CHAPTER XV. THE NATURE OF MIND.—THE WILL.

The power _to choose_ exists in other animals as well as in man, so that it is not this faculty which distinguishes our race from the brutes. It is another part of our nature which elevates us above the lower animals, which will now be described.

Irrational Free Agency.

We have seen that desires for good are measured as to their strength or feebleness by our own consciousness, and that in multitudes of cases we choose those things which excite _the strongest_ desire. A mind so constituted as never to be able to choose any thing but that which excites the strongest desire, would be entirely dependent on circumstances, and thus the helpless sport of chance. This is the kind of free agency which belongs to the brutes, and may properly be called _irrational free agency_.

Rational Free Agency.

In contrast with the above, we have already described the mind of man as possessing the power to choose _either_ that which excites the strongest desire or that which the intellect decides to be _best for all concerned_.

When there is nothing to excite desires, there is no power at all to choose; so that motives are as indispensable to the action of the will as physical causes are to the movement of matter. The more strongly desire is excited the more the power of choice is increased. This gives rise to the universal use of language which characterizes motives as stronger or weaker according as desire is more or less powerful.

The greater part of our choices are for things which are _best_, so that there is no conflict between what excites the strongest desire and what is best for all. Thus to eat, drink, walk, sleep and perform most of the daily duties of life, are cases where the strongest desire and what is best coincide. In all such cases we choose that which excites the strongest desire. And when we assign the cause or reason for our choice, we say it was the strongest desire which was the _cause_; that is to say, it was the _occasional_ cause of our choice. But our own mind is the only _producing_ cause of its own volitions.

This exhibits the grand principle of _free agency_ in distinction from its opposite, which is called _fatalism_, viz.:

_Motives are producing causes of desire, and are occasional causes of choice. Mind itself is the only producing cause of choice, having power to choose either that which excites the strongest desire or that which reason and conscience decide to be best for all concerned._

In opposition to this, the fatalist maintains that every act of choice follows the strongest desire, so that there is the same _invariable_ antecedence and sequence between the two as there is in material changes between the necessary cause and effect. This being so, the mind has no power to choose any thing but that which excites the strongest desire.

Now, this is a question which every person, learned or unlearned, can decide. Have we power to choose any other way than as we do choose? Here it is claimed that every human being _believes_ that we have this power, and proves that he believes it by word and action. And if any person were habitually to talk and act as if he believed children and men had no power to choose right when they choose wrong, he would be regarded as having lost his reason.

This, therefore, is placed as one of the principles of common sense, viz., _every rational mind has power to choose either that which excites the strongest desire or that which the intellect decides to be best, even when it does not excite the strongest desire_.

_Moral power_ is the power to control rational minds by motives.

When no desire for any good and no fear of any evil exists, the mind has no power to choose. Excited desires (or motives) are as indispensable to choice as physical causes are to any change in matter.

The stronger the desire for a thing, the _easier_ it is to choose it; and the less desire there is for a given thing, the _harder_ it is to choose it. This measuring of various degrees of power to choose, is a matter of consciousness to every mind, and it is recognized in all languages. And we find that all mankind, of all languages, recognize the fact that men have power to choose what is _best_, even when it conflicts with the strongest desire; so much so, that life itself has been relinquished for the good of others, when there was little or no expectation of a future life, or of any consequent good to self.

Moreover, it will be shown in a future chapter that our _highest_ idea of virtue implies a conflict between the strongest desire and the conviction of what is right and best on the whole; so that sometimes men choose what is seen to be wrong and yet excites the strongest desire, and at other times what is right or best, when it does not excite the strongest desire.

All self‐control, self‐denial and self‐government involve the idea of a conflict between the decisions of reason and conscience as to what is best and right, and the importunities of the strongest desire for what is not so.

Subordinate and General Purposes.

There is a constant succession of selections to be made between different modes of securing happiness. A lesser good is given up for a greater, or some good relinquished altogether to avoid some consequent pain. Often, also, some evil is sought as the means of securing some future good, or of avoiding some greater evil. Thus men endure want, fatigue and famine to purchase wealth. Thus the nauseous draught will be swallowed to avoid the pains of sickness; and thus the pleasures of domestic affection will be sacrificed to obtain honor and fame. The whole course of life is a constant succession of such decisions between different modes of securing happiness and of avoiding pain.

In noticing the operation of mind, it will be seen that there is a foundation for two classes of volitions or acts of choice, which may be denominated _subordinate_ and _general purposes_.

A _subordinate purpose_ is one that secures some particular act, such as the moving of the arm or turning of the head. Such volitions are ordinarily consequent on some more general purpose of the mind, which they aid in accomplishing, and which is, therefore, denominated a _general_ or _generic purpose_. For example, a man chooses to make a certain journey: this is the general purpose, and, in order to carry it out, he performs a great variety of acts, each one of which aids in carrying out the generic decision.

It can be seen that the general purposes may themselves become subordinate to a still more comprehensive purpose. Thus the man may decide to make a journey, which is a generic choice in reference to all acts subordinate to this end. But this journey may be a subordinate part of a more general purpose to make a fortune, or to secure some other important end.

It is frequently the case that a generic purpose, which relates to objects that require a long time and many complicated operations, exists when the mind seems almost unconscious of its power. For example, a man may form a generic purpose to enter a profession for which years will be required to prepare. And while his whole course of action is regulated by this decision, he engages in pursuits entirely foreign to it, and which seem to engross his whole attention. These pursuits may sometimes be such as are antagonistic to his grand purpose, so as at least to imperil or retard its accomplishment. And yet this strong and quiet purpose remains, and is eventually carried out.

It is the case, also, that a generic choice may be formed to be carried out at some particular time and place, and then the mind becomes entirely unconscious of it till the appointed period and circumstances occur. Then the decision becomes dominant, and controls all other purposes. Thus a man may decide that, at a specified hour, he will stop his studies and perform certain gymnastic exercises. This volition is forgotten until the hour arrives, and then it recurs and is carried out.

This phenomenon sometimes occurs in sleep. Some persons, in watching with the sick, will determine to wake at given hours to administer medicines; then they will sleep soundly till the appointed time comes, when they will waken and perform the predetermined actions.

In regard to the _commencement_ of a generic purpose, we find that sometimes it is so distinct and definite as to be the subject of consciousness and memory. For example, a spendthrift, in some moment of suffering and despondency, may form a determination to commence a systematic course of thrift and economy, and may actually carry it out through all his future life. Such cases are often to be found on record or in every‐day life.

In other cases, this quiet, hidden, but controlling purpose seems to be formed by unconscious and imperceptible influences, so that the mind can not revert to the specific time or manner when it originated. For example, a child who is trained from early life to speak the truth, can never revert to any particular moment when this generic purpose originated.

It is sometimes the case, also, that a person will contemplate some generic purpose before it occurs, while the process of its final formation seems almost beyond the power of scrutiny. For example, a man may be urged to relinquish one employment and engage in another. He reflects, consults, and is entirely uncertain how he shall decide. As time passes, he gradually inclines toward the proposed change, until, finally, he finds his determination fixed, he scarcely knows when or how.

Thus it appears that generic purposes commence sometimes so instantaneously and obviously that the time and influences connected with them can be recognized. In other cases, the decision seems to be a gradual one, while in some instances the process can be traced, and in others it is entirely unnoticed or forgotten.

It is in reference to such generic purposes that the _moral character_ of men is estimated. An honest man is one who has a fixed purpose to act honestly in all circumstances. A truthful man is one who has such a purpose to speak the truth at all times.

In such cases, the degree in which such a purpose controls all others is the measure of a man’s moral character in the estimate of society.

The history of mankind shows a great diversity of moral character dependent on such generic choices. Some men possess firm and reliable moral principles in certain directions, while they are very destitute of them in others.

Thus it will be seen that some have formed a very decided purpose in regard to honesty in business affairs, who yet are miserable victims to intemperance. Others have cultivated a principle called _honor_, that restrains them from certain actions regarded as mean, and yet they may be frequenters of gambling saloons and other haunts of vice.

In the religions world, too, it is the case that some who are very firm and decided on all points of religious observances and in the cultivation of devotional emotions, are guilty of very mean actions, such as some worldly men of honor would not practice at the sacrifice of a right hand.

On a Ruling Purpose or Chief End.

The most important of all the voluntary phenomena is the fact that, while there can be a multitude of these quiet and hidden generic purposes in the mind, it is also possible to form _one_ which shall be the dominant or controlling one, to which all the others, both generic and specific, shall become subordinate. In common parlance this would be called the _ruling passion_. It is also called the _ruling purpose_, or _controlling principle_. This consists in the permanent choice of some one mode of securing happiness as the _chief end_ or grand object of life.

There is a great variety of sources of happiness and of suffering to the human mind. Now in the history of our race we find that each one of these modes of enjoyment has been selected by different individuals as the chief end of their existence—as the mode of seeking enjoyment to which they sacrifice every other. Some persons have chosen the pleasures of eating, drinking, and the other grosser enjoyments of sense. Others have chosen those more elevated and refined pleasures that come indirectly from the senses in the emotions of taste.

Others have devoted themselves to intellectual enjoyments as their chief resource for happiness. Others have selected the exercise of physical and moral power, as in the case of conquerors and physical heroes, or of those who have sought to control by moral power, as rulers and statesmen.

Others have made the attainment of the esteem, admiration, and love of their fellow‐creatures, their chief end. Others, still, have devoted themselves to the promotion of happiness around them as their chief interest. Others have devoted themselves to the service of God, or what they conceived to be such, and sometimes by the most miserable life of asceticism and self‐torture.

Others have made it their main object in life to obey the laws of rectitude and virtue.

In all these cases, the _moral character_ of the person, in the view of all observers, has been decided by this dominant volition, and exactly in proportion to the supremacy with which it has _actually controlled_ all other purposes.

Some minds seem to have no _chief_ end of life. Their existence is a succession of small purposes, each of which has its turn in controlling the life. Others have a strong, defined and all‐controlling principle.

Now experience shows that both of these classes are capable, the one of _forming_ and the other of _changing_ such a purpose. For example, in a time of peace and ease there is little to excite the mind strongly; but let a crisis come, where fortune, reputation, and life are at stake, and men and women are obliged to form generic decisions involving all they hold dear, and many minds that have no controlling purpose immediately originate one, while those whose former ruling aims were in one direction change them entirely to another.

This shows how it is that days of peril create heroes, statesmen and strong men and women. The hour of danger calls all the energies of the soul into action. Great purposes are formed with the strongest desire and emotion. Instantly the whole current of thought, and all the coexisting desires and emotions, are conformed to these purposes.

The experience of mankind proves that a dominant generic purpose may _extend to a whole life_, and actually control all other generic and specific volitions.

How the Thoughts, Desires and Emotions are controlled by the Will.

We will now consider some of the modes by which the will controls the thoughts, desires and emotions.

We have seen, in previous pages, the influence which desire and emotion exert in making both our perceptions and conceptions more vivid. Whatever purpose or aim in life becomes an object of strong desire, is always distinctly and vividly conceived, while all less interesting objects are more faint and indistinct.

We have also seen that whenever any conception arises it always brings connected objects, forming a new and complex picture.

Whenever the mind is under the influence of a controlling purpose, the object of pursuit is always _more interesting_ than any other. This interest always fastens on those particulars in any mental combination that are connected with the ruling purpose and seem fitted to promote it, making them more vivid. Around these selected objects their past associated ideas begin to cluster, forming other complex pictures. In all these combinations, those ideas most consonant with the leading interest of the mind become most vivid, and the others fade away.

The grand method, then, for _regulating the thoughts_ is by the generic decisions of the mind as to the modes of seeking enjoyment.

In regard to the power of the mind over its own _desires and emotions_, it is very clear that these sensibilities can not be regulated by direct specific volitions. Let any person try to produce love, fear, joy, hope or gratitude by simply choosing to have them arise, and it is soon perceived that no such power exists.

But there are _indirect_ modes by which the mind can control its susceptibilities. The first method is by directing attention to those objects of thought which are fitted to call forth such emotions. For example, if we wish to awaken the emotion of fear, we can place ourselves in circumstances of danger, or call up ideas of horror and distress. If we wish to call forth emotions of gratitude, we can direct attention to acts of kindness to ourselves calculated to awaken such feelings. If we wish to excite desire for any object, we can direct attention to those qualities in that object that are calculated to excite desire. In all these cases the mind can, by an act of will, _direct its attention_ to subjects calculated to excite emotion and desire.

The other mode of regulating the desires and emotions is by _the direction of our generic volitions_. For example, let a man of business, who has never had any interest in commerce, decide to invest all his property in foreign trade. As soon as this is done, the name of the ship that bears his all can never be heard or seen but it excites some emotion. A storm, that before would go unnoticed, awakens fear; the prices in the commercial markets, before unheeded, now awaken fear or afford pleasure. And thus multitudes of varied desires and emotions are called into existence by this one generic volition.

One result of a purpose to deny an importunate propensity is frequently seen in the immediate or gradual diminution of that desire. For example, if a person is satisfied that a certain article of food is injurious and resolves on _total abstinence_, it will be found that the desire for it is very much reduced, far more so than when the effort is to diminish the indulgence.

When a generic purpose is formed that involves great interests, it is impossible to prevent the desires and emotions from running consonant with this purpose. The only mode of changing this current is to give up this generic purpose and form another. Thus, if a man has devoted his whole time and energies to money‐making, it is impossible for him to prevent his thoughts and feelings from running in that direction. He must give up this as his chief end, and take a nobler object, if he would elevate the whole course of his mental action.

These are the principal phenomena of the grand mental faculty which is the controlling power of the mind, and on the regulation of which all its other powers are dependent.

The _nature of regeneration_, and the question whether it is instantaneous or gradual or both, all are intimately connected with the subject of this chapter.