Part 60

In the North, then, the Treaty of Tilsitt had produced the effect which Napoleon had desired. Advantage had been taken of the bombardment of Copenhagen, which was held to be a fresh proof of the lawless ambition of England, to oblige Austria, Russia, and Prussia all to declare war with England. Denmark had joined the French alliance, Sweden had been compelled to forego the friendship of England. But there still existed one part of Europe where the Berlin Decree was unacknowledged, and the blockade of the British Isles was thus incomplete; this country was Portugal.

[Sidenote: Condition of the Peninsula.]

[Sidenote: Napoleon's pretext for war with Portugal.]

Napoleon had long had his eyes fixed upon the Peninsula; by the Treaty of Tilsitt it had in fact been delivered into his hands as Finland into the hands of Alexander. The condition of the Peninsula was very favourable to his schemes. Charles IV., a weak old man, was on the throne, governed by his wife and by her favourite minister Godoy, the Prince of the Peace. In strong opposition to his father and to the Queen was Ferdinand, the Prince of Asturias. Both parties intrigued for the support of Napoleon, but Godoy had been able to offer the more tempting bait. Napoleon had induced the Prince of Asturias to enter into communication with regard to a marriage with a lady of the Bonaparte family. The secret correspondence had been brought to the knowledge of the King, and made use of by him and his minister to affix a charge of treason upon the Prince, and to imprison him for having conspired to drive his father from the throne. By the people the story of the conspiracy was regarded as a calumny of the minister to destroy the Prince, and fearful of the storm he had excited, Godoy now attempted to mediate a reconciliation between the King and his son. The Prince in his imprisonment was induced to write penitential letters, and a solemn pardon was given. But though the attempt to remove the Prince had thus failed, Godoy's own connection with Napoleon, who had probably been at the bottom of the late affair, was almost immediately shown by the publication, on the 29th of October, of the Treaty of Fontainebleau. This treaty disclosed the bait with which Godoy had been enabled to secure the alliance of Bonaparte. He suggested that France and Spain should join in appropriating Portugal if only he were allowed a principality out of the spoil. The house of Braganza was to be dispossessed; the northern province of Portugal was to be given to the King of Etruria,[21] whose own province, Tuscany, might thus be appended to the Italian kingdom; Godoy was to be rewarded with the principality of Alentejo and Algarves. Some excuse was of course wanted for this wanton attack upon Portugal. It was found in the way in which the Court of Lisbon obeyed the demand addressed to it after the Peace of Tilsitt, to close the ports of Portugal against England, to detain all Englishmen resident in Portugal, and to confiscate all English property. Meanwhile all Portuguese merchant ships in the ports of France were to be detained. The Prince Regent of Portugal was not strong enough to resist the demand. He obeyed the first order, without however forfeiting the friendship of England, which confessed the coercion laid upon him. To the other two demands he also at length conceded, but not till he had given plentiful warning to the English to withdraw and to sell their property. The delay was, however, sufficient to afford Napoleon the pretext he wanted.

[Sidenote: Junot's army enters Spain. Oct. 18.]

[Sidenote: Ferdinand VII. succeeds his father Charles IV. March 19, 1808.]

[Sidenote: Murat occupies Madrid. March 23.]

[Sidenote: Napoleon places Joseph on the throne.]

While negotiations were still proceeding with Portugal, the real intention of the Emperor--to appropriate both that country and Spain--became obvious. For this purpose nearly 30,000 French troops were to enter Spain, and 40,000 more were assembled at Bayonne. While Junot, with "the first army of the Gironde," poured through Salamanca (in October 1807), and proceeded to the conquest of Portugal, the domestic quarrels of the Spanish Court continuing, the 40,000 men assembled at Bayonne moved in two armies into Spain, and while apparently preparing to follow Junot, really occupied the line of mountains north of Madrid, and cut off that capital from the northern provinces, which were thus practically conquered without a blow. In March 1808 riots both in Madrid and Aranjuez, ending in the abdication of Charles and the accession of Ferdinand, gave the French, now under the command of Murat, an excuse for crossing the mountains by the Pass of Somo Sierra and occupying Madrid. By a series of shameless intrigues Napoleon attracted both Ferdinand and his father to Bayonne. Ferdinand was there induced to restore the crown to his father (May 5), who abdicated a second time, placing the crown in the hands of Napoleon. Napoleon immediately established his brother Joseph upon the vacant throne (June 15).

[Sidenote: Insurrection in Spain.]

[Sidenote: Operations of Napoleon's three armies from Madrid.]

[Sidenote: Joseph evacuates Madrid. Aug. 1, 1808.]

But the Spaniards, especially the Castilians, were a people of high temper; in spite of a century's degradation, certain remembrances of a former greatness hung about them. They saw with scorn and disgust the treacherous conduct of their own rulers, who were handing them over, bound hand and foot, to a foreign prince, whose very virtues rendered him doubly detestable to them; for the rule of the French meant splendid and centralized organization, restraint, self-denial, and wise government, very much opposed to Spanish feeling. While their rulers were basely truckling to the invader the people rose; the flame of insurrection spread far and wide; great riots in Toledo and Madrid were followed by similar exhibitions of national anger throughout the country, and Napoleon's armies, though they found no regular opposition, though intrigue and treachery had apparently removed all obstacles, found themselves in the midst of a hostile population, and masters only of the ground on which they stood. To meet this new difficulty the fertile mind of the Emperor had at once a plan ready. Madrid was to be a centre from which should radiate in all directions expeditionary armies to suppress the insurrections, Madrid itself resting for support on France. To hold the communications between Madrid and France therefore became a prime object. This work was intrusted to Bessières, while Duhesme operated in Catalonia, and expeditions were sent out from Madrid against Valencia under Moncey, and against Andalusia under Dupont. Bessières, though his general Lefèbvre failed before the desperate energy of the Saragossans, thoroughly defeated the Gallician troops under Blake and Cuesta at the Rio Seco. Duhesme effected nothing, and was obliged to raise the siege of Gerona. Moncey, though he reached the town of Valencia with success, was unable to take it, and had to retreat. Dupont pushed at first as far as Cordova, but losing heart, and badly supplied from Madrid, also attempted to retreat, was pursued by the Spaniards, and compelled to lay down his arms with 18,000 men, after the battle of Baylen, before he could recross the Sierra Morena. Unsuccessful, therefore, on all sides, and though victorious yet hard pressed upon the North, the French were obliged to retire, and King Joseph, evacuating Madrid, withdrew to France.

[Sidenote: The Portuguese royal family emigrate to Brazil. Nov. 29, 1807.]

[Sidenote: Junot's army occupies Lisbon. Nov. 30.]

Meanwhile Junot's army had proceeded direct to Portugal with orders to occupy it by the 30th of November 1807. As Junot approached the capital, the Prince Regent, acting under the advice of Lord Strangford, the English ambassador, determined to leave his European dominions and to transfer the apparatus and seat of government to Brazil. On the 29th of November as many as 15,000 persons were carried by the English fleet down the Tagus. The last ship had hardly sailed when Junot arrived. He had wished to stop and reorganize his troops in Salamanca, but pressed by the Emperor, he hurried forward in spite of the difficulties of the way, and marched upon Lisbon with only a few thousand weary and travel-worn soldiers. He however met with no opposition there, and after the manner of Napoleon's lieutenants, at once set about Gallicizing the country. The Portuguese army was chiefly sent away to France. The police in the hands of the French was well administered, and though the people of Lisbon obeyed unwillingly, order was successfully maintained. The position of Spain and Portugal was thus closely analogous; in both cases the people had been deserted by their natural rulers, in both cases the consequences were the same. The insurrections in Spain were followed by similar movements in Portugal. The people took the government into their own hands, and a popular Junta was established at Oporto under the influence of the Bishop.

[Sidenote: Enthusiasm in England for the Spanish insurrection.]

[Sidenote: Asturian envoys arrive in England. June 1808.]

The insurrection in Spain had been observed with enthusiastic admiration by the people of England. It seemed at last as if that popular insurrection against the tyranny of Napoleon, which had long been expected, had arrived. Nevertheless, the total absence of central authority produced its inevitable effects upon a country so ill ruled and so ignorant of self-government as Spain. Ambitious men everywhere laid hold of the local authority, and irresponsible juntas arose. The provincial feeling, always unreasonably strong in the Peninsula, found full vent. Junta disputed with junta, and the whole country was involved in the wildest anarchy. None the less the feeling of the English people was a true one. Napoleon had reached the point when he came into collision with that very power which formed the basis of his own success--the power of the people. Already his behaviour in Germany had excited among the lower classes enthusiastic feelings of hatred to their conquerors and of desire for national liberty; and the outbreak of the Spanish insurrection added fresh vigour and raised fresh hopes in the lovers of liberty throughout the whole of Europe. To the English Government the arrival of two Asturian envoys in the month of June seemed to offer an opportunity which had long been wanted of giving a national and unselfish character to our opposition to the great conqueror. In the course of time it afforded also a battle-ground on which at length the military power of the country found room to move in larger and more combined action, than in the feeble expeditions of the earlier part of the war. But as yet this was not foreseen. For some years the great war in the Peninsula was starved, while money was lavished upon useless and isolated efforts in other parts of the Continent; it was only slowly and by degrees that the genius, the steadfastness, the success, of Wellington taught England the necessity of large and well-continued efforts in one direction. The Asturian envoys were received with enthusiasm not only by the Opposition but by the Government. But the opportunity offered was not wisely made use of. Spain was inundated with agents of no political ability, who were deceived by the boasting assertions of the Spaniards. Money and arms were sent over in lavish quantities to be left unopened on the quays, appropriated by the rival juntas for their own personal or local advantage, or to fall into the hands of the enemy, and the Spaniards, who did little or nothing for themselves, were taught to demand the assistance of England as a right.

[Sidenote: An English force sent to Portugal.]

[Sidenote: Wellesley lands at Figueras. Aug. 1, 1808.]

The position of Portugal seemed to offer a more favourable ground for action, and thither it was determined to send an English armament. But the Government could not yet conceive of war upon a large scale, and in entire ignorance of the real condition of Spain believed that a mere handful of English troops, aided by the boasted enthusiasm of the Spanish nation, would be able to withstand the enormous armies Napoleon was ready to pour into the Peninsula. The army at first sent was little better than an expeditionary force. A body of troops ready at Cork for war in South America were despatched under Sir Arthur Wellesley, at that time Secretary for Ireland; but by some ridiculous mismanagement two senior officers, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, were put over his head, and Sir John Moore, who was despatched with a second body of troops to reinforce him, though he had served as commander-in-chief both in Sicily and Sweden, also found himself in a subordinate position. The expedition touched first at Corunna, but was persuaded by the members of the local junta to proceed to Portugal, where they declared the numerous Spanish army was already collected, and whither they promised speedily to send reinforcements. Upon reaching Oporto, however, the commander found that there were no Spanish troops in the north of Portugal, neither were there any Portuguese troops; but upon the river Mondego there appeared to be a disorganized body of about 5000 men, representing 40,000 for whom the Bishop of Oporto had received accoutrements. With them there were some 10,000 peasants without arms. Wellesley had now a choice left. He might land north of Lisbon and act against Junot, or proceed to Cadiz, and joining Spencer, who had a small command there, act against the French in Spain. He preferred the first alternative, and determined to land at the mouth of the Mondego, near Figueras. He sent to Cadiz for Spencer's troops, but fortunately that general, on hearing of the victory of Baylen, had already determined to sail for the Tagus. The two corps when joined amounted to about 12,000 men. The landing of the English at the Mondego confined the operations to that tongue of land which lies between the sea and the Tagus in its south-westerly course, and which is terminated by the city of Lisbon.

[Sidenote: Combat of Rorica. Aug. 17.]

Wellesley determined to strike rapidly, and bring affairs in Portugal to a crisis at once. Therefore, although deserted by the Portuguese troops, he advanced directly southward towards Lisbon. Junot's troops were somewhat scattered, and the temper of the people prevented him from energetic action. He proceeded, however, to concentrate his troops, and while this movement was going forward the English army came into contact with one of his divisions under Laborde, occupying a strong position at the end of a valley leading from Obidos to Rorica. Here, after a sharp contest, the French general found himself outflanked by the hills which line the valley, and withdrew, allowing Wellesley to proceed. Meanwhile Junot had been continuing his concentration, and had collected 14,000 men at Torres Vedras, to bar the road to Lisbon. Sir Harry Burrard, Wellesley's superior officer, had now arrived at the coast, and Wellesley begged him to allow Sir John Moore's division, on its arrival from England, to land on the Mondego river, and cross the tongue of land to the Tagus, thus cutting off the natural line of retreat into Spain, which would be up the valley of that river. He then proceeded to advance against Junot. But Burrard, a commonplace general, disregarding his advice, determined to bring Sir John Moore up as a reinforcement, and forbad Wellesley to undertake any offensive movement till that general's arrival.

[Sidenote: Battle of Vimiero. Aug. 21, 1808.]

Wellesley was therefore obliged to return to his army, which was in position at Vimiero. A little hill covered the village to the front. On either side of it ran a chain of heights, from which on the east a branch ran off southwards. There was a direct road between Vimiero and Torres Vedras, and a second road from Torres Vedras to a place called Lourinham ran along the top of the branch ridge crossing the main ridge. On the hill before the village and upon the ridge to the west Wellesley took up his position, expecting to be attacked on his right. But early on the 21st the French came into view on the Lourinham road, and as they pressed forward evidently threatened the left, and not the right, of the English position. A considerable body of troops was therefore moved from the right to the left ridge, a movement unobserved by the French, for the valley between the armies was thickly wooded. For the same reason a ravine which rendered the left wing nearly unassailable was unobserved by the French. Junot directed two main attacks, upon the central hill and upon the left ridge. The attack upon the centre was defeated, for it was open on the flank to the fire of an English brigade moving to the left, which halted half-way up the hill when the strength of the central attack was seen; the left attack was ruined by the ravine. Meanwhile troops had been sent to turn the English left by the Lourinham road and to advance along the left ridge, which the French believed almost unoccupied; but, as has been mentioned, it was now covered with troops, and Ferguson's brigade beat the assailants back, and pursued them along the ridge till he had wholly separated them from the rest of the French army. They must have capitulated had not an unexpected order arrived to halt. Sir Harry Burrard, who had been on the field all day, had just assumed the command, and the change of leaders became at once perceptible. When the battle was over, thirteen guns, and many prisoners, including a general, were in the hands of the English, and the French had lost between 2000 and 3000 men.

[Sidenote: Convention of Cintra. Aug. 30.]

The road to Torres Vedras from Lourinham, on which the beaten French army had collected, was two miles longer than the direct road from Vimiero. Wellesley designed to push forward with his victorious army, part of which had not been engaged, to forestall the French at Torres Vedras, and cut them off from Lisbon, a measure which, had Sir John Moore been landed from Mondego, must have completed their ruin. Again the prudence of Sir Harry Burrard thwarted Wellesley's plan. He was compelled to allow his army to rest in their old position. Sir Harry Burrard having thus spoilt a great victory, was almost immediately superseded by the arrival of Sir Hugh Dalrymple. Their combined wisdom allowed an advance upon Lisbon, but insisted on bringing Sir John Moore to join the army. While this was being settled, an envoy arrived from the French offering to treat, and finally the convention known as the Convention of Cintra was entered into, in many points against Wellesley's advice. It stipulated for the evacuation of Portugal, but for the transport of the whole French army, with their guns and horses, to France. It was likewise arranged that the Russian fleet, at that time in Lisbon, should be regarded as in a neutral port; but as some English regiments had got possession of the mouth of the river, and had hoisted the English flag, this clause was overruled, and Siniavin, the Russian admiral, with his fleet, passed into the hands of the English.

[Sidenote: Napoleon's position in Europe.]

It was not to be supposed that Napoleon would calmly watch the defeat of his troops even in an obscure corner of Europe, still less when their defeat seemed to thwart the completeness of his system, and was connected with events which had driven his brother from his throne. Though he knew that conquered Prussia beneath the surface was glowing with inextinguishable hatred, and though Austria, in spite of the war against England in which she was nominally engaged, was strengthening her army and re-establishing her finances in a way which seemed to threaten fresh efforts at freedom on her part, he determined to turn the full strength of his Empire upon the devoted Peninsula. He felt that so long as his friendship with Russia existed, so long as the Peace of Tilsitt held firm, his position was tolerably secure. He therefore renewed his alliance with Russia at a meeting with the Czar at Erfurth (Oct. 12), and suddenly ordered the widely scattered divisions of the grand army to concentrate on Paris preparatory to marching into Spain.

[Sidenote: Preparations in Spain.]

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore's march to Salamanca. Oct.]

Unconscious of the coming danger and of the vast strength of its enemy, the central Junta at Madrid went on with its ill-arranged preparations to secure the freedom of Spain, and with its idle boasts as to the strength of the national armies. The English Government had not yet lost faith in Spanish assertions, nor learnt the absolute worthlessness of Spanish generals and armies; the fables of the Junta gained credence, and while all the other generals who had gone to Portugal were recalled, some 25,000 men were intrusted to Sir John Moore, with orders to advance into Spain and assist the Spanish troops, which were now occupying the valley of the Ebro and closing the French frontier. Even had the Spanish troops been worth anything, there was an absurd disproportion between the forces prepared and the scene of action for which they were intended. Nor did this weakness fail to strike military men. The Duke of York, though by no means a first-rate general, called the attention of Government to the wide dissipation of the Spanish troops, and the great distance of Portugal from the scene of action, and gave it as his opinion that to employ less than 60,000 men was merely to waste them. The Government refused to listen to his advice, Lord Castlereagh, the War Minister, was unmoved, and Moore was sent forward to certain failure. With a raw commissariat, and ill supplied with money, although it was at that very time being lavished upon the Spaniards, he embarked upon his dangerous march through a country where the roads were so bad that his artillery to reach Salamanca had to proceed all up the valley of the Tagus almost to Madrid and come back to meet him at Salamanca, where he was to be joined by reinforcements from England under Sir David Baird. Moore's concentration at Salamanca was wholly based on the supposition that the Spanish armies were strong enough at all events to retard, if not wholly to resist, the invasion of the French. Yet the grand army was rapidly approaching, and before long the forces collected upon the frontier rendered resistance hopeless. In September arrangements were made for the incorporation of the troops coming from Germany with those already in Spain, and eight great corps d'armée, commanded by six French marshals and Generals Junot and St. Cyr, besides the Imperial Guard, were collected to bear down all opposition.

[Sidenote: Napoleon arrives at Vittoria. Nov. 8, 1808.]

While Moore was painfully completing his concentration at Salamanca, Napoleon himself arrived at Vittoria, and almost immediately the Spanish troops, which the English general was to support, were scattered to the winds.

[Sidenote: Destruction of the Spanish armies. Napoleon at Madrid. Dec. 4, 1808.]