Part 5

If the term of time were of any appreciable length in which thoughts and feelings are conveyed from one part of the perceptive mind to the other, then, while one part of the mind was hating an object, another part of the same mind might be loving it because of newly discovered qualities; and while a part of the mind in one foot was suffering intense pain, caused by treading upon hot iron, another part of the mind in the other foot, not having had time to receive the information, would venture also into the same danger.

Were it possible for the different parts of the mind to feel and think without being able to communicate their respective feelings to each other, then every part that thus thought and felt, would be a distinct individual, as much so as if it were separated for miles from all the rest, or, as if it were a separate organization. In this case, the whole being or mind which we before termed I, would cease its individual unity; and each part which thought and felt independently, could appropriate to itself the term I, and with the greatest propriety could apply the term YOU to every other part which thought and felt distinctly and differently from itself.

It is, therefore, because all parts of the mind seem to be affected in the same way, and apparently at the same time, that it is felt to be a single individual mind. It is this, and this only, that constitutes the unity of a thinking being, and not, as the immaterialist asserts, a something "without parts," which from its very nature could constitute neither a unity, nor a plurality, nor any thing else, but nothing.

If the human spirit be nearly the same form and magnitude as the fleshly tabernacle in which it dwells, it must be composed of an immense number of particles, each of which is susceptible of almost an infinite variety of thoughts, emotions, and feelings. Whence originated these susceptibilities? Are they the results of organization? Did each particle obtain its susceptibilities by being united with others? This would be impossible; for if a particle were entirely destitute of the capacity of thinking and feeling, no possible organization could impart to it that power. The power to think and feel, is not, nor can not be derived from any arrangement of particles. If they have not this power before organization, they can never have it afterwards. It follows then, that if ever there were a time when the particles of the human spirit existed in a disorganized state, each particle so existing, must have had all the susceptibilities of feeling and thought that it now has; and, consequently, each particle must have been a separate independent being of itself. Therefore, under such circumstances, one particle would have been no more affected with the state or condition of others, than one man is affected with the pleasures or pains of others with whom he is not associated.

How, then, it may be asked, can these separate independent beings, be so united as to form but one being, possessing the same susceptibilities as each of the individuals of which it is composed? The answer to this question may be more clearly understood by the following illustration. Let a certain number of iron filings exist in a scattered condition, widely separated from each other. It is evident that each possesses the susceptibility of magnetism. Such as are brought within the influence of a loadstone or magnet, under favourable circumstances, will exhibit all the magnetic phenomena, while others unconnected and at a distance, will remain entirely unaffected. But let all these filings be firmly united together into one bar of iron, and be exposed to the influence of a magnet or loadstone, and they will then be affected alike. Those which were before the union distinct individual particles, exhibiting at the same time different susceptibilities and qualities, according to the different circumstances in which they were placed,--are, by their union, consolidated into one mass. In this condition, if one part be magnetized, the whole will be magnetized; if one part be moved, the whole will be moved. Therefore the particles in this bar, though distinct parts of the same substance, can no longer be considered distinct individuals, because they are no longer affected differently, but alike. So it is with the human spirit: its particles previous to the organization, are, as above stated, separate and distinct beings, and the affections of each are entirely independent of the state of the others. But when organized into a person, all particles must from henceforth be subject to the same influences; and though they are distinct parts of the same substance, yet they are one in all their thoughts and feelings; and it is this which constitutes individuality in all intelligent organizations.

If a bar of iron, weighing one pound, had the power of expressing its different qualities, it could with the greatest propriety say, I am heavy--I am magnetized--I move. The term I would represent the whole bar, consisting of an infinite number of parts,--all affected precisely in the same moment and in the same manner. Now no one would for a moment suppose the pound of iron to be immaterial and without parts, because the term I was representative of a single individual bar. So likewise in the expressions, I think,--I feel,--I remember; the term I is a representative of the whole being, every part of which thinks, feels, and remembers in the same moment and in the same manner.

The arguments which Dr. Brown has used (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.) against the materiality of the mind, would apply with the same force against the materiality of iron or any other substance; for if thought or feeling prove the unity and inextension of mind,--weight, magnetism, or motion will, with as much reason, prove the unity and inextension of iron.

Mr. Taylder has asserted that "The Materialism of the Mormons is not only unscriptural, but anti-scriptural." (Taylder against Materialism, page 21.)

1.--He undertakes to show that it is unscriptural, by asserting that it is "in opposition to the _spirituality_ of the Divinity." (Taylder against Materialism, page 22.)

We readily admit that any system which is "in opposition to the _spirituality_ of the Divinity," is not only unscriptural but dangerously false. That the Spirits of the Father and the Son, as well as the Holy Spirit, consist of a substance purely spiritual, can by no means be denied by any believer in the sacred scriptures. It is a doctrine firmly believed by us and all the Latter-day Saints. It is a doctrine most definitely expressed and advocated in our pamphlet on the Kingdom of God, and that, too, on the very page from which Mr. Taylder makes copious extracts. It is there that we have definitely spoken of "_the_ SPIRITS _of the Father and Son_:" it is there that we speak of the Holy SPIRIT: it there that we have expressly said that "_God is a SPIRIT_." And yet in the face of all these declarations Mr. Taylder has had the hardihood to say that our theory is "in opposition to the spirituality of the Divinity." Instead of this, it is the material theory alone that establishes the very existence, of Spirit. Take away the _materiality_ of Spirit, and you at once destroy its very existence, as we have abundantly shown in the foregoing pages.

The immaterialists have aimed a deadly blow at the foundation of all spiritual existence, by denying it extension and parts. We, in opposition to this unphilosophic, unscriptural, and atheistical doctrine, have most clearly expressed our belief in a real tangible substance called Spirit, which has extension and parts, like all other matter.

"In the case of the angels' visit to Abraham, and of their partaking of food, who," inquiries Mr. Taylder, "would conclude they must have fleshy bodies?" (Taylder against Materialism, page 24.) We answer that a "_fleshly body_" and a _spiritual body_ are entirely different things. One is a body of material flesh; the other is a body of material spirit--they are entirely different kinds of matter, as much so as iron and oxygen. Jesus says, "God is a Spirit;" and again he says, "a Spirit hath not flesh and bones." From these sayings of Jesus, we can see that spiritual matter and fleshy or bony matter are distinct substances. These passages are sometimes quoted as a supposed proof of immateriality. But everyone knows that there are millions of substances that are not flesh and bones. A house, a stone, or a tree, "hath not flesh and bones," any more than a spirit; shall we therefore say that all these substances are _immaterial_? If a spirit must be _immaterial_ because it hath not flesh and bones, then every substance in the universe, except flesh and bones, must be immaterial.

Mr. Taylder supposes that the persons who appeared to Abraham, and ate, and walked, and conversed with him, were only "_bodily forms_," "_assumed_ in _mercy_ to man." But, we ask, how does our author know but what these bodily forms were the real, true, substantial forms of these beings, instead of assumed ones? He seems to think that "it might be assumed, with equal propriety, that the Divine Being is 'a rock,' 'a fortress,' 'a tower,' 'a shield,' 'a buckler,' because he is so styled in the bible." But did he ever appear in the form of a "rock," or "a fortress," to any person anciently? Did he ever appear to Abraham, to Jacob, to Moses, to the Seventy Elders of Israel, to Micaiah, to Isaiah, or to the Jewish nation, when he walked among them, in the flesh, as a tower, a shield, or a buckler? No: he appeared to them all as a person. If the three persons whom Abraham saw had appeared like a shield, or any other inanimate thing, they would not have been called men. It was because they resembled the human species that they were thus called.

Mr. Taylder says, "this scheme contradicts itself; for if Christ were possessed of a body of flesh and blood, how could he become incarnate? The Mormons believe," continues he, "in the incarnation, but this contradicts it. Their doctrine implies that he had a _body before_ he was incarnate, or he had a body before he had a body, or he had a body and had not a body at the same time." (Taylder's Tract, page 26.)

This author must be very ignorant of our doctrine if he supposes that we think that Christ had "a body of flesh and blood" before his incarnation. Christ, before his incarnation, was a spiritual body, and not a body of flesh and bones. It was the body of his spirit and not a fleshly body that was with the Father in the beginning, when God said, "let us make man in our likeness and in our image." Whenever he appeared before he dwelt in flesh, it was the pure spiritual matter only that was seen. The spiritual body of Christ has hands, face, feet, and all other members, the same as his body of flesh and bones. The spiritual bodies of all men were in the likeness of the spiritual body of Christ when they were first created.

That spiritual bodies are capable of condensation, is evident from the fact of their occupying the small bodies of infants. The spirits of just men, who have departed from the fleshly tabernacle, have been seen by the inspired writers; and from their description of them, we should not only judge them to be of the same _form_, but likewise of about the same size as man in this life. These departed spirits, then, which are about the same magnitude as men in the flesh, once occupied infant bodies. There are only two methods by which to account for their increase in magnitude; one is by an additional quantity of spiritual matter, being gradually and continually incorporated in the spiritual body, by which its magnitude is increased in the same way and in the same proportion as the fleshly body is increased. And the other is by its elasticity or expansive properties by which it increases in size, as the tabernacle of flesh and bones increases, until it attains to its natural magnitude, or until its expansive and cohesive properties balance each other, or are in a state of equilibrium.

The latter method seems to be in accordance with scripture. The spiritual body of Christ, when seen previous to his incarnation, is not represented as an infant in stature, but as a man, and consequently his spirit must have been of the size of a man. Therefore, when he came and dwelt in the infant tabernacle of flesh, born of a virgin, his spirit must have been greatly condensed; and did not completely regain its former magnitude until the fleshly tabernacle had attained its full growth.

As a further evidence of the condensation of spiritual matter, we read of seven devils beings cast out of Mary Magdalene, and of a legion of others inhabiting one man, and which, after being cast out, entered a large herd of swine. Now these devils were once angels who kept not their first estate. Those angels who kept their first estate, that have been seen, appear about the size and of the form of men, insomuch that they are frequently called men in the scriptures: and it is reasonable to suppose that those angels who fell did not, to any great extent, alter their size and form. Therefore, they must have been very much condensed and crowded when a legion of them entered one body.

That the different particles of a spirit are not all in actual contact is very evident from the fact that a spiritual body can alter its dimensions by condensation or expansion. It is also evident from the fact of its entering into union with flesh and bones, and also withdrawing itself at death. If the particles were in contact, and inseparably connected, there would be no possibility of getting in and out of a fleshly body, unless by entirely dissolving its parts. But, as it is, each refined particle of the spirit can, like heat or electricity, pass between the fleshly particles; and thus the whole body of spiritual particles can liberate themselves; and by their own self-moving powers and free will, can still preserve and maintain their own organization. Here is manifested the great superiority of spiritual matter to all other matter; each particle has the power of self-motion. The whole mass of particles have power to preserve themselves in an organized form as long as they please. Should they, by any contingency, be disarranged, as in passing in or out of a body, they can with the greatest ease, resume their former position, and maintain their bodily organization either in or out of a fleshly tabernacle.

Mr. Taylder, in speaking of the seven devils which possessed Mary Magdalene, says, if they were material they must have "_condensed_ themselves into a very small space." He then remarks, "No doubt the reader questions the possibility of any sane person, first embracing and then calmly propagating such errors. (Taylder's Tract, page 28.) But we calmly ask Mr. Taylder, which would be the most reasonable and philosophic,--to believe that seven substances could all occupy the same space at the same time, or to believe, as we do, in the _condensation_ of substance? The former is an admitted absurdity, but the latter is something that is constantly taking place in a great variety of substances. None could believe the former, unless his mental vision was obscured and his eyes blinded by the absurd insane notions of priestcraft and false tradition; but any man of sound sense, who dares think for himself, could believe the latter, because it does not involve an absurdity.

"The Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove" upon the Saviour, and like "as cloven tongues of fire" on the apostles. "How can a dove," inquires Mr. Taylder, "extend through all space and intermingle with all the matter?" "It is (he asserts) a clear impossibility." We readily admit that a dove or a cloven tongue of fire cannot be omnipresent. It is, as Mr. Taylder says, "_a clear impossibility_." And it is likewise just as impossible for a _person_ to be everywhere present, as it is for a dove. Why should our author suppose it possible for a person to be everywhere present, when he admits that a dove could not be in such a condition? The "_cloven tongues of fire_" that appeared unto the disciples on the day of pentecost, were only parts of that all-wise substance which extends through space. The cloven tongue of fire which rested upon one man, was not the same that rested upon all the others; hence there was a _plurality_ of them that appeared. The prophet Joel informs us, that in the last days the Spirit shall be poured out upon _all flesh._ No two persons can receive the same identical particles of this Spirit at the same instant; a part therefore of the Holy Spirit will rest upon one man, and another part will rest upon another. If the Spirit rests upon all flesh at the same time, then there will be as many parts of the Spirit as there are distinct individuals in whom it dwells. No one of these parts of the Spirit can be everywhere present any more than a dove. Each part can occupy only one place at a time. If the whole be infinite in quantity, it can extend through infinite space; if it be finite in quantity, it can only occupy finite space.

That different parts of this spirit can assume different shapes, is evident from its appearing as a dove at one time, and as cloven tongues of fire at another. It is also evident from the fact of the Saviour's speaking of the Holy Spirit as a personage. "Howbeit, when _he_ the Spirit of truth, is come, HE will guide you into all truth; for HE shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever HE shall hear, that shall HE speak: and HE will shew you things to come." (John, xvi., 13.) There is no more inconsistency in one part of the Holy Spirit existing in the form of a person, than there is in another part existing in the form of a dove, and several other parts existing in the form of cloven tongues of fire.

That the all-powerful matter called the Holy Spirit is very widely diffused, is evident from the fact that the time will come when it will be poured out upon all flesh. It is very certain that the Psalmist had some idea of the immense quantities of this substance, and of its extensive diffusion, when he exclaims, "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit?" &c. The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the deep, and by his Spirit the heavens were garnished. When we speak of the Spirit of God, extending through all space, we do not mean that it absolutely fills every minute portion of space, for if this were the case, there would be no room for any other matter. A substance, to absolutely fill all space, would be an infinite solid, without pores and immovable in all its parts; therefore, the Spirit exists in different parts of space in greater or less degrees of density, like heat, light, or electricity. It is this glorious and all-powerful substance that governs and controls all other substances by its actual presence, producing all the phenomena ascribed to the laws of nature; in it we exist, we live, we move, and by it we receive wisdom and knowledge, and are guided into truth in proportion as we permit it to dwell within us and receive its heavenly teachings.

2.--"The next consideration," says our author, "is their denial of the infinity, perfection, and omnipresence of the Godhead." (Taylder's Tract, page 31.) Under this head he quotes many passages of scripture to show that the presence of God fills heaven and earth, and that the heaven of heavens cannot contain him. All these things we freely admit. The Holy Spirit is called God in the scriptures, as well as the Father and Son. This, we presume, Mr. Taylder will admit. It is God, the Holy Spirit, then, that is everywhere, substantially and virtually. The Holy Spirit is infinitely perfect and wise, one in substance, but one in wisdom, power, glory, and goodness. Jesus prayed that all his disciples might be made one, as he and his Father are one. If Jesus and the Father are one person, then all the disciples must, according to the prayer of Jesus, lose their individual identity and become one person: this would be perfect nonsense. Therefore, Jesus and the Father are two persons or two substances, the same in kind but not the same in identity--in the same sense that his disciples are different persons: and, consequently, distinct substances. His disciples are to be made one with him, and with each other, the same as Jesus and the Father are one; that is, they are to be one in wisdom, power, and glory, but not in person and substance. The substance of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct substances, as much as the substance of three men are distinct.

These three substances act in concert in the same way that all the innumerable millions of his disciples, after they are glorified, will act in concert. The disciples will then be like him. Their glorified bodies will be similar to that of Christ's but not the same as Christ's: they will all maintain their separate individualities, like the Father and Son. The one-ness of the Godhead may be in some measure illustrated by two gallons of pure water, existing in separate vessels, representing the Father and Son, and an ocean of pure water, representing the Holy Spirit. No one would say of these three portions of water that they were identically the same. Every portion would be a separate substance of itself, but yet the separate portions would be one in kind--one in quality, but three in separate distinct identities. So it is with the Godhead so far as the spiritual matter is concerned. There is the same power, wisdom, glory, and goodness in every part, and yet every part has its own work to perform, which accords in the most perfect harmony with the mind and will of every other part.

Each atom of the Holy Spirit is intelligent, and like all other matter has solidity, form, and size. It is because each acts in the most perfect unison with all the rest that the whole is considered one Holy Spirit. All these innumerable atoms are considered one Holy Spirit in the same sense that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are considered one God. The immense number of atoms, though each is all-wise and all-powerful, is, by virtue of their perfect concord and agreement, but one Holy Spirit, the same as the intelligent particles of a man's spirit are, by their peculiar union, but one human spirit. Their unity or oneness does not consist in that inexplicable, incomprehensible, imaginary something without extension or parts, as taught in the first of the "Thirty-nine Articles," but it consists in a unity or oneness of wisdom, power, and glory, each part performing its own splendid works and operations in union with the mind and will of every other part. No one part can perform any work but what is the mind of the whole. Therefore, in this sense it is the same mind--the same will--the same wisdom that pervades the whole.

Mr. Taylder, in order to establish his views of a god without parts, quotes from the theological works of a very celebrated writer on the omnipresence of God, which reads as follows:--