Part 5

_Mr. B[u]rke_⸺I must confess, Sir, notwithstanding my long and melancholy experience of the present administration, I cannot hear, without astonishment, the language held forth by the speech, and echoed in this day’s debate. This session, Sir, at a period big with horror, pregnant with ruin to this country, is ushered in with the song of triumph; and parliament are bid to rejoice at a time when nothing but the language of despair is to be heard throughout the nation. Surely, Sir, the hour is at last arrived, when humility and moderation ought to take place of pride and confidence; when, instead of launching further into a sea of troubles, we might be content to try what little can be saved from the wreck of national honour and prosperity. Ministers might at length condescend to tell us, what means are left to avert the gathering ruin; how we are to tread back the mazes of error and folly, through which we have been led; and where are the resources from which one gleam of hope might dawn upon us, in the hour of danger and despair—But, deaf to the solemn call of occasion and necessity, they rejoice in the absence of thought, in the contempt of foresight. Like the wretch who seeks in stupefaction a momentary relief from sorrow, they sink from a voluntary intoxication into a torpid insensibility. The illusion, indeed, is not to be confined within the narrow limits of their own minds; its baneful influence must be circulated through every corner of the nation; and, by a shameful perversion, that anxiety for the public welfare, which, in times like these, is, in my opinion, the highest of public virtues, must be amused with the pageantry of domestic warfare, or lulled by the opiate of our American Gazettes. I own, Sir, even on principles of criticism, I cannot but consider the stile of these Ministerial annals, as no very favourable criterion of the present times. In happier days, their characteristic was plain conciseness. Victories were then too rapid, too numerous, to admit of a dilated relation.—Success is seldom tedious, but I am afraid our highest atchievements have amounted to no more than the inroads of savages, or the depredations of pyrates. Upon my word, Sir, though we may censure our Officers, our Ministers at least shew some generalship; if they cannot deceive the enemy, they are prompt enough to mislead their countrymen; though they discover but little skill in the arrangement of armies, they have an admirable talent in marshalling Gazettes. They have given celebrity to sheep-stealing, and blazoned, in all the pompous prolixity of ostentatious phraseology, the important depredations at—_Martha’s_ Island—Certainly, Sir, the gallant Commander of that expedition may vie in pastoral atchievements with Ajax, with Jason, or at least Don Quixote; and, if he does not obtain a triumph, he is clearly entitled to an _ovation_. Not, Sir, that I mean to cast any reflection on those Officers and Soldiers to whose lot these ridiculous services have fallen—they, no doubt, have effected every thing that the bravery of the British troops in such a situation could accomplish; but the Hand of Nature, Sir, has thrown in their way obstacles which it was not in the most obstinate valour, in the most consummate wisdom to surmount. It is a want of confidence in the directors of this war that has chilled every vein, and slackened every sinew of military enterprize. Besides, Sir, if I may be permitted to indulge a little superstition, there is a certain fatality attending the measures of Administration: through all their bungling operations of war, through all their wretched plans of peace, the evil Genius, Sir, of this country, seems to haunt their footsteps. He it is that has suffered them to wander on, undismayed by danger, unabashed by reproaches, from one absurdity to another, ’till our blunders and our follies have at length reared that stupendous fabric of American Empire that now engrosses the attention, and claims the wonder of mankind. Allow me, Sir, to pause for a moment, while I contemplate this phœnomenon of modern ages, this new constellation in the western hemisphere; a mighty and extensive empire, not rising by slow degrees and from small beginnings, but bursting forth at once into full vigour and maturity; not cherished in the soft lap of peace and commerce, but shaking off in its outset the long established dominion of a powerful master, and thriving in the midst of carnage and desolation. “Ab ipso ducit opes animumq. bello.” If we view them in another light, as completely enthroned in sovereignty, as receiving embassies from distant potentates, as forming leagues with the princes and states of Europe, we shall find more abundant matter for self-humiliation—I could wish to shut my eyes on the scene that follows: The parent baffled and depressed, imploring pardon of her injured and alienated children, yielding to their successful resistance, what she had denied to their prayers and petitions, and offering every concession short of a total emancipation; but scorned and rejected in her turn, not (as she had rejected them) with rudeness and insolence, but with firmness and with dignity; and convinced, at length, that the day of conciliation is past, and that the groundwork of peace can only be laid on the broad basis of equality and independance.

Is this the unconditional submission the noble Lord in the American department so prodigally announced? This is indeed unconditional submission, but unconditional submission from Great Britain to America.

Gentlemen may remember how often my voice has preached peace within these walls; how often it has warned administration to healing measures, while the wounds of America might yet have been closed. I will still repeat it, ’till the echo of this house shall be conscious of no other sound; Peace, Peace, Peace, is still my object.

It is now high time, Sir, that Gentlemen should awaken to a sense of our danger, that Parliament should discard those wretched schemes of short-sighted policy, which cannot, in our present situation, afford even a temporary refuge. As yet, we experience only the beginnings of our sorrows; but the storms of adversity are gathering fast around us, and the vessel is still trusted to the direction of Pilots, whose ignorance and obstinacy has been manifest to all the world.⸺What thanks, Sir, to the vigilance of our Rulers, that we are not already sunk beyond the possibility of redemption? What thanks to them, that the flower of our army and navy, and with them all the hopes of Britain had not withered before the power of a lately dejected but now triumphant enemy? Is it owing to their care that the rich produce of the Western Isles has not flowed into every harbour of France?

No, Sir, it is the hand of Providence that wards off for a while the ruin of this declining empire. It is Providence alone that has preserved our gallant Admirals in America, by an almost miraculous interposition.—It is due to Providence alone, that the heart-strings of our commerce are not cut asunder by the sword of our adversaries.

I own, Sir, I cannot join in an implicit approbation of such ministers: I must be a little better acquainted with their merits before I can place an unlimited confidence in their wisdom and discretion; that discretion which has led us into a labyrinth of difficulties; that wisdom that cannot find a clue for our deliverance.

[Sidenote: Mr. D[u]nn[in]g.]

Mr _D[u]nn[i]ng_ said a few words, which, from the learned gentleman’s being particularly hoarse and uncommonly inarticulate, owing (as has been suggested) to a violent cold, and a multiplicity of business in Westminster-hall, we could not collect with the accuracy that we wish to observe on every occasion. His language was neat and pointed, though somewhat tinctured with professional pedantry: his arguments seemed ingenious, though perhaps too refined for the comprehension of his auditors. He had much antithesis, much verbal gingle, and many whimsical climaxes. He talked of the competency or incompetency of the House to the discussion of the present question; of the materiality or immateriality of the proposed amendment; of the responsibility or irresponsibility of Ministers. He said, he neither asked, nor knew, nor cared to what the present question might ultimately tend; but of this he was confident, that it’s propriety was clearly evinced, and it’s necessity irrefragably proved by that opposition which purported to baffle it.—Upon the whole, his harrangue seemed to be a medley of legal quibble and quaint humour.

[Sidenote: Mr. S[olicito]r G[enera]l.]

Mr. _S[o]ll[i]c[i]t[o]r-G[e]n[e]r[a]l_, CONTRA, began with _declaring_, that when he _tuk_ his present office, he _understud_ it to be a _General Retainer_, to _shew cause_ in behalf of Administration: That, therefore, he hoped to be favoured with a few words by way of _replication_ to his learned friend: That he might in this case have insisted on _want of notice_, but, for the sake of candour in practice, he would waive that objection; for, that he had no doubt, on the merits, but that _judgment wud be given_ in his favour: _Protesting_, that the speech was _warranted_ by _precedent_, and had _the highest authority_ in it’s support: _Protesting_ also, that no _gud_ objection _cud_ be made to the address, as it strictly pursued the very words of the speech. He _justified, under an immemorial custom_, that Administration _have been accustomed to have, and still of right ought to have_, certain echoes in this House, called _Addresses_.—He admitted, that _true it was_, there had been some _errors in our proceedings_ with respect to America; but he was informed, and believed, that Sir Henry Clinton intended to have a _new trial_. As to the cause of Great Britain _versus_ France, he had been given to understand and be informed, that the place in which the _trespass_ was supposed to have been committed, was, PARCEL of the Island of Dominica, _in parts beyond the seas_; which place said French, with force of arms, to wit, with ships of divers guns, drums, trumpets, bayonets, hand grenades, and cartridge boxes, had broken and entered, _doing nevertheless as little damage on that occasion as they possibly cud_: but that he was clearly of opinion, that if the troops of said France should _traverse_ the Channel, and lay _a Venue_ in Kent or Sussex, _issue might be joined_ by the militia at Cox-Heath; and, in that case, _afterwairds_, if verdict _shud_ be given in our favour, the adverse party would sustain heavy and exemplary _damages_.—He concluded with _averring_, that he approved of the address in it’s present form; and that he should _demur_ to the amendment moved by the Noble _Lud_, as _multifarious, uncertain, insufficient, and informal_.

[Sidenote: Mr F[o]x.]

Mr _F[o]x_ now rose; and, with that extent of information, refined perspicuity, and vehemence of eloquence, by which he so invariably commands the attention and admiration of the House, entered at large into the subject of debate.

To do justice to the force of his reasoning, or elegance of his stile, is totally beyond the utmost efforts of the editor.—All that he can attempt is, to give an imperfect sketch of an inimitable original.⸺He began with lamenting the accomplishment of that ruin, which, from time to time, he had too justly predicted. He confessed, that little merit could be ascribed to those prophecies; which, however chimerical and visionary ministers had affected to consider them, were, in fact, no more than plain deductions of what must necessarily ensue from their own measures. He proceeded to recapitulate the conduct of Administration since the prorogation of Parliament; particularly observing on the impolitic removal of the troops from Philadelphia at the moment, when, if ever, their continuance _there_ might have effected some good purpose. The concealment of that intended evacuation, even from the Commissioners themselves, was a part (he said) of that system of duplicity and deception which pervaded the whole of ministerial conduct. Possibly, indeed, Ministers were aware, that gentlemen of high character and esteem would not have become the executive tools of a plan so wretchedly concerted. The Commissioners therefore were not suffered to participate in counsels, which, if they had known, they must have despised. Nor was folly more conspicuous in the origin than in the prosecution of this paltry disingenuous plan. Sir Henry Clinton, to whose courage and conduct every praise is due, was ordered to return to New-York. Encumbered with baggage, and pursued by an army superior in numbers, he made his way thro’ the almost impervious forests of that country; and, by almost a miraculous effort, not only secured his retreat, but in the Jerseys had the good fortune to resist the enemy with some success—a success however, which, without disparaging the British troops, must in great part be attributed to General Lee; who, in consequence of his misconduct in that affair, was immediately put in arrest, and afterwards suspended for the space of a year.

He went on with indicating the circumstance of a fleet of Victuallers having been sent to Philadelphia, after the army, which was to be supplied by that fleet, had been ordered to evacuate Philadelphia.—That fleet, he said, had narrowly escaped being taken in the Delaware; and, thence, he argued Ministers were as culpable, as if, in consequence of the capture of that fleet, the army, then arrived at New-York, had famished for want of those provisions, on which their future subsistance was wholly dependant.

He said, he was yet to learn what plan Administration could pretend to alledge they had followed, or meant to follow, in America. Upon what grounds could they attempt to prosecute an _offensive_ war? Or, taking the alternative, how can they presume to say they have acted on the _defensive_?⸺As to the first, they have thirty thousand men to conquer the continent of America: admitting then the superiority of their army and their navy, still he contended that superiority had been, and ever must be ineffectual and useless; because, as long as the English army and navy co-operate, the Americans will never have the unnecessary temerity to give up the advantage of situation, or expose their cause to the hazard of one decisive engagement. The last campaign was the clearest proof of that position; and, now, though our fleet was superior to the French, yet D’Estaign is safe at Boston.—It was, on that principle, he doubted not, the gallant and experienced Commanders of the last campaign had formed their conduct: It was their policy, and, in his opinion, the best policy, to keep a collected force, and to avoid any inferior exertions, that might require a separation, or weaken that superiority, which, in case of a decisive action, they rightly judged could alone have been fatal to American resistance.—It remained for General Clinton to pursue a contrary policy.—Yet, though (he declared) no man in that house entertained a higher respect for the personal and professional merit of that able Commander, (who from his particular talent for military enterprise, and his education under the Prince of Brunswick, was best calculated for effecting such a plan) yet, from the minutest investigation of the late Gazettes, he could not collect any very auspicious presage of his military career. If indeed, from his observation, of what had already happened, he might hazard an opinion of what may happen, we had no reason to rejoice at the revival of that plan of separation, which had proved so fatal in the Northern expedition. He was sorry he had mentioned that expedition—It led him to a subject he wished to avoid.—He had been accused of an asperity of reflexion on the conduct of the noble Lord who planned that expedition. He would strive, in future, to overcome his indignation, by indulging his contempt for the Adviser of it.—Yet, thus much he would say; though unhappy for this country, it was happy for our troops, happy for our officers, to be directed and controlled by a Minister, to whose wisdom not even Envy could ascribe one particle of their success, in whose imbecillity even Justice would afford them an asylum from every disgrace.

Having thus stated the impracticability of an offensive war in America, either on the former plan of united force, or on the present separate efforts, he recurred to the other part of his argument, whether Administration could pretend to alledge their having adopted the alternative, and formed even a defensive plan for America and the West-Indies?⸺If they dared to assume that merit, how could they expect the House to attend, with any degree of patience, to such a mockery of all truth? On any rational plan of mere defence, would they not have left a force at New-York, Rhode-Island, and Halifax, fully able to prevent any attack in that quarter; at the same time, detaching a sufficient force to protect the West-India Islands?—Upon such a plan, would not any spirited Minister have grafted some degree of activity and enterprise? Would He not have attacked Martinique, Guadaloupe, or St. Domingo? Such conduct would have struck terror to France, we should have been enriched by new acquisitions, or, at least, have prevented the disgrace of our own losses.

But, admitting that this defensive plan may have been but recently adopted, how are Administration to regain the time they have lost, or what resources of finance are still unexhausted to prosecute even this plan? Are all the Country Gentlemen equally disposed to devote fifteen shillings in the pound to carry on this defensive war? Are they all equally delighted with the great and growing ruin of an accumulating debt and a decreasing revenue? Or do they rest their hopes on the wealth of our East-India trade? Do they know that, there too, the French are undermining the foundation of our commerce? Or is it studiously concealed from them, that the French ministry have sent Monsieur Vaugelin to Canton, in the quality of their Consul at the Chinese Court?⸺He had heard much of a sudden increase of national wealth by our late captures, but, at best, the prizes of privateers are a partial benefit; they can enrich but a few individuals; they afford no diminution of the general burthens of a whole people. In the present instance, the truth was these boasted prizes were, in fact, public losses; the French having had the art to insure their most valuable ships, particularly the Indiamen, by English policies—besides that, several of the richest captures were actually freighted with consignments to English merchants.

But, supposing this extraordinary spirit of bounty should become general among the Country Gentlemen, and that, to support a war which had totally lost the original object of revenue, for which they had been tempted to engage in it; supposing they were all well inclined to a land-tax of fifteen shillings in the pound, and determined to overflow the Exchequer with an extraordinary redundance of profusion, yet would they be particularly happy that all that wealth should be portioned out to subsidise Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hanau, Waldeck, Brandebourg-Anspach, and all the mercenaries of Germany? Or that it should wholly be devoted to satiate the monopolising avarice of a Russian alliance? You have no force at home—you are almost defenseless.⸺

[Sidenote: Col. T[u]ffn[e]ll.]

(Here he was called to order by Colonel Tuffnell for speaking of the _defenceless_ state of this country.) Col. _T[u]ffn[e]ll_ said, the word _defenceless_ was, to the last degree, improper and disorderly; for that he himself had the command at Dover Castle, opposite Calais, where, though the country all about it was rather flat, he would not wish such a word as _defenceless_ to be sent from that house to Paris, by any friend of Dr. Franklin’s. And, as he was on his legs, he must say, that word _defenceless_ was doubly wrong, from the late state of the camps; where, in spite of French spies, there had been the utmost discipline, unanimity, peace, and quietness; except, indeed, some desertions, much nakedness, frequent floggings, and several duels.

Mr. _F[o]x_ then proceeded, without any remark on this interruption; and observed, that every petty Landgrave and Margrave had already been exhausted; they had no more Chasseurs, no more mercenary boors, to fight, or rather not to fight, our battles. Russia is frozen up for some months; and, not improbably, the courts of Berlin and Vienna would sufficiently engage her in their Bavarian contest; or, at least, not make it adviseable for her to lessen the internal defence of a country surrounded with such powerful armies. As to the Fleet, how could it be recruited with sailors or marines? Though even the spirit of adventure could instantly man every Privateer that had been fitted out, yet the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty had pretended to palliate his own incapacity and criminal neglect, by alledging it was almost impossible, even with an extraordinary bounty, and the utmost rigour of an Impress and an Embargo, to man the Royal Fleet—the fact was, the minds of the people were obstinately bent against this American war; nay, even against a French war, when France became the protector of America.

With such Ministers, such principles, such plans, such internal resources, such prospects of alliance; Gentlemen were now called on to echo the Speech, to panegyrize an Administration too despicable for satire, to plunge this devoted country in aggravated ruin, and, with a remorseless dispair, to _desolate_ what they had found impossible to _subdue_.

[Sidenote: Lord N[o]rth.]

L[o]rd _N[o]rth_.[8] Mr. Sp[eake]r, at the same time that I agree with many Gentlemen who have spoken in the course of this day’s debate, that the present is a very serious moment of deliberation, I can by no means join with them in thinking our situation is desperate, though, I confess, it is distressing.

Sir, in all cases of distress or difficulty there is some relief to be found in comparison. Gentlemen who hear me, will admit that this country, in former wars, has been acquainted with unfortunate events. The loss of some of our possessions, and the failure of enterprizes, marked the onset of last war. Commanders were unsuccessful, perhaps criminal;—I do not mean to draw a complete analogy between that period and the present—I only mean to observe, that there has been no difficulty in modern times, from which this Country has not been able to extricate itself, when rouzed by a sense of its wrongs, and determined to vindicate its justice, its dignity, and its honour.⸺In saying this, I shall be told by Gentlemen that we were indebted to a great Character in the midst of our misfortunes during the last war, and that, by his vigour and enterprizing genius, this Country was extricated from her embarrassing situation. I will join heartily in paying that tribute of truth to his memory⸺Would to God that such a man were alive at this moment, to step forward with the full exertion of the same zeal, and the same talents. I would yield to none as a second in the work, though I confess my inability to be employed as a first.

Sir, the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last, has gone over such a variety of ground, and has given so large a history of the wickedness of Ministers during the American war, that the asperity with which he has delivered it, would be a sufficient reason for my silence, did I not think it necessary, from a duty I owe to this house and to my country, to give some answers to assertions which have fallen from him.