greatest dominion in the World. For, time may produce daring and flagitious characters in that continent also, whose object it may be to destroy the sovereignty of Spain over her Colonists—Neither can I agree with Gentlemen in thinking, that the union of America and France can be lasting. I might as well suppose that different religions, Liberty and slavery, in short, that contrarieties can form a system, as admit that unity and harmony can ever last between France and America—Neither of the countries expect it—The one supports, and the other receives, merely for the temporary purpose of distressing Great Britain⸺France can have no thoughts of establishing herself in the Heart of America. And America will only avail herself of the assistance of France, until she is at peace with this Country.

In the mean time, however, our exertions must be of a powerful nature to resist this unnatural alliance—And here, Sir, let me return to the consideration of what is proper to be done in consequence of his M[ajes]ty’s speech.

Sir, in giving my entire approbation of what has been proposed by the Honourable Gentleman in the motion for the Address, I trust I shall be forgiven, if I submit to the House the necessity there is at this time of vigour and firmness in all our proceedings, in order to give a spirit to national exertion. And, whilst we regret that even our unanimity and liberal offers have not been productive of peaceable accommodation with America, I trust that her ingratitude may yet meet with the recompence such a conduct has deserved: in holding out this doctrine, I mean not to forget that America is still the offspring of Great Britain: that when she returns to her duty, she will be received with open arms, and all her faults be buried in oblivion.

In a word, Sir, the period is arrived, when it is no longer a question who is to be Minister, who are to compose a party, or who have been to blame. Such discussions will not probably obtain conviction on either side—The day has passed for reflexions on those who have been alledged to have given confidence to Insurgency, or on those who have been said to have provoked it. The object of your consideration is now⸺the salvation of your Country.

For myself, Sir, I shall no longer desire to remain in my own situation, than his Majesty, and this House, think I can be useful in it. If any one Man will take it from me, He will relieve me from the most anxious tasks that any Minister probably ever experienced: But, till then, Sir, I look to the support of this house, and to that of all good Men in defending and maintaining the glory and honour of Great Britain.

[Sidenote: Col. B[a]rré.]

Col. _B[a]rré_ began with recounting his predictions.—I foretold in the outset of the American contest, that your obstinacy would establish independance of the colonies. My first prophecy was, that France would join them—was I wrong?—I will boldly hazard one prediction more—I say, Spain sooner or later will join both⸺such are the allies of America.—Who are your’s? The Onandagas, the Tuscaroras, and the Choctaws! These are your copper coloured allies, that fix a stain on the name of Britain; and disgrace this country even in victory, as well as defeat—I knew of these alliances, and their barbarities, so early as the 8th of June last. I have a letter from a friend of mine at Poughkeepsie, of that date;—the Indians, headed by Col. B[u]tl[e]r, began their rapine in _Cherry Valley_; parties of _Indians and Tories_ (so my friend couples those blood-hounds of desolation) butchered the innocent inhabitants of _Sacandago_, and spread ruin and carnage through _Minisink_—I am sure, Col. B[u]tl[e]r, (who is indeed as gallant and amiable an Officer as ever I knew, and I know him well) never would have embrued his hands in innocent blood, but that he knew he must sacrifice his feelings to the speculative, I do not say practical, violence, of the American Secretary. Gen. C[a]rlt[o]n lost the Noble Lord’s favour by his abhorrence of the tomahawk and the scalping knife:—have not we tried those satanic instruments of death too long? Is the whole of Miss _Macreas_ race to be sacrificed? Not one innocent babe left unbutchered to lisp out the tale of that devoted, that unhappy family? Of whom are we now to enquire for any official documents of your war? I see no Secretary of War in this house? Does the American Secretary monopolize and consolidate all warlike business? I hope not.⸺

Sir, I beg pardon for the heat which I find rising within me—but the inexorable hour of vengeance is not far distant; the heavy load of black and bloody guilt will sink you all.—The time will come when the thunder of the cannon will be heard at your walls. Examples will be made. The Tower and the Block must expiate the crimes of Ministers. The voice of truth will be heard. The Rubicon is passed.⸺Sir, what is the comparative state of the revenues of France, and of this country? Mons. Neckar, a very able and a very amiable man, has, I understand, found taxes, and not oppressive ones, for two years;—is that a fact?—The revenue of this country is diminished—it has been gradually so during this detestable war—will Ministers deny it? Good God, Sir, what a state are we in? Dominica lost!—Sir, Monsieur Bouillé was once my particular friend—Sir, he is returned to France for fresh powers and orders—look to your West-India settlements, callous as we are, we cannot bear the loss of them.

Sir, I am astonished at the blind credulity of Ministry—can they be so very simple as to trust to vague compliments against those decisive words of the Pacte de Famille, the Family Compact, “Qui attaque une couronne attaque l’autre;” (I translate for the country Gentlemen) whoever attacks one crown attacks the other.⸺I know Count Almodovar—I was introduced to him by my old friend, Don Francisco Buccarelli:—I never shall forget dining with him at a kind of Table d’Hotes, in a tavern opposite the Escurial;—as chance would have it, many more illustrious characters dined with us that day; there was the Count, his wife’s cousin, and myself, on one side of the table;—Count Cobentzel, and Baron Reidesdel (who were then on their travels) and Duke de Chartres (who had just come from Paris) sat opposite to us—Monsieur de Sartine (who came in the Duke’s vis a vis) was at the foot of the table; and we put Buccarelli in the chair⸺we had an excellent dinner—the wine was good—and we toasted the Madrid beauties in bumpers of Packeretti—however, I was not so far gone but I can very well remember what Almodovar whispered in my ear, while _Cobentzel and Reidsdale_ were drinking Maxamilian Joseph of Bavaria’s health. Colonel (says he) _Il alte se volto Estremadura che molto_—I won’t translate it. I feel the respect due to Ambassadors.—But, will Ministry answer a plain question? I put it roundly, because I ask for a positive answer—Is there no treaty now on the tapis to cede Gibraltar, or Port Mahon?—I say, the neutrality of Spain is to be trucked for by the dismembring this country of its best possessions.—Here he proceeded to read variety of Gazettes, American News-papers, two or three Treaties, letters from gallant Officers in all parts of the world; accounts of Cl[i]nt[o]n’s retreat; transactions of Lord H[o]we, and Mons. D’Estaign; Alderman Oliver’s letter—affair at Rhode Island, &c. &c. &c. He went also into a string of similar surmises, recognized various intimates in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, and interspersed the whole with a multiplicity of anecdotes, proverbs, quotations, menaces and bon mots—concluding, that having then read to the house all the various papers he himself could collect, he found it necessary to give his vote for the Amendment, as the only way to get at more.

[Sidenote: Mr H. St[anle]y.]

Mr. H. _St[anle]y_ observed, that many Gentlemen had deviated from the business immediately before the house, which, in his opinion, was merely this: Whether this house will or will not support his M[ajest]y, and the executive powers of government, in the endeavours to recal the Americans to obedience, and to punish the natural enemies of this country?[10] That his own opinion was determined by a conviction of the necessity, in this hour of difficulty and distress, for exertion and firmness. Much has been said of the wealth and resources of France in comparison of those of England. I can only say, Sir, from all the observations I have been able to make, that France is, with respect to its finances, certainly an impoverished country. It has not yet recovered the impression made by the last war; and, whatever Gentlemen may think, neither Mons. Neckar (whom I very much respect) nor any other person, will be able, at least for a great length of time, to overturn the old mode of attainment of French money; I mean, Sir, by the vehicle of the _Fermeurs Generaux_. It must be a minister of great courage indeed, and a King of Terrors, that will new model the French finances; new taxes may be imposed, but I much doubt of the collection of them. When a good contract has been long in possession, it is too sweet to resign easily; and the _Fermeurs Genereaux_ are too important to be offended, especially, when the state is necessitated to have recourse to their assistance. In saying this, I give full credit to Mons. Neckar for his attempt to improve the revenue of France, and that too, when the attempt is surrounded with so much difficulty and danger.⸺The revenue of this country, Sir, has not suffered by the American war; the surpluses of the sinking fund, are as great as during the state of perfect peace with America. Other countries have taken from us those manufactures which we exported before with bounties to America.

As I think Britain is still equal to resist, and, I trust, to subdue all its Enemies, I am clearly for the Motion which has been proposed, and seconded, by the honourable Gentlemen, with so much credit to themselves, and with so particular a desert of the approbation of their Country.

[Sidenote: Gen. C[o]n[wa]y.]

_Gen. C[o]n[wa]y._ Mr. Sp[eake]r, I beg pardon for troubling the House with one short word, Sir, at this late hour of the night, Sir, when there are many Gentlemen very desirous⸺and much more capable than I am, of speaking—upon so material—so important—so comprehensive a business—I may say, Sir—as that which now immediately comes before us—for our deliberation.⸺In doing this, Sir—in offering my poor sentiments—upon this matter, Sir⸺I own, I feel some degree of warmth, at the supineness—at the coolness—I may say—of the Ministers in so dangerous—so hazardous—and, God knows, probably so destructive an hour⸺And, Sir, I hope I may suggest my thoughts at so critical a period, when, indeed, all Europe and America are convulsed—and shaken—by the imbecillity, the inattention, and the indecision of Ministers; who have so supinely, so cooly, and so indecisively sat _with their hands before them_, waiting for events—and contingencies⸺In saying this, Sir,—I mean not to throw any reflexion upon any of them—Most of them I know to be men of honour and ability—but, Sir, I beg pardon, Sir, for taking up the time of the house, Sir; I think the moment is past when any system can prevail, I mean on the part of this country over America. Your West-India Islands are unprotected—Dominica is gone—Who knows but Jamaica is gone too? What force have you at Antigua? I understand, Admiral Barrington is gone from Barbadoes. What is to become of St. Vincents and Grenada? Good God! Sir, will the Nation sit still under these apprehensions? Have Ministers taken care of Ireland? Does the Noble Lord underneath me know the state of Guernsey and Jersey? Will they be able to resist Count Broglio with 50,000 men? Is your force, particularly at Jersey, equal to resistance—Sir, at this moment, I tremble for Jersey.[11]⸺

In one short word, Sir, I beg pardon—I do trust in God, Sir ... in the King ... Sir, and in the spirit of this unhappy Nation, Sir, that we shall be relieved from these dreadful apprehensions, and difficulties, and that we shall see once more, Peace, Harmony, and Wisdom, resume their order in this country, in the stead of weakness, irresolution, wavering folly, absurd doubts, and indecision, Sir.

[Sidenote: Mr S[aw]b[rid]ge.]

Mr _S[aw]b[rid]ge_⸺Example—impeachment—axes—Tower—blood—Sister Mac[au]ly—republicanism—Washington, greatest man in the World—will be heard—tyranny at Warley-Common—militia men turned to road-pioneers—undermining trees—sand in bread—waste of powder—Middlesex election—vast expence of flints—triennial parliaments—body politic—ill humours—state-surgeons—example—axes—Tower—blood⸺_Da Capo_.

The question being now called for with most violent impatience, the House prepared to divide.⸺The Editor cannot but lament that the eloquence of the day is compriseable in so small a compass.—He regrets, with many others, the silence of those who might have been supposed, from attachment, from principle, and a sense of honour, to have taken a more decided part in the debate. Probably it might be considered too severe to impute the conduct of those Gentlemen to the precariousness of the times, to the expectation of new Administrations, or to the fretfulness of an insatiable avarice of wealth and power.

Little more remains to add, than that the House having become very clamorous for a division, at half past three the question on the Amendment being put, the motion was rejected by a majority of 261 to 148. Tellers for the Ayes, Mr T. T[ownshe]nd and Mr B[y]ng—for the Noes, Sir G[re]y C[oope]r and Mr C[harles] T[ownshe]nd.⸺The main question being then put, the original Address was carried in nearly the same proportion.

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