CHAPTER VIII

ROMAN DOMINATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN; THE FIRST PHASE—THE STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE; 265–201 B. C.

I. THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN 265 B. C.

*Rome a world power.* With the unification of the Italian peninsula Rome entered upon a new era in her foreign relations. She was now one of the great powers of the Mediterranean world and was inevitably drawn into the vortex of world politics. She could no longer rest indifferent to what went on beyond the confines of Italy. She assumed new responsibilities, opened up new diplomatic relations, developed a new outlook and new ambitions. At this time the other first-class powers were, in the east, the three Hellenistic monarchies—Egypt, Syria, and Macedon,—which had emerged from the ruins of the empire of Alexander the Great, and, in the west, the city state of Carthage.

*Egypt.* The kingdom of Egypt, ruled by the dynasty of the Ptolemies, comprised the ancient kingdom of Egypt in the Nile valley, Cyrene, the coast of Syria, Cyprus, and a number of cities on the shores and islands of the Aegean Sea. In Egypt the Ptolemies ruled as foreigners over the subject native population. They maintained their authority by a small mercenary army recruited chiefly from Macedonians and Greeks, and by a strongly centralized administration, of which the offices were in Greek hands. As the ruler was the sole proprietor of the land of Egypt, the native Egyptians, the majority of whom were peasants who gained their livelihood by tilling the rich soil of the Nile valley, were for the most part tenants of the crown, and the restrictions and obligations to which they were subject rendered their status little better than that of serfs. A highly developed but oppressive system of taxation and government monopolies, largely an inheritance from previous dynasties, enabled the Ptolemies to wring from their subjects the revenues with which they maintained a brilliant court life at their capital, Alexandria, and financed their imperial policy.

The aim of this policy was to secure Egyptian domination in the Aegean, among the states of Southern Greece, and in Phoenicia, whose value lay in the forests of the Lebanon mountains. To carry it into effect the Ptolemies were obliged to support a navy which would give them the command of the sea in the eastern Mediterranean. However, the occupation of their outlying possessions brought Egypt into perpetual conflict with Macedon and Syria, whose rulers made continued efforts to oust the Ptolemies from the Aegean and from the Syrian coast.

*Syria.* Syria, the kingdom of the Seleucids, with its capital at Antioch on the Orontes, was by far the largest of the Hellenistic monarchies in extent and population, and in wealth it ranked next to Egypt. It stretched from the Aegean to the borders of India, and included the southern part of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Persia, and northern Syria. But the very size of this kingdom was a source of weakness, because of the distances which separated its various provinces and the heterogeneous racial elements which it embraced. The power of the dynasty was upheld, as in Egypt, by a mercenary army, and also by the Greek cities which had been founded in large numbers by Alexander the Great and his successors. However, these islands of Greek culture did not succeed to any great extent in Hellenizing the native populations which remained in a state of subjection, indifferent or hostile to their conquerors. Furthermore the strength of the Seleucid empire was sapped by repeated revolts in its eastern provinces and dissensions between the members of the dynasty itself.

*Macedon.* The kingdom of Macedon, ruled by the house of the Antigonids, was the smallest of the three in extent, population and resources, but possessed an internal strength and solidarity lacking in the others. For in Macedon, the Antigonids, by preserving the traditional character of the patriarchal monarchy, kept alive the national spirit of the Macedonians and made them loyal to the dynasty. They also retained a military system which fostered the traditions of the times of Philip II and Alexander, and which, since the Macedonian people had not lost its martial character, furnished a small but efficient national army. Outside of Macedon, the Antigonids held sway over Thessaly and the eastern part of Greece as far south as the Isthmus of Corinth. Their attempts to dominate the whole peninsula were thwarted by the opposition of the Aetolian and Achaian Confederacies, who were supported in this by the Ptolemies.

*The minor Greek states.* In addition to these three great monarchies we should note as powers of minor importance the Confederacies mentioned before, the kingdom of Pergamon on the northwest coast of Asia Minor, the island republic of Rhodes, which was a naval power of considerable strength, and the kingdom of Syracuse in Sicily, the last of the independent Greek cities on that island.

*Carthage.* The fourth world power was Carthage, a city state situated on the northern coast of Africa, opposite the western end of the island of Sicily, which had created for itself an empire that controlled the western half of the Mediterranean. Carthage was founded as a colony of the Phoenician city of Tyre about 814 B. C. In the sixth century, with the passing of the cities of Phoenicia under the domination, first of Babylon, and later of the Persian Empire, their colonies in the western Mediterranean severed political ties with their mother land and had henceforth to maintain themselves by their own efforts.

*The Carthaginian Empire.* Their weakness was the opportunity of Carthage, which, in the sixth and following centuries, brought under her control the other Phoenician settlements, in addition to founding new colonies of her own. She also extended her sway over the native Libyan population in the vicinity of Carthage. These Libyans were henceforth tributary and under the obligation of rendering military service to the Carthaginians: similar obligations rested upon the dependent Phoenician allies. In the third century the Carthaginian empire included the northern coast of Africa from the Gulf of Syrtis westwards beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, the southern and eastern coasts of Spain as far north as Cape Nao, Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily, with the exception of Messana in the extreme northeast and the Kingdom of Syracuse in the southeastern part of the island. The smaller islands of the western Mediterranean were likewise under Carthaginian control.

*The government of Carthage.* At this time the government of Carthage itself was republican in form and strongly aristocratic in tone. There was a primary Assembly for all Carthaginian citizens who could satisfy certain age and property requirements. This body annually elected the two chief magistrates or suffetes, and likewise the generals. For the former qualifications of wealth and merit were prescribed. There was also a Senate, and a Council, whose organization and powers are uncertain. The Council, the smaller body, prepared the matters to be discussed in the Senate, which was consulted by the Suffetes on all matters and usually gave the final decision, although the Assembly was supposed to be consulted in case the Senate and Suffetes disagreed. The Suffetes exercised judicial, financial and religious functions, and presided over the council and senate. The Carthaginian aristocracy, like that of Venice, was a group of wealthy families whose fortunes, made in commercial ventures, were handed down for generations in the same houses. From this circle came the members of the council and senate, who directed the policy of the state. The aristocracy itself was split into factions, struggling to control the offices and through them the public policy, which they frequently subordinated to their own particular interests.

*The commercial policy of Carthage.* The prosperity of Carthage depended upon her empire and the maintenance of a commercial monopoly in the western Mediterranean. This policy of commercial exclusiveness had caused Carthage to oppose Greek colonial expansion in Spain, Sardinia and Sicily, and had led to treaties which placed definite limits upon the trading ventures of the Romans and their allies, and of the Greeks from Massalia and her colonies in France and northern Spain.

*Carthaginian naval and **military** strength.* Such a policy could only be maintained by a strong naval power, and, in fact, Carthage was the undisputed mistress of the seas west of the straits of Messana. Unlike Rome, however, Carthage had no organized national army but relied upon an army of mercenaries recruited from all quarters of the Mediterranean, among such warlike peoples as the Gauls, Spaniards, Libyans and Greeks. Although brave and skillful fighters, these, like all troops of the type, were liable to become dispirited and mutinous under continued reverses or when faced by shortage of pay and plunder.

Such was the state with which Rome was now brought face to face by the conquest of South Italy and which was the first power she was to challenge in a war for dominion beyond the peninsula. As we have seen, Rome had long ere this come into contact with this great maritime people.(4) Two treaties, one perhaps dating from the close of the sixth century, and the other from 348 B. C., regulated commercial intercourse between the two states and their respective subjects and allies. A third, concluded in 279, had provided for military coöperation against Pyrrhus, but this alliance had ceased after the defeat of the latter, and with the removal of this common enemy a feeling of coolness or mutual suspicion seems to have arisen between the erstwhile allies.

II. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR: 264–241 B. C.

*The origins of the war.* The first war between Rome and Carthage arose out of the political situation in the island of Sicily. There the town of Messana was occupied by the Mamertini, a band of Campanian mercenaries, who had been in the service of Syracuse but who had deserted and seized this town about 284 B. C. Because of their perpetual acts of brigandage they were a menace to their neighbors, the Syracusans. The latter, now under an energetic ruler, Hiero, who had assumed the title of king, in 265 succeeded in blockading Messana and its ultimate capture seemed certain. In despair the Mamertini sought help from the Carthaginians who sent a garrison to Messana, for they looked with jealousy upon any extension of Syracusan territory. However, the majority of the Mamertini sought to be taken under the protection of Rome and appealed to the Roman Senate for aid. The senators on the one hand saw that to espouse the cause of the Mamertini would be to provoke a war with Carthage, an eventuality before which they shrank, but on the other hand they recognized that the Carthaginian occupation of Messana would give them the control of the Straits of Messana and constitute a perpetual threat against southern Italy. The strength of these conflicting considerations made them unwilling to assume responsibility for a decision and they referred the matter to the Assembly of the Centuries. Here the people, elated, apparently, by their recent victorious wars in Italy, and led on by hopes of pecuniary advantage to be derived from the war, decided to admit the Mamertini to the Roman alliance. One consul, Appius Claudius, was sent with a small force to relieve the town (264).

The Mamertini induced the Carthaginian garrison to withdraw, and then admitted the Roman force which crossed the straits with the aid of vessels furnished by their Greek allies in Italy. Thereupon the Carthaginians made an alliance with the Syracusans, but the Romans defeated each of them.

*Alliance of Rome and Syracuse.* In the next year the Romans sent a larger army into Sicily to attack Syracuse and met with such success that Hiero became alarmed, and, making peace upon easy terms, concluded an alliance with them for fifteen years.(5) Aided by Hiero the Romans now began an attack upon Agrigentum, the Carthaginian stronghold which threatened Syracuse. When this was taken in 262, they determined to drive the Carthaginians from the whole island.

*Rome builds a fleet.* However, Roman operations in Sicily could only be conducted at considerable risk and the coasts of Italy remained exposed to continued raids as long as Carthage had undisputed control of the sea. Consequently the Romans decided to build a fleet that would put an end to the Carthaginian naval supremacy. They constructed 120 vessels, of which 100 were of the type called quinquiremes, the regular first class battleships of the day. The complement of each was three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty fighting men.(6) With this armament, and some vessels from the Roman allies, the consul, Gaius Duilius, put to sea in 260 B. C. and won a decisive battle off Mylae on the north coast of Sicily. As a result of this battle in the next year the Romans were able to occupy Corsica and attack Sardinia, and finding it impossible to force a decision in Sicily, they were in a position to attack Carthage in Africa itself.

*The Roman invasion of Africa, 256 B. C.* Another naval victory, off Ecnomus, on the south coast of Sicily, cleared the way for the successful landing of an army under the consul Marcus Atilius Regulus. He defeated the Carthaginians in battle and reduced them to such extremities that they sought to make peace. But the terms which Atilius proposed were so harsh that in desperation they resumed hostilities. At this juncture there arrived at Carthage, with other mercenaries, a Spartan soldier of fortune, Xantippus, who reorganized the Carthaginian army. By the skilful use of cavalry and war elephants he inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Romans and took Atilius prisoner. A Roman fleet rescued the remnants of the expedition, but was almost totally lost in a storm off the southern Sicilian coast (255).

*The war in Sicily, 254–241 B. C.* The Romans again concentrated their efforts against the Carthaginian strongholds in Sicily, which they attacked from land and sea. In 254 they took the important city of Panormus, and the Carthaginians were soon confined to the western extremity of the island. There, however, they successfully maintained themselves in Drepana and Lilybaeum. Meantime the Romans encountered a series of disasters on the sea. In 253 they lost a number of ships on the voyage from Lilybaeum to Rome, in 250 the consul Publius Clodius suffered a severe defeat in a naval battle at Drepana, and in the next year a third fleet was destroyed by a storm off Phintias in Sicily.

In 247 a new Carthaginian general, Hamilcar Barca, took command in Sicily and infused new life into the Carthaginian forces. From the citadel of Hercte first, and later from Eryx, he continually harassed the Romans not only in Sicily but even on the coast of Italy. Finally, in 242 B. C., when their public treasury was too exhausted to build another fleet, the Romans by private subscription equipped 200 vessels, which undertook the blockade of Lilybaeum and Drepana. A Carthaginian relief expedition was destroyed off the Aegates Islands, and it was impossible for their forces, now completely cut off in Sicily, to prolong the struggle. Carthage was compelled to conclude peace in 241 B. C.

*The terms of peace.* Carthage surrendered to Rome her remaining possessions in Sicily, with the islands between Sicily and Italy, besides agreeing to pay an indemnity of 3200 talents (about $3,500,000) in twenty years. For the Romans the long struggle had been very costly. At sea alone they had lost in the neighborhood of 500 ships and 200,000 men. But again the Roman military system had proven its worth against a mercenary army, and the excellence of the Roman soldiery had more than compensated for the weakness in the custom of annually changing commanders. Moreover, the military federation which Rome had created in Italy had stood the test of a long and weary war, without any disloyalty being manifest among her allies. On the other hand, the losses of Carthage had been even more heavy, and, most serious of all, her sea power was broken and Rome controlled the western Mediterranean.

*The revolt of the Carthaginian mercenaries.* Weakened as she was after the contest with Rome, Carthage became immediately thereafter involved in a life and death struggle with her mercenary troops. These, upon their return from Sicily, made demands upon the state which the latter found hard to meet and consequently refused. Thereupon the mercenaries mutinied and, joining with the native Libyans and the inhabitants of the subject Phoenician cities (Libyphoenicians), entered upon a war for the destruction of Carthage. After a struggle of more than three years, in which the most shocking barbarities were practised on either side and in which they were brought face to face with utter ruin, the Carthaginians under the leadership of Hamilcar Barca stamped out the revolt (238 B. C.).

*Rome acquires Sardinia.* Up to this point Rome had looked on without interference, but now, when Carthage sought to recover Sardinia from the mutinous garrison there, she declared war. Carthage could not think of accepting the challenge and bought peace at the price of Sardinia and Corsica and 1200 talents ($1,500,000). This unjustifiable act of the Romans rankled sore in the memories of the Carthaginians.

III. THE ILLYRIAN AND GALLIC WARS: 229–219 B. C.

*The first Illyrian war: 229–228 B. C.* In assuming control of the relations of her allies with foreign states, Rome had assumed responsibility for protecting their interests, and it was the fulfillment of this obligation which brought the Roman arms to the eastern shores of the Adriatic.

Under a king named Agron an extensive but loosely organized state had been formed among the Illyrians, a semibarbarous people inhabiting the Adriatic coast to the north of Epirus. These Illyrians were allied with the kingdom of Macedonia and sided with the latter in its wars with Epirus and the Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies. In 231 Agron died and was succeeded by his queen Teuta, who continued his policy of attacking the cities on the west coast of Greece and practising piracy on a large scale in the Adriatic and Ionian seas. Among those who suffered thereby were the south Italian cities, which in 230 B. C. as the result of fresh and more serious outrages appealed to Rome for redress. Thereupon the Romans demanded satisfaction from Teuta and, upon their demands being contemptuously rejected, they declared war.

*The Romans cross the Adriatic: 229 B. C.* In the next spring, 229 B. C., the Romans sent against the Illyrians a fleet and an army of such strength that the latter could offer but little resistance and in the next year were forced to sue for peace. Teuta had to give up a large part of her territory, to bind herself not to send a fleet into the Ionian sea, and to pay tribute to Rome. Corcyra, Epidamnus, Apollonia, and other cities became Roman allies.

The fact that Rome first crossed the Adriatic to prosecute a war against the Illyrians placed her in hostility to their ally, Macedonia, the greatest of the Greek states. And although Macedonia had been unable to offer aid to the Illyrians because of dynastic troubles that had followed the death of King Demetrius (229 B. C.), the Macedonians regarded with jealous suspicion Rome’s success and the establishment of a Roman sphere of influence east of the Adriatic. Conversely, the war had established friendly relations and coöperation between Rome and the foes of Macedon, the Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies, which rejoiced in the accession of such a powerful friend. The way was thus paved for the participation of Rome, as a partizan of the anti-Macedonian faction, in the struggles which had so long divided the Greek world.

*The second Illyrian war: 220–219 B. C.* The revival of Macedonian influence led indirectly to Rome’s second Illyrian war. The alliance of Antigonus Doson with the Achaean Confederacy and his conquest of Sparta (222 B. C.) united almost the whole of Greece under Macedonian suzerainty. Thereupon Demetrius of Pharos, a despot whose rule Rome had established in Corcyra, went over to Macedonia, attacked the cities allied with Rome, and sent a piratical squadron into Greek waters (220 B. C.). Rome, now threatened with a second Carthaginian War, acted with energy. Macedonia, under Philip V, the successor of Antigonus Doson, was involved in a war with the Aetolians and their allies. Deprived of support from this quarter Demetrius was speedily driven to take refuge in flight. His subjects surrendered and Rome took possession of his chief fortresses, Pharos and Dimillos.

*War with the Gauls in North Italy: 225–22 B. C.* In the interval between these Illyrian Wars Rome became involved in a serious conflict with the Gallic tribes settled in the Po valley. For about half a century this people had lived at peace with Rome, ceasing their raids into the peninsula and becoming a prosperous agricultural and pastoral people. It is claimed that they became alarmed at the Roman assignment of the public land on their southern borders, called the Ager Gallicus, to individual colonists in 233 B. C., and that this caused them to take up arms. However, this territory had been Roman since 283 B. C. and its settlement could hardly have been interpreted as an hostile act. More probable is it that the cause of the new Gallic invasion was the coming of fresh swarms from across the Alps, which some of the Cisalpine Gauls, who had forgotten the defeats of the previous generation, perhaps invited, and certainly joined, for the sake of plunder. In 238 such a band of Transalpines crossed the Roman frontier and penetrated as far as Ariminum, but serious dissensions broke out within their own ranks and they had to withdraw. There was no further inroad attempted until 225 B. C.

*The Gallic invasion of 225 B. C.* In that year a formidable horde, called the Gasatae, crossed the Alps and, joined by the Boii and Insubres, prepared to invade Roman territory with a force of 50,000 foot and 20,000 mounted men. The Romans and Italians were seriously alarmed, for the memory of the fatal day of the Allia had never been effaced. Rome called for a military census of her whole federation. The lists showed 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry. Expecting the Gauls to advance into Umbria the Romans stationed an army under one consul at Ariminum. The other consul was sent to Sardinia, possibly from fear of a Carthaginian attack, while the defence of Etruria was left to a force of Roman allies. Alliances were concluded with the Cenomani, a Gallic tribe to the north of the Po, and with the Veneti.

Avoiding the army at Ariminum the Gauls crossed the Apennines into Etruria, defeated the Roman allies and plundered the country. But the consul from Ariminum hastened to the rescue, the army in Sardinia was recalled, and the Gauls began to withdraw northwards to place their spoils in safety. The Romans followed and as the army from Sardinia landed to the north of the foe and cut off their retreat, the latter were surrounded and brought to bay at Telamon. They were annihilated in a bloody battle won by the superiority of the Roman tactics and generalship. One of the Roman consuls fell on the field of battle.

*War against the Boii and Insubres: 224–222 B. C.* Italy was saved, and now the Romans decided to expel the Boii and the Insubres from the Po valley as a penalty for their conduct and to prevent future invasions of this sort by occupying their territory. In three hard-fought campaigns the Romans, while they failed to exterminate or dispossess these peoples, reduced them to subjection, forcing them to surrender part of their territory and to pay tribute. But the Romans did not conquer without suffering heavy losses, and their ultimate success was to a considerable degree due to the coöperation of the Cenomani.

*The Roman frontier reaches the Alps.* Between 221 and 219 the Romans subdued the peoples of the Adriatic coast as far as the peninsula of Istria. Thus, with the exception of Liguria and the upper valley of the Po, all Italy to the south of the Alps was brought within the sphere of Roman influence. The Latin colonies Placentia and Cremona were founded in the territory taken from the Insubres to secure the Roman authority in this region, but Hannibal’s invasion of 217 B. C. found the Cisalpine Gauls ready to revolt against the Roman yoke.

IV. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: 218–202 B. C.

*Carthaginian expansion in Spain.* As we have seen, the Roman seizure of Sardinia and Corsica and the exaction of a fresh indemnity in 238 left a longing for revenge in the hearts of the dominant faction at Carthage. This faction was led by Hamilcar Barca, the victor of the mercenary war, who saw in Spain the opportunity for repairing the fortunes of his state, for compensating Carthage for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, and for developing an army that would enable him to face the Romans on an equal footing. The Phoenician subjects of Carthage were hard pressed by the attacks of the native Iberian peoples when he secured for himself the command of the Carthaginian forces in the peninsula (238 B. C.). By skilful generalship and able diplomacy he extended the Carthaginian dominion over many of the Spanish tribes, and created a strong army, devoted to himself and his family.

*Hasdrubal.* Consequently, when Hamilcar died in battle in 229 B. C. he was succeeded in the command by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who carried on his predecessor’s policy. He it was who founded the town of New Carthage (Carthagena) to serve as the center of Carthaginian influence in Spain. The annual revenue of from 2000 to 3000 talents ($2,400,000 to $3,000,000) derived from the Spanish silver mines readily induced the Carthaginians to acquiesce in the almost regal position that the Barcidae enjoyed in Spain. Thus the latter could carry out their plans without interference from the home government.

*Hasdrubal’s treaty with Rome, 226 B. C.* But the Carthaginian advance in Spain aroused the alarm of the Greeks of Massalia, and of her colonies, Emporiae and Rhodae, whose commercial interests and independence were thereby endangered. Now the Massaliots had long been in alliance with Rome,—they were said to have contributed to the ransom which the Romans paid to the Gauls in 387 B. C.,—and there seems little doubt that they secured the intervention of Rome on their behalf. In 226 B. C. the Romans concluded a treaty with Hasdrubal which bound him not to send an armed force north of the river Ebro. A few years later the Romans entered into a defensive alliance with the Spanish town of Saguntum, which lay to the south of the Ebro, but which was not subject to Carthage. The motive of the Romans in making this alliance is obscure, but it was probably in answer to a request from the Saguntines.

*Hannibal.* Upon the assassination of Hasdrubal in 221, Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, then in his twenty-sixth year, was appointed to the command in Spain. Thereupon, relying upon the army which his predecessors and he himself had built up in Spain and upon the resources of the Carthaginian dominions there, he resolved to take a step which would inevitably lead to war with Rome, namely, to attack Saguntum.

*The siege of Saguntum: 219 B. C.* Using as a pretext a dispute between the Saguntines and some of his Spanish allies, he laid siege to the town in 219 B. C. and captured it after a siege of eight months. A Roman embassy appeared at Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal and his staff as the price of averting war with Rome. But the anti-Roman party was in the majority and the Carthaginian senate accepted the responsibility for the act of their general, whatever its consequences might be. The Roman ambassador replied with the declaration of war.

*The Roman plan of campaign.* The most fateful result of the First Punic War had been the destruction of the maritime supremacy of Carthage. She never subsequently thought of contesting Rome’s dominion on the sea, and consequently, while extending her empire in Spain and Africa she had neglected to rebuild her navy. This fact was to be of decisive importance in the coming struggle. Rome, relying upon it, planned an offensive war. One army, under the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio, was to proceed to Spain, supported by the fleet of Massalia, and to detain Hannibal there, while a second army, under the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius, was assembled in Sicily to embark for Africa.

*The plan of Hannibal.* But the Romans had not taken into account the military genius of Hannibal, whose audacious plan of carrying the war into Italy upset their calculations. Realizing that he could not transport his army to Italy by sea, he was prepared to cross the Pyrenees, traverse southern Gaul and, crossing the Alps, descend upon Italy from the north. Among the Gauls of the Po valley he hoped to find recruits for his army, and expected that, once he was in Italy, the Roman allies would seize this opportunity of recovering their independence. Deprived of their support Rome would have to yield. His ultimate object was not the destruction of Rome, but the breaking up of the Roman federation in Italy, and the reduction of the Roman state to the limits attained in 340 B. C. This purpose is apparent from the plan of campaign which he followed after his arrival in Italy.

*Hannibal’s march into Italy.* Hannibal’s preparations were more advanced than those of the Romans and, early in the spring of 218 B. C., he set out from New Carthage for the Pyrenees. Forcing a passage there, he left the passes under guard and resumed his march with a picked army of Spaniards and Numidians. His brother Hasdrubal was left in Spain to collect reinforcements and follow with them. Hannibal arrived at the Rhone and crossed it by the time that Scipio reached Massalia on his way to Spain. The latter, failing to force Hannibal to give battle on the banks of the Rhone, returned in person to Italy, but decided to send his army, under the command of his brother, to Spain, a decision which had the most serious consequences for Carthage. Meanwhile Hannibal continued his march and, overcoming the opposition of the peoples whose territory he traversed, as well as the more serious obstacles of bad roads, dangerous passes, cold, and hunger, he crossed the Alps and descended into the plain of North Italy in the autumn of 218, after a march of five months.(7) His army was reduced to 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. Practically all his elephants perished.

Hannibal at once found support and an opportunity to rest his weary troops among the Insubres and the Boii, the latter of whom had already taken up arms against the Romans. At the news of his arrival in Italy Sempronius was at once recalled from Sicily, but Scipio who had anticipated him ventured to attack Hannibal with the forces under his command. He was beaten in a skirmish at the river Ticinus, and Hannibal was able to cross the Po. Upon the arrival of Sempronius, both consuls attacked the Carthaginians at the Trebia, only to receive a crushing defeat (December, 218).

*Hannibal invades the peninsula: 217 B. C.* Hannibal wintered in north Italy and in the spring, with an army raised to 50,000 by the addition of Celtic recruits, prepared to invade the peninsula. The Romans divided their forces, stationing one consul at Ariminum and the other at Arretium in Etruria. Hannibal chose to cross the Apennines and the marshes of Etruria, where he surprised and annihilated the army of the consul Flaminius at the Trasimene Lake (217 B. C.). Flaminius himself was among the slain. This victory was soon followed by a second in which the cavalry of the army of the second consul was cut to pieces. Hannibal began his attempt to detach the Italians from the Roman alliance by releasing his Italian prisoners to carry word to their cities that he had come to set them free. Thereupon he marched into Samnium, ravaging the Roman territory as he went.

The Romans in great consternation chose a dictator, Quintus Fabius Maximus. Fabius recognized the superiority of Hannibal’s generalship and of the Carthaginian cavalry, and consequently refused to be drawn into a general engagement. But he followed the enemy closely and continually threatened an attack, so that Hannibal could not divide his forces for purposes of raiding and foraging. Still he was able to penetrate into Campania and thence to recross the mountains into Apulia, where he decided to establish winter quarters. The strategy of Fabius, which had not prevented the enemy from securing supplies and devastating wide areas, grew so irksome to the Romans that they violated all precedent in appointing Marcus Minucius, the master of the horse and an advocate of aggressive tactics, as a second dictator. But when the latter risked an engagement, he was badly beaten and only prompt assistance from Fabius saved his army from destruction.

*Cannae: 216 B. C.* Next spring found the Romans and Carthaginians facing each other in Apulia. The Romans were led by the new consuls, Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro. The over-confidence of Varro led to the battle of Cannae, one of the greatest battles of antiquity and the bloodiest of all Roman defeats. Of 50,000 Romans and allies, about 25,000 were slain and 10,000 captured by the numerically inferior Carthaginians. The consequences of the battle were serious. For the first time Rome’s allies showed serious signs of disloyalty. In Apulia and in Bruttium Hannibal found many adherents; ambassadors from Philip of Macedon appeared at his headquarters, the prelude to an alliance in the next year; Syracuse also, where Hiero the friend of Rome had just died, wavered and finally went over to Carthage; and, most serious of all, Capua opened its gates to Hannibal.

Still the courage of the Romans never wavered. They at once levied a new force to replace the army destroyed at Cannae. The central Italian allies, the Greek cities in the south, and the Latins, remained true to their allegiance, and the fortified towns of the latter proved to be the pillars of the Roman strength. For Hannibal, owing to the smallness of his army and the necessity of maintaining it in a hostile country, had to be continually on the march and could not undertake siege operations, for which he also lacked engines of war. Thus the Romans, avoiding pitched battles, were able to attempt the systematic reduction of the towns which had yielded to Hannibal and to hamper seriously the provisioning of his forces. At the same time they still held command of the sea, kept up their offensive in Spain, and held their ground against Carthaginian attacks in Sicily and Sardinia.

*Rome recovers Syracuse and Capua: 212–11 B. C.* In 213 the Romans were able to invest Syracuse. The Syracusans with the aid of engines of war designed by the physicist Archimedes resisted desperately, but Marcellus, the Roman general, pressed the siege vigorously, and treachery caused the city to fall (212 B. C.). Syracuse was sacked, its art treasures carried off to Rome, and for the future it was subject and tributary to Rome. And in Italy, although Hannibal defeated and killed the consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, and was able to occupy the cities of Tarentum (although not its citadel), Heraclea and Thurii, he could not prevent the Romans from laying siege to Capua (212 B. C.). The next year he thought to force them to raise the blockade by a sudden incursion into Latium, where he appeared before the walls of Rome. But Rome was garrisoned, the army besieging Capua was not recalled, and Hannibal’s march was in vain. Capua was starved into submission, its nobility put to the sword, its territory confiscated, and its municipal organization dissolved.

*Operations against Philip V. of Macedon.* Upon concluding his alliance with Hannibal, Philip of Macedon hastened to attack the Roman possessions in Illyria. Here he met with some successes, but failed to take Corcyra or Apollonia which were saved by the Roman fleet. Furthermore, Rome’s command of the sea prevented his lending any effective aid to his ally in Italy. Before long the Romans were able to induce the Aetolians to make an alliance with them and attack Macedonia. Thereupon other enemies of Philip, among them Sparta and King Attalus of Pergamon, joined in the war on the side of Rome. The Achaean Confederacy, however, supported Philip. The coalition against the latter was so strong that he had to cease his attacks upon Roman territory and Rome could be content with supporting her Greek allies with a small fleet, while she devoted her energies to the other theatres of war.

*The war in Spain: 218–207 B. C.* The fall of Capua came at a moment most opportune for the Romans, since they had immediate need to send reinforcements to Spain. Thither, as we have seen, they had sent an army in 218 B. C. under Gnaeus Scipio, who obtained a foothold north of the Ebro. In the next year he was joined by his brother Publius Cornelius. Thereupon the Romans crossed the Ebro and invaded the Carthaginian dominions to the south. A revolt of the Numidians caused the recall of Hasdrubal to Africa, and the Romans were able to capture Saguntum and induce many Spanish tribes to desert the Carthaginian cause. However, upon the return of Hasdrubal and the arrival of reinforcements from Carthage, the Carthaginian commanders united their forces and crushed the two Roman armies one after the other (211 B. C.). Both the Scipios fell in battle and the Carthaginians recovered all their territory south of the Ebro.

*Publius Cornelius Scipio sent to Spain: 210 B. C.* Undismayed by these disasters the Romans determined to continue their efforts to conquer Spain because of its importance as a recruiting ground for the Carthaginian armies and because the continuance of the war there prevented reinforcements being sent to Hannibal in Italy. The fall of Capua and the fortunate turn of events in Sicily enabled them to release fresh troops for service in Spain, and in 210 B. C., being dissatisfied with the cautious strategy of the pro-praetor Nero, then commanding north of the Ebro, the Senate determined to send out a commander who would continue the aggressive tactics of the Scipios. As the most suitable person they fixed on Publius Cornelius Scipio, son of the like-named consul who had fallen in 211. However, he was only in his twenty-fourth year and having filled no magistracy except the aedileship, he was technically disqualified from exercising the _imperium_. Therefore, his appointment was made the subject of a special law in the Comitia, which nominated him to the command in Spain with the rank of a pro-consul. This is the first authentic instance of the conferment of the _imperium_ upon a private citizen.

*The capture of New Carthage: 209 B. C.* Seeing that the armies of his opponents were divided and engaged in reconquering the Spanish tribes, Scipio resumed the offensive, crossed the Ebro, and by a daring stroke seized the chief Carthaginian base—New Carthage. Here he found vast stores of supplies and, more important still, the hostages from the Spanish peoples subject to Carthage. His liberation of these, and his generous treatment of the Spaniards in general was in such striking contrast with the oppressive measures of the Carthaginians, that he rapidly won over to his support both the enemies and the adherents of the former.

*Hasdrubal’s march to Italy: 208 B. C.* Meanwhile in Italy the Romans proceeded steadily with the reduction of the strongholds in the hands of Hannibal. Tarentum was recovered in 210, and although Hannibal defeated and slew the consuls Gnaeus Fulvius (210) and Marcus Marcellus (208), his forces were so diminished that his maintaining himself in Italy depended upon the arrival of strong reinforcements. Since his arrival he had received but insignificant additions to his army from Carthage, whose energies had been directed to the other theatres of war. Up to this time also the Roman activities in Spain had prevented any Carthaginian troops leaving that country. But after the fall of New Carthage and the subsequent successes of Scipio, Hasdrubal, despairing of the situation there, determined to march to the support of his brother by the same route which the latter had taken. Scipio endeavored to bar his path, but although Hasdrubal was defeated in battle he and 10,000 of his men cut their way through the Romans and crossed the Pyrenees (208 B. C.).

*The Metaurus: 207 B. C.* The next spring he arrived among the Gauls to the south of the Alps. Reinforced by them he marched into the peninsula to join forces with Hannibal. For the Romans it was of supreme importance to prevent this. They therefore divided their forces; the consul Gaius Claudius faced Hannibal in Apulia, while Marcus Livius went to intercept Hasdrubal. Through the capture of messengers sent by the latter Claudius learned of his position and, leaving part of his army to detain Hannibal, he withdrew the rest without his enemy’s knowledge and joined his colleague Livius. Together they attacked Hasdrubal at the Metaurus; his army was cut to pieces and he himself was slain. With the battle the doom of Hannibal’s plans was sealed, and with them the doom of Carthage. Hannibal himself recognized that all was lost and withdrew into the mountains of Bruttium.

*The conquest of Carthaginian Spain, and peace with Philip.* For the first time in the war the Romans could breathe freely and look forward with confidence to the issue. In the two years (207–206 B. C.) following the departure of Hasdrubal Scipio completed the conquest of what remained to Carthage in Spain. In 205 he returned to Rome to enter upon the consulship, and thereupon went to Sicily to make preparations for the invasion of Africa, since the Romans were now able to carry out their plan of 218 B. C. which Hannibal had then interrupted. At this moment, too, the Romans found themselves free from any embarrassment from the side of Macedonia. In Greece the war had dragged on without any decided advantage for either side until 207, when the temporary withdrawal of the Roman fleet enabled Philip and the Achaean Confederacy to win such successes that their opponents listened to the intervention of the neutral states and made peace (206 B. C.). In the next year the Romans also came to terms with Philip.

*The invasion of Africa: 204 B. C.* In 204 B. C. Scipio transported his army to Africa. At first, however, he was able to do nothing before the combined forces of the Carthaginians and the Numidian chief, Syphax, who had renewed his alliance with them. But in the following year he routed both armies so decisively that he was able to capture and depose Syphax, and to set up in his place a rival chieftain, Masinissa, whose adherence to the Romans brought them a welcome superiority in cavalry. The Carthaginians now sought to make peace. An armistice was granted them; Hannibal and all Carthaginian forces were recalled from Italy, and the preliminary terms of peace drawn up (203 B. C.). Hannibal left Italy with the remnant of his veterans after a campaign which had established his reputation as one of the world’s greatest masters of the art of war. For nearly fifteen years he had maintained himself in the enemy’s country with greatly inferior forces, and now after inflicting many severe defeats and never losing a battle he was forced to withdraw because of lack of resources, not because of the superior generalship of his foes. Before leaving Italian soil he set up a record of his exploits in the temple of Hera Lacinia in Bruttium.

*Zama: 202 B. C.* An almost incredible feeling of over-confidence seems to have been aroused in Carthage by the arrival of Hannibal. The Carthaginians broke the armistice by attacking some Roman transports and refused to meet Scipio’s demand for an explanation. Hostilities were therefore resumed. At Zama the two greatest generals the war had developed met in its final battle. Hannibal’s tactics were worthy of his reputation but his army was crushed by the flight of the Carthaginian mercenaries at a critical moment, and by the Roman superiority in cavalry(8).

*Peace: 201 B. C.* For Carthage all hope of resistance was over and she had to accept the Roman terms. These were: the surrender of all territory except the city of Carthage and the surrounding country in Africa, an indemnity of 10,000 talents ($12,000,000), the surrender of all vessels of war except ten triremes, and of all war elephants, and the obligation to refrain from carrying on war outside of Africa, or even in Africa unless with Rome’s consent. The Numidians were united in a strong state on the Carthaginian borders, under the Roman ally Masinissa. Scipio returned to Rome to triumph “over the Carthaginians and Hannibal,” and to receive, from the scene of his victory, the name of Africanus.

V. THE EFFECT OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR UPON ITALY

The destruction of the Carthaginian empire left Rome mistress of the western Mediterranean and by far the greatest power of the time. But this victory had only been attained after a tremendous struggle, the greatest probably that the ancient world ever witnessed, a struggle which called forth in Rome the patriotic virtues of courage, devotion, and self-sacrifice to a degree that aroused the admiration of subsequent generations, which drained her resources of men and treasure and which left ineffaceable scars upon the soil of Italy.

One of the main factors in deciding the issue was the Roman command of the sea which Carthage never felt able to challenge seriously. Another was the larger citizen body of Rome, and the friendly relations between herself and her federate allies. This, with the system of universal military service, gave her a citizen soldiery which in morale and numbers was superior to the armies of Carthage. As long as Hannibal was in Italy Rome kept from year to year upwards of 100,000 men in the field. Once only, after the battle of Cannae, was she unable to replace her losses by the regular system of recruiting and had to arm 8000 slaves who were promised freedom as a reward for faithful service. On the other hand, Carthage had to raise her forces from mercenaries or from subject allies. As her resources dwindled the former became ever more difficult to obtain, while the demands made upon the latter caused revolts that cost much effort to subdue. It required the personality of a Hannibal to develop an _esprit de corps_ and discipline such as characterized his army in Italy. A third factor was the absence in the Roman commanders of the personal rivalries and lack of coöperation which so greatly hampered the Carthaginians in Spain and in Sicily. Still one must not be led into the error of supposing that the Carthaginians did not display tenacity and patriotism to a very high degree. The senatorial class especially distinguished itself by courage and ability, and there are no evidences of factional strife hampering the conduct of the war. The Romans overcame the disadvantage of the annual change of commanders-in-chief by the use of the proconsulship and pro-praetorship often long prorogued, whereby officers of ability retained year after year the command of the same armies. This system enabled them to develop such able generals as Metellus and the Scipios.

The cost of maintaining her fleet and her armies taxed the financial resources of Rome to the utmost. The government had to make use of a reserve fund which had been accumulating in the treasury for thirty years from the returns of the 5% tax on the value of manumitted slaves, and the armies in Spain could only be kept in the field by the generosity and patriotism of several companies of contractors who furnished supplies at their own expense until the end of the war. An additional burden was the increased cost of the necessities of life and the danger of a grain famine, caused by the disturbed conditions in Italy and Sicily and the withdrawal of so many men from agricultural occupations. In 210 the situation was only relieved by an urgent appeal to Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt, from whom grain had to be purchased at three times the usual price. However, this crisis passed with the pacification of Sicily in the next year.

Furthermore, a heavy tribute had been levied upon the man power of the Roman state. The census list of citizens eligible for military service fell from about 280,000 at the beginning of the war to 237,000 in 209; and the federate allies must have suffered at least as heavily. The greatest losses fell upon the southern part of the peninsula. There, year after year, the fields had been laid waste and the villages devastated by the opposing armies, until the rural population had almost entirely disappeared, the land had become a wilderness, and the more prosperous cities had fallen into decay. From the effects of these ravages southern Italy never recovered.