Part 67

IMPRESS-_Service_, A particular duty which is performed by persons belonging to the navy. Soldiers, that behave ill, in the British service, and from repeated misconduct are deemed incorrigible on shore, get frequently turned over to a press gang. This does not, however, occur without some sort of concurrence on the part of the soldier, who is left to chuse between the execution or continuance of a severe military punishment, or to enter on board one of the ships of war.

IMPRESS-_Money_. All sums which are paid to men who have been compelled to serve are so called.

IMPRESSION, the effect of an attack upon any place, or body of soldiers.

IMPREST _of Money_. A term not strictly grammatical, but rendered familiar by its official adoption, signifying sums of money received from time, to time, by persons in public employment, for the current services of the year.

_To_ IMPUGN, to attack, or assault.

IMPULSE, hostile impression.

INACCESSIBLE, not to be approached, in contradiction to accessible.

INCAPABLE. A term of disgrace, which is frequently annexed to military sentences; as, such an officer has been cashiered by the sentence of a general court-martial, and rendered _incapable_ of ever serving his majesty in either a civil or military capacity.

INCH, a well known measure in length, being the 12th part of a foot, and equal to three barley-corns in length. See MEASURE.

INCIDENCE, the direction with which one body strikes another; the angle made by that line and the plane of the body struck, is called the Angle of Incidence, which see.

INCLINAISON, _Fr._ See INCLINATION.

_To_ INCLINE, in a military sense, means to gain ground to the flank, as well as to the front. Inclining is of great use in the marching of the line in front, to correct any irregularities that may happen. It is equivalent to the quarter facing and to the oblique marching of the infantry. It enables you to gain the enemy’s flank without exposing your own, or without wheeling or altering the parallel front of the squadron.

_Right_ (_or left_) INCLINE. A word of command in cavalry movements, when each man makes a half-face on his horse’s fore feet, by which means each will appear to be half a head behind his flank leader; and the whole will look to the hand to which they are to incline. It must be generally observed, that the leading officer on the flank, with a glance of his eye ascertaining his points, marches steadily upon them, at whatever pace is ordered: every other man in the squadron moves in so many parallel lines, with respect to him, and preserves the same uniformity of front and files, as when he first turned his horse’s head.

At no time of the incline ought the former front of the squadron, or distance of files to be altered.

In the incline, the rear rank moves in the same manner, and is of course regulated by the front rank, which it takes care to conform to.

Whenever a squadron inclines it must not pass an angle of 34° with respect to its former direction, unless it should be required to gain as much or more ground to the flank as to the front. The distance of files at six inches allows the squadron to incline in perfect order, while its new direction does not go beyond the angle specified. When more is required to be taken, the squadron must either wheel up, and march upon the flank point, or it will fall more or less into file, according to the degree of obliquity required, by moving each horse retired, half neck, or head to boot.

INCLINED _Plane_. See GUNNERY.

INCLUSIVE, comprehended in the sum or number; thus when the abstracts were made out for 60 and 61 days, they generally ran from the 24th of one month to the 24th of the second month, including the last 24th _only_. Since the new British regulation, the muster, as also the abstract, is taken from the 25th of one month to the 24th of the following month, both days _inclusive_.

INCOMMENSURABLE. That cannot be measured, or be reduced to any proportion or equal measure with another.

INCOMPETENT. Incapable, unfit, unequal. No officer, be his situation what it may, (from a general inclusive to the lowest non-commissioned) can be said to be _competent_ to command, who is not only willing and able to follow orders himself, but will likewise see them strictly adhered to by others; whose mind is not superior to partialities, and whose judgment is not equal to discern real merit from ignorant assumption. Every soldier is incompetent to his profession who does not possess a spirit of subordination, and cool determined bravery.

INCOMPLETE, opposed to complete, which see.

_To_ INCORPORATE. In a military sense, is to add a smaller body of forces to a large, and to mix them together. Independent companies are said to be incorporated, when they are distributed among different regiments, regiments among brigades, &c. &c. So that any lesser body may be incorporated in a greater.

INCURSION, invasion without conquest; inroad; ravage.

INDEMNIFICATION, any reimbursement or compensation which is given for loss or penalty.

_Military_ INDEMNIFICATION, a regulated allowance which is made by the British for losses sustained by officers or soldiers on actual service, viz.

_Infantry._

1st. The whole of the personal baggage of a subaltern officer to be valued at 60_l._ and the camp equipage between two subalterns, 35_l._

2d. The baggage of a captain to be valued at 80_l._ and the camp equipage, at 35_l._

3d. Field officer’s baggage, 100_l._ and the camp equipage 60_l._

4th. Colonel’s baggage, 120_l._ and camp equipage, 80_l._

_Cavalry._

5th. The whole of the personal baggage of a subaltern officer to be valued at 70_l._ and the camp equipage at 45_l._

6th. Captain’s baggage, 90_l._ and camp equipage 45_l._

7th. Field officer’s baggage, 120_l._ and camp equipage 90_l._

8th. Colonel’s baggage, 140_l._ and camp equipage, 90_l._

9th. Officers giving certificates signed by themselves and the commanding officer of their regiments, that they have lost the whole of their baggage and camp equipage, and that at the time it was lost, they were in no respect deviating from the orders of the general officer commanding in chief relative to baggage, shall receive the whole of the sums above allotted, according to their ranks.

10th. Officers losing any part of their baggage, are to give in similar certificates, according to the best of their belief and judgment, without entering into particulars, but estimating their loss at one-fourth, one-half, or three-fourths of the whole value, according to which they shall be paid the like proportion of the above sums.

11th. The whole baggage of a quarter-master of cavalry shall be estimated at 40_l._ A quarter-master losing the whole or any part of his baggage, must produce certificates from the officer commanding, and from his captain, as to the quantity of his baggage, which to the best of their belief and judgment has been lost, according to which he will receive the whole or a proportion, of the above sum of 40_l._

12th. The baggage and camp equipage of all staff officers of both cavalry and infantry, are to be valued as those of subaltern officers, except for such as are allowed a tent to themselves, whose camp equipage in that case will be valued as that of a captain.

13th. A serjeant of cavalry losing his necessaries, without any fault of his own, shall receive 2_l._ 15_s._

14th. Corporal, trumpeter, or private, 2_l._ 10_s._

15th. Serjeant of infantry, 2_l._ 10_s._

16th. Corporal, drummer, or private, 2_l._ 2_s._

17th. A servant, not being a soldier, 3_l._ 8_s._

The certificates in these five cases to be the same as in the case of the quarter-master.

Officers on actual service, whose horses shall be killed or taken by the enemy, or shall be shot for the glanders, receive allowances by way of indemnification for them, according to the following rates; viz.

_Cavalry._

Heavy dragoons, first charger, 47_l._ 5_s._

Light dragoons, first ditto. 36_l._ 15_s._

Heavy or light ditto, second ditto, 31_l._ 10_s._

Quarter-master’s horse, 29_l._ 8_s._

_Infantry._

Field officer’s charger, 31_l._ 10_s._

Adjutant’s ditto, 31_l._ 10_s._

Chaplain’s and subaltern’s horses, each 18_l._ 18_s._

Bat horses, (both cavalry and infantry) 18_l._ 18_s._

General officer’s first charger, 47_l._ 5_s._

Second ditto, 31_l._ 10_s._

Aids de camp, brigade majors, and other staff officers, whose situations require their keeping good horses, receive as the light dragoons.

Staff officers, for whom inferior horses are deemed sufficient, 18_l._ 18_s._

Certificates, stating the particular circumstances and causes of the loss of the horses, are to be signed by the officers themselves, and by the commanding officers of their regiments.

And the general officers commanding in chief on the different foreign stations, are to decide on the claims preferred in their respective districts of command upon the ground of this regulation, and to grant payment accordingly.

INDEMNITY, a security or exemption from penalty, loss, or punishment. It is sometimes connected with amnesty. Thus Charles the second on his restoration, endeavored to conciliate the minds of his subjects, by promising amnesty and indemnity to the different parties that had been directly active, indirectly instrumental, or passively the means of his father’s death.

_To_ INDENT, a word particularly made use of in India for the dispatch of military business. It is of the same import and meaning as to draw or set a value upon. It likewise means an order for military stores, arms, &c. As an indent for new supplies, &c.

INDENTED _line_, in fortification, is a line running out and in like the teeth of a saw, forming several angles, so that one side defends another. They are used on the banks of rivers, where they enter a town; the parapet of the covert-way is also often indented.--This is by the French engineers called _redans_. Small places are sometimes fortified with such a line, but the fault of such fortifications is, that the besiegers from one battery may ruin both sides of the _tenaille_ of the front of a place, and make an assault without fear of being enfiladed, since the defences are ruined.

INDEPENDENT, in a military sense, is a term which distinguishes from the rest of the army, those companies that have been raised by individuals for rank, and were afterwards drafted into corps that were short of their complement of men.

INDEPENDENT COMPANY, INDEPENDENT TROOP, is one that is not incorporated into any regiment.

INDIAN _Camp_. An Indian camp may be considered as one of the loosest assemblages of men, women, and children, that can perhaps, be imagined.

Every common soldier in the army is accompanied with a wife, or concubine; the officers have several, and the generals whole seraglios; besides these the army is encumbered by a number of attendants and servants, exceeding that of the fighting men; and to supply the various wants of this enervated multitude, dealers, pedlars, and retailers of all sorts, follow the camp, to whom a separate quarter is allotted, in which they daily exhibit their different commodities, in greater quantities, and with more regularity, than in any fair in Europe; all of them sitting on the ground in a line, with their merchandise exposed before them, and sheltered from the sun by a mat supported by sticks.

INDIAN _Engineer_. Mr. Orme, in his history of the Carnatic, affords an instance of the art of engineering being known, and cultivated by the native Indians. In page 265, he gives the following account of a place called Chinglapet, which had been fortified by an Indian engineer. Chinglapet is situated about 30 miles west of Covelong, 40 south-west of Madras, and within half a mile of the northern bank of the river Paliar. It was, and not without reason, esteemed by the natives, a very strong hold. Its outline, exclusive of some irregular projections at the gateways, is nearly a parallelogram, extending 400 yards from north to south, and 320 from east to west. The eastern and half the northern side, is covered by a continued swamp of ricefields, and the other half of the north, together with the whole of the west side, is defended by a large lake. Inaccessible in these parts, it would have been impregnable, if the south side had been equally secure; but here the ground is high, and gives advantages to an enemy.--The Indian engineer, whoever he was that erected the fort, seems to have exceeded the common reach of his countrymen in the knowlege of his art, not only by the choice of the spot, but also, by proportioning the strength of the defences, to the advantages and disadvantages of the situation: for the fortifications to the south are much the strongest, those opposite to the rice-fields, something weaker; and the part that is skirted by the lake, is defended only by a slender wall: a deep ditch 60 feet wide, and faced with stone; a _fausse braye_, and a stone wall 18 feet high, with round towers, on, and between the angles, form the defences to the land: nor are these all, for parallel to the south, east, and north sides of these outward works, are others of the same kind, repeated within them, and these joining to the slender wall, which runs to the west along the lake, form a second enclosure of fortification.

INDIAN _Fortification_. The entrance into an Indian fortification is through a large and complicated pile of buildings, projecting in the form of a parallelogram from the main rampart; and if the city has two walls, it projects beyond them both: this building consists of several continued terraces, which are of the same height as the main rampart, and communicate with it; the inward walls of these terraces, form the sides of an intricate passage about 20 feet broad, which leads by various short turnings at right angles, through the whole pile to the principal gate, that stands in the main rampart. We have extracted this passage, from the History of the Carnatic, as affording a general outline of Indian fortification. In the same place may be seen, (page 320) the following description of a battery; which was built by the English in 1753, and contributed to the preservation of Tritchinopoly, when the French attempted to storm that place.

This battery was called Dalton’s battery, from an officer of that name, who, when intrusted with the command of the garrison, had converted that part of the gateway which projected beyond the outward wall, into a solid battery, with embrasures; having the part between the two walls, as it stood with its windings and terraces: an interval was likewise left between the backside of the battery and the terrace nearest to it, which lay parallel to each other; so that an enemy who had gained the battery, could not get to the terrace, without descending into the interjacent area, and then mounting the wall of the terrace with scaling ladders: the battery, however, communicated with the rampart of the outward wall of the city, but being, as that was, only eighteen feet high, it was commanded by the terraces behind it, as well as by the rampart of the inner wall, both of which, were thirty feet high; upon one of the inward cavaliers, south of the gateway, were planted two pieces of cannon, to plunge into the battery, and scour the interval between the two walls, as far as the terraces of the gateway; and two other pieces, mounted in the north-west angle of the inward rampart, commanded in like manner, both the battery and the interval to the north of the terraces.

INDIAN _Guides_. According to the ingenious author of the history of the Carnatic, these men are not to be depended upon. In page 217 he relates, that on the 1st of April, 1752, at night, a captain Dalton was ordered with 400 men to march, and, by taking a large circuit, to come in at the eastern extremity of the enemy’s camp, which he was to enter, beat up, and set fire to. The English troops, from their long inactivity, knew so little of the ground about Tritchinopoly, that they were obliged to trust to Indian guides; and these being ordered to conduct them out of the reach of the enemy’s advanced posts, fell into the other extreme, and led them several miles out of their way, and through such bad roads, that when the morning star appeared, they found themselves between Elimiscram and the French rock, two miles from Chunda Saheb’s camp, and in the centre of all their posts.

INDIAN _princes and their troops_. Their military character may be collected from the following curious account, which is given of a circumstance that occurred in the Tanjore country, when the English obtained a signal victory over the French and Mysoreans, in 1753. The presence of the nabob being thought necessary to facilitate a negociation that was then judged expedient to undertake, he prepared to march with the English army; but on the evening he intended to quit the city, his discontented troops assembled in the outer court of the palace, and clamoring, declared, that they would not suffer him to move, before he had paid their arrears; in vain were arguments used to convince this rabble, more insolent because they had never rendered any effectual service, that his going to Tanjore was the only measure from which they could hope for a chance of receiving their pay: they remained inflexible, and threatened violence; upon which captain Dalton, a British officer, sent a messenger to the camp, from whence the grenadier company immediately marched into the city, where they were joined by 100 of the garrison of Tritchinopoly, and all together forcing their way into the palace, they got the nabob into his palanquin, and escorted him to the camp, surrounded by 200 Europeans with fixed bayonets; the malcontents not daring to offer him any outrage as he was passing, nor on the other hand, was any injury offered to them: for notwithstanding such proceedings in more civilized nations rarely happen, and are justly esteemed mutiny and treason; yet in Hindustan they are common accidents, and arise from such causes as render difficult to ascertain whether the prince or his army be most in fault. The nabob had certainly no money to pay his troops; so far from it, that the English had now for two years furnished all the expences of their own troops in the field, but it is a maxim with every prince in India, let his wealth be ever so great, to keep his army in long arrears, for fear they should desert. This apprehension is perhaps not unjustly entertained of hirelings collected from every part of a despotic empire, and insensible of notions of attachment to the prince or cause they serve; but from hence the soldiery, accustomed to excuses when dictated by no necessity, give no credit to those which are made to them, when there is a real impossibility of satisfying their demands; and a practice common to most of the princes of Hindustan, concurs not a little to increase this mistrust in all who serve them; for on the one hand, the vain notions in which they have been educated, inspire them with such a love of outward shew, and the enervating climate in which they are born, renders them so incapable of resisting the impulses of fancy; and on the other hand, the frequent reverses of fortune in this empire, dictate so strongly the necessity of hoarding resources against the hour of calamity, that nothing is more common than to see a nabob purchasing a jewel or ornament of great price, at the very time that he is in the greatest distress for money to answer the necessities of the government. Hence, instead of being shocked at the clamors of their soldiery, they are accustomed to live in expectation of them, and it is a maxim in their conduct to hear them with patience, unless the crowd proceed to violence; but in order to prevent this, they take care to attach to their interest some principal officers, with such a number of the best troops, as may serve on emergency to check the tumult, which is rarely headed by a man of distinction. But when his affairs grow desperate by the success of a superior enemy, the prince atones severely for his evasions, by a total defection of his army, or by suffering such outrages as the Nabob Mahomed-Ally would in all probability have been exposed to, had he not been rescued in the manner we have described.

_Military_ INDICATIONS. (_Indices_, _Fr._) Marshal Saxe very judiciously observes, that there are indications in war which every officer should attend to, and from which deductions and conclusions may be drawn with some degree of certainty. A previous knowlege of your enemy’s national character and customs, will contribute not a little towards the attainment of this object. Every country indeed has customs and usages which are peculiar to itself. Among various indications that we might adduce, let us suppose these leading ones by which the intentions of an enemy may be discovered by the garrison of a besieged town. If, for example, towards the close of day groupes or loose parties of armed men should be discovered upon the neighboring heights which overlook and command the town, you may remain assured, that some considerable attack is in agitation. Small detachments from the different corps are sent forward for this purpose, and the besieging army is thereby apprized of the business; as the heights are occupied in the evening by the parties in question, in order that they may be thoroughly acquainted with the leading avenues, &c.

When much firing is heard from an enemy’s camp, and another army lies encamped near, the latter may conclude, that an engagement will take place the following day; for it must be evident, that the soldiers are cleaning and trying their musquets.

Marshal Saxe further remarks, that a considerable movement in an enemy’s army may be discovered by any large quantity of dust, which is a sure indication of it. The reflection of the sun upon the firelocks of an army will likewise lead to some knowlege of its position. If the rays are collected and perpendicular, it is a certain indication, that the enemy is advancing towards you; if they disappear at times and cast a broken radiance, you may conclude, that he is retreating. If the troops move from right to left, their line of march is towards the left; if from left to right, the line of march is towards the right. Should considerable clouds of dust be seen to rise from an enemy’s camp, and it be ascertained, that he is in want of forage, it may fairly be inferred, that the train of waggoners and purveyors, &c. are moving, and that the whole will follow shortly.

If the enemy, observes the same writer, has his camp-ovens on the right or left, and you are covered by a small rivulet, you may make a flank disposition, and by that manœuvre, suddenly return and detach ten or twelve thousand men to demolish his ovens; and whilst you are protected by the main body of the army which is ordered to support the first detachment, you may seize upon all his flour, &c. There are innumerable stratagems of this sort which may be practised in war, and by means of which, a victory may be obtained without much bloodshed on your part, and at all events with considerable disadvantage to the enemy.

INDIES (EAST). According to the geographical description of the East Indies, they must be considered as being divided into two principal parts, viz. India within the river Ganges, and India beyond the river Ganges.