Part 59

The temporary annihilation of Austria at Austerlitz, and the complete overthrow of Prussia at Jena, had made Napoleon master of nearly the whole of Europe. Nothing is more remarkable than the rapid expansion of his ambition; each new success seemed to supply him with a new starting-point for further schemes. His mind, in spite of its practical character, had a strong tendency towards romance; as in his youth he had been fired with the idea of a great Eastern monarchy, so now, as circumstances had been favourable to him, the idea of repeating the rôle of Charlemagne, and the re-establishment of the Empire of the West, seems to have been prominent in his mind. Already, in his dealings with the Pope, in the Confederation of the Rhine, and in the creation of vassal kingdoms, he had shown his wish to imitate the conduct of that great ruler. The idea was confirmed by the conquest of Prussia, and strengthened by a petition from one of his armies that he would take the title of Emperor of the West. Russia was the only opponent left upon the Continent. If Russia could be either conquered or won over, not only would he have been in truth the Western Emperor, but he would have the means, as he believed, of wreaking his vengeance upon his detested rival England, which still refused to yield to his ascendancy. Already in fact, he believed that this vengeance was in his grasp. On the 21st of November he issued the extraordinary measure known as the Berlin Decree. Even during the negotiations with Fox he had insisted upon Prussia closing against English traffic the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. The measure had not been a success, 400 Prussian vessels had been seized in reprisal, and the mouths of the North German rivers declared in a state of blockade. That blockade had been real. But the Emperor now, as he said by a just use of the law of retaliation (while he was unable with safety to place a single ship upon the ocean), declared that the whole of the British Isles were in a state of blockade, forbad on the part of all his dependent countries any commerce or correspondence with them, declared every subject of England found in a country occupied by French troops a prisoner of war, and all English merchandise, even all private property of Englishmen, confiscated. Thus was established what is known as the Continental system. It laboured under three disadvantages. In the first place, it was absolutely impracticable, Europe could not be supplied without England, as Napoleon himself found in the course of the year when he authorized the clothing of his own army with English cloth; secondly, it enabled England by retaliatory measures to destroy every mercantile marine in Europe except its own; thirdly, it was so distressing and vexatious, and interfered so wantonly both with private property and the supply of necessaries for the people, that, more than anything else that Napoleon did, it excited popular indignation against him, and tended to his downfall. And yet it was not without a certain plausible excuse, which rested on the difference then existing between the laws of war as carried on by land and upon the sea. By land the property of an enemy was not considered lawful prize unless it belonged to the hostile government itself; by sea the property of peaceable merchants was liable to seizure and confiscation. By land no one was considered a prisoner of war unless taken with arms in his hand; by sea the crews of merchantmen were imprisoned as well as those of armed vessels. The second point which formed Napoleon's excuse was the extension given by England to the right of blockade. These two points afforded the pretext under which the Decree was promulgated, and was declared to be a fundamental law of the French Empire, till England should recognize the laws of war to be the same by sea and by land, and should consent to restrict the right of blockade to fortified towns actually invested by a sufficient force. In issuing his Decree, then, Napoleon put on a specious appearance of magnanimity, and took upon himself the part which he was fond of assuming, that of champion of the rights of nations against the tyranny of the English.

[Sidenote: Orders in Council.]

[Sidenote: Their effect on America.]

The necessity under which England as a belligerent lay of employing to the full the power which usage gave it of necessity inflicted considerable inconvenience upon neutral powers. The retaliatory measures which the Government thought it wise to take still further injured the neutrals, and threatened almost to annihilate the American trade. A series of orders in Council was issued, extending from January to November 1807. By the first of these orders vessels were forbidden to trade between any ports in the possession of France, or of her allies if under her control. By the second, issued in November, after the extension of the Continental system to the Mediterranean, general reprisals were granted against the goods, ships, and inhabitants of Tuscany, Naples, Dalmatia, and the Ionian Islands. By the third, all ports from which the flag of England was excluded were declared in blockade, all trade in their produce unlawful, and their ships a prize, while all vessels carrying certificates of origin (a measure which Napoleon had insisted upon to prevent evasion of his system) were declared liable to capture. By the fourth, another plan of evasion was forbidden; the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral was declared illegal, because the French had managed to preserve much of their commerce by fictitious sales, enabling them to continue their business under neutral flags. The Americans were the chief sufferers by these orders, and the irritation already felt by them was so increased that it ultimately ripened into war. Their two special grievances were the constant search of their vessels for deserters, and the refusal of the British authorities to recognize their customhouse arrangements. By the English law as then existing an English subject could not get rid of his nationality. But America was full of English and Irish emigrants and deserters from English ships, and the Americans had the constant mortification of seeing even their war-ships stopped and searched, and the asylum of their flag violated by the apprehension, under the rough justice of English naval officers, of many of their best seamen. By the neutral laws direct trading between the colony of a belligerent and its mother country was forbidden, but neutrals might trade for their own supply with the colonies. More than this, if they imported from the colonies more than they wanted they might re-export it even to the mother country; the proof of a _bona fide_ interrupted voyage was the payment of the customhouse dues in the ports of the neutral. But these dues were in America paid not in money but in bonds, which were cancelled when the goods were re-exported. The payment of goods was therefore fictitious, and English officials refused to recognize them. The irritation produced by these two causes was but slightly allayed by negotiations in 1809, and, as will be subsequently mentioned, the people, especially the Southerners, forced the States into war in 1812.

[Sidenote: Battle of Eylau. Feb. 7, 1807.]

To enable Napoleon to carry out his idea either of a Western Empire or of the complete annihilation of English trade it was necessary that war with Russia should continue. As a means for injuring that power he had already held out hopes of restoration of liberty to Poland, and in December he was received as a national saviour at Warsaw; but some remnant of the Prussian army had formed a junction with the forces of the Czar, and Benigsen, in command of the combined armies, refused to give the French a resting time in their new quarters. Napoleon had again himself to take the field. The allies fell back northwards to Eylau, not far from Königsberg, and there, on the 7th of February, was fought a great battle, which, for almost the first time, the French could not claim as a victory. Their exhaustion was great. Three times within seven months fresh conscriptions had been ordered in France. The firmness of the Russians at Eylau gave rise to well-grounded hopes that the chance of checking Napoleon had arrived, but money and reinforcements of troops were sorely wanted.

[Sidenote: Incapacity of the Grenville ministry.]

But at this critical moment the Grenville ministry exhibited to the full its incapacity for carrying on war. The Emperor of Russia was told that he need expect no great assistance from England, and money was doled out to him with ridiculous parsimony. There was indeed in England a total misapprehension of the necessities of a great war. Since the time of Marlborough and Queen Anne the idea of war on a large scale, except upon the sea, seemed to have wholly disappeared from the minds of the public men of the country. Even the great successes of Chatham had depended principally upon his good fortune in securing the alliance of Frederick the Great, and now all the resources of England were frittered away in a ridiculous series of small expeditions. When a concentration of troops and a frank and open-handed assistance to its allies might have saved Europe, the English Government taught them by its conduct, that while urging them to fight it would practically desert them at the moment when its assistance was wanted, and spend its men and money on such frivolous expeditions as the attack on Buenos Ayres, Alexandria, or upon the Dardanelles. These were the three military projects of the Grenville ministry.

[Sidenote: Expedition to Buenos Ayres. May 1807.]

In 1806 the English had recaptured from the Dutch the Cape of Good Hope. Sir Home Popham, who commanded the fleet, without orders from Government, determined upon a similar assault upon the Spanish colonies in America, and proceeded to capture Buenos Ayres. He thence wrote home a triumphant letter calling upon the English merchants to come to the magnificent new market he had opened. His triumph was of short duration. The colonists rallied under command of a French colonel, the city was recaptured, and the troops compelled to surrender as prisoners of war. In February 1807, 3000 men were sent out under Sir Samuel Auchmuty to assist Popham. Too late to save Buenos Ayres, he attacked and captured Monte Video. Before his success was known fresh reinforcements were sent out under General Whitelocke, with orders to assume the chief command, and with Popham's forces recapture Buenos Ayres. The attempt was a disgraceful failure; the troops were ordered to enter the city with unloaded muskets, and to rendezvous in the central square. The effect of so strange an attempt at street fighting may be easily conjectured. From the side-streets, housetops, and barricades thrown up across the roads, a destructive fire was kept up. Though Auchmuty met with some success, by nightfall 2500 of the English were either killed or prisoners, and Whitelocke was glad to accept the freedom of the prisoners both of the present engagement and of the past year, and to withdraw his troops, surrendering Monte Video and all he had conquered. In the judgment of the court martial which tried Whitelocke he was held totally unfit to serve his Majesty in any military capacity whatever, and the popular voice changed his name to General Whitefeather.

[Sidenote: Turkey declares war against Russia.]

[Sidenote: Expedition to the Dardanelles. Feb. 1807.]

During the continuance of the great European war the friendship of Turkey had been a constant object with the great powers. The ambassadors from Russia, France, and England had used all their powers of persuasion and menace to secure the adhesion of the Sultan. Before the end of the year 1806 the threats of Russia had had the effect of driving the Sultan to the friendship of France, and the Porte had declared war with Russia just after the battle of Jena. Wanting his troops for the defence of his own country, and being at that time in close friendship with England, Alexander requested the English Government to take charge of his interests at the Turkish capital, and despatch a fleet to oblige Selim to give up his friendship with France. The plan, being one which could be carried out by the navy, suited the policy of the Grenville Government, and orders were sent to Lord Collingwood, then cruising off Cadiz, to send a squadron to the Dardanelles. He was not allowed to choose his own commander, but received orders from home to appoint Sir John Duckworth. Nothing could be worse managed than the expedition. Collingwood had given strict charge to Duckworth not to be drawn into negotiations. But when the passage of the Dardanelles, at that time almost unfortified, was forced, Duckworth, forgetful of Collingwood's advice, suffered himself to be entangled in negotiations. Sebastiani, the French ambassador, aroused the temper of the Turks, and instructed them in the best manner of fortifying their coasts. The English fleet was in danger of being shut up in the Straits. It became necessary to withdraw; but that step was no longer easy. On the 1st of March the fleet sailed back through the Dardanelles. Batteries had been erected at every point, and though the fleet succeeded in running the gauntlet through the terrible fire, with the loss of only some 300 men, it found itself entirely prevented from any return. The object of the expedition had completely failed, and the only resource left was to keep the Turkish fleet blockaded.

[Sidenote: Expedition to Alexandria. March to August.]

In connection with this expedition a body of troops had been despatched under General Fraser to capture Alexandria. It was hoped that on the receipt of the news of Duckworth's expected success, it would have been able to advance to the reconquest of Egypt. Want of food necessitated an attack upon Rosetta. It was undertaken in the same foolish spirit as Whitelocke's attack upon Buenos Ayres. Entangled in the streets, the English soldiery were shot down in great numbers, and with the loss of a third of his troops the general in command withdrew to Alexandria. A subsequent effort was made to besiege Rosetta in form, but the forces of the Pasha of Egypt proved too strong for the besiegers; with heavy loss they withdrew to Alexandria, and in August 1807 were compelled to evacuate the country.

[Sidenote: Expedition to Sicily. July, 1806.]

The only gleam of success which attended the military operations of the Grenville ministry was gained in the south of Italy. It will be remembered that immediately after the battle of Austerlitz the kingdom of Naples had been appropriated by France. Sicily, however, was not conquered, and in that island there was an English army commanded by Sir John Stewart. Urged to do something for the assistance of the Neapolitan Court, he landed in Calabria in July, and there fought and won the battle of Maida, in which the French general Reynier was completely beaten. The forces at Stewart's command were insufficient for the reconquest of the country, which fell again into French hands on the retirement of the English, after a lengthened opposition on the part of the peasantry.

[Sidenote: Complete dissolution of the coalition.]

The attempt made at the Peace of Westphalia to establish the balance of power in Europe, and to secure the rights of small states, had proved unsuccessful. It had been rudely shocked by the career of Frederick II., and almost annihilated by the partition of Poland. A spirit of jealousy and a desire for selfish aggrandizement had taken possession of the great reigning houses, and had proved a fatal obstacle to the formation of loyal coalitions for a general purpose. It is to this that may be traced the failure of united effort in the last war, and the terrible reverses which both Austria and Prussia had undergone; England had in the same spirit just been frittering away its strength in attempts to secure the mastery of the sea, and the opening of new markets for her trade; thus left without the assistance they had a right to demand, the Russians were completely defeated at the battle of Friedland (June 14). It was now the turn for Russia to seek its own ends, and to secure them by deserting its allies. Disgusted with the lukewarm assistance afforded by England, attached to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and eager to carry on its schemes of aggression against Turkey, the Czar allowed himself to be dazzled by the flattering offers of Napoleon. The Emperor had found his difficulties increase with his empire; he had discovered that the Russians were more difficult to conquer than the Austrians or Prussians, and he was now willing to purchase the friendship of the Czar and his assistance against England by an arrangement by which Alexander should be Emperor of the East, while he kept for himself the envied position of Emperor of the West.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Tilsitt. July 7, 1807.]

The meeting between the Emperors took place, as upon neutral ground, on a raft in the middle of the Niemer at Tilsitt. "I hate the English as you do," Alexander is reported to have said. "Then," replied Napoleon, "peace is made;" and the two Emperors set to work to arrange Europe according to their own fancies, upon the common basis of dislike to England, and under the showy pretext of checking her overweening pride upon the sea. As Russia was fighting not for herself but for her allies, a treaty of peace and amity was all that was wanted between her and France, and of course the lately conquered King of Prussia had to pay the price of the treaty, the terms being chiefly in favour of France. Prussia was deprived of all its provinces between the Rhine and the Elbe, and of its Polish possessions. The former were incorporated with Hesse, Brunswick, and a part of Hanover, to form a kingdom of Westphalia, which was given to Jerome Bonaparte; the latter were formed into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and given to the King of Saxony, one province only excepted, which was given to Russia, nominally to cover the expenses of the war. All the alterations which Napoleon had effected in Europe were accepted; the Duchies of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were restored to their possessors, on the condition that the French should hold their ports till the conclusion of a general peace; Silesia and the German provinces on the right bank of the Elbe were restored to Prussia, but a military road was allowed to Saxony through Silesia, to afford the Saxon Prince access to his new dominions. Prussia was, however, to acknowledge the Berlin Decree, to reduce its troops to 42,000 men, to pay France £6,000,000 of money, in addition to the charges of the war, amounting to about £20,000,000, and to leave Berlin and its chief fortresses in the hands of the French till the debt was paid; as the yearly revenue of Prussia was not much more than £3,000,000, this promised to be for some time.

[Sidenote: Secret articles of the treaty.]

But the real point of the treaty was its secret articles, which were dimly suspected at the time, and the existence of which has subsequently been fully proved. By these articles, if England had not consented by the 1st of November to conclude peace--recognizing that the flags of all Powers ought to enjoy an equal and perfect independence on the seas, and restoring all conquests won from France or its allies since 1805--Russia was to make common cause with France against her, and oblige the Courts of Lisbon, Stockholm and Copenhagen to join in the alliance. In exchange for this, which was to wreak Napoleon's vengeance upon England, it was stipulated that if the Porte did not accept the mediation of France, France would make common cause with Russia against the Porte, and would agree to take from the Turks all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, with the exception of the town of Constantinople and Roumelia. Napoleon had thus thrown over, for his own advantage, the Poles, on whose hopes of liberty he had traded, and the Turks, whom he had induced to declare war with Russia; Spain and Portugal were left open to his ambition; Sweden was placed at the disposal of Russia, which was likewise rid of all difficulty from Poland.

[Sidenote: Conduct of Alexander.]

The conduct of Alexander has an appearance of extreme treachery. Only a few days before he had written to the English King that "there was no salvation to himself or to Europe but by interminable resistance to Bonaparte;" moreover, he did not refuse to accept a considerable portion of the territories of his ally the King of Prussia. His apologists assert that his readiness to accept Napoleon's terms was assumed to afford him an opportunity for strengthening himself for future opposition to French aggrandizement. More probably he was led away, partly by his peculiar enthusiastic temperament, which made him wish to have a large share both in the establishment of peace and in the rearrangement of Europe, and partly by an undercurrent of ambition which laid him open to offers securing him the acquisition of Poland, and the command both of the Baltic and the Black Seas.

[Sidenote: Consequences of the Peace of Tilsitt.]

[Sidenote: Capture of the Danish fleet. Sept. 8.]

[Sidenote: War between Russia and Sweden. Oct. 31.]

Already, before the signing of the Peace of Tilsitt, information had been brought to Canning, our Foreign Minister, that the fleets of Portugal and Denmark were to be taken by the French and used for an assault upon England. The secret articles of the treaty vindicate the truth of this information, and justify in some degree the immediate action which the English Government took upon it. For although there seems to be proof that the Danes themselves were anxious to maintain their friendship with England, it was more than probable that they would be unable to resist the combined pressure of Russia and France. Refusing the mediation offered by Russia, unless England was put on a fair footing with France by a frank disclosure of the nature of the late treaty, the English Government despatched a squadron to require the immediate surrender of the Danish fleet. It was no doubt a harsh measure, rendered still harsher by the courageous conduct of the Danes. Although Copenhagen was unprepared for an attack, the demand was refused, and it was found necessary to bombard the city. The effect of this step was, on the one hand, a surrender of the whole Danish fleet, which was brought to England, and on the other, to make Denmark, whatever its previous intention may have been, a close ally of France. In a second direction the consequences of the treaty became immediately obvious. Russia demanded of Sweden her adhesion to the Continental System. Christian IV., the king of that country, was chivalrous and impetuous to the verge of madness. He refused all solicitations to forsake his alliance with England, and became entangled in a war with France and Russia at once. When scarcely strong enough to defend his own country, he began an assault upon the Danish province of Norway, and consequently lost all his territory in Pomerania and Finland, which amounted to nearly a third of his kingdom. Sir John Moore, with an army of 10,000 men, were sent to his assistance, but found him so wild and unreasonable that he thought it better to sail home without even landing his troops. Frightened at the eccentricities of their sovereign, the Swedes removed him from the throne, setting up his uncle in his place.

[Sidenote: Continental System acknowledged everywhere except in Portugal.]