CHAPTER XXII. RIGHT AND WRONG—TRUE VIRTUE.

Having discovered the end for which mind is made, and thus gained the idea of what is meant by perfectness, in its _nature_ or _construction_, we next inquire as to what is the perfect _action_ of mind.

Here we must again recognize the distinction between two classes of mental actions, viz., those acts which are _natural_ as resulting necessarily from the constitution of mind, of which God is the producing cause, and those which are _voluntary_ and of which man is the producing cause. The first are _natural and involuntary_, the latter are _moral and voluntary_.

This introduces the second part of the system of natural religion, that which relates to man’s obligations or duty toward the Creator, toward his fellow beings, and toward himself. In other words, the question is, “what is _right voluntary or moral action_?”

In seeking the reply to this without the aid of revelation, the following particulars demand attention:

In all discussions on this question there is no mental analysis more important than the distinction between the desire, or what _moves_ us to choose, and the act of choice.

The mind is always moved to choice by desire for some good to be gained or some evil to be avoided. The susceptibility or power of being thus led, in popular language is called a “bias,” an “inclination,” a “propensity,” a “tendency,” or a “proclivity” toward the object which causes the desire. Thus the susceptibility to desire stimulating drinks is excited by liquors, and this is called “a propensity” to strong drink.

The susceptibility to desire to amass money is called a bias, or propensity to avarice. The only thing ever meant by a bias or propensity to choose any thing is, that there are such susceptibilities that desire can be excited for that thing.

But all such propensities or biases are _from evil_ and _toward good_ in the widest sense of these terms. No rational mind ever desires pure evil, but always desires good of some sort. On the contrary, it is one of the implanted principles of common sense that _no rational mind will choose pure evil_. Any man who should do this would be regarded as insane—as having lost the distinctive feature of a rational mind.

But we find that desires are called _strong_, _imperative_, _powerful_, and the like, not at all with reference to the question whether what is desired would be _best_ for all concerned. They are measured, as to strength or weakness, by the degrees of enjoyment their gratification secures, or the amount of pain that self‐denial would involve. This _measurement_ of varied degrees of pleasure and pain is a matter of consciousness to every mind, and is constantly referred to by all races and in all languages.

In this use of the term, the strongest desire often exists for that which is perceived to be the _best_ good for all concerned. At other times the strongest desire is for that which is seen to be the lesser good. When the strongest desire is for that which is best, the choice is _easy_, and the mind always chooses the _best_ good. But when the strongest desire is for that which is not best, then choice is more difficult, and there is a conscious struggle between the promptings of reason and conscience, and the importunities of strong desire for the lesser good.

At such periods there is a conscious _power_ in every mind to choose _either_ way, and sometimes we choose to gratify the strongest desire and give up the best good, and at other times we choose the best good and deny the strongest desire. Every human being has been conscious of this struggle between excited desire and the dictates of reason, and all the literature of the world refers to it as a universal fact. The terms _self‐ denial_, _self‐control_, _self‐government_, all are based on this experience of all minds.(6)

Right Actions and Rewardable Actions.

The preceding furnishes the ground for the distinctions always recognized between voluntary action which is _right_ as _best_ for all concerned, and those actions which are deemed _praiseworthy_, _rewardable_, and _meritorious_.

Whenever the dictates of reason and our strongest desire are coincident, so that choosing what is right and best involves no struggle; then the ideas of merit and of desert of reward, praise, and commendation are wanting. We say such acts are right, but there is no merit in them, and no proper ground for adding any other reward than that which naturally results from choosing what we desire most, and which is best for us and for all concerned.

On the contrary, when there is a struggle between a sense of what is right and best, and the strongest desire, and a choice is made which involves self‐denial and self‐sacrifice, we feel that the act is one which is meritorious, and deserving of reward and praise.

Any voluntary action, then, is _right_ which is conformed to those rules of rectitude which tend to secure _the most_ happiness for all, even when there is no temptation to another course. But an action is _meritorious_ and _rewardable_ only when there is a reference to the rules of rectitude in the mind of the actor and some degree of self‐denial. To choose what we desire most, without any regard to what is right or wrong, even when it chances that our choice is that which is _best_, and thus _right_, does not meet our idea of a meritorious and praiseworthy act.

The greater portion of our choices are of those things which are good in all relations, as best for self and best for all concerned. Thus when we desire to eat, to drink, to breathe the pure air, to admire the beauties of nature, to enjoy the society of friends,—to choose these and a thousand other daily blessings, promotes our own best good and the best good of all concerned. In all such cases choosing what we desire most is morally _right_ in all relations. But no acts of choice are _meritorious_, except as they involve a regard to law in the mind of the actor, and some degree of self‐denial in conforming to rule.

The only cases where moral evil (or wrong choices) can exist, are where desires are excited for some good, either for ourselves or for others, which is not _best for all concerned_. In all such cases there is a “bias,” “tendency,” and “propensity” to choose _good_ of some sort, but it is not the _best_ good, and therefore to choose it would be morally wrong. Thus there is a bias or propensity to what is good in one relation, but evil in another; good as tending to give enjoyment, but evil as contrary to a law which enjoins that the _best_ good should always be preferred.

In such cases the _desires_ for a good which is not for the _best_ are not morally wrong, for they arise involuntarily from those susceptibilities implanted by God, which are not to be exterminated, but only regulated by law. The moral evil consists not in the _existence_ of such desires, but in _choosing_ to gratify them at the sacrifice of the best good of self or of others.

It has been shown that one result of the wrong action of mind is such a change in its constitutional nature, that there will be a desire to inflict evil on others as a malignant pleasure to the guilty mind. In these cases such desires may properly be called _morally wrong_ because they are the result of the _voluntary_ action of the sinful mind, and not of the natural susceptibilities implanted by the Creator. As they result wholly from wrong previous choices, the guilty mind itself is the author of them and not the Creator of mind.

Here it is important to discriminate in regard to that natural impulse in all minds which is excited by the infliction of pain on self or on others. It is this natural impulse to inflict evil on the author of evil which is the foundation of _justice_ in the family and in the civil state. Its design is for the best good of all concerned, and it becomes evil only by excess and misuse. So long as it is controlled by reason and conscience it is good and only good.

In view of the above distinctions, there can be no moral evil in _desires_ for things which it would be wrong to choose, _except as these desires are the result of previous wrong choices_.(7)

It has been shown that the principle of _habit_ renders it more and more easy and agreeable to regulate our choices by the rules of rectitude. The habit of sacrificing personal gratification to the rule of duty may be so cultivated that what at first was difficult, and involved a painful struggle, becomes easy. It is possible so to cultivate such habits that our highest desires, and the dictates of reason and conscience, shall continually be more and more coincident.

We can conceive of newly‐created beings as placed in such circumstances that, for a considerable period, all their strongest desires may be coincident with the best good of themselves and of others, so that there can be no opportunity to practice self‐control in regulating their desires by the rules of rectitude. In such a case, while acting simply from impulse, without reference to rule, they would always act _right_, and yet they would form no habits of self‐control, and thus would be liable to fail at the first temptation where their strongest desire conflicted with the known law of rectitude.

The preceding statements are made in order to arrive at correct and discriminating definitions of certain fundamental terms on which the whole question of the “depraved nature” of the human mind will be found to turn.

Right in Tendency and Right in Motive.

Mankind in all ages and in all languages speak of certain acts as right or wrong in reference to their _tendency_ or their effect on human happiness, and without reference to the intention of the author. Thus they affirm that the stealing and selling of men is wrong, whatever may be the motives of the slave trader.

Again, they speak of acts as right or wrong in reference to the _motive_ or _intention_ of the author. Thus they say a man who sacrificed his wealth and reputation, rather than to violate his conscience, acted right as to _motive_, although he was mistaken in his views of duty, so that his act, as it respects its tendency, may have been wrong.

Right General Purpose.

Again, it has been shown that a man may form a _general purpose_ to act right in obeying all the laws of God as discoverable by reason or revelation. This general purpose may be a quiet, abiding principle, so as to regulate the thoughts and emotions, and may control most of the specific choices of a whole succeeding life. The _main purpose_, or _chief end_ of such a man is to bring all his thoughts, words, and actions into perfect agreement with the rules of rectitude. In reference to this and his consequent conduct, his would be denominated a _virtuous character_.

No one will deny that this is a correct statement of the use of terms by mankind in every‐day life. Thus then we have gained the following definitions as established, not by metaphysicians and theologians, but by _the people_.

Definitions.

_A right moral act_, as it respects its _tendencies_, is one in which the thing chosen is for the _best_ good of all concerned.

_A right moral act_, as to _motive_, is one in which the _intention_ of the actor is to conform to the rules of rectitude.

_A meritorious_ or _praiseworthy act_ is one in which there is some _sacrifice_ of feeling, either immediate or remote, in order to conform to law.

_A virtuous act_ is one in which that which is chosen is right, both in _tendency_ and in _motive_.

_A virtuous character_ is one in which a general purpose exists to obey all the rules of rectitude. The _degree_ of virtue is dependent on a correct judgment of what is right or wrong, and the strength or measure of the general purpose in controlling all other purposes. Some men carry out a general purpose much more steadily and consistently than others, and some men have much more correct ideas of what is right and wrong in conduct than others.

The _natural character_ of a man is that which results from his constitutional powers and faculties of mind, of which God is the author.

The _moral character_ of a man is all that results from _his own willing_.

Our highest idea of a virtuous character, as gained by experience and observation, is that of a mind so trained to habits of self‐control and obedience to rule, that it has become easier to obey the laws of rectitude, than to gratify any excited desire, however imperative, which is seen to violate law.

Thus, then, it is shown that a virtuous character consists, not in the _nature_ of the mind which is given by God, but in the _purposes_, _habits_, and _feelings_ generated by voluntary acts, of which the man himself is the author; God being the cause or author, of this virtue only as he is the Creator of mind and of all its circumstances of temptation and trial.

In regard to the formation of a virtuous character, as a matter of experience, it usually results from a slow and gradual process of training and development. The general purpose to obey all the laws of rectitude originates, as a general fact, not as a definitely formed purpose, whose time of inception can be distinctly marked. Yet it is not unfrequently the case that persons who have passed a life of unrestrained indulgence, by some marked and powerful influence, are suddenly led to a decided and definitely marked purpose of virtuous obedience, and carry out this purpose with great success.

Any such sudden change, in popular language, would be called “the commencement of a new life.” And when this sudden change takes place under the influence of motives presented in the Bible, it is called by one class of theologians the “new birth” or “regeneration.”

Is True Virtue Possible before Regeneration?

In the discussions which are to follow, it will be found that almost every point debated involves, as a foundation question, “what _is_ true virtue?” And the grand question at issue between the system of common sense and the teachings of all theologians who uphold the Augustine theory, is this: _is true virtue possible to an unregenerate mind_? Theology says no, common sense says yes. Theology teaches that previous to regeneration every voluntary act of every human mind is “sin, and only sin.” Common sense maintains, on the contrary, that every voluntary act which is in agreement with the best good of all concerned, when the _intention_ is to act right, is virtuous without any regard to the question of the regeneration of the mind. In other words, theology teaches that true virtue is the right voluntary action of a mind after its “nature” is changed by God, and common sense teaches that true virtue is the right voluntary action of any mind without any change in its nature.

The discussion of this point involves the further consideration of certain mental experiences which will shed some light on the subject. It will be found that in case of all persons who are said to “act on principle,” or to be “conscientious persons,” that, in the greater portion of their voluntary acts, they have no _conscious_ immediate reference to the rules of rectitude. There seems to be an unconscious general purpose to act right on all occasions, which becomes obvious only when a case occurs involving a seeming violation of the rules of rectitude. At such times the mind becomes conscious of its ruling purpose. But the greater portion of all the daily acts of life have been decided upon as in agreement with the all‐controlling general purpose, and a man chooses to do many things in which he has no _conscious_ reference to rule. And still such acts have, in past time, been subjects of reflection in reference to the question of right and wrong, and have been decided to be right, and it is in consequence of this decision that the mind no longer considers these questions with a conscious reference to rule.

The distinction between what is denominated “a man of principle” and an “unprincipled man,” is simply this, that the former is one who has formed habits of self‐regulation by the rules of rectitude, and the latter has not.

This mental analysis is important in reference to deciding the character of _a virtuous action_.

A virtuous act, as defined above, is one in which the thing chosen is right and the motive is right. But it is not indispensable that the person who performs the act should be immediately _conscious_ of a reference to rule in each right specific volition. It is sufficient that the mind be under the control of a _ruling purpose_ of rectitude, so that all the subordinate minor purposes are in fact regulated, though unconsciously, by this purpose.

It is at this point that the class of theologians who make regeneration to include a voluntary act on the part of man, are in antagonism with the experience and common sense of mankind. Such maintain that every act of every human being is “sin, and only sin,” until a ruling purpose is formed to obey God as the chief end, and one also which is actually _more_ efficient and stronger in controlling the ordinary acts of life than the purpose to gratify self. Previous to the existence of this general purpose, they maintain that every act of self‐denial or self‐sacrifice for the good of others is “sin, and only sin.” According to their theory, choosing that which is right because it is right, is not a virtuous act until a ruling purpose of universal obedience to God is formed.

That is to say, it is the _ruling purpose_, or _the want_ of a ruling purpose to obey God in all things, which decides the character of every specific act of choice. Thus if a child is trained to be honest, truthful, and self‐denying, and succeeds very often in conforming to such instructions, there is no true virtue in any such acts until a _ruling purpose_ of obedience to God is generated, which is habitually _more_ controlling than the impulses of self‐indulgence. This is the point where _the people_ and _theologians_ are at issue.

The people insist that every act is virtuous when the thing chosen is right and the intention is right, even before the mind of a child has attained a ruling purpose of universal obedience. Theologians say no; such acts are “sin, and only sin,” in the sight of God.(8)

It will be shown hereafter that the theory of theology on this subject is not carried out consistently in practice, but that in the early training of little children theologians contradict their own theory and adopt that of the people.

Perfectness in Construction and Perfectness in Action and Character.

In a previous chapter we have seen [p. 103] that our idea of _perfectness_ in moral character and action always has reference to _power_. In a system where evil is actually existing, we regard a contrivance or an action as perfect when there is no power in God or man to make it better, even when evil is involved. A being is perfect in character and in action when his purpose is to do the best possible for all concerned, and when this purpose is carried out to the full extent of his power.

We have shown in the preceding chapter that the mind of man is perfect in _nature_ or _construction_ as being better fitted to its place in the best possible system of mind than it would be by any change possible either to God or man.

The preceding pages of this chapter enable us to point out what is the _perfect moral character_ of minds which are perfect in construction. It consists in _a ruling purpose to discover and to obey all the laws of the Creator, which is carried out to the full extent of power in the one who thus purposes_.

It has been shown that the Creator himself is limited by the eternal nature of things to a system which, though the best possible, makes him, in one sense, the author of some evil, both natural and moral. He is the author only as the Creator of all things, and thus the author of all the consequent results of creation, even of those that are morally evil. In this sense alone is he the author of either natural or moral evil.

The infinite and eternal mind of God is limited, not by want of wisdom and knowledge, but by the eternal nature of things of which his own existence and natural attributes are a part. But finite minds are limited by a want of knowledge and wisdom which can be the result only of _experience and training_. For the want of this knowledge and training every finite mind, so far as we can discover by reason and experience, must inevitably violate the laws of God. And yet any mind may be perfect in moral character and action in exactly the same sense as God is perfect, (_i.e._) it may form and carry out a purpose to conform to the laws of the existing system of things _to the full extent of its knowledge and power_. When this purpose is formed and carried out to the full measure of ability, the finite creature becomes “perfect, even as our Father which is in heaven is perfect.”

Common Sense Theory of the Origin of Evil.

What then is the cause or origin of evil as taught by reason and experience?

_It is the eternal nature of things existing independently of the will of the Creator or of any other being._

What is the cause of the existence of this created system? It is the will of the Creator.

What is the cause or reason why God willed that this system should be as it is, with all the evil that exists? It is because it is the best system possible in the nature of things.

What is the cause or reason that any given event, however evil, is not prevented by God? It is because any change that would prevent it, would alter the best possible system, and thus make more evil than the one thus prevented.