Part 152
SURPRISES, (_Surprises_, _Fr._) In a military sense, may apply either to those measures which are adopted by one army in the field to surprise another, or to those which are followed in the attack of fortified places. The French make a distinction between _surprises de campagne_, and _surprises des places_, or the surprises which are practised against an army in the field, and those which are executed against fortified towns or places. What has been said under the article _Stratagems of War_, will equally apply to the latter system.
When it is found expedient to attempt a surprise in the field, a sufficient number of men must be collected for the purpose, not only of advancing with confidence against the enemy, but of being able to make good a retreat, should he prove stronger than was suspected. The troops that are selected for this duty should be remarkable for their fidelity, and be able to undergo the greatest fatigue. Intelligent and faithful guides must be distributed among the different troops and companies, in order to keep up the continuity of the march, and put those of the rear in the right paths, should they have deviated from the direct route or line of march.
If the detachment or corps, that is entrusted with the secret expedition or surprise, be marched out of an entrenched camp, proper precautions must be taken, to prevent any intercourse between the enemy and persons employed to send or give intelligence. To do this effectually, the instant the rear guard has left the camp, the gates must be shut, and the strictest orders be issued to prevent spies or deserters from stealing out. Small parties of cavalry and riflemen must likewise be sent forward, to scour the roads, and to pick up stragglers. Care is taken to have it understood by the people of the country, that these parties are detached, for no other purpose than to escort some waggons, which are expected for the use of the army, to parley, or apparently to execute some business that can neither create jealousy, nor give uneasiness.
About an hour after, it must be proclaimed, in and about the camp and adjacent country, that no officer, soldier, sutler, or inhabitant of the villages, &c. shall on any account go more than one quarter of a league from the army. Small scouring parties, with the provost marshal’s field patroles, must be distributed beyond these limits, in order to pick up stragglers, and to search their persons lest they should be the bearers of letters, &c. A great number of small ambuscades must be laid along the leading avenues between the enemy’s camp and your own. If, notwithstanding all these precautions, you should learn, that the enemy has gained some information respecting your movement, a report must be instantly spread to make him imagine, that you have some other design in contemplation.
If, during the night, or in the course of the day, small reconnoitring parties, belonging to the enemy, should be discovered upon the road, or about it, one half of your patrole or scouring detachment, must be placed in ambush along one side of the road, in order to take them in the rear, whilst the other half attacks them in front, and by thus surrounding them, prevents any intelligence from being carried to the enemy.
When such parties consist of a regular advanced detachment from the enemy’s forces, that challenges you on your approach, your out-scouts must instantly give the name of the power or general against whose troops you are marching, or make them imagine, that you are returning from some secret expedition which had been undertaken in his favor, or that you came out of a neighboring state. As you draw near, proper measures must be adopted to get upon its flanks, so as ultimately to surround the whole guard, and to prevent any information from being forwarded to the main body of the enemy. This operation cannot fail of success, if you act with promptitude; and most especially if you can get possession of the enemy’s watchword or countersign.
Such are the leading precautions to be observed at the first outset of an army, whose design is to surprise its enemy. But these are not all. A perfect knowlege of his position must have been likewise acquired; correct descriptions of all the posts and stations, local as well as artificial advantages, must likewise have been given in, with a special account of the bridges, fords, &c. the state of his provisions, and of the general’s head-quarters.
If it be your design to surprise any strong holds, or particular posts, to fall suddenly upon some detached generals, or to carry the head-quarters themselves, you must be made thoroughly acquainted with all the intricacies of ground about them, with the number of men which may be opposed against you; and, when you have gained the necessary information respecting these matters, particularly the latter, you must assemble a body of active and zealous troops, whose number shall be one third at least greater than that of the enemy, to execute your plan.
When your project has been completed, you must call your men together. For in all expeditions of this sort, desultory operations are unavoidably necessary, and the troops employed upon them, must be dispersed. Should any be found absent at the roll-calling of the different companies or detachments, it may reasonably be presumed, that they are engaged in pillaging the place they entered. In which case you must set fire to the houses, if you cannot withdraw the free-booters by any other method. Strict orders should be given out, that no soldier or follower of the army shall move before the detachment returns to the main body, after having effected the surprise, or remain behind when it marches off. It frequently happens, that a few irregular soldiers, &c. will avail themselves of the confusion of the moment, to conceal the property that may have fallen into the hands of the detachment, and thereby to avoid sharing it with their comrades. Patroles must be sent out of the camp, and be posted along the road or roads that lead to the place which has been surprised, with strict injunctions to stop all stragglers; and the quarter and rear-guards of the camp itself must see, that none enter before the detachment is regularly marched in. When any are found guilty of this unmilitary practice, they must not only be stripped of their booty, but they must also be severely punished for the sake of example. If there should not be a sufficient number of waggons to bring off the wounded, the cavalry must dismount, and the wounded be put upon their horses. But if it be found expedient to make use of the horse, you must then convey the disabled in the best manner you can, by taking all the horses, &c. which may have been found in the place you have surprised.
After a _surprise_ has been accomplished, the troops employed upon that service, must, if possible, be marched back to head-quarters, by a different road to the one they took in advancing against the enemy. For it would be extremely impolitic to expose them even though their number were a third greater than that of the enemy, to a second action; under the manifest disadvantages of being fatigued with the march, and the attack they had just made, and of being encumbered with the booty, &c. of the place they had surprised. Their retreat must be effected through the shortest way back. But if there should be the least ground to apprehend, that any attempt might be made by the enemy to cut them off, the first movement must be upon the same road they came, and when the night approaches, the troops must be suddenly countermarched, in order to take a different road, and to avoid any ambush that might be laid by the enemy.
Under these circumstances, every measure must be embraced to deceive the enemy. Some prisoners may be suffered to escape, before the troops have been countermarched, in order to give false information; some mules or horses may be left on the road, and small parties of drummers, &c. be detached forward to keep beating along the first road, as if the whole body were marching that way. Fires may also be lighted by patroles sent forward for the purpose. Among other means, which may be resorted to, to induce the enemy to believe that the original line of march has been continued, that of sending horses and men forward to mislead them by their footsteps is not the worst imagined.
It is more than probable, that if the retreat be made during the night, and through an enclosed or intersected country, the enemy will scarcely run the risk of pursuing, lest ambuscades should be formed to surprise him on his march.
If, notwithstanding all your precautions, the enemy should get intelligence of what has happened, and in consequence thereof he should have time to collect his forces together in order to attack you in your retreat; under these circumstances a position must be taken that is best suited to the kind of troops you have with you, and to their effective number.
If there be a ford, a bridge, or a defile, near to the ground you have taken up, which the enemy must unavoidably pass, the greatest expedition must be made to get beyond the obstacle, so as to have it securely in your rear. Should the obstacle be upon either of your flanks, a detachment must be posted there to keep the enemy in check, while your main body continues on its march. If you cannot conveniently send forward your booty, for fear of weakening your forces, it must be placed in such a manner as not to be in the way when you find it necessary to engage the enemy.
As soon as the enemy approaches, the whole body must be halted, and the proper dispositions be made for battle. The guard that is entrusted with the care of the prisoners, must instantly strip them of their swords, bayonets, and of every offensive weapon, (supposing them to have had permission to wear them) and must order them to sit down, threatening to shoot or cut down the first man that should presume to stir. On this account, the men who compose the guard, should always be ready to do their duty upon the least symptom of irregularity. A small cavalry detachment is usually employed upon this service, as it would not be in the power of the infantry to act with so much promptitude and activity. Before the troops are ranged in order of battle, directions must be given for every soldier to take off his knapsack, or havre-sack; for if the men were allowed to retain this load of baggage and booty, it would not be in their power to act.
History furnishes us with various instances in which fortified places, strong holds, and gates, have been surprised. There are others again in which _surprises_ have been practised with success by means of spies, and of secret intercourse with one or more of the party against whom you are engaged. In 1707 several Miquelets disguised themselves as peasants, entered Balvastro, and remained concealed in the houses of some of the inhabitants, who supplied them with arms to enable them to attack the gate of Monsons, in order to co-operate with a detachment which was advancing towards that quarter for the purpose of surprising the place. But they did not succeed; for two regiments which lay in the town to guard the hospitals and magazines belonging to the army, instantly flew to arms, marched against the detachment, and forced them to retreat. Had the latter been superior in force, it is more than probable, that the stratagem used by the Miquelets, and seconded by the treachery of the inhabitants, would have amply succeeded. In 1580, count Egmont surprised Courtray, by ordering a number of determined good soldiers to get into the town _à la débandade_, and to remain concealed in the houses of the Roman catholics. See _Stratagemes de Guerre_, page 164, &c. &c. For various interesting particulars that regard the article we have been cursorily discussing, we refer our reader to _La Suite de l’essai sur la science de la guerre_, tom. iii. page 259; and tom. iv. page 87. Likewise _Les Œuvres Militaires_, tom. ii. page 69; and to the _Stratagemes de Guerre_, page 173.
_To prevent a_ SURPRISE. Turpin in his Art of War, observes, that it is not sufficient for the security of the quarters, that they are well distributed, that the guards of horse are posted on the outside, and guards of foot on the inside, and that patroles also are added to them; detachments must be sent out in advance of the guards, in order to make discoveries.
A quarter should never be imagined to be totally secure, whilst there are only guards before it: it would not be difficult for the enemy to come close up to them, particularly if the country is enclosed, either during the day or night; and if it is an open country, in the night time only.
Detachments in advance of the quarters are absolutely necessary, even when there are guards; they should be increased according to the number of the troops, and in proportion to the extent of country to be guarded.
These detachments should march separately in the front, and they should occupy as much country as possible upon the flanks; they must march upon the roads leading to the enemy. In the day time, they must scour the hedges, thickets, and woods, the villages, the hollows, and every sort of place that may serve for an ambuscade: in the night time, they must draw near the quarter, and remain at the distance of at least four hundred paces, and even further if the country is open. In the night, detachments must march very leisurely, not advancing, but crossing each other; and beside the word given out in orders, they will have another particular one to recognize each other. Every now and then they must stop and listen, in order to discover, whether they can hear any thing. The officers commanding the detachments should avoid fighting till the last extremity; they should constantly bear in mind, that the sole purpose of their being ordered to advance, is to preserve the quarters from a surprise.
These detachments should not continue out above six or eight hours, and consequently should never dismount. If there are any hussars in the quarters, they should be employed in these detachments preferably to any other troops, as they are better calculated to scour a country than heavy cavalry, or even dragoons; their horses being more in wind and less liable to be fatigued. It is, besides, the sort of war which is natural to hussars.
As soon as these detachments are returned, others should be sent out for the same purpose, as the quarters should never be uncovered in front. If these detachments hear any thing in the night, the commanding officer should send to discover what it is, and must afterwards convince himself of the truth of it: if it should be occasioned by troops, he will directly send an hussar to the commanding officer of one of the guards, if there are any in the front of the quarters; but if not, then to the commandant of the first quarter, who will apprise the general. He must conceal himself in some place, from whence, without being discovered, he will with greater ease be able to form a judgment of what is marching towards him; and when he shall be more confirmed that they are enemies, he will send a second hussar to give notice to the first post, who will inform the general; and will always continue to observe their motions by marching either on their flank, or before them. See _Am. Mil. Lib._
_To_ SURRENDER, (_Rendre_, _Fr._) To give up a town, post, or other fortification, agreeably to articles, &c.
_To_ SURRENDER, (_Se rendre_, _Fr._) To lay down your arms, and give yourself up as a prisoner of war.
SURRENDER, (_Reddition_, _Fr._) The act of giving up. As the surrender of a town or garrison.
SURRENDER of general Burgoyne, 17th October, 1777, at Saratoga.
SURRENDER of general Cornwallis 19th October, 1779, at Yorktown.
_To_ SURROUND. In fortification, to invest. In tactics, to outflank and cut off the means of retreating.
SURROUNDED. Inclosed; invested. A town is said to be surrounded when its principal outlets are blocked up; and an army, when its flanks are turned, and its retreat cut off.
SURSOLID. The fourth multiplication or power of any number whatever taken as the root.
SURVEILLANCE, _Fr._ Inspection; superintendance; the act of watching. The substantive is new among the French, and comes from _Surveiller_, to watch.
SURVEY. A survey is an examination of any place or stores, &c. to ascertain their fitness for the purposes of war, &c.
SURVEYING. In military mathematics, the art or act of measuring lands; that is, of taking the dimensions of any tract of ground, laying down the same in a map or drawing, and finding the content or area thereof.
_Surveying_, called also _geodæsia_, is a very ancient art; it is even held to have been the first or primitive part of geometry, and that which gave occasion to, and laid the foundation of all the rest.
Surveying consists of three parts: the first is the taking of the necessary measures, and making the most necessary observations, on the ground itself: the second is, the laying down of these measures and observations on paper: and the third, the finding the area or quantity of ground there laid down. The first is what we properly call _surveying_; the second we call _plotting_, _protracting_, or _mapping_; and the third _casting up_.
The first, again, consists of two parts, viz. the making of observations for the angles, and the taking of measures for the distances. The former of these is performed by someone or other of the following instruments, viz. the theodolite, circumferenter, semi-circle, plain table, or compass. The latter is performed by means either of the chain, or perambulator.
The second branch of surveying is performed by means of the protractor, and plotting scale. The third, by reducing the several divisions, inclosures, &c. into triangles, squares, trapeziums, parallelograms, &c. but especially triangles; and finding the areas or contents or these several figures. See _American Mil. Lib._
SURVEYOR _of the Ordnance_. See ORDNANCE.
SUSBANDE, _Fr._ The iron band or plate which covers the trunnion belonging to a piece of ordnance, or to a mortar, when either is fixed upon its carriage.
SUSPECT, _Fr._ A term adopted by the modern French to signify any person suspected of being an enemy, or indifferent to the cause of the revolution. Hence--_Classe des suspects_, _Fr._ The list of the suspected. _Reputé suspect_, _Fr._ Looked upon as a suspected person.
_To_ SUSPEND, (_Suspendre_, _Fr._) In a military sense to delay, to protract. Hence to suspend hostilities. It is likewise used to express the act of depriving an officer of rank and pay, in consequence of some offence. This sometimes happens by the sentence of a general court-martial, or by the summary order of the president through the secretary at war. In both cases it is usual for the commanding officer of the regiment to report him to the general of the district, by whom he is again reported to the commander in chief through the adjutant-general. He is then directed, by letter to the commanding officer of the regiment, to be suspended agreeably to the nature of the transgression. In a trifling case, he is only suspended from pay, and is respited accordingly upon the next muster roll for the government of the regimental agent. But when the offence is aggravated by palpable neglect, or obstinacy in not sending a satisfactory reason for his absence, (which can only be done by vouchers from the medical board, &c.) he is suspended from both rank and pay. So that to be suspended is either partially or generally to be deprived of the advantages of a military appointment.
_To_ SUSPEND _hostilities_. To cease attacking one another.
SUSPENSION _of Arms_. A short truce that contending parties agree on, in order to bury their dead without danger or molestation; to wait for succours; or to receive instructions from a superior authority.
SUSPENSION, as a military punishment, was probably intended to operate as pecuniary fining does in that of the common law; but (to use Mr. Sullivan’s words, in his treatise on martial law) it can neither be considered as deprivation or degradation. It does not divest an officer of his military character, though it puts him under a temporary incapacity to exercise the duties of his station: he still possesses his rank, though he does not reap any immediate advantage from it: It, in fact, may be looked upon and considered as borrowed from the ecclesiastical system of jurisdiction, which admitted suspension as a minor excommunication.
One stubborn difficulty, however, seems to present itself from suspension; and that is the article of pay and allowance. For if an officer shall have been suspended from the exercise of the authority annexed to his rank, and to have the pay of his allowance also suspended, he certainly seems warranted to plead such suspension in bar to the proceedings of a court-martial; there being always an implied contract between a soldier and his employer, that in consideration of certain pay and advantages granted by the one, the other shall submit to military discipline; and the obligation being mutual, when one fails in the performance of his part, he frees the other from the observance of his; therefore, when the pay and other advantages are suspended by the employer, the subjection to military discipline would _seem_ also suspended. But this difficulty is easily removed, from the circumstances of the officer so suspended, still holding his commission; and from his submitting himself to the punishment which hath been inflicted on his transgression. The latitude of this principle hath even been seen to go farther, and under the sanction of such authority, that (since his majesty hath been graciously pleased to direct, in cases of doubt, members of a court-martial shall be guided by their consciences, the best of their understandings, and the custom of war in the like cases) it may be said to establish a precedent, which may with safety be appealed to. We here allude to the trial of lord George Sackville, who, at the time he was put upon the judgment of a general court-martial, had (so dear are the honor and reputation of a soldier) _neither military employ nor commission_ under his majesty; and yet he was deemed entitled to an awful and solemn investigation of his conduct; application, indeed, having been previously made in his name, and he having declared himself willing to abide by the decision of the court. In a word, then, it may, without risking too much, be asserted, that an officer under suspension may be considered as _strictly amenable_ to martial law for any trespass or transgression he shall commit. The same writer observes, in a preceding page, that suspension is a specific punishment, for a specific crime; but it is a punishment which does not free a man from his military obligations. On the contrary, he still is considered as in the service; he holds his commission, and at the expiration of the term of suspension, becomes a perfect man again. If therefore during the continuance of this chastisement, he should attempt to go over to the enemy, to desert, or hold treasonable correspondence, he certainly is, in such cases, to be dealt with according to martial law. Pages 86, 87, and 88, Thoughts on Martial Law.