A History of Rome to 565 A. D.

CHAPTER XIII

Chapter 395,918 wordsPublic domain

THE RISE OF POMPEY THE GREAT: 78–60 B. C.

*The extraordinary commands.* For the period following the death of Sulla in 78 B. C. Roman history centers around the lives of a small group of eminent men, whose ambitions and rivalries are the determining factors in the political life of the state. This is due to the fact that neither the Senate nor the Assembly have the power to control the men to whom the needs of the empire compel them to give military authority. The generation of Marius and Sulla had seen the rise of the professional army which revealed itself as the true power in the state, and the disturbances of the Italian and Civil Wars supplied an abundance of needy recruits who sought service with a popular and successful general for the sake of the rewards which it lay in his power to bestow. As military achievements were the sole sure foundation for political success, able men made it the goal of their ambition to be entrusted with an important military command. The dangers of civil and foreign wars at first compelled the Senate to confer military power upon the few available men of recognized ability even when it distrusted their ulterior motives, and later such appointments were made by the Assembly through the coalition of the general and the tribunate. In this way arose the so-called extraordinary commands, that is, such as involved a military _imperium_ which in some way exceeded that of the regular constitutional officers and required to be created or defined by a special enactment of the Senate or Comitia.

The man who first realized the value of the extraordinary command as a path to power was Pompey the Great.

I. POMPEY’S COMMAND AGAINST SERTORIUS IN SPAIN: 77–71 B. C.

*The revolt of Lepidus.* It was not to be expected that Sulla’s measures would long remain unassailed. Those dispossessed of their property, those disqualified for office, and the equestrians who sought to regain control of the courts, were all anxious to undo part of his work. They found a leader in Lepidus, who as consul in 78 B. C., the very year of Sulla’s death, sought to renew the distribution of cheap grain to the masses in Rome, which Sulla had suppressed, to restore the Marian exiles, and reinstate those who had lost their lands. For the time he failed to carry his proposals, but in the next year, as proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul, he raised an army and marched on Rome to seize the consulate for a second term, since disorders had prevented the election of consuls for that year. However he was defeated by his former colleague, the proconsul Catulus, and Pompey, whom the Senate had appointed to a subordinate command in view of his military expedience. Lepidus crossed over to Sardinia where he died shortly after, and the bulk of his forces under Marcus Perperna withdrew to Spain, to join the Marians who were in revolt there.

*Sertorius in Spain, 83–78 B. C.* The rebellion in Spain was headed by Quintus Sertorius, who had been appointed governor of Hither Spain by Cinna in 83 B. C. Two years later he was driven out by Sulla’s representative, but, after various adventures, returned in 80 B. C. to head a revolt of the Lusitanians. His ability as a guerrilla leader, and the confidence which he aroused among the native Spaniards soon created alarm in Rome. Sertorius professed to take the field not against Rome but against the Senate. He regarded himself as the legitimate governor of Spain, employed members of the Marian party as his military and civil subordinates and organized a Senate among the Romans of his following. To crush the revolt Sulla sent out to Farther Spain Metellus, the consul of 80 B. C., but he failed to make any headway, and Sertorius was able to overrun Hither Spain also. In 79 B. C. the praetor of that province was killed in battle, and the same fate befell the proconsul of Narbonese Gaul who came to the help of Metellus (78 B. C.).

*Pompey sent to Spain, 78 B. C.* It was imperative to send a new commander and a new army to Spain. As the consuls were unwilling to go, Pompey, who had refused to disband his army at the orders of Catulus, sought the command. The Senate could not help itself and, in spite of considerable opposition, passed a decree conferring upon him proconsular _imperium_ and entrusting him with the conduct of the war in Hither Spain. Even after the arrival of Pompey with an army of 40,000 men Sertorius was more than able to hold his own against his foes in 76 and 75 B. C. At the end of the latter year Pompey was forced to recross the Pyrenees and appeal to the Senate for reinforcements. At the same time Sertorius, through the agency of the pirates, entered into alliance with Mithradates, King of Pontus, who was again on the point of war with Rome.

The arrival of the desired reinforcements enabled Pompey in 74 and 73 B. C. to turn the tide against Sertorius. To prevent desertions the latter resorted to severe punishments which alienated the Spaniards, who were already estranged by the acts of his subordinates. He was further hampered by dissensions in the ranks of his Roman supporters. The center of disaffection was Perpenna, who treacherously assassinated Sertorius in 72 B. C. and assumed command of his forces. However he was defeated by Pompey, taken captive and executed. The revolt was broken and pacification of Spain speedily accomplished. Pompey was able to return to Rome in 71 B. C.

II. THE COMMAND OF LUCULLUS AGAINST MITHRADATES: 74–66 B. C.

*The situation in the Near East.* After concluding peace with Sulla in 85 B. C., Mithradates Eupator directed his energies to consolidating his kingdom and reorganizing his forces in expectation of a renewal of the struggle with Rome. He recognised that Sulla had been ready to make peace only because of the situation in Italy and the fact that he had been unable to secure written confirmation of the terms of the treaty warned him that the Romans still contemplated his complete overthrow. Indeed he had been attacked in the years 83 and 82 B. C. by Lucius Murena, the proconsul of Asia, but had been able to defend himself and Sulla had once more brought about a cessation of hostilities. Meantime, Tigranes of Armenia, the ally of Mithradates, had enlarged his dominions by the annexation of Syria (83 B. C.), where he terminated the rule of the house of Seleucus, and of Greater Cappadocia.

*The command of Lucullus and Cotta, 74 B. C.* In 75 B. C. occurred the death of Nicomedes III, King of Bithynia, who left his kingdom to the Roman people. The Senate accepted the inheritance and made Bithynia a province, but Mithradates championed the claims of a son of Nicomedes and determined to dispute the possession of Bithynia with the Romans. He had raised an efficient army and navy, was leagued with the pirates, and in alliance with Sertorius, who supplied him with officers and recognized his claims to Bithynia and other districts in Asia Minor. Rome was threatened with another serious war. One of the senatorial faction, the consul Lucius Lucullus, contrived to have assigned to himself by a senatorial decree the provinces of Cilicia and Asia with command of the main operations against Mithradates, while his colleague Cotta received Bithynia and a fleet to guard the Hellespont. At the same time a praetor, Marcus Antonius, was given an extraordinary command against the pirates with an unlimited _imperium_ over the Mediterranean Sea and its coast. However, he proved utterly incompetent, was defeated in an attack upon Crete, and died there.

*Siege of Cyzicus, 74–3 B. C.* Early in 74 B. C., Mithradates invaded Bithynia. There he was encountered by Cotta, whom he defeated and blockaded in Chalcedon. Thereupon he invaded Asia and laid siege to Cyzicus. But Lucullus cut off his communications and in the ensuing winter he was forced to raise the siege and retire with heavy losses into Bithynia. The following year a fleet which Lucullus had raised defeated that of Mithradates. This enabled the Romans to recover Bithynia and invade Pontus. In 72 B. C. Lucullus defeated Mithradates and forced him to take refuge in Armenia. In the course of this and the two following years he completed the subjugation of Pontus by the systematic reduction of its fortified cities. Cotta undertook the siege of Heraclea in Bithynia and upon its fall in 71 B. C. returned to Rome. The winter of 71–70 B. C. Lucullus spent in Asia reorganizing the financial situation. There the cities were laboring under a frightful burden of indebtedness to Roman bankers and taxgatherers which had its origin in the exactions of Sulla. Lucullus interfered on behalf of the provincials and by reducing the accumulated interest on their debts enabled them to pay off their obligations within four years. This care for the provincials won for himself the bitter enmity of the Roman financial interests which sought to deprive him of his command.

*Invasion of Armenia, 69 B. C.* As the war could not be regarded as terminated so long as Mithradates was at large, Lucullus demanded his surrender from Tigranes. When the latter refused Lucullus invaded Armenia, defeated him and took his capital, Tigranocerta, 69 B. C. In the following year Lucullus attempted to complete the subjugation of Armenia but was prevented by the mutinous conduct of his troops. He was unpopular with his men because he maintained discipline and protected the subject peoples from the excesses of the soldiers. Also some of his legions had come to the East with Fimbria in 86 B. C. and clamored for the discharge to which they were entitled. In 67 B. C. Mithradates reappeared in Pontus and Lucullus had to return from Armenia to face him, whereupon Tigranes began to recover lost ground. Because of the mutiny in his army Lucullus was forced to remain inactive. He had already been superseded in the command of Asia, Cilicia and Bithynia, which had come under his control with the return of Cotta, and his enemies in Rome deprived him of the remnants of his authority in 66 B. C.

III. THE REVOLT OF THE GLADIATORS: 73–71 B. C.

*Spartacus.* While Pompey was fighting Sertorius in Spain and Lucullus was pursuing Mithradates in Bithynia a serious slave war arose in Italy. It began in 73 B. C. with the revolt of a band of gladiators from a training school in Capua under the leadership of the Thracian Spartacus and the Gauls, Crixus and Onemaus. Taking refuge on the slopes of Vesuvius they rapidly recruited large numbers of runaway slaves. They defeated the armies of two Roman praetors and overran Campania, Lucania, and all southern Italy. By the end of the year 73 B. C. their number had grown to 70,000.

In the next year they divided their forces; the Gauls and Germans followed Crixus, the Thracians Spartacus. The two consuls took the field against them; Crixus and his horde were defeated in Apulia. Spartacus marched north, intending to make his way through the Alps to Thrace. The consuls pursued him, and he defeated them one after the other. Thereupon his followers refused to leave Italy and turned southwards, plundering as they went. Again Spartacus defeated the consuls but dared not attack Rome and retired to South Italy.

*Crassus in command, 71 B. C.* In 71 B. C. the consuls displayed no enthusiasm to undertake the command against Spartacus, and so the Senate appointed as extraordinary commander the praetor Marcus Licinius Crassus, one of Sulla’s veteran officers, who volunteered his services. After restoring discipline among his troops, Crassus succeeded in penning up Spartacus in the peninsula of Bruttium. Spartacus hired some Cilician pirates to transport him to Sicily, but, after receiving their price, they abandoned him to his fate. He succeeded in breaking through Crassus’ lines, but his forces divided into two detachments, each of which was caught and beaten. Spartacus fell in battle; while 6000 of his following were taken and crucified. Crassus had bent all his energies to bring the revolt to a close before the arrival of Pompey, who was on his way from Spain. This he might fairly claim to have accomplished although a body of 5000 slaves who had escaped to North Italy were met by Pompey and annihilated.

IV. THE CONSULATE OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS: 70 B. C.

*Pompey and Crassus consuls.* Both Pompey and Crassus, flushed by their victories in Spain and in Italy, now demanded the right to stand for the consulship for 70 B. C. Both sought triumphs and under this pretext did not disband their armies. The Senate resisted their claims, for Pompey’s candidature was clearly unconstitutional, and since Crassus was praetor in 71 he was not eligible for the consulate in the following year. Furthermore both were distrusted because of their ambitious natures. In view of this opposition Crassus, in spite of mutual jealousy between himself and Pompey, made overtures to the latter and they agreed to unite their forces. They also made a bid for the support of the _populares_ by promising to restore the tribunate to its former privileges and for that of the equestrians by promising to reinstate them in the jury courts. This combination overawed senatorial opposition, their candidatures were legalized by special bills and both were elected. In their consulate the tribunes were relieved of the restrictions which Sulla had placed upon their activities, and the jury courts were reorganized. However, the latter were not given over completely to the equestrians, but each panel of jurors was to consist of three equal sections, one drawn from the Senate, one from the _equites_, and one from the _tribuni aerarii_, the class of citizens whose assessment was next to that of the _equites_. The Sullan régime was at an end, and in the tribunate emancipated from the Senate’s control the ambitious general of the future was to find his most valuable ally.

*Trial of Verres.* In the same year, prior to the passing of the Aurelian Law which reformed the juries, occurred the trial of Caius Verres, ex-propraetor of Sicily, a case notable because the prosecution was conducted by the young Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose accusation contained in his published _Orations against Caius Verres_ constitutes a most illuminating commentary upon provincial misgovernment under the Sullan régime. The senatorial juries after 82 B. C., had protected the interests of the provinces no better than had the equestrian juries established by Caius Gracchus. They had shown themselves shamelessly venal, and a provincial governor who made judicious disbursements could be confident that he would be acquitted of any charges of extortion brought against him. Relying upon this Verres, who was propraetor of Sicily in 73, 72 and 71 B. C., had carried off from that province money and valuables estimated at 40,000,000 sesterces ($2,000,000). He had openly boasted that he intended the profits of one year for himself, those of the second for his friends and patrons, and those of the third for his jurors. At the opening of the year 70 B. C. the Sicilian cities sued Verres for restitution of damages and chose Cicero as their advocate. Cicero was a native of Arpinum, the birthplace of Marius, and was now in his thirty-sixth year. His upright conduct as quaestor in western Sicily in 75 B. C. had earned him the confidence of the Sicilians, and his successful conduct of the defense in several previous trials had marked him as a pleader of exceptional ability. But Verres had entrusted his case to Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, regarded at the time as the foremost of Roman orators, and every conceivable device was resorted to in order to prevent the case from coming to trial. Another prosecutor appeared, who claimed to have a better right than Cicero to bring suit against Verres. This necessitated a trial to decide which could better claim to represent the Sicilians. Cicero was able to expose the falsity of the claims of his rival, who was acting in collusion with Verres. He then proceeded to Sicily where he gathered his evidence in fifty of the hundred and ten days allowed him for the purpose. Before the hearing the elections for the next year were held and Hortensius elected consul, but Cicero was returned as aedile in spite of all the efforts of his opponents to weaken his prestige by a defeat at the polls.

The trial was set for the fifth of August, and as there were fifty holidays for various festivals between that date and the end of the year, the defense hoped to drag out the trial until after January first, when a praetor friendly to Verres would preside over the court for extortion. But Cicero defeated their hopes by abstaining from any long formal speech of accusation and contenting himself with a brief statement of the obstacles the defense had placed in his way, a threat to punish in his capacity of aedile any attempts at corruption, and a short statement of the charge against Verres. He then called his witnesses. Hortensius found himself without any arguments to combat and could not refute the evidence. Before the hearing of the witnesses was concluded Verres went into exile. He was condemned in his absence and Cicero became the leading advocate of the day. However, it must be admitted that the condemnation of Verres was also partly due to the danger of the loss of their privileges which threatened the senatorial jurors.

*The crimes of Verres.* The evidence which had been brought out against Verres was afterwards used by Cicero in composing his _Second Pleading against Verres_ (_actio secunda in Verrem_) which was of course never delivered, but was a political pamphlet in the form of a fictitious oration. From it we learn the devices of which the governor made use to amass a fortune at the expense of his province. By initiating false accusations, by rendering, or intimidating other judges to render unjust decisions, he secured the confiscation of property the value of which he diverted to his own pockets. He sold justice to the highest bidder. While saving himself expense by defrauding the collectors of port dues of the tax on his valuables shipped out of Sicily, he added to his profits by the sale of municipal offices and priesthoods. He entered into partnership with the _decumani_ or collectors of the ten per cent produce tax, and ordered the cultivators to pay whatever the collectors demanded, and then, if dissatisfied, seek redress in his court, a redress which, needless to say, was never gained. He loaned public funds at usurious rates of interest, and either did not pay in full or paid nothing for corn purchased from the Sicilian communities for the Roman government, while charging the state the market price. At the same time he insisted upon the cities commuting into money payments at rates far above current prices the grain allotted for the upkeep of the governor’s establishment. At times the demands made upon cultivators exceeded the total of their annual crop, and in despair they fled from their holdings. To the money gained by such methods Verres added a costly treasure of works of art, which he collected from both individuals and cities by theft, seizure and intimidation. Even the sacred ornaments of temples were not spared. All who resisted or denounced him, even Roman citizens, were subjected to illegal imprisonment, torture or execution. These iniquities were carried out in defiance of the provincial charter, but there was no power in his province to restrain him, and the Senate, which should have done so, remained indifferent to the complaints which were carried to Rome. The sad truth was that after all Verres was only more shameless and unscrupulous than the average provincial governor, and consequently the sympathies of the Senate were with him rather than with his victims—the provincials.

V. THE COMMANDS OF POMPEY AGAINST THE PIRATES AND IN THE EAST: 67–62 B. C.

*The pirate scourge.* Both Pompey and Crassus had declined proconsular appointments at the close of 70 B. C., because there were no provinces open which promised an opportunity to augment their influence or military reputation. Accordingly they remained in Rome watching for some more favorable chance to employ their talents. Pompey found such an opportunity in the ravages of the Cilician pirates. After the failure of Marcus Antonius (74–72 B. C.), Caecilius Metellus had been sent to Crete in 69 B. C. and in the course of the next two years reduced the island to subjection and made it a province. But his operations there did little to check the pirate plague. So bold had these robbers become that they did not hesitate to raid the coasts of Italy and to plunder Ostia. When finally their depredations interrupted the importation of grain for the supply of the city, a famine threatened, and decisive measures had to be taken against them.

*The Gabinian Law, 67 B. C.* The only way to deal with the question was to appoint a commander with power to operate against the pirates everywhere, and the obvious man for the position was Pompey. However, the Senate mistrusted him and in addition feared the consequences of creating such an extensive extraordinary command. But since 71 B. C. Pompey had stood on the side of the _populares_ and now, like Marius, he found in the tribunate an ally able to aid him in attaining his goal. In 67 B. C. the tribune Aulus Gabinius proposed a law for the appointment of a single commander of consular rank who should have command over the whole sea within the pillars of Hercules and all Roman territory to a distance of fifty miles inland. His appointment was to be for three years, he was to have the power to nominate senatorial _legati_, to raise money in addition to what he received from the quaestors, and recruit soldiers and sailors at discretion for his fleet. This command was modelled upon that of Antonius the praetor in 74 B. C., but conveyed higher authority and greater resources. The Senate bitterly resisted the passage of the bill but it passed and the Senate had to relinquish its prerogative of creating the extraordinary commands. Although no person had been nominated for this command in the law of Gabinius, the opinion of the voters had been so clearly expressed in a _contio_ that the Senate had to appoint Pompey. He received twenty-four _legati_ and a fleet of five hundred vessels.

*The pirates crushed.* Pompey set to work energetically and systematically. In forty days he swept the pirates from the western Mediterranean. In forty-nine more he cornered them in Cilicia, where he forced the surrender of their strongholds. His victory was hastened by the mildness shown to those who surrendered. They received their lives and freedom, and in many cases were used as colonists to revive cities with a declining population. Within three months he had brought the pirate war to a triumphant conclusion, but his _imperium_ would not terminate for three years and he was anxious to gather fresh laurels.

*The Manilian Law, 66 B. C.* It so happened that Pompey’s success coincided with the temporary check to the Roman arms in Pontus, owing to the disaffection of the troops of Lucullus and the machinations of the latter’s enemies in Rome. Pompey now sought to have the command of Lucullus added to his own, and in this he had the support of the equestrian order. Early in 66 B. C. one of the tribunes, Caius Manilius, proposed a law transferring to Pompey the provinces of Bithynia and Cilicia and the conduct of the war against Mithradates and Tigranes. Cicero, then a praetor, supported the measure in his speech, _For the Manilian Law_. His support was probably dictated by the fact that he was a man without family backing and consequently had to have the friendship of an influential personage if he was to secure the political advancement which he desired. The Senate strongly opposed any extension of Pompey’s military authority, but the bill was passed and he took over the command of Lucullus. He was clothed with power to make peace or war with whom he chose, and enjoyed an unexampled concentration of authority in his hands.

*The campaigns of Pompey in the East.* Pompey at once advanced into Pontus and attacked Mithradates. The latter was forced to withdraw into Lesser Armenia where he was overtaken and his army scattered by Pompey. The king fled to the neighborhood of the Sea of Asov. Upon the defeat of Mithradates, Tigranes deserted his cause and submitted to Pompey. He was permitted to retain his kingdom as a Roman ally. In the following year, 65 B. C., Pompey reduced to submission the peoples situated south of the Caucasus, between the Black and the Caspian Seas, who had been in alliance with Mithradates, and so completed the subjugation of Pontus, which he made into a province (64 B. C.).

In 64 B. C. he turned his attention to Syria, where a state of chaos had reigned since Lucullus had wrested it from Tigranes and where a scion of the Seleucids had failed to find recognition. Pompey decided to treat Syria as a Roman conquest and incorporate it within the empire. He then interfered in a dynastic struggle in the kingdom of Judaea. After a brief struggle, in which the temple of Jerusalem was stormed by the Romans, he installed his nominee as High Priest at the head of the local government. Judaea was then annexed to the province of Syria (63 B. C.).

While Pompey was in Judaea the death of Mithradates occurred. Deserted by the Greek cities of the northern Euxine, he formed the plan of joining the Celtic peoples of the Danube valley and invading Italy. But his army deserted him for his son Pharnaces, who revolted against his father, and Mithradates committed suicide. Thereupon Pharnaces made peace with Pompey.

The Mithradatic war was finally over and Pompey, after organizing affairs in Asia Minor and the adjoining countries, started on a triumphal return to Italy with his victorious army and rich spoils of war (62 B. C.).

VI. THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE, 63 B. C.

*The situation in Rome.* While Pompey was adding to his military reputation in the East he was regarded with jealous and anxious eyes not only by the Senate but also by the other champions of the popular party, Crassus who found his wealth no match for Pompey’s military achievements, and Caius Julius Caesar who was rapidly coming to be one of the leading figures in Roman public life. Caesar was born in 100 B. C., of the patrician _gens_ of the Julii, but since his aunt was the wife of Marius, and he himself had married the daughter of Cinna, his lot was cast with the Populares. As a young man he had distinguished himself by refusing to divorce his wife at Sulla’s behest, whereat Sulla was with difficulty induced to spare his life, saying that he saw in him many a Marius. For the time being Caesar judged it prudent to withdraw from Rome to Rhodes. While in the East he was captured by pirates, and after being ransomed, fulfilled his threat to avenge himself by taking and executing his captors. After the death of Sulla, Caesar returned to Rome and devoted his more than average oratorical abilities to the cause of the Marians. In 69 or 68 B. C. he was quaestor in Farther Spain, and shortly afterwards he became closely associated with Crassus in the attempt to develop a counterpoise to Pompey’s influence. While aedile in 65 B. C. he curried favor with the populace by the extraordinary lavishness with which he celebrated the public festivals, by the restoration of the public monuments of the campaign of Marius and by supporting the prosecution of agents in the Sullan proscriptions. The splendor of his shows had obliged Caesar to contract heavy debts, and Crassus was in all probability his chief creditor. Both were therefore interested in securing for Caesar a position in which he could secure the wealth to meet his obligations.

The unrest in Rome was heightened by the presence there of a number of men of ruined fortunes, both Marians dispossessed by Sulla and those of the opposite party who had squandered their resources or had been excluded from the Senate by the censors of 70 B. C. This element was ready to resort to any means, however desperate, to win wealth or office. Foremost among them was Lucius Sergius Catilina, a patrician who enjoyed an evil repute for his share in the Sullan proscriptions and the viciousness of his private life. Symptomatic of the weakening of the public authority was the organization of partizan gangs to terrorize opposition and control the Assembly.

*Cicero elected consul, 64 B. C.* In the year 64 B. C. three candidates presented themselves for the consulship, Catiline, Caius Antonius, a noble of the same type as Catiline, and Cicero. The first two were supported by Caesar and Crassus who hoped to use them for their own ends. Cicero, as a _novus homo_, was distasteful to the Optimates, but since they felt that Catiline must be defeated at all costs they supported the orator, who was elected with Antonius. From that time Cicero ranged himself on the side of the Optimates, and his political watchword was the “harmony of the orders,” that is, of the senators and the equestrians. Of the consular provinces Cicero received by lot Macedonia and Antonius Cisalpine Gaul. As the latter was dissatisfied Cicero resigned Macedonia to him, in return for his public assurance of abstaining from opposing Cicero’s acts during their year of office.

*The land bill of Rullus, 63 B. C.* On the first day of his consulate Cicero delivered a speech in which he scathingly criticized a land bill proposed by the tribune Servilius Rullus. This bill aimed to create a land commission of ten members of praetorian rank, elected in a special _comitia_ of seventeen tribes, which Rullus was to choose by lot. These commissioners were to be vested with extraordinary powers for five years, including the right to sell the public land in Italy and in Pompey’s recent conquests, to exercise judicial authority, to confiscate lands, to found colonies, and to enroll and maintain troops. The bill would have placed in the hands of the commissioners extraordinary military authority both in Italy and in the provinces, guaranteed by the income derived from the sale of land. Pompey was excluded from the commission by a clause requiring the personal appearance of candidates. Everyone was aware that the measure was devised in the interests of Caesar and Crassus and that they would dominate the commission. However, the attack upon the Senate’s control of the public land and the general mistrust of the purposes of a bill of this sort caused such strong opposition that its sponsors did not bring the matter to a vote.

*Caesar, **Pontifex** Maximus.* But Caesar could console himself with victory in another sphere. The position of Pontifex Maximus had become vacant, and by a tribunician bill the _lex Domitia_, revoked by Sulla, was again brought into effect and election to the priesthood entrusted to a _comitia_ of seventeen tribes. In the ensuing election Caesar was victorious.

*The Catilinarian conspiracy: 63 B. C.* In July, 63 B. C., occurred the consular elections for the next year. Catiline was again a competitor, but now he lacked the support of Crassus and Caesar and appealed directly to all needy and desperate characters throughout Italy, who hoped to enrich themselves by violent means. He was bitterly opposed by Cicero and the Optimates and was defeated. Thereupon he and his followers conspired to overthrow the government by armed force. Cicero, who was on the watch, got news of the conspiracy and induced the Senate to pass the “last decree” empowering him to use any means to save the state. Catiline then left the city to join the bands his supporters had raised in Etruria. He was declared a public enemy and a force under the consul Antonius dispatched against him. December seventeenth was the day set for a rising in Rome, when the city was to be fired, the consuls and others murdered, and a reign of terror instituted. But the plan was betrayed by a delegation of the Gallic Allobroges who happened to be in Rome and whom the conspirators endeavored to enlist on their side. The leading Catilinarians in Rome were arrested, and, in accordance with a decree of the Senate, put to death. Caesar had argued for a milder sentence, but the firm stand of the young Marcus Porcius Cato, a man of uncompromising uprightness and loyalty to the constitution, sealed the fate of the plotters. Upon the failure of his plans in Rome, Catiline endeavored to make his way with his army into Cisalpine Gaul, but was overtaken and forced to give battle to the forces of Antonius at Pistoria. He and most of his followers died sword in hand. The suppression of the conspiracy added to Cicero’s reputation and greatly strengthened the position of the Senate and the Optimates.

But the whole episode bears testimony to the general weakness of the government and the danger of the absence of a regular police force for the maintenance of the public peace.

VII. THE COALITION OF POMPEY, CAESAR AND CRASSUS: 60 B. C.

*Pompey’s return.* Towards the close of the year 62 B. C. Pompey landed in Italy and, contrary to the expectations of those who feared that he would prove a second Sulla, disbanded his army. The following September (61) he celebrated a memorable triumph. He was exceedingly anxious to crown his achievements by having the Senate ratify his eastern arrangements and securing land grants for his veterans. However, since the dismissal of his troops he was no longer feared by the Senate, which insisted on examining his acts in detail and not ratifying them _en bloc_ as he demanded. Thus the Optimates lost the opportunity of binding Pompey to their side, and at the same time they fell out with the equestrians over the demand made by the _publicani_ who had contracted for the taxes of Asia for a modification of the terms of their contract on the ground of poor harvests in the province.

*The coalition of 60 B. C.* No settlement had been reached when Caesar returned to Rome in 60 B. C. He had been praetor in 62 and for the following year governor of Further Spain, where he waged successful border wars, conciliated the provincials and yet contrived to find the means to satisfy his creditors. He now requested a triumph and the privilege of standing for the consulate while waiting outside the city for the former honor. However, when the Senate delayed its decision he gave up the triumph and became a candidate for the consulate. He now succeeded in reconciling Pompey and Crassus and the three formed a secret coalition to secure the election of Caesar and the satisfaction of their particular aims. This unofficial coalition is known as the First Triumvirate. Through the influence of his supporters Caesar was easily elected but his colleague was Calpurnius Bibulus, the nominee of the Optimates.