Part 154

This part of the progression from 8 to 3 being known, we easily conceive how the files of the phalanx had been diminished from 16 to 8 in the ages preceding Turenne. It is to be presumed, that this depth was considered as superfluous, and it was judged necessary to diminish it, in order to extend the front. However, the motive is of very little consequence, since we are now reduced to three ranks; let us see what qualities of the phalanx have been preserved, and what might have been added thereto.

To shew that the defects of the phalanx were preferred in Europe, we suppose two bodies of troops, one of eight thousand men, ranged as a phalanx, sixteen deep; the other a regiment of three battalions, consisting only of fifteen hundred men, drawn up in three lines, after the same manner. Those two bodies shall be perfectly equal and alike in extent of front, and shall differ in nothing but in the depth of their files: the inconveniences and defects, therefore, occasioned by the length of the fronts are equal in both troops, though their numbers are very different; hence it follows, that, in Europe, the essential defects of the phalanx were preserved and its advantages lost.

Let the files of this body of eight thousand, be afterwards divided, and let it be reduced to three in depth, its front will then be found five times more extensive, and its depth five times less: we may, therefore, conclude, that the defects of the phalanx were evidently multiplied in the discipline of Europe, at the expence of its advantages, which consisted in the depth of its files.

The progress which has taken place in the artillery, has contributed greatly to this revolution. As cannon multiplied, it was necessary to avoid its effects; and the method of avoiding, or at least of lessening them, was to diminish the depth of the files.

The musquet, likewise, has a great share in the alteration; the half-pike was entirely laid aside for the bayonet; and in order to have no fire unemployed, it was thought necessary to put it in the power of every soldier to make use of his firelock.

Those are, we think, the two principal causes of the little solidity, or depth given to the battalion.

Thus the defects of the phalanx were multiplied in the European discipline, and its advantages and perfections injudiciously diminished. The system of Prussia, made some alterations, but with every other power until the French revived the principles of the phalanx in their columns of attack, the system was much inferior to the phalanx, and had nothing but the single effect of fire-arms to counterbalance all its advantages. The effect, however, of fire-arms is a partial power, and does not originally belong to the manner of disciplining troops, the sole aim of which, should be to employ man’s natural action. It is man, therefore, and not his fire, which is to be considered as the principal agent; and from hence the European systems before the French revolution were very much inferior to the phalanx, and still more to the Roman arrangement, which so far surpassed that of Greece.

The light troops of both those people were much heavier than modern battalions, and had more power and solidity for a shock or conflict. However, the Roman discipline, notwithstanding its superiority, is not calculated for our times; because, as we are obliged to engage first at a distance, ours, by its cannon, would destroy the Roman order of battle in a very short time, and would be exposed to a loss much less considerable itself, supposing even the artillery was equal on both sides; we should then, in order to perfect our arrangements, endeavor to procure them all the advantageous qualities of the legionary regulations, as the only means of giving them the superiority.

Many people are of opinion, that we now imitate the Romans, and that we give battle according to their system, because our troops are drawn up in lines, some of which are full, and others vacant. But it is shewn, that three battalions have the same front, and the same inconveniences that eight thousand men ranged in the phalanx order. Our lines are formed by brigades, regiments, or battalions, and the distance of one corps from the other is equal to the front of one of those corps: so that those lines, both full and vacant, are composed of detachments equal in front; each has a phalanx of six, eight, or twelve thousand men. This order of battle consequently, can be no more at most than a kind of medium between those of Greece and Rome.

TACTICS _of Bonaparte_. It is well known that the greater part of the victories of Bonaparte may be imputed to the admirable system adopted by this general; a system which, however often repeated, has still been attended with the same success--a system, to which the established tactics have as yet applied no remedy, or rather, to which the confirmed habits of men, educated in the ancient system, are as unwilling as unable to accommodate themselves.

The minor discipline is his great secret; the simple methods of the first drills, are merely facings and wheelings in a discretionary order, all his rules, are like general principles, the results of which may be produced by a different process of the same elements. All his movements are at rapid time; and the rotation of evolutions, though laid down in regulation, is not pursued in practice, the soldier is taught not so much how to execute a set of movements, as how to perform any that the variety of ground and the incidents of action, never twice alike, call for. These are the elementary rules, on which the system is founded.

His system of action is comprehended in the following principles:

1st. To select some partial point of attack, most frequently the enemy’s centre, but occasionally one or other of the wings--and then, strengthening that part of his own army which is opposed to the point of attack, by drafts from the other divisions, to bear down upon the point of attack, with the advantage of numbers, and consequently of greater physical force.

2d. To counteract the effect of the weakness of the other divisions, by assigning them a defensive part only; a purpose which evidently requires a less power than is necessary to attack.

2. By some advantage of position. This is either natural, as a strong position properly so called, or relative, as where the weaker divisions are so placed as either to be protected by the stronger, or, in case of dispersion, to be enabled to fall in with the main body.

3d. The necessary, the inevitable effects of this system are--

That the part of the enemy, which is the point of attack, is almost invariably broken, driven back, in a word, defeated.

That, in the mean time, the weaker divisions of the army which attack, according to this system, are either enabled to maintain their ground, against the strongest wings of the enemy, or they are repulsed.

That, if the divisions maintain the ground, the defeat of their enemy is certain, complete, and irrecoverable.

The main body of the attacking army, having driven before it the point of attack, has now become the rear of those other divisions of the enemy which are contending with its own divisions. The divisions of the enemy are thus between two bodies. The divisions they are in the act of attacking, and the victorious main body, which, having accomplished its own part, is hastening to the relief of its divisions.

That, on the other hand, if the weaker divisions of the attacking army, (attacking according to the system) should happen to be dispersed; confident of their final victory, they exert themselves like conquerors, with the spirit of hope, and courage of assured victory. They dispute the ground, retreat inch by inch, and, if they cannot prevent, still protract their defeat, till the victorious main body shall come to their aid.

Finally, and indeed, most materially, though the weaker divisions of the attacking army should be absolutely defeated, the victorious main body cannot but necessarily recover every thing. The divisions of the enemy, which have succeeded in defeating the divisions of the attacking army, must be equally dispersed by pursuit, as the defeated divisions by defeat. It is, indeed, an essential part of this system, to contrive that they should so be dispersed, by the scattered flight of the divisions defeated. By this means the victorious main body, formed by the exactest discipline to keep their ranks, returning from their pursuit at the word of command, and in the very moment of opportunity have an easy conquest over scattered divisions, which are thus likewise under the circumstance of being placed between two fires.

Such is the celebrated system. Three singular inferences must be deduced from it:--

That, where an army attacks according to this system, the defeat of one part of the army of its enemy is the defeat of the whole.

That the defeat of the smaller divisions by the defending army, is no defeat at all; the defeat, or at least, repulse of these divisions, being one of the means of the victory of the attaching army.

That it is the event of the main attack, and not the repulse or even defeat of the subordinate and merely defensive divisions that should decide the victory.

_Maritime_ TACTICS, or _manœuvres, &c. at sea_. Like those practised on land may be considered under two heads. The first contains what the French term _historique_ or detail, in which are included the orders and signals directed to be observed by fleets going into action; together with a specific account of the different manœuvres which have been executed in the principal engagements. The second comprehends a knowlege of the rates of ships, and of the method of constructing them.

The vessels of the ancients made their way by means of sails and oars. The rows of oars were proportioned to the different sizes, from what was called _unus-ramus_, which was the smallest, and had only one row; to the _quinque-rami_, which had five rows.

The particular method in which these ships were constructed, as well as of the arrangements that were made within, in order that a sufficient number of rowers might be commodiously placed to work them, is not perfectly known to the moderns; nor have the ancients left us documents sufficiently clear and accurate on that head.

With respect to naval tactics, or the art of fighting at sea, it is confessedly less ancient than tactics on shore, or what is generally called land service. Mankind were accustomed to contend for the possession of territory long before they determined on, or even dreamed of, making the sea a theatre of war and bloodshed.

Setting aside the many fabulous accounts which are extant concerning naval tactics, we shall remain satisfied with what has been transmitted to us by the Roman writers of the Vth and VIth centuries of that republic. We shall there find specific details of the different manœuvres which were practised at sea during the Punic war. In those times naval armaments began to be regularly fitted out; ships of different forms and sizes were constructed, and certain offensive and defensive machines, that served as a species of artillery, were placed upon them. They had already been drawn out according to system; being divided into certain proportions which were then called divisions, but are now named squadrons; and the persons who commanded them, exerted all their skill and genius to gain advantages over their enemies, by opportunely getting to windward, by seizing the favorable occurrence of the tide, or by mooring in advantageous situations.

At the battle of Actium, Augustus finding himself inferior to Mark Antony in the number of his ships, had the sagacity to draw up his line of battle along the entrance of the gulph of Ambracia, and thereby to make up for his deficiency. This naval manœuvre, as well as that of getting to windward of the enemy, in order to bear down upon him with more certainty and effect, exists to the present day.

We act precisely upon the same principles in both cases, by which the ancients were governed, with the additional advantage, in fighting to windward, of covering the enemy’s line with smoke from the discharge of ordnance and fire-arms. The French call this being in possession of the closest line--_Occuper la ligne du plus prés_.

In those times, ships were boarded much sooner than they are at present. Most engagements at sea are now determined by cannon shot. Among the ancients, when two ships endeavored to board each other, the rowers drew in their oars, to prevent them from being broken in the shock.

The manœuvre which was practised on this occasion, was for the ship that got to windward of its adversary, to run upon its side, with the prow, which being armed with a long sharp piece of iron, made so deep an impression in it, that the ship thus attacked, generally sunk. The voyages which were afterwards made on the ocean, rendered it necessary to construct ships that carried more sail, and were double decked; and since the invention of gunpowder, tiers of guns have been substituted in the room of rows of oars.

On the decline and fall of the Roman empire, the Saracens got the ascendancy in naval tactics. They took advantage of this superiority, and extended their conquests on all sides. The whole extent of coast belonging to the Mediterranean, together with the adjacent islands, fell under their dominion. Mankind are indebted to them for considerable improvements in naval tactics.

It was only under Charlemagne that the Europeans may be said to have first paid any great attention to their navy. That monarch kept up a regular intercourse with the caliphs of the East; and having just grounds to apprehend an invasion from the Normans, he constructed vessels for the defence of his coasts.

During the reign of the first French kings, belonging to the third race, naval tactics were little attended to, on account of the small extent of maritime coast which France possessed at that period. It was only in the days of Louis the Younger, and of Louis, surnamed the Saint, that we discover any traces of a considerable fleet; especially during the crusades.

Under Charles the Vth, and his successor Charles the VIth, the French got possession of several sea-ports, and had command of a long line of coast. Yet neither they nor the English, with whom they were frequently at war, had at that period any thing like the fleets which are fitted out now.

The discovery of America by Columbus, and the more lucrative possession of the East Indies, induced the principal states of Europe to encrease their naval establishments, for the purpose of settling colonies, and of bringing home, without the danger of molestation, or piracy, the wealth and produce of the Eastern and Western worlds.

The French marine was far from being contemptible under Francis the first; but it grew into considerable reputation during the administration of cardinal Richelieu, in the reign of Louis the XIIIth; and continued so until the battle of La Hogue. From that epoch it began to decline; while the English, on the other hand, not only kept up the reputation they had acquired under Cromwell and his predecessors, but rendered themselves so thoroughly skilled in naval tactics, that they have remained masters of the sea to this day. In corroboration of what we have advanced, we refer our readers to a history of the Sovereignty of the Ocean, by the American editor of this work.

TACTIQUE _Maritime_, _Fr._ Naval tactics, or sea manœuvres, &c. See NAVAL TACTICS.

TAGBEERE, _Ind._ Dismission.

TAIGAU, _Ind._ A sabre.

TAIL _of the trenches_. The post where the besiegers begin to break ground, and cover themselves from the fire of the place, in advancing the lines of approach.

TAILLE _du soldat_, _Fr._ The size, height, and stature most proper for a soldier.

TAILLER, _Fr._ To cut. _Tailler en pièces_, to cut to pieces.

TAILLOIR, _Fr._ Trencher. It likewise signifies in architecture a square piece of stone, or wood which is placed above the capital.

_To_ TAKE. This verb, as Dr. Johnson observes, like _prendre_ in French, is used with endless multiplicity of relations. Its uses are so numerous, that they cannot easily be exemplified; and its references to the words governed by it so general and lax, that they can hardly be explained by any succedaneous terms. But commonly that is hardest to explain which least wants explanation. We shall content ourselves with giving a few general terms, in which the verb _take_ is used with respect to military matters.

_To_ TAKE. To make prisoner.

_To_ TAKE _advantage of_. To avail oneself of any peculiar event or opening, whereby an enemy may be overcome, viz.--He took advantage of the debaucheries which were daily committed in the enemy’s camp, to surprise the army.

_To_ TAKE _ground to the right or left_. To extend a line towards either of those directions.

_To_ TAKE _up quarters_. To occupy locally; to go into cantonments, barracks, &c. To become stationary for more or less time.

_To_ TAKE _up the gauntlet_. The correlative to throw down the gauntlet. To accept a challenge.

_To_ TAKE _up arms_. To embody and troop together for offensive or defensive purposes. We likewise say, to take arms.

_To_ TAKE _down_. To minute; to commit to paper what is spoken or given orally. Hence to take down his words.

_To_ TAKE _the field_. To encamp. It likewise means generally to move with troops in military order.

_To_ TAKE _in_. A low phrase, signifying to cheat, to gull. Officers, especially the junior classes, are frequently _taken in_.

_To_ TAKE _oath_. To swear.

_To_ TAKE _up_. To seize; to catch; to arrest; as to take up a deserter.

_To_ TAKE _on_. An expression in familiar use among soldiers that have enlisted for a limited period, to signify an extension of service by taking a fresh bounty.

_To_ TAKE. To adopt any particular formation:

_Rear ranks take open order_ _Rear ranks take close order_ Words of command which are used in the discipline of troops. For the manner in which they are executed see ORDER.

_To_ TAKE _cognisance_. To investigate with judicial authority.

TALC, (_Talc_, _Fr._) In natural history, a shining, squamous, fissile species of stone, easily separable into thin lamina or scales, improperly called Isinglass.

There are two kinds of talc, viz. the white talc of Venice, and the red talc of Muscovy.

TALE. Information; disclosure of any thing secret.

TALE, _Ind._ An Indian coin equal to six shillings and eight pence.

TALEBEARER. One who gives officious or malignant intelligence. With respect to the interior economy of military life, a talebearer is the most dangerous creature that could insinuate itself among honorable men; and however acceptable domestic information may sometimes seem to narrow minds, it will be found even by those who countenance the thing, that such means of getting at the private sentiments of others, not only defeat their own ends, but ultimately destroy every species of regimental harmony. The only way to secure a corps from this insidious evil, is for commanding officers to treat those with contempt, who would endeavor to obtain their countenance by such base and unofficer-like conduct. For it is a known axiom, that if there were no listeners, there would be no reporters.

TALENT. Count Turpin, in his essay on the Art of War, makes the following distinction between genius and talent:--Talent remains hidden for want of occasions to shew itself; genius breaks through all obstacles: genius is the contriver, talent the workman in military affairs. Talent is properly that knowlege acquired by study and labor, and ability to apply it; genius takes, as by intuition, a glance of whatever it is occupied on, and comprehends at once without labor the true character of the subject; genius must however not be devoid of acquired knowlege.

TALK. The Indian tribes of the United States, on public occasions, such as treaties, depute persons to deliver discourses to those with whom they treat, and those discourses are called TALKS: they often abound with eloquence.

_To_ TALK. To make use of the powers of speech. Officers and soldiers are strictly forbidden to talk under arms.

TALLOW. A well known name for the fat of animals. It is used as a combustible in the composition of fireworks. See LABORATORY.

TALON, _Fr._ In architecture, an ornamental moulding, which is concave below and convex above.

TALON _renversé_, _Fr._ An ornamental moulding which is concave above. This word is likewise applied to many other things, as the upper part of a scythe, &c. the end of a pike, &c.

TALON _d’un cheval_, _Fr._ A horse’s heel, of the hind part of his hoof. Talon literally means heel.

TALOOK, _Ind._ A farm under rent; or a number of farms or villages let out to one chief.

TALOOKDAR, _Ind._ The head of a village under a superior.

TALPATCHES, _Fr._ A nickname which is given to the foot soldiers in Hungary. It is derived from TALP, which, in the Hungarian language, signifies sole of a shoe, and plainly proves, from the ridicule attached to it, that the Hungarians would rather serve on horseback than on foot. All persons are strictly forbidden to call them by this name.

TALUS, _Fr._ This word is sometimes written _Talut_. For its signification see FORTIFICATION.

TALUTED, from _taluter_, is sloped or graduated from a given height to a less.

TALUTER, _Fr._ To give a slope to any thing in fortification.

TAMBOUR, in fortification, is a kind of work formed of pallisades, or pieces of wood, 10 feet long and 6 inches thick, planted close together, and driven 2 or 3 feet into the ground; so that when finished, it may have the appearance of a square redoubt cut in two. Loopholes are made 6 feet from the ground, and 3 feet asunder, about 8 inches long, 2 inches wide within and 6 without. Behind is a scaffold 2 feet high, for the soldiers to stand upon. They are frequently made in the place of arms of the covert-way, at the saliant angles, in the gorges, half-moons, and ravelins, &c.

TAMBOURS, in fortification, solid pieces of earth which are made in that part of the covert way that is joined to the parapet, and lies close to the traverses, being only 3 feet distant from them. They serve to prevent the covert-way from being enfiladed, and obstruct the enemy’s view towards the traverses. When tambours are made in the covert-way, they answer the same purposes that works _en cremaillére_ would.

Tambour likewise means, in fortification, a single or isolated traverse, which serves to close up that part of the covert-way where a communication might have been made in the glacis for the purpose of going to some detached work.

TAMBOUR also signifies, both in French and English, a little box of timber-work covered with a cieling, within side the porch of certain churches, both to prevent the view of persons passing by, and to keep off the wind, &c. by means of folding doors. In many instances it is the same as porch.

TAMBOUR, _Fr._ See DRUM.

_Marcher_ TAMBOURS _battans et drapeaux flottans_. To march with drums beating and colors flying.

TAMBOUR, _Fr._ See DRUMMER. We frequently use the word Drum in the same sense that the French do, viz. to signify drummer. We likewise say fife for fifer; as, one drum and one fife to each company.

TAMBOUR _major_, _Fr._ Drum major.

_Batteries de_ TAMBOUR, _Fr._ The different beats of the drum. The principal beats among the French are--_La générale_, the general; _L’assemblée_, the assembly; _Le dernier_, the last beat; _Le drapeau_, the troop; _Aux champs_, to the field; _La marche_, the march; _La diane_, the reveille; _L’alarme_, to arms, or the alarm; _La chamade_, the parley; _L’appel_, the roll or call; _La fascine ou brelogue_, the workman’s call. _Le ban et la rétraite._