Part 4
If two bodies of iron of equal size were moving with equal velocities towards each other, upon meeting they would destroy each others motion, and the next moment, though in contact, there would be no signs of resistance; not so with the resistance which mind offers to mind through the medium of the muscular organs; the resistance can be continued at the option of the two resisting minds; hence mind exhibits resistance in a greater degree than other substances, and should, therefore, according to Dr. Brown's test, be considered material in preference to all other substances.
No two atoms of spirit or any other matter can occupy two or more places at the same time. We have never known of a circumstance of the spirit of man residing in the body and out of it at the same time. No particles of light, odour, heat, electricity, can occupy two places at once. These substances can only be extensively diffused by being extensive in quantity. The particles of light which enter the right eye are not the same which enter the left eye. Though their qualities may be exactly alike, yet they are separate individual substance, as much so as if they were millions of miles asunder. The same is true of the atoms of spirit and all other substances.
OF THE ESSENCE OF SUBSTANCES.
Philosophers of modern times have asserted that we know nothing of the _essence_ of bodies. It is affirmed that all that can be known of mind or matter, are merely its properties. Dr. Abercrombie, says, "We talk, indeed, about matter, and we talk about mind; we speculate concerning materiality and immateriality, until we argue ourselves into a kind of belief that we really understand something of the subject. The truth is, we understand nothing. Matter and mind are known to us by certain properties: but in regard to both it is entirely out of the reach of our faculties to advance a single step beyond the facts which are before us. Whether in their substratum or ultimate essence, they are the same, or whether they are different we know not, and never can know in our present state of being." (Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers. Part I. Sec. I.)
There are many truths which we ascertain by reflection, independently in a great measure of our senses. We are assured and know in our own minds that duration must be endless, and that space must be boundless, not because we have learned these truths directly through the medium of our senses, or have been able to demonstrate them by any process of reasoning. In the same way we know concerning the essence of bodies. Instead of being entirely ignorant on the subject, as modern philosophers assert, it is directly the opposite; we know the essence of all substances. Solidity is the only essence in existence. Although the ultimate atoms of matter cannot come under the cognizance of our senses, and we cannot demonstrate their solidity by any process of reasoning, yet we are none the less assured of their solidity. We believe that they are solid because it is impossible for us to believe otherwise. We are as certain that the ultimate atoms of all substances are solid, as we are that they exist. What we mean by solidity is, that all substances completely fill a certain amount of space, and that it is impossible for them ever to fill a greater or less amount of space.
The amount of absolute space occupied by any substance is constant, that is the elementary atoms cannot be increased or decreased in magnitude in the least degree. Particles may be divided, but their respective parts occupy the same amount of space when separated as when united. Condensation or expansion is not a property of the ultimate atoms of bodies, but merely the relation which these atoms sustain to each other. When a collection of atoms called body are forced into a closer connexion with each other, the body is said to be condensed. When their relative distances are increased the body is expanded. The maximum of density excludes all pores. In such a condition the space is wholly occupied--any further condensation is absolutely impossible. A bar of iron varies its dimensions with its temperature, while the atoms of which the bar consists remain unchangeable in size. The pores of the iron increase in the same proportion as the bar increases, and diminish as the bar diminishes. Solidity is universally supposed to be a property of atoms, but this is an error. Solidity is not a property, but only another name for the essence. A property must be a property of something; but solidity is not a property of _anything_--it is the essence itself--the thing that exists, aside from all properties and powers. If we suppose _solidity_ to be a _property,_ then it is evident that there must be a distinction between atoms as possessors, and solidity as the thing or property possessed; but we find it impossible to conceive of atoms separate and apart from solidity. Deprive atoms of solidity, and they are deprived not of a property, but of existence itself, and nothing remains. Solidity is associated with existence, and we cannot conceive of the one independently of the other. Solidity, then, is the essence to which all qualities belong--taste, smell, colour, weight, &c., are the affections of solids. Every feeling or thought is the feeling or thought of solids. All the powers of the universe, from the almighty powers of Jehovah down to the most feeble powers that operate, are the powers of solid atoms. We can conceive of solid atoms existing without powers, but we cannot conceive of atoms existing without solidity; therefore the very essence of all substance is solidity. Love, joy, and all other affections are only the different states of this essence.
When the essence or solidity of substance is considered by itself, independently of its powers, there cannot possibly be any difference in atoms only in their _magnitude_ and _form_. The essence of all substance is precisely alike when the essence alone is considered. Substances can only differ in their magnitude, form, and susceptibilities, but not in their essences, for they are and must be alike.
THE IMMATERIALISTS ONLY POSSIBLE ARGUMENT REFUTED.
The only possible argument which the immaterialist pretends to bring forward in support of the _inextension_ and _indivisibility_ of a thinking substance, and consequently of its immateriality--is founded on the self-consciousness of such substance.
A thinking substance is conscious of its own individual unity: it is conscious that itself is not _many_ beings, but one. Mankind universally feel their own individual unity when each contemplates himself. Each one is certain that it is the same being that rejoiced yesterday who remembers to-day--that all past and present affections are the affections of _one_ being, and not of many. The absolute _oneness_ of a thinking being is supposed to be inconsistent with a _plurality_ of parts. To avoid this supposed inconsistency the immaterialist assumes that such a substance is without parts.
Dr. Brown says "that the very notion _of plurality_ and division is as inconsistent with the notion of self as the notions of existence and nonexistence." (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.) That by the term "_plurality_," he means the plurality of parts, as well as a plurality of atoms,--is very evident from the whole tenor of his reasoning. If the materialist, as Dr. Brown again says, "assert thought to be the affection of a single particle, a monade; he must remember that if what he chooses to term a single particle, be a particle or matter, it too must still admit of division; it must have a top and bottom, a right side and a left; it must, as it is demonstrable in geometry, admit of being cut in different points, by an infinite number of straight lines; and all the difficulty of the composition of thought, therefore, remains precisely as before." "If it be supposed," continues he, "so completely divested of all the qualities of matter, as not to be _extended,_ nor consequently divisible, it is then mind which is asserted under another name, and every thing which is at all important in the controversy is conceded." (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.)
A unity of substance, consisting of parts, is supposed by Dr. Brown and other immaterialists to be, not only relatively, but absolutely absurd. But this supposed absurdity is only imaginary, and is founded wholly on supposition and false reasoning, and not on our self-consciousness. Self-consciousness teaches us the _unity_ of self, but it does not teach us that a unity of self is inconsistent with a plurality of parts, and consequently inextended.
The absolute _oneness_ or _unity_ of a thinking being can, by no means, be denied. Every man in all the world,--the savage as well as the philosopher,--is conscious that what he calls himself is not _many_ but _one_; but no man is conscious that the thinking substance called self does not consist of a plurality of parts--no one is conscious that self is inextended. Indeed, in the very notion of unity is involved the notion of a plurality of parts. In abstract numbers themselves a unit consists of an unlimited number of fractional parts. A unit of time is composed of innumerable parts called moments. A unit of space embraces a countless number of fractional spaces. A unit of substance is composed of an immense number of fractional parts. Without a plurality of parts we can form no notion whatsoever of unity. If consciousness, therefore, teaches us of the unity of self, it must teach us of a unity consisting of parts; otherwise it teaches us nothing. The unity of the thinking being, then, proves to a demonstration that it consists of parts, and consequently must be extended.
The term _unity_ when applied to time, space, or substance, is entirely indefinite as to quantity. Any quantity, either great or small, may be assumed as a unit. In a multitude of human beings a man; in a bodily organ a molecule of any compounded substance which enters into its composition; and, in a molecule, an atom may be assumed as the unit. In an atom there is an indefinite number of parts, either of which may be chosen as a unit. But when we descend the scale still farther, and speak of that which has no parts, we can form no possible conception of a unit of inextension. The term nothing, instead of unity, is the only applicable term for that which is inextended. To think of unity in reference to external things, we think of something that has parts; so likewise to feel the unity of the mind is to feel that it has parts.
If the unity or oneness of the mind is any evidence in favor of its being inextended and without parts, the unity or oneness of all other substances is equal evidence of their inextension. All the atoms of every substance in the immensity of space, when considered separately and apart, are units, that is each atom is not _many_ substances, but one. Therefore, if the unity of substance necessarily implies the inextension of substance, every atom in the universe must be inextended and without parts, and consequently immaterial.
If it be said that the universe contains no substances that can be called _units,_ but that each atom is a _plurality_ of substances, this would not obviate the difficulty in the least; it would only be adding absurdity to absurdity; for a _plurality_ to exist without the possibility of a _unity's_ existing, is inconceivable nonsense. A plural number, without a singular, or many substances to co-exist without the possibility of the existence of any single one, is as grossly absurd as immaterialism itself. Hence _unity_ implies parts as much as _plurality._ Therefore, wherever a unity or plurality of substance exists, there matter exists, with all its essential characteristics.
No doubt but that the immaterialist absurdity was invented principally to combat the gross errors which have been embraced by some materialists, both of ancient and modern times. The great majority of materialists have contended that thought and feeling are the _results_ of organization, beginning and ceasing with it. Hobbes, Spinosa, Priestley, Darwin, and numerous other individuals, have strenuously advocated this inconsistency. They have asserted that particles of matter have no susceptibilities of thought and feeling when unorganized, but as soon as they were brought together into a certain system, the result of such union is thought and feeling. Dr. Brown, in combating this vague conjecture, has clearly shown that a system of particles can have no properties as a whole which it does not possess in its individual parts; and, consequently, that a thought, or a joy, or a fear, or any other affections of the mind, cannot possibly be the affections resulting from a plurality, but in all cases must be the affections or feelings of every part of a substance. We most cordially believe with Dr. Brown, that a system of particles cannot possibly possess a property which the individuals composing the system do not possess. Had this great philosopher and metaphysician stopped here, his reasoning would have been amply sufficient to have overthrown the errors of Priestly, Darwin, and others who have supposed thought to begin and end with organization. But by supposing an individual unity to be inconsistent with extension and parts, he has advocated an absurdity still more glaring than the one which a part of his reasoning has so successfully overthrown.
There is another gross error of a very different nature from the one advocated by Priestley and his followers, which Dr. Brown also very clearly exposes. This error consists in assuming thought, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, desire, and all other affections to be little particles of matter. We are not aware, however, that there was ever a human being so void of common sense as to advocate this palpable inconsistency. It is very evident that this error is not necessarily incorporated with that absurd notion which supposes thought and other affections to be a _property_ of an organized system of particles, but not a property of each individual particle. The two errors are widely different: the one supposes a thought or feeling to be a _property,_ not of a single particle, but of a collection of particles; the other supposes a thought or feeling to be a little particle of matter itself, and not a _property_ of either a particle or collection of particles. The former error has had numerous advocates in such men as Priestley, Darwin, &c.; but the latter, so far as we are aware, has had no advocates. Dr. Brown, however, has attacked not only the former, but the latter error, as though it really had an existence in some popular theory.
If thought be little particles of matter, Dr. Brown justly argues, "that it will be not more absurd to talk of the twentieth part of an affirmation, or the quarter of a hope, of the top of a remembrance, and the north and east corners of a comparison, than of the twentieth part of a pound, or of the different points of the compass in reference to any part of the globe of which we may be speaking." We agree with him most perfectly in saying, "that with every effort of attention which we can give to our mental analysis, we are as incapable of forming any conception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half of a belief, as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a central point, or of a square without a single angle."
Dr. Brown also endeavours to bring this mode of reasoning to bear against the absurdity which supposes thought to be a _quality_ of a collection of particles arranged in the form of an organ, but not a quality of single particles. But it is evident that the arguments which entirely demolish one error, leave the other entirely untouched. The weakness of Dr. Brown's argument, when wrongfully applied against the last-named error, will more fully appear by reference to his own words which read as follows:--
"Even though it were admitted, however, in opposition to one of the clearest truths in science, that an organ is something more than a mere name for the separate and independent bodies which it denotes, and that our various feelings are states of the sensorial organ, it must still be allowed that, if two hundred particles existing in a certain state form a doubt, the division of these into two equal aggregates of the particles, as they exist in this state at the moment of that particular feeling, would form halves of a doubt; that all the truths of arithmetic would be predicable of each separate thought, if it were a state of a number of particles."
By a little reflection it will be seen that Dr. Brown's inference is entirely unfounded. "If two hundred particles existing in a certain state form a doubt," it does not necessarily follow that "the division of these into two equal aggregates of the particles," would form halves of a doubt. If two hundred pounds weight attached to a certain machine will produce a result called _motion,_ it does not necessarily follow that one hundred pounds will produce a result called _half of a motion._ If exactly two hundred particles organized in a certain form, were requisite to produce a certain thought, then it is evident that to alter in the least either the number or organization would be a complete destruction of that particular thought, instead of forming fractions of it. This is what Priestley and his followers assert. They say that thought begins and ends with the organization, and that the single individuals entering into the system, form no thought nor fractions of a thought. This absurdity, therefore, remains untouched by this argument of Dr. Brown. It is effectually demolished, however, by another species of argument, used by him to which we have already referred. He has proved Priestley's theory to be false, not by supposing that the fractions of a doubt could be made to result from it, but by clearly showing that an organ is only a name for a collection of many substances, which cannot possibly possess any property as a whole, which the individuals do not possess when existing singly. He has also proved the theory which asserts that a thought or a feeling is a little particle of matter, to be false, because it involves the absurdity of fractional thoughts, hopes, fears, &c.
But there is one more theory which we venture to propose, that we believe to be impregnable, which no philosopher or metaphysician ever has or ever can refute. This theory may be stated as follows:--
A thought, hope, fear, joy, or any other feeling is not a little particle of matter, nor the result or quality of a collection of particles, called an organ or a system or organs, but it is the state or affection of a single individual substance, having extension and parts, and all the essential characteristics belonging to all other matter.
There is no absurdity in speaking of the half, or of a quarter, or of any other fractional part of this substance, but there would be a great absurdity in speaking of the fractional parts of its mere _states_ or _affections._ The half or a thousandth part of a thinking substance is as reasonable as the half or a thousandth part of an attracting substance; but the top or bottom of a thought would be as absurd as the top or bottom of attraction. The north or east side of a substance which remembers, is just as correct as the north or east corners of a substance which possesses a chemical affinity; but the north side of a remembrance would be as inconsistent as the north side of a chemical affinity. Hence, none of the arguments which are so successfully brought to bear against the other two theories, will in the least affect this. It is invulnerable in every point at which it may be assailed.
Every conceivable part of this substance, however minute, possesses the same property as the whole. A thought, or any other state of feeling is, therefore, perceived by every possible part of which a whole consists. A unity of substance, as we have already had occasion to remark, consists of an immense number of fractional parts. These, in order to constitute _unity,_ must be so closely connected with, and related to each other, that whatever state or affection one may happen to be in, all the rest must immediately be notified of the same. If one part be affected with pain, every other part most be conscious of it. If one part rejoices, hopes, or fears, the whole must, by sympathy, rejoice, hope, or fear in the same manner. But if one part could suffer, while another part was unconscious of such suffering; or if the affection of one part had no tendency to affect another, then the individual unity would be destroyed, and the substance would be as many distinct, thinking, feeling beings as there were parts unconscious of the affections of the others.
It is not necessary that a thinking substance should be limited to magnitudes or quantities that are exceedingly minute in order to constitute a unity. Large amounts of substance are as consistent with unity as small ones. But in all cases, whether the quantity be large or small, it is necessary that the parts should bear that relation to each other, that when one is affected every other should be affected also; otherwise, it could not be a unity. The feeling or thinking substance of an elephant or whale is as much an individual unity as the feeling substance or spirit of a gnat or animalculæ, though the magnitude of the former far exceeds that of the latter. It is the peculiar organization or relation of parts in such a manner as to be all conscious of each other's affection which constitutes the unity, without any regard to the size or amount of substance organized. When the several parts are so organized as to think, remember, hate, love, and feel alike, under the different circumstances to which the organization may be exposed, the whole is one individual unity or being.
If the mind or spirit be of the same magnitude as the body, then the impressions received through the various organs of a human body would only have to be transferred to the distance of about five feet, in order that every part of the mind might be alike conscious of such impressions. Let the velocity be ever so rapid, time would be an essential ingredient to the transfer of these communications from part to part. If they were communicated with the velocity of sound, those parts of the mind the most distant from the one first affected, would receive the impression in the two hundredth part of a second. If the transfer were as rapid as light, the impression would be conveyed to the most distant extremities of the mind in the two hundred millionth part of a second. These inconceivably minute portions of time would be altogether imperceptible to the mind. Hence, whenever any part of the mind is affected through its sensorial organs, every other part seems to be affected in the same instant, whereas, in reality, the affection is conveyed successively from part to part, the same as sound or light is conveyed from a sounding or a luminous body.
The conveyance of internal thoughts or emotions of any kind form one part of the mind to the other, is probably equal in velocity to the transfer of the various notions gained by sensation. Therefore, in consequence of the inconceivable velocity with which all thoughts and sensations are conveyed from one extremity of the mind to another, it is impossible for one part of the mind to have a thought, sensation, or feeling of any kind which the other parts of the mind can, during any term of time that is appreciable, be ignorant of. It is for this reason that the _whole_ of the mind thinks,--the whole of the mind loves,--the _whole_ of the mind hates,--the _whole_ of the mind wills, &c.