CHAPTER XIV

THE RIVALRY OF POMPEY AND CAESAR: CAESAR’S DICTATORSHIP; 59–44 B. C.

I. CAESAR CONSUL: 59 B. C.

*A rule of force.* At the beginning of his consulship Caesar tried to induce the Senate to approve his measures, but, when they failed to do so, he carried them directly to the Assembly. And when Bibulus and Cato essayed to obstruct legislation in the Comitia he crushed all opposition by the aid of Pompey’s veterans. Bibulus, protesting against the illegality of Caesar’s proceedings, shut himself up in his own house. Thus Caesar carried two land laws for the benefit of the soldiers of Pompey, induced the Senate to ratify the latter’s eastern settlement, and secured for the equestrians, whose cause was championed by Crassus, the remission of one third of the contract price for the revenues of Asia.

*The Vatinian Law.* A lucky chance enabled Caesar to secure his own future by an extended military command. The Senate had taken pains to render him harmless by assigning as the consular provinces for 58 the care of forests and country roads in Italy, but in February, 59, the death of Metellus Celer, proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul, left vacant a post of considerable importance in view of the imminent danger of war breaking out in Transalpine Gaul. Accordingly a law proposed by the tribune Vatinius transferred to Caesar the command of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with a garrison of three legions, for a term of five years beginning 1 March, 59. To this the Senate, at the suggestion of Pompey, added Transalpine Gaul and another legion.

*The banishment of Cicero, 58 B. C.* Caesar’s consulship had been an open defiance of constitutional precedent, and had revealed the fact that the triumvirate was stronger than the established organs of government, and that the Roman Empire was really controlled by three men. Well might Cato say that the coalition was the beginning of the end of the Republic. Within the triumvirate itself Pompey was the dominant figure owing to his military renown and the influence of his veterans. Caesar appeared as his agent, yet displayed far greater political insight and succeeded in creating for himself a position which would enable him to play a more independent rôle in the future. The coalition did not break up at the end of Caesar’s consulship; its members determined to retain their control of the state policy, and to this end secured for 58 B. C. the election of two consuls in whom they had confidence. To cement the alliance Pompey married Caesar’s daughter Julia, and Caesar married the daughter of Piso, one of the consuls-elect. To secure themselves from attack they felt it necessary to remove from the city their two ablest opponents, Cato and Cicero. The latter had refused all proposals to join their side, and had sharply criticized them on several public occasions. His banishment was secured through the agency of the tribune Clodius, whose transfer from patrician to plebeian status Caesar had facilitated. Clodius was a man of ill repute who hated Cicero because the latter had testified against him when he was on trial for sacrilege. Early in 58 B. C. Clodius carried a bill which outlawed any person who had put to death Roman citizens without regular judicial proceedings. This law was aimed at Cicero for his share in the execution of the Catalinarian conspirators. Finding that he could not rely upon the support of his friends, Cicero went into exile without awaiting trial. He was formally banished, his property was confiscated, and he himself sought refuge in Thessalonica, where the governor of Macedonia offered him protection. Cato was entrusted with a special mission to accomplish the incorporation of Cyprus, then ruled by one of the Egyptian Ptolemies, into the Roman Empire, and his Stoic conception of duty prevented him from refusing the appointment. Caesar remained with his army in the vicinity of Rome until after Cicero’s banishment and then set out for his province.

II. CAESAR’S CONQUEST OF GAUL: 58–51 B. C.

*The defeat of the Helvetii and Ariovistus: 58 B. C.* In 58 B. C., when Caesar entered upon his Gallic command, the Roman province in Transalpine Gaul (_Gallia __Narbonensis_) embraced the coast districts from the Alps to the borders of Spain and the land between the Alps and the Rhone as far north as Lake Geneva. The country which stretched from the Pyrenees to the Rhine, and from the Rhone to the ocean was called _Gallia comata_ or “long-haired Gaul,” and was occupied by a large number of peoples of varying importance. These were usually regarded as falling into three groups, (1) those of Aquitania, between the Pyrenees and the Loire, where there was a large Iberian element, (2) those called Celts, in a narrow sense of the word, stretching from the Loire to the Seine and the Marne, and (3) the Belgian Gauls, dwelling between these rivers and the Rhine. Among the latter were peoples of Germanic origin. Although conscious of a general unity of language, race and customs, the Gauls had not developed a national state, owing to the mutual jealousy of the individual peoples, and each tribe was perpetually divided into rival factions supporting different chiefs. Rome had sought to protect the province of Narbonensis by establishing friendly relations with some of these Gallic peoples and had long before (c. 121 B. C.) made an alliance with the Aedui. About 70 B. C. conditions in _Gallia comata_ had been disturbed by an invasion of Germanic Suevi, from across the Rhine, under their King Ariovistus. He united with the rivals of the Aedui, the Sequani, and after a number of years reduced the former to submission. In 59 B. C. he reached an agreement with Rome, became a “friend” of the Roman people, and, while abstaining from further aggression, remained firmly established in what is now Alsace. For some time the Roman province had been alarmed by the threat of a migration of the Helvetii, then settled in western Switzerland, and in March, 58 B. C., this people started in search of new abodes. Caesar reached Gaul in time to prevent their crossing the upper Rhone, and followed them as they turned westward into the lands of the Sequani and Aedui. Defeated in two battles, they were forced to return to their home and to become allies of Rome. The movement of the Helvetii had given Caesar the opportunity for intervention in _Gallia comata_, and a pretext for extending his influence there was found in the hostility of some of the Gauls to Ariovistus, and the knowledge that a band of Suevi was expected soon to cross the Rhine to reinforce the latter. To frustrate a German occupation of Gaul now became Caesar’s object. Ariovistus rejected the demands of Caesar, who thereupon attacked him, defeated him in the vicinity of Strassburg and drove him across the Rhine. Caesar was now the dominant power in Gaul, and many of the leading tribes entered into alliance with Rome. Of the Belgae, however, only the Remi came over to the side of Rome.

*The conquest of the Belgae, Veneti, and Aquitanians, 57–56 B. C.* In the next year, 57 B. C., Caesar marched against the united forces of the Belgae, defeated them, and subdued many tribes, chief of whom were the Nervii. At the same time his legates received the submission of the peoples of Normandy and Brittany. In the course of the following winter some of these, led by the Veneti, broke off their alliance and attacked Caesar’s garrisons. Thereupon he set to work to build a fleet, with which in the course of the next summer the fleet of the Veneti was destroyed and their strongholds on the coast taken (56 B. C.). The same year witnessed the submission of the Aquitanians, which brought practically the whole of Gaul under Roman sway.

*Events in Rome, 58–55 B. C.* Meanwhile important changes had taken place in the situation at Rome. Pompey had broken with Clodius, and supported the tribune Titus Annius Milo who pressed for Cicero’s recall. A law of the Assembly withdrew his sentence of outlawry, his property was restored, and the orator returned in September, 57 B. C., to enjoy a warm reception both in the municipal towns and at the capital. For the moment Pompey and the Optimates were on friendly terms, and the former made use of a grain famine in the city to secure for himself an appointment as curator of the grain supply (_curator annonae_) for a period of five years. This appointment carried with it proconsular _imperium_ within and without Italy, and the control of the ports, markets and traffic in grain within the Roman dominions. It was really an extraordinary military command. Pompey relieved the situation but could do nothing to allay the disorders in Rome, where Clodius and Milo with their armed gangs set law and order at defiance. The news of Caesar’s victories and the influence which he was acquiring in the city by a judicious distribution of the spoils of war fired the ambitions of Pompey and Crassus who were no longer on good terms with one another. Furthermore, the return of Cato in 56 B. C. had again given the Optimates an energetic leader. Consequently Caesar felt it necessary for the coalition to reach a new agreement. Accordingly while spending the winter in Cisalpine Gaul he arranged a conference at Luca in April, 56, where the three settled their differences and laid plans for the future. They agreed that Pompey and Crassus should be consuls in 55 B. C., that the former should be given the Spanish provinces and Libya for five years, that Crassus should have Syria for an equal period, and that Caesar’s command in Gaul should be prolonged for another five year term to run from 1 March, 54.(12)

These arrangements were duly carried out. Since it was too late for Pompey and Crassus to be candidates at the regular elections in 56 B. C., they forcibly prevented any elections being held that year. The following January, after forcing the other candidates to withdraw, they secured their election. Thereupon a law of the tribune Gaius Trebonius made effective the assignment of provinces agreed upon at Luca. Once more it was made plain that the coalition actually ruled the empire. Cicero, who was indebted to Pompey for his recall, was forced to support the triumvirate, and the Optimates found their boldest leader in Cato, who had returned to Rome early in 56 B. C.

*Caesar’s crossing of the Rhine and invasion of Britain: 55–54 B. C.* During the winter following the subjugation of the Veneti, two Germanic tribes, the Usipetes and the Tencteri, crossed the lower Rhine into Gaul. In the next summer, 55 B. C., Caesar attacked and annihilated their forces, only a few escaping across the river. As a warning against future invasion, Caesar bridged the Rhine and made a demonstration upon the right bank, destroying his bridge when he withdrew. Towards the close of the summer he crossed the Straits of Dover to Britain, to punish the Britons for aiding his enemies in Gaul. But owing to the lateness of the season and the smallness of his force he returned to Gaul after a brief reconnaissance.

In the following year, after gathering a larger fleet, he again landed on the island with a force of almost 30,000 men. This time he forced his way across the Thames and received the submission of Cassivellaunus, the chief who led the British tribes against the invaders. After taking hostages, and receiving promises of tribute, Caesar returned to Gaul. Britain was in no sense subdued, but the island had felt the power of Rome, and, besides enlarging the geographical knowledge of the time, Caesar had brought back numbers of captives. In Rome the exploit produced great excitement and enthusiasm.

*Revolts in Gaul: 54–53 B. C.* Although the Gauls had submitted to Caesar, they were not yet reconciled to Roman rule, which put an end to their inter-tribal wars and to the feuds among the nobility. Consequently, many of the tribes were restive and not inclined to surrender all hopes of freedom without another struggle. In the course of the winter 54–53 B. C. the Nervii, Treveri and Eburones in Belgian Gaul attacked the Roman detachments stationed in their territories. One of these was cut to pieces but the rest held their ground until relieved by Caesar, who stamped out the rebellion.

*Vercingetorix, 52 B. C.* A more serious movement started in 52 B. C. among the peoples of central Gaul who found a national leader in Vercingetorix, a young noble of the Arverni. The revolt took Caesar by surprise when he was in Cisalpine Gaul and his troops still scattered in winter quarters. He recrossed the Alps with all haste, secured the Narbonese province and succeeded in uniting his forces. These he strengthened with German cavalry from across the Rhine. However, a temporary check in an attack upon the position of Vercingetorix at Gergovia caused the Aedui to desert the Roman cause, and the revolt spread to practically the whole of Gaul. Caesar was on the point of retiring to the province, but after repulsing an attack made upon him he was able to pen up Vercingetorix in the fortress of Alesia. A great effort made by the Gauls to relieve the siege failed to break Caesar’s lines, and the defenders were starved into submission. The crisis was over, although another year was required before the revolting tribes were all reduced to submission and the Roman authority re-established (51 B. C.). Caesar used all possible mildness in his treatment of the conquered and the Gauls were not only pacified but won over. In the days to come they were among his most loyal supporters. The conquest of Gaul was an event of supreme importance for the future history of the Roman empire, and for the development of European civilization as well. For the time _Gallia comata_ was not formed into a province. Its peoples were made allies of Rome, under the supervision of the governor of Narbonese Gaul, under obligation to furnish troops and for the most part liable to a fixed tribute. Caesar’s campaign in Gaul had given him the opportunity to develop his unusual military talents and to create a veteran army devoted to himself. His power had become so great that both Pompey and the Optimates desired his destruction and he was in a position to refuse to be eliminated without a struggle. The plots laid in Rome to deprive him of his power had made him hasten to quell the revolt of the Gauls with all speed. When this was accomplished he was free to turn his attention to Roman affairs.

*Crassus in Syria, 55–53 B. C.* After the assignment of the provinces by the Trebonian Law in 55 B. C., Crassus set out for Syria intending to win military power and prestige by a war against the Parthians, an Asiatic people who, once the subjects of the Persians and Seleucids, had established a kingdom which included the provinces of the Seleucid empire as far west as the Euphrates. Crassus had no real excuse for opening hostilities, but the Parthians were a potentially dangerous neighbor and a campaign against them gave promise of profit and glory. Accordingly, in 54 B. C., Crassus made a short incursion into Mesopotamia and then withdrew to Syria. The next year he again crossed the Euphrates, intending to penetrate deeply into the enemy’s country. But he had underestimated the strength of the Parthians and the difficulties of desert warfare. In the Mesopotamian desert near Carrhae his troops were surrounded and cut to pieces by the Parthian horsemen; Crassus himself was enticed into a conference and treacherously slain, and only a small remnant of his force escaped (53 B. C.). But the Parthians were slow in following up their advantage and Crassus’ quaestor, Cassius Longinus, was able to hold Syria. Still Roman prestige in the East had received a severe blow and for the next three centuries the Romans found the Parthians dangerous neighbors. The death of Crassus tended to hasten a crisis in Rome for it brought into sharp conflict the incompatible ambitions of Pompey and Caesar, whose estrangement had already begun with the death of Pompey’s wife Julia in 54 B. C.

*Affairs in Rome, 54–49 B. C.* At the end of his consulship Pompey left Rome but remained in Italy, on the pretext of his curatorship of the grain supply, and governed his province through his legates. In Rome disorder reigned; no consuls were elected in 54 B. C. nor before July of the following year; the partizans of Clodius and Milo kept everything in confusion. Pompey could have restored order but preferred to create a situation which would force the Senate to grant him new powers, so he backed Clodius, while Milo championed the Optimates. Owing to broils between the supporters of the candidates, no consuls or praetors could be elected for 52 B. C. In January of that year Clodius was slain by Milo’s body-guard on the Appian Way, and the ensuing outburst of mob violence in the city forced the Senate to appeal to Pompey. He was made sole consul, until he should choose a colleague, and was entrusted with the task of restoring order. His troops brought quiet into the city; Milo was tried on a charge of public violence, convicted, and banished. Pompey had attained the height of his official career; he was sole consul, at the same time he had a province embracing the Spains, Libya, and the sphere assigned to him with the grain curatorship, he governed his provinces through _legati_, and his armies were maintained by the public treasury. In reality he was the chief power in the state, for without him the Senate was helpless, and he was justly regarded by contemporaries as the First Citizen or Princeps. In many ways his position foreshadowed the Principate of Augustus. However, Pompey did not wish to overthrow the republican régime; his ambition was to be regarded as the indispensable and permanent mainstay of the government and to enjoy corresponding power and honor. In such a scheme there was no room for a rival, and therefore he determined upon Caesar’s overthrow. This decision put him on the side of the extreme Optimates, who were alarmed by Caesar’s wealth, influence and fame and feared him as a dangerous radical. They had no hesitation in choosing between Pompey and Caesar.

*Pompey’s attack upon Caesar: 52 B. C.* The latter’s immediate aim was to secure the consulship for 48 B. C. and to retain his proconsular command until the end of December, 49. He knew that he had reached a position where his destruction was the desire of many, and that the moment he surrendered his _imperium_ he would be open to prosecution by those seeking to procure his ruin. But he had no intention of placing himself in the power of his enemies. The consulship would not only save him from prosecution but would enable him to confirm his arrangements in Gaul, reward his army, and secure his own future by another proconsular appointment. However, to secure his election, he had to be exempted from presenting himself in person for his candidature in 49, and this permission was accorded him by a tribunician law early in 52 B. C. So far his position was strictly legal, but Pompey, whose own consulship was unconstitutional, now broke openly with Caesar by passing legislation which would undermine the latter’s position. One of Pompey’s laws prohibited candidacies for office _in absentia_, and when Caesar’s friends protested, he added to the text of the law after it had passed a clause exempting Caesar from its operation; a procedure of more than dubious legality. A second law provided that in future provincial governorships should not be filled by the city magistrates just completing their term of office but by those whose terms had expired five years previously. This latter law may have been intended to check the mad rivalry for provincial appointments, but its immediate significance lay in the fact that it permitted a successor to be appointed to take over Caesar’s provinces on 1 March, 49 B. C. He would thus have to stand as a private citizen for the consulship and would no longer enjoy immunity from legal attack. At the same time Pompey had his own command in Spain extended for another five years.

*Negotiations between Caesar, Pompey and the Senate, 51–50 B. C.* The question of appointing a successor to Caesar’s provinces filled the next two years and was the immediate cause of civil war. Caesar claimed that his position should not be affected by the Pompeian law, and pressed for permission to hold his command until the close of 49 B. C. The extreme conservatives sought to supersede him on March first of that year, but Caesar’s friends and agents thwarted their efforts. Pompey was not willing to have Caesar’s command to run beyond 13 November, 49. Cicero, who had distinguished himself by his uprightness as governor of Cilicia in 51, strove to effect a compromise, but in vain. Caesar offered to give up Transalpine Gaul and part of his army, if allowed to retain the Cisalpine province but the overture was rejected. Finally, in December, 50 B. C., he formally promised to resign his provinces and disband his troops, if Pompey would do the same, but the Senate insisted upon his absolute surrender. On 7 January, 49 B. C., the Senate passed the “last decree” calling upon the magistrates and proconsuls (i. e. Pompey) to protect the state, and declaring Caesar a public enemy. Caesar’s friends left the city and fled to meet him in Cisalpine Gaul, where he and his army were in readiness for this emergency.

III. THE CIVIL WAR BETWEEN CAESAR AND THE SENATE: 49–46 B. C.

*Caesar’s conquest of Italy and Spain, 49 B. C.* The senatorial conservatives had forced the issue and for Caesar there remained the alternative of victory or destruction. He possessed the advantages of a loyal army ready for immediate action and the undisputed control over his own troops. On the other hand, his opponents had no veteran troops in Italy, and although Pompey acted as commander-in-chief of the senatorial forces, he was greatly hampered by having at times to defer to the judgment of the consuls and senators who were in his camp. It was obviously to Caesar’s advantage to take the offensive and to force a decision before his enemies could concentrate against him the resources of the provinces. Hence he determined to act without delay, and, upon receiving news of the Senate’s action on 7 January, he crossed the Rubicon, which divided Cisalpine Gaul and Italy, with a small force, ordering the legions beyond the Alps to join him with all speed. The Italian municipalities opened their gates at his approach and the newly raised levies went over to his side. Everywhere his mildness to his opponents won him new adherents. Pompey decided to abandon Italy and withdraw to the East, intending later to concentrate upon the peninsula from all sides; a plan made feasible by his control of the sea. Caesar divined his intention and tried to cut off his retreat at Brundisium, but could not prevent his embarkation. With his army and the majority of the Senate Pompey crossed to Epirus. Owing to his lack of a fleet Caesar could not follow and returned to Rome. There some of the magistrates were still functioning, in conjunction with a remnant of the Senate. Being in dire need of money, he wished to obtain funds from the treasury, and when this was opposed by a tribune, Caesar ignored the latter’s veto and forcibly seized the reserve treasure which the Pompeians had left behind in their hasty flight. In the meantime Caesar’s lieutenants had seized Sardinia and Sicily, and crossed over into Africa. He himself determined to attack the well organized Pompeian forces in Spain and destroy them before Pompey was ready for an offensive from the East. On his way to Spain, Caesar began the siege of Massalia which closed its gates to him. Leaving the city under blockade he hastened to Spain, where after an initial defeat he forced the surrender of the Pompeian armies. Some of the prisoners joined his forces; the rest were dismissed to their homes. Caesar hastened back to Massalia. The city capitulated at his arrival, and was punished by requisitions, the loss of its territory and the temporary deprivation of its autonomy. From here Caesar pressed on to Rome, where he had been appointed dictator by virtue of a special law. After holding the elections in which he and an approved colleague were returned as consuls for 48, he resigned his dictatorship and set out for Brundisium. There he had assembled his army and transports for the passage to Epirus.

*Pharsalus, 48 B. C.* During Caesar’s Spanish campaign Pompey had gathered a large force in Macedonia, nine Roman legions reinforced by contingents from the Roman allies. His fleet, recruited largely from the maritime cities in the East, commanded the Adriatic. Nevertheless, at the opening of winter (Nov. 49 B. C.) Caesar effected a landing on the coast of Epirus with part of his army and seized Apollonia. However, Pompey arrived from Macedonia in time to save Dyrrhachium. Throughout the winter the two armies remained inactive, but Pompey’s fleet prevented Caesar from receiving reinforcements until the spring of 48 B. C., when Marcus Antonius effected a crossing with another detachment. As Caesar’s troops began to suffer from shortage of supplies he was forced to take the offensive and tried to blockade Pompey’s larger force in Dyrrhachium. However, the attempt failed, his lines of investment were broken, and he withdrew to Thessaly. Thither he was followed by Pompey, who suffered himself to be influenced by the overconfident senators to risk a battle. Near the town of Old Pharsalus he attacked Caesar but was defeated and his army dispersed. He himself sought refuge in Egypt and there he was put to death by order of the king whose father he had protected in the days of his power. Pompey’s great weakness was that his resolution did not match his ambition. His ambition led him to seek a position incompatible with the constitution; but his lack of resolution did not permit him to overthrow the constitution. The Optimates had sided with him only because they held him less dangerous than Caesar and had he been victorious they would have sought to compass his downfall.

*Caesar in the East, 48–47 B. C.* After Pharsalus Caesar had set out in pursuit of Pompey, but arrived in Egypt after the murder of his foe. His ever pressing need of money probably induced Caesar to intervene as arbiter in the name of Rome in the dynastic struggle then raging in Egypt between the twenty-year-old Cleopatra and her thirteen-year-old brother, Ptolemy XIV Dionysus, who was also, following the Egyptian custom, her husband. Caesar got the young king in his power and brought back Cleopatra, whom the people of Alexandria had driven out. Angered thereat, and resenting his exactions, the Alexandrians rose in arms and from October, 48, to March, 47 B. C., besieged Caesar in the royal quarter of the city. Having but few troops with him Caesar was in dire straits and was only able to maintain himself through his control of the sea which enabled him to eventually receive reinforcements. His relief was effected by a force raised by Mithradates of Pergamon who invaded Egypt from Syria. In co-operation with him Caesar defeated the Egyptians in battle; Ptolemy Dionysus perished in flight; and Alexandria submitted. Cleopatra was married to a still younger brother and put in possession of the kingdom of Egypt. Caesar had succumbed to the charms of the Egyptian queen and tarried in her company for the rest of the winter. He was called away to face a new danger in Pharnaces, son of Mithradates Eupator, who had taken advantage of the civil war to recover Pontus and overrun Lesser Armenia, Cappadocia and Bithynia. Hastening through Syria Caesar entered Pontus and defeated Pharnaces at Zela. After settling affairs in Asia Minor he proceeded with all speed to the West, where his presence was urgently needed.

*Thapsus, 46 B. C.* Both the fleet and the army of Pompey had dispersed after Pharsalus, but Caesar’s delay in the East had given the republicans an opportunity to reassemble their forces. They gathered in Africa where Caesar’s lieutenant Curio, who had invaded the province in 49 B. C., had been defeated and killed by the Pompeians through the aid of King Juba of Numidia. From Africa they were now preparing to attack Italy. In Rome, Caesar had been appointed dictator for 47 B. C. with Antony as his master of the horse. Here disorder reigned as a result of the distress arising from the financial stringency brought on by the war. Antony, who was in Rome, had proved unable to deal with the situation. Caesar reached Italy in September, 47 B. C., and soon restored order in the city. He was then called upon to face a serious mutiny of his troops who demanded the fulfillment of his promises of money and land and their release from service. By boldness and presence of mind Caesar won them back to their allegiance and set out for Africa in December, 47 B. C. He landed with only a portion of his troops and at first was defeated by the republicans under Scipio and Juba. But he was supported by King Bogud of Mauretania and a Catalinarian soldier of fortune, Publius Sittius, and after receiving reinforcements from Italy he besieged the seaport Thapsus. Scipio came to the rescue but was completely defeated in a bloody battle near the town. The whole of the province fell into Caesar’s hands. Cato, who was in command of Utica, did not force the citizens to resist but committed suicide; the other republican leaders, including Juba, either followed his example, or were taken and executed by the Caesarians. From Africa Caesar returned to Rome where he celebrated a costly triumph over Gaul, Egypt, Pharnaces and Juba. He was now undisputed master of the state and proceeded according to his own judgment to settle the problem of governing the Roman world.

IV. THE DICTATORSHIP OF JULIUS CAESAR: 46–44 B. C.

*The problem of imperial government.* From 28 July, 46, to 15 March, 44 B. C., Caesar ruled the Roman Empire with despotic power, his position unchallenged except for a revolt of the Pompeian party in Spain which required his attention from the autumn of 46 to the spring of 45 B. C. His victory over Pompey and the republicans had placed upon him the obligation to provide the empire with a stable form of government and this responsibility he accepted. Sulla, when faced with the same problem, had been content to place the Senate once more at the head of the state, but from his own experience Caesar knew how futile this policy had been. Nor could the ideal of Pompey commend itself as a means of ending civil war and rebellion. Caesar was prepared to deal much more radically with the old régime, but death overtook him before he had completed his reorganization. What was the goal of his policy will best be understood from a consideration of his official position during the year and a half which followed the battle of Thapsus.

*Caesar’s offices, powers and honors.* Caesar’s autocratic position rested in the last instance upon the support of his veterans, of the associates who owed their advancement to him, and of such small forces as he kept under arms, but his position was legalized by the accumulation in his hands of various offices, special powers and unusual honors. Foremost among his offices came the dictatorship. We have seen that he had held this already for a short time in 49 and again in 47. In 46 B. C. he was appointed dictator for ten years, and in the following year for life. At the same time he was consul, an office which he held continuously from 48 B. C., in 45 as sole consul, but usually with a colleague. In addition to these offices he enjoyed the tribunician authority (_tribunicia potestas_), that is, the power of the tribunes without the name. This included the right to sit with the tribunes and the right of intercession, granted him as early as 48 B. C., and also personal inviolability (_sacrosanctitas_) which he received in 45. He had been Chief Pontiff since 63, and in 48 B. C. was admitted to all the patrician priestly corporations. And in 46 B. C. he was given the powers of the censorship under the title of “prefect of morals” (_praefectus morum_), at first for three years and later for life. In addition to these official positions of more or less established scope, Caesar received other powers not dependent upon any office. He was granted the right to appoint to both Roman and provincial magistracies, until in 44 B. C. he had the authority to nominate half the officials annually; and in reality appointed all. In 48 B. C. he received the power of making war and peace without consulting the Senate, in 46 the right of expressing his opinion first in the Senate (_ius primae sententiae_), and in 45 the sole right to command troops and to control the public moneys. In the next year ratification was given in advance to all his future arrangements, and magistrates entering upon office were required to swear to uphold his acts. The concentration of these powers in his person placed Caesar above the law, and reduced the holders of public offices to the position of his servants. Honors to match his extraordinary powers were heaped upon Caesar, partly by his own desire, partly by the servility and fulsome flattery of the Senate. He was granted a seat with the consuls in the Senate, if he should not be consul himself; he received the title of parent or father of his country (_parens_ or _pater patriae_); his statue was placed among those of the kings of Rome, his image in the temple of Quirinus; the month Quinctilis, in which he was born, was renamed Julius (July) in his honor; a new college of priests, the Julian Luperci, was created; a temple was erected to himself and the Goddess Clementia, and a priest (flamen) appointed for his worship there; and he was authorized to build a house on the Palatine with a pediment like a temple. Most of these honors he received after his victory over the Pompeians in Spain in 45 B. C. However, the title _imperator_ (Emperor), which was regularly the prerogative of a general who was entitled to a triumph and was surrendered along with his military _imperium_, was employed by Caesar continuously from 49 until after the battle of Thapsus in 46, when he celebrated his triumph over the Gauls and his other non-Roman enemies. He assumed it again after Munda in the following year.

*Caesar’s aim—monarchy.* Taking into account the powers which Caesar wielded and his lifelong tenure of certain offices there can be no doubt that he not only had established monarchical government in Rome but also aimed to make his monarchy permanent. And this gives the explanation why he accepted honors which were more suited to a god than to a man, for since the time of Alexander the Great deification had been accepted in the Greek East as the legal and moral basis for the exercise of absolute power, and as distinguishing a legitimate autocracy from a tyranny. To a polytheistic age, familiar with the idea of the deification of “heroes” after death and permeated in its educated circles with the teaching of Euhemerus that the gods were but men who in their sojourn upon earth had been benefactors of the human race, the deification of a monarch in no way offended religious susceptibilities. The Romans were acquainted with monarchies of this type in Syria and in Egypt. Indeed this was the only type of monarchy familiar to the Romans of the first century B. C., if we exclude the Parthian and other despotisms, and it was bound to influence any form of monarchical government set up in Rome. The plebs actually hailed Caesar as “_rex_,” and at the feast of the Lupercalia in February, 44 B. C., Antony publicly offered him a crown. It is possible that he would have assumed the title if popular opinion had supported this step. And there may well have been some truth in the rumor that he contemplated marriage with Cleopatra, who came to Rome in 46 B. C., for a queen would be a fit mate for a monarch and such a step would have effected the peaceful incorporation of Egypt into the Roman Empire.

*Caesar’s reforms.* Upon returning to Rome after the battle of Thapsus Caesar began a series of reforms which affected practically every side of Roman life. One of the most useful was the reform of the Roman calendar. Hitherto the Romans had employed a lunar year of three hundred and fifty-five days (the calendar year beginning on March first and the civil year, since 153 B. C., on January first) which was approximately corrected to the solar year by the addition of an intercalary month of twenty-two days in the second, and one of twenty-three days in the fourth year, of cycles of four years. For personal or political motives the pontiffs had trifled with the intercalation of these months until in 46 B. C. the Roman year was completely out of touch with the solar year. With the assistance of the Greek astronomer Sosigenes, Caesar introduced the Egyptian solar year of approximately 365¼ days, in such a way that three years of 365 days were followed by one of 366 days in which an extra day was added to February after the twenty-fourth of the month. The new Julian calendar went into effect on 1 January, 45 B. C. Another abuse was partially rectified by the reduction of the number who were entitled to receive cheap grain in Rome from about 320,000 to 150,000. The Roman plebeian colleges and guilds, which had become political clubs and had contributed to the recent disorders in the city, were dissolved with the exception of the ancient association of craftsmen. The _tribuni aerarii_ were removed from the jury courts and the penalties for criminal offences increased. Plans were laid for a codification of the Roman law but this was not carried into effect. Municipal administration in Rome and the Italian towns was regulated by the Julian Municipal Law, which brought uniformity into the municipal organization of Italy. The Roman magistracies were increased in number; the quaestorships from twenty to forty, and the eight praetorships finally to sixteen. At the same time the priesthoods were likewise enlarged. Administrative needs and the wish to reward a greater number of followers probably influenced these changes. A number of new patrician families were created to take the places of those which had died out. The membership of the Senate was increased to 900, and many new men, including ex-soldiers of Caesar and enfranchised Gauls, were enrolled in it. Caesar provided for his veterans by settling them in Italian municipalities and in colonies in the provinces. The deserted sites of Carthage and Corinth were repeopled with Roman colonists and once more became flourishing cities. In this way Caesar promoted the romanization of the provinces, a policy which he had begun with his conferment of the franchise upon the Transpadane Gauls in 49, and continued in the case of many Spanish communities. This romanization of the provinces and the admission of provincials to the Senate points to an imperial policy which would end the exploitation of the provinces in the interests of a governing caste and a city mob.

*Munda, 45 B. C.* Caesar proved himself a magnanimous conqueror. No Sullan proscriptions disgraced his victory. After Pharsalus he permitted all the republican leaders who submitted (among them Cicero), to return to Rome. Even after Thapsus at the intercession of his friends he pardoned bitter foes like Marcus Marcellus, one of the consuls of 50 B. C. But there remained some irreconcilables led by his old lieutenant Labienus, Varus, and Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey, sons of Pompey the Great, who after Pharsalus had betaken themselves with a small naval force to the western Mediterranean. In 46 B. C. they were joined by Labienus and Varus and landed in Spain where they rallied to their cause the old Pompeian soldiers who had entered Caesar’s service but whose sympathies had been alienated by one of his _legati_, Quintus Cassius. The Caesarian commanders could make no headway against them and it became necessary for the dictator to take the field in person. In December 46 B. C. he set out for Spain. Throughout the winter he sought in vain to force the enemy to battle, but in March 45 the two armies met at Munda, where Caesar’s eight defeated the thirteen Pompeian legions. The Caesarians gave no quarter and the Pompeian forces were annihilated; Labienus and Varus fell on the field, Gnaeus Pompey was later taken and put to death, but his brother Sextus escaped. Caesar returned to Italy in September, 45 B. C., and celebrated a triumph for his success.

*The **assassination** of Julius Caesar, 15 March, 44 B. C.* His victory at Munda had strengthened Caesar’s autocratic position, and was responsible for the granting of most of the exceptional honors which we have noted above. It was now clear at Rome that Caesar did not intend to restore the republic. In the conduct of the government he allowed no freedom of action to either Senate or Assembly, and although in general mild and forgiving he was quick to resent any attempt to slight him or question his authority. The realization that Caesar contemplated the establishment of a monarchy aroused bitter animosity among certain representatives of the old governing oligarchy, who chafed under the restraints imposed upon them by his autocratic power and resented the degradation of the Senate to the position of a mere advisory council. It could hardly be expected that members of the Roman aristocracy with all their traditions of imperial government would tamely submit to being excluded from political life except as ministers of an autocrat who was until lately one of themselves. This attitude was shared by many who had hitherto been active in Caesar’s cause, as well as by republicans who had made their peace with him. And so among these disgruntled elements a conspiracy was formed against the dictator’s life. The originator of the plot was the ex-Pompeian Caius Cassius, whom Caesar had made praetor for 44, and who won over to his design Marcus Junius Brutus, a member of the house descended from the Brutus who was reputed to have delivered Rome from the tyranny of the Tarquins. Brutus had gone over to Caesar after the battle of Pharsalus and was highly esteemed by him, but allowed himself to be persuaded that it was his duty to imitate his ancestor’s conduct. Other conspirators of note were the Caesarians Gaius Trebonius and Decimus Junius Brutus. In all some sixty senators shared in the conspiracy. They set the Ides of March, 44, as the date for the execution of the plot. Caesar was now busily engaged with preparations for a war against the Parthians, who had been a menace to Syria ever since the defeat of Crassus. This defeat Caesar aimed to avenge and, in addition, to definitely secure the eastern frontier of the empire. An army of sixteen legions and 10,000 cavalry was being assembled in Greece for this campaign, and Caesar was about to leave Rome to assume command. He is said to have been informed that a conspiracy against his life was on foot, but to have disregarded the warning. He had dismissed his body-guard of soldiers and refused one of senators and equestrians. On the fatal day he entered the Senate chamber, where the question of granting him the title of king in the provinces was to be discussed. A group of the conspirators surrounded him, and, drawing concealed daggers, stabbed him to death. He fell at the foot of Pompey’s statue.

*Estimate of Caesar’s career.* By the Roman writers who preserved the republican tradition Brutus, Cassius, and their associates were honored as tyrannicides who in the name of liberty had sought to save the republic. Cato, who had died rather than witness the triumph of Caesar, became their hero. But this is an extremely narrow and partizan view. The republic which Caesar had overthrown was no system of popular government but one whereby a small group of Roman nobles and capitalists exploited for their own personal ends and for the satisfaction of an idle city mob millions of subjects in the provinces. The republican organs of government had ceased to voice the opinion even of the whole Roman citizen body. The governing circles had proven themselves incapable of bringing about any improvement in the situation and had completely lost the power of preserving peace in the state. Radical reforms were imperative and could only be effective by virtue of superior force. In his resort to corruption and violence in furthering his own career and in his appeal to arms to decide the issue between himself and the Senate, Caesar must be judged according to the practices of his time. He was the child of his age and advanced himself by means which his predecessors and contemporaries employed. That he was ambitious and a lover of power is undeniable but hardly a cause for reproach; and who shall blame him, if when the Senate sought to destroy him by force, he used the same means to defend himself. His claim to greatness lies not in his ability to outwit his rivals in the political arena or outgeneral his enemies on the field of battle, but in his realization, when the fate of the civilized world was in his hands, that the old order was beyond remedy and in his courage in attempting to set up a new order which promised to give peace and security both to Roman citizens and to the provincials. Caesar fell before he had been able to give stability to his organization, but the republic could not be quickened into life. After Caesar some form of monarchical government was inevitable.