vi. 24, "Woe to you that are rich! for ye have received your

consolation." Jam. v. 1-3, "Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you." Ver. 5, 6, "Ye have lived in pleasure on earth, and been wanton--Ye have condemned and killed the just."--Luke xii. 21. Chap. xvi. the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, is spoken to make men think of the rich as miserable, damned creatures. Ezek. xxi. 25, "Thou profane, wicked prince of Israel." Prov. xxv. 5, "Take away the wicked from before the king." Prov. xxix. 12, "If a ruler hearken to lies, all his servants are wicked:" the contempt of greatness is made a part of the christian religion.

_Answ._ 1. As if there were no difference between the contempt of riches and worldly prosperity, and the contempt of government. He is blind that cannot see that riches and authority are not the same: yea, that the overvaluing of riches is the cause of seditions, and the disturbance of governments, when the contempt of them removeth the chief impediments of obedience and peace. 2. And may not governors be sufficiently honoured, unless they be exempted from the government of God? and unless their sin must go for virtue? and unless their duty, and their account, and the danger of their souls, be treacherously concealed from them? God will not flatter dust and ashes; great and small are alike to him. He is no respecter of persons: when you can save the greatest from death and judgment, then they may be excepted from all those duties which are needful to their preparation. 3. And is it not strange, that God should teach men to contemn the power which he himself ordaineth? and which is his own? Hath he set officers over us, for the work of government, and doth he teach us to despise them? There is no show of any such thing in Scripture: there are no principles in the world that highlier advance and honour magistracy, than the christian principles, unless you will make gods of them, as the Roman senate did of the Antonines, and other emperors.

_Object._ II. How can there be any government, when men must believe that they must not resist evil, but give place to wrath, and turn the other cheek to him that smiteth them, and give their coat to him that taketh away their cloak, and lend, asking for nothing again? Is not this to let thieves and violent, rapacious men rule all, and have their will, and go unpunished? What use is there then for courts or judges? And when Christ commandeth his disciples, that though the kings of the nations rule over them, and exercise authority, and are called benefactors, yet with them it shall not be so.[93]

_Answ._ These were the old cavils of Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian; but very impudent. As though love and patience were against peace and government. Christ commandeth nothing in all these words, but that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and love his soul above our wealth, and that we do as we would be done by, and use not private revenge, and take not up the magistrate's work: and is this doctrine against government? It is not magistrates, but ministers and private christians, whom he commandeth not to resist evil, and not to exercise lordship, as the civil rulers do. When it will do more hurt to the soul of another, than the benefit amounteth to, we must not seek our own right by law, nor must private men revenge themselves. All law-suits, and contentions, and hurting of others, which are inconsistent with loving them as ourselves, are forbidden in the gospel. And when was government ever disturbed by such principles and practices as these? Nay, when was it disturbed but for want of these? When was there any sedition, rebellion, or unlawful wars, but through self-love, and love of earthly things, and want of love to one another? How easily might princes rule men, that are thus ruled by love and patience!

_Object._ III. Christianity teacheth men to obey the Scriptures before their governors, and to obey no law that is contrary to the Bible; and when the Bible is so large, and hath so many passages hard to be understood, and easily perverted, some of these will be always interpreted against the laws of men; and then they are taught to fear no man against God, and to endure any pains or death, and to be unmoved by all the penalties which should enforce obedience; and to rejoice in this as a blessed martyrdom, to the face of kings; and those that punish them, are reproached as persecutors, and threatened with damnation, and made the vilest men on earth, and represented odious to all.[94]

_Answ._ The sum of all this objection is, That there is a God. For if that be not denied, no man can deny that he is the Universal Governor of the world; and that he hath his proper laws and judgment, and rewards and punishments, or that magistrates are his ministers, and have no power but from him; and consequently, that the commands, and threats, and promises of God, are a thousand-fold more to be regarded, than those of men.[95] He is a beast, and not a man, that feareth not God more than man, and that feareth not hell more than bodily sufferings: and for the Scriptures, 1. Are they any harder to be understood than the law of nature itself? Surely the characters of the will of God _in natura rerum_, are much more obscure than in the Scriptures. Hath God sent so great a messenger from heaven, to open to mankind the mysteries of his kingdom, and tell them what is in the other world, and bring life and immortality to light, and yet shall his revelation be accused as more obscure than nature itself is? If an angel had been sent from heaven to any of these infidels by name, to tell them but the same that Scripture telleth us, sure they would not have reproached his message with such accusations. 2. And are not the laws of the land about smaller matters, more voluminous and difficult? And shall that be made a reproach to government? And for misinterpretation, it is the fault of human nature, that is ignorant and rash, and not of the Scriptures. Will you tell God, that you will not obey him, unless he will make his laws so, as no man can misinterpret them? When or where were there ever such laws? God will be God, and Judge of the world, whether you will or not; and he will not be an underling to men, nor set their laws above his own, to avoid your accusations. If there be another life of joy or misery, it is necessary that there be laws according to which those rewards and punishments are to be adjudged. And if rulers oppose those who are appointed to promote obedience to them, they must do it at their perils; for God will render to all according to their works.

_Object._ IV. Doth not experience tell the world, that christianity every where causeth divisions, and sets the world together by the ears? What a multitude of sects are there among us at this day; and every one thinketh that his salvation lieth upon his opinion! And how can princes govern men of so contrary minds, when the pleasing of one party is the losing of the rest? We have long seen that church divisions shake the safety of the state. If it were not that few that are called christians are such indeed, and serious in the religion which themselves profess, there were no quietness to be expected; for those that are most serious, are so full of scruples, and have consciences still objecting something or other against their obedience, and are so obstinate in their way, as thinking it is for their salvation, that all ages and nations have been fain to govern them by force as beasts, which they have called persecution.[96]

_Answ._ 1. There is no doctrine in the world so much for love, and peace, and concord as the doctrine of Christ is. What doth it so much urge and frequently inculcate? What doth it contain but love and peace from end to end? Love is the sum and end of the gospel, and the fulfilling of the law. To love God above all, and our neighbours as ourselves, and to do as we would be done by, is the epitome of the doctrine of Christ and his apostles. 2. And therefore christianity is only the occasion, and not the cause of the divisions of the earth. It is men's blindness and passions and carnal interests rebelling against the laws of God, which is the make-bate of the world, and filleth it with strife. The wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits; it blesseth the peace-makers and the meek. But it is the rebellious wisdom from beneath, that is earthly, sensual, and devilish, which causeth envy and strife, and thereby confusion and every evil work, James iii. 15-17; Matt. v. 6-8. So that the true, genuine christian is the best subject and peaceablest man on earth. But seriousness is not enough to make a christian; a man may be passionately serious in an error; understanding must lead and seriousness follow. To be zealous in error is not to be zealous in christianity; for the error is contrary to christian verity. 3. As I said before, it is a testimony of the excellency of religion that it thus occasioneth contention. Dogs and swine do not contend for crowns and kingdoms, nor for sumptuous houses or apparel; nor do infants trouble the world or themselves with metaphysical, or logical, or mathematical disputes; idiots do not molest the world with controversies, nor fall thereby into sects and parties. Nor yet do wise and learned persons contend about chaff, or dust, or trifles. But as excellent things are matter of search, so are they matter of controversy, to the most excellent wits. The hypocritical christians that you speak of, who make God and their salvation give place to the unjust commands of men, are indeed no christians, as not taking Christ for their sovereign Lord; and it is not in any true honour of magistracy that they are so ductile, and will do any thing, but it is for themselves, and their carnal interest; and when that interest requireth it, they will betray their governors, as infidels will do. If you can reduce all the world to be infants, or idiots, or brutes, yea, or infidels, they will then trouble the state with no contentions for religion or matters of salvation. But if the governed must be brutified, what will the governors be? 4. All true christians are agreed in the substance of their religion; there is no division among them about the necessary points of faith or duty. Their agreement is far greater than their disagreement; which is but about some smaller matters, where differences are tolerable; therefore they may all be governed without any such violence as you mention. If the common articles of faith, and precepts of christian duty, be maintained, then that is upheld which all agree in; and rulers will not find it needful to oppress every party or opinion save one, among them that hold the common truths. Wise and sober christians lay not men's salvation upon every such controversy; nor do they hold or manage them unpeaceably to the wrong of church or state, nor with the violation of charity, peace, or justice. 5. Is there any of the sciences which afford not matter of controversy? If the laws of the land did yield no matter of controversy, lawyers and judges would have less of that work than now they have. And was there not greater diversity of opinions and worship among the heathens than ever was among christians? What a multitude of sects of philosophers and religions had they! And what a multitude of gods had they to worship! And the number of them still increased as oft as the senate pleased to make a god of the better sort of their emperors when they were dead. Indeed one emperor, (of the religion of some of these objectors,) Heliogabalus, bestirred himself with all his power to have reduced all religion to unity, that is, he would have all the worship brought to his god to whom he had been priest: saith Lampridius in his life, _Dicebat Judæorum et Samaritanorum religiones et christianam devotionem, illuc transferendam, &c._ And therefore he robbed, and maimed, and destroyed the other gods, _id agens ne quis Romæ Deus nisi Heliogabalus coleretur_. But as the effect of his monstrous, abominable filthiness of life was to be thrust into a privy, killed, and dragged about the streets, and drowned in the Tiber; so the effect of his desired unity, was to bring that one god or temple into contempt, whereto he would confine all worship. The differences among christians are nothing in comparison of the differences among heathens.[97] The truth is, religion is such an illustrious, noble thing, that dissensions about it, like spots in the moon, are much more noted by the world, than about any lower, common matters. Men may raise controversies in philosophy, physic, astronomy, chronology, and yet it maketh no such noise, nor causeth much offence or hatred in the world; but the devil and corrupted nature have such an enmity against religion, that they are glad to pick any quarrel against it, and blame it for the imperfections of all that learn it, and should practise it. As if grammar should be accused for every error or fault that the boys are guilty of in learning it; or the law were to be accused for all the differences of lawyers, or contentions of the people; or physic were to be accused for all the differences or errors of physicians; or meat and drink were culpable because of men's excesses and diseases. There is no doctrine or practice in the world, by which true unity and concord can be maintained, but by seriousness in the true religion. And when all contention cometh for want of religion, it is impudence to blame religion for it, which is the only cure. If rulers will protect all that agree in that which is justly to be called the christian religion, both for doctrine and practice; and about their small and tolerable differences, will use no other violence but only to compel them to live in peace, and to suppress the seditious, and those that abuse and injure government or one another; they will find that christianity tendeth not to divisions, nor to the hinderance or disturbance of government or peace. It is passion, and pride, and selfishness that doth this, and not religion; therefore let these and not religion be restrained. But if they will resolve to suffer none to live in peace, but those that in every punctilio are all of one opinion, they must have but one subject that is sincere in his religion, (for no two will be in every thing of the same apprehension, no more than of the same complexion,) and all the rest must be worldly hypocrites, that while they are heartily true to no religion, will profess themselves of any religion which will serve their present turns; and these nominal christians will be ready to betray their rulers, or do any mischief which their carnal interest requireth.[98]

_Object._ V. What witness need we more than their own accusations of one another?[99] For the papists, how many volumes have the protestants written against them as enemies to all civil government; alleging even the decrees of their general councils, as Later. sub Innoc. III. Can. 3. And for the protestants, they are as deeply charged by the papists, as you may see in the "Image of both Churches," and "Philanax Anglicus," and abundance more. For Calvin and the presbyterians and puritans, let the prelates tell you how peaceable they are. And the papists and puritans say that the prelatists are of the same mind, and only for their own ends pretend to greater loyalty than others. There are no two among them more famous for defending government, than Hooker and Bilson. And what Hooker saith for popular power, his first and eighth books abundantly testify: and even Bishop Bilson himself defendeth the French and German protestant wars; and you may judge of his loyal doctrine by these words, p. 520, "Of Christian Subjection:" "If a prince should go about to subject his kingdom to a foreign realm, or change the form of the commonwealth from impery to tyranny, or neglect the laws established by common consent of prince and people, to execute his own pleasure; in these and other cases which might be named, if the nobles and commons join together to defend their ancient and accustomed liberty, regimen, and laws, they may not well be counted rebels."[100]

_Answ._ 1. If it be clear that christianity as to its principles, is more for love, and concord, and subjection, than any other rational doctrine in the world, then if any sect of christians shall indeed be found to contradict these principles, so far they contradict christianity: and will you blame religion because men contradict it? or blame Christ's doctrine because men disobey it? Indeed every sect that hath something of its own to make a sect, besides christian religion, which maketh men mere christians, may easily be guilty of such error as will corrupt the christian religion. And as a sect, they have a divided interest which may tempt them to dividing principles; but none more condemn such divisions than Christ. 2. And indeed, though a christian as such is a credible witness; yet a sect or faction as such, doth use to possess men with such an envious, calumniating disposition, that they are little to be believed when they accuse each other! This factious zeal is not from above, but is earthly, sensual, and devilish; and therefore where this is, no wonder if there be strife, and false accusing, and confusion, and every evil work. But as these are no competent witnesses, so whether or no they are favoured by Christ, you may judge if you will read but those three chapters, Matt. v. Rom. xii. James iii. I may say here as Bishop Bilson in the place which is accused, p. 521. "IT IS EASY FOR A RUNNING AND RANGING HEAD TO SIT AT HOME IN HIS CHAMBER AND CALL MEN REBELS, HIMSELF BEING THE RANKEST." 3. For the papists I can justify them from your accusation, so far as they are christians; but as they are papists let him justify them that can. Indeed usurpation of government is the very essence of popery; for which all other christians blame them; and therefore there is small reason that christianity should be accused for them. 4. And for the protestants, both episcopal and disciplinarians, the sober and moderate of them speak of one another in no such language as you pretend. For the episcopal, I know of none but railing papists, that accuse them universally of any doctrines of rebellion: and for the practices of some particular men, it is not to be alleged against their doctrine. Do you think that Queen Elizabeth, to whom Bishop Bilson's book was dedicated, or King Charles, to whom Mr. Hooker's book was dedicated, took either of them to be teachers of rebellion? It is not every different opinion in politics that proveth men to be against subjection. He that can read such a book as Bilson's for "Christian Subjection against Antichristian Rebellion," and yet deny him to be a teacher of subjection, hath a very hard forehead. For the controversies, I shall say no more of them here, but what I have said before to Mr. Hooker. And as for Calvin and the disciplinarians, or puritans, as they are called, they subscribe all the confessions for magistracy, and take the same oaths of allegiance and supremacy, as others do; and they plead and write for them: so that for my part I know not of any difference in their doctrine. Hear what Bishop Andrews saith, (who was no rebel,) in his "Tortura Torti," p. 379, 380. _Calvinus autem ut papam regem; ita regem papam non probavit; neque nos quod in papa detestamur, in rege approbamus; at et ille nobiscum, et nos cum illo sentimus, easdem esse in ecclesia christiana regis Jacobi partes, quæ Josiæ fuerunt in Judaica; nec nos ultra quicquam fieri ambimus_--: that is, "But Calvin neither liked a pope-king, nor a king-pope; nor do we approve of that in the king, which we detest in the pope. But he with us, and we with him, do judge, that King James hath as much to do in the christian church, as Josias had in the Jewish church; and we go not about to get any more." And after, _Sub primatus nomine, papatum novum rex non invehit in ecclesiam; sic enim statuit, ut non Aaroni pontifici, ita nec Jeroboamo regi, jus ullum esse conflatum a se vitulum populo proponendi, ut adoret, (id est,) non vel fidei novos articulos, vel cultus divini novas formulas procudendi_: that is, "The king doth not bring into the church a new papacy, under the name of primacy; for thus he judgeth, (or determineth,) that neither Aaron the priest, nor Jeroboam the king, had any right to propose the calf which they had made, to the people to be adored; that is, neither to hammer (or make) new articles of faith, or new forms of divine worship." And p. 379, 380. _Quos vero puritanos appellat, si regium primatum detestantur, detestandi ipsi. Profitentur enim, subscribunt, jurant indies; sed et illi quod faciunt ingenue faciunt, et societatem in hoc Torti, ipsumque adeo Tortum, tanquam mendacem hominem, (et alibi de aliis, et hic de se,) ac sycophantem egregium detestantur_: that is, "And for those he calleth puritans, if they detest the king's supremacy, they are to be detested; for they daily profess, subscribe, and swear to it; and what they do, they do ingenuously; and they detest the society of Tortus in this, and Tortus himself, as a lying man, (elsewhere of others, and here of themselves,) and an egregious sycophant." By these testimonies judge what protestants think of one another in point of loyalty.

5. And why are not all the other christians taken into your enumeration? the Armenians, Abassins, and all the Greek churches? whom the papists so frequently reproach as flatterers or servile, because they still gave so much to their emperors. Have you any pretence for your accusation as against them? Unless perhaps from the tumults which Alexandria in its greatness was much addicted to, which is nothing to the doctrine of christianity, nor to the practice of all the rest.

[Sidenote: Christianity is most for loyalty and subjection.]

Having answered these cavils of the late atheistical or infidel politicians, I shall next show, though briefly, yet by plentiful evidence, that christianity and true godliness is the greatest strength of government, and bond of subjection, and means of peace, that ever was revealed to the world: which will appear in all these evidences following.

1. Christianity teacheth men to take the higher powers as ordained of God, and to obey them as God's ministers or officers, having an authority derived immediately from God; so that it advanceth the magistrate as God's officer, as much higher than infidels advance him, (who fetch his power no higher than force or choice,) as a servant of God is above a servant of men; which is more than a man is above a dog.[101]

2. Christianity telleth us that our obedience to magistrates is God's own command, and so that we must obey him by obeying them. And as obedience to a constable is more procured by the king's laws than by his own commands, so obedience to a king is far more effectually procured by God's laws than by his own. If God be more above a king, than a king is above a worm, the command of God must be a more powerful obligation upon every understanding person, than the king's. And what greater advantage can a king have in governing, than to have subjects whose consciences do feel themselves bound by God himself, to obey the king and all his officers.

_Object._ But this is still with exception, if it be not in things forbidden of God; and the subjects are made judges whether it be so or no.

_Answ._ And woe to that man that grudgeth that God must be obeyed before him; and would be himself a god to be obeyed in things which God is against! The subjects are made no public judges, but private discerners of their duties; and so you make them yourselves: or else they must not judge whether the king or a usurper were to be obeyed; or whether the word of a king or of a constable, if they be contradictory, is to be preferred. To judge what we must choose or refuse is proper to a rational creature: even brutes themselves will do something like it by instinct of nature, and will not do all things according to your will. You would have us obey a justice of peace no further than our loyalty to the king will give leave: and therefore there is greater reason that we should obey the higher powers no further than our loyalty to God will give leave.[102] But if men pretend God's commands for any thing which he commandeth not, magistrates bear not the sword in vain, and subjects are commanded by God not to resist. If they punish them rightfully, God will bear the rulers out in it; if they punish them wrongfully or persecute them for well doing, God will severely punish them, who so wronged his subjects, and abused the authority which he committed to their trust.

3. The christian religion bindeth subjects to obedience upon sorer penalties than magistrates can inflict; even upon pain of God's displeasure, and everlasting damnation, Rom. xiii. 2, 3. And how great a help this is to government it is so easy to discern, that the simpler sort of atheists do persuade themselves, that kings devised religion to keep people in obedience with the fears of hell. Take away the fears of the life to come, and the punishment of God in hell upon the wicked, and the world will be turned into worse than a den of serpents and wild beasts; adulteries, and murders, and poisoning kings, and all abomination, will be freely committed, which wit or power can think to cover or bear out! Who will trust that man that believeth not that God doth judge and punish?

4. The christian religion doth encourage obedience and peace with the promise of the reward of endless happiness (_cæteris paribus_); heaven is more than any prince can give. If that will not move men, there is no greater thing to move them. Atheism and infidelity have no such motives.

5. Christianity teacheth subjects to obey not only good rulers but bad ones, even heathens themselves, and not to resist when we cannot obey. Whereas among heathens, princes ruled no longer than they pleased the soldiers or the people; so that Lampridius marvelled that Heliogabalus was no sooner butchered, but suffered to reign three years: _Mirum fortasse cuipiam videatur Constantine venerabilis, quod hæc clades quam retuli loco principum fuerit; et quidem prope triennio, ita ut nemo inventus fuerit qui istum a gubernaculis Romanæ majestatis abduceret, cum Neroni, Vitellio, Caligulæ cæterisque hujusmodi nunquam tyrannicida defuerit_.[103]

6. Christianity and godliness do not only restrain the outward acts, but rule the very hearts, and lay a charge upon the thoughts, which the power of princes cannot reach. It forbiddeth to curse the king in our bedchamber, or to have a thought or desire of evil against him; it quencheth the first sparks of disloyalty and disorder; and the rule of the outward man followeth the ordering of the heart; and therefore atheism, which leaveth the heart free and open to all desires and designs of rebellion, doth kindle that fire in the minds of men, which government cannot quench; it corrupteth the fountain; it breaketh the spring that should set all a going; it poisoneth the heart of commonwealths.[104]

7. Christianity and godliness teach men patience, that it may not seem strange to them to bear the cross, and suffer injuries from high and low; and therefore that impatience which is the beginning of all rebellion being repressed, it stayeth the distemper from going any further.

8. Christianity teacheth men self-denial as a great part of their religion;[105] and when selfishness is mortified, there is nothing left to be a principle of rebellion against God or our superiors. Selfishness is the very predominant principle of the ungodly; it is only for themselves that they obey when they do obey; no wonder therefore if the author of Leviathan allow men to do any thing when the saving of themselves requireth it. And so many selfish persons as there be in a kingdom, so many several interests are first sought, which for the most part stand cross to the interests of others: the godly have all one common centre; they unite in God, and therefore may be kept in concord; for God's will is a thing that may be fulfilled by all as well as one; but the selfish and ungodly are every one his own centre, and have no common centre to unite in, their interests being ordinarily cross and inconsistent.

9. Christianity teacheth men by most effectual arguments, to set light by the riches and honours of the world, and not to strive for superiority; but to mind higher things, and lay up our treasure in a better world, and to condescend to men of low degree. It forbiddeth men to exalt themselves lest they be brought low; and commandeth them to humble themselves that God may exalt them; and he that knoweth not that pride and covetousness are the great disquieters of the world, and the cause of contentions, and the ruin of states, knoweth nothing of these matters. Therefore if it were but by the great urging of humility and heavenly-mindedness, and the strict condemning of ambition and earthly-mindedness, christianity and godliness must needs be the greatest preservers of government, and of order, peace, and quietness in the world.[106]

10. Christianity teacheth men to live in the love of God and man. It maketh love the very heart, and life, and sum, and end of all other duties of religion. Faith itself is but the bellows to kindle in us the sacred flames of love. Love is the end of the gospel, and the fulfilling of the law. To love all saints with a special love, even with a pure heart and fervently, and to love all men heartily with a common love; to love our neighbour as ourselves; and to love our very enemies; this is the life which Christ requireth, upon the penalty of damnation; and if love thus prevail, what should disturb the government, peace, or order of the world?

11. Christianity teacheth men to be exact in justice, distributive and commutative; and to do to others as we would they should do to us: and where this is followed kings and states will have little to molest them, when _gens sine justitia est sine remige navis in unda_.

12. Christianity teacheth men to do good to all men as far as we are able, and to abound in good works, as that for which we are redeemed and new made; and if men will set themselves wholly to do good, and be hurtful and injurious to none, how easy will it be to govern such!

13. Christianity teacheth men to forbear and to forgive, as ever they will be forgiven of God, and the strong to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please themselves, but one another to their edification; not to be censorious, harsh, or cruel, nor to place the kingdom of God in meats, and drinks, and days, but in righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; to bear one another's burdens, and to restore them with the spirit of meekness that are overtaken in a fault, and to be peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and hypocrisy, and to speak evil of no man; and where this is obeyed, how quietly and easily may princes govern![107]

14. Christianity setteth before us the perfectest pattern of all this humility, meekness, contempt of worldly wealth and greatness, self-denial and obedience, that ever was given in the world. The eternal Son of God incarnate, would condescend to earth and flesh, and would obey his superiors after the flesh, in the repute of the world; and would pay tribute, and never be drawn to any contempt of the governors of the world, though he suffered death under the false accusation of it. He that is a christian, endeavoureth to imitate his Lord: and can the imitation of Christ, or of his peaceable apostles, be injurious to governors? Could the world but lay by their serpentine enmity against the holy doctrine and practice of christianity, and not take themselves engaged to persecute it, nor dash themselves in pieces on the stone which they should build upon, nor by striving against it provoke it to fall on them and grind them to powder, they never need to complain of disturbances by christianity or godliness.[108]

15. Christianity and true godliness containeth, not only all those precepts that tend to peace and order in the world, but also strength, and willingness, and holy dispositions for the practising of such precepts. Other teachers can speak but to the ears, but Christ doth write his laws upon the heart; so that he maketh them such as he commandeth them to be: only this is the remnant of our unhappiness, that while he is performing the cure on us, we retain a remnant of our old diseases, and so his work is yet imperfect: and as sin in strength is it that setteth on fire the course of nature, so the relics of it will make some disturbance in the world, according to its degree; but nothing is more sure than that the godliest christian is the most orderly and loyal subject, and the best member (according to his parts and power) in the commonwealth; and that sin is the cause, and holiness the cure of all the disorders and calamities of the world.

16. Lastly, Consult with experience itself, and you will find, that all this which I have spoken, hath been ordinarily verified.[109] What heathenism tendeth to, you may see even in the Roman government (for there you will confess it was at the best). To read of the tumults, the cruelties, the popular unconstancy, faction, and injustice; how rudely the soldiers made their emperors, and how easily and barbarously they murdered them, and how few of them from the days of Christ till Constantine did die the common death of all men, and escape the hands of those that were their subjects; I think this will satisfy you, whither men's enmity to christianity tendeth: and then to observe how suddenly the case was altered, as soon as the emperors and subjects became christian (till in the declining of the Greek empire, some officers and courtiers who aspired to the crown did murder the emperors): and further to observe, that the rebellious doctrines and practices against governors, have been all introduced by factions and heresies, which forsook christianity so far before they incurred such guilt; and that it is either papal usurpation (which is in its nature an enemy to princes) that hath deposed and trampled upon emperors and kings, or else some mad enthusiastics that overrun religion and their wits, that at Munster, (and in England some lately,) by the advantage of their prosperity, have dared to do violence against sovereignty; but the more any men were christians and truly godly, the more they detested all such things; all this will tell you that the most serious and religious christians, are the best members of the civil societies upon earth.

II. Having done with the first part of my last direction, I shall say but this little of the second; let christians see that they be christians indeed, and abuse not that which is most excellent to be a cloak to that which is most vile. 1. In reading politics, swallow not all that every author writeth in conformity to the polity that he liveth under. What perverse things shall you read in the popish politics (Contzen, and abundance such)! What usurpation on principalities, and cruelties to christians, under the pretence of defending the church, and suppressing heresies!

2. Take heed in reading history that you suffer not the spirit of your author to infect you with any of that partiality which he expresseth to the cause which he espouseth. Consider in what times and places all your authors lived, and read them accordingly with the just allowance. The name of liberty was so precious, and the name of a king so odious to the Romans, Athenians, &c., that it is no wonder if their historians be unfriendly unto kings.

3. Abuse not learning itself to lift you up with self-conceitedness against governors! Learned men may be ignorant of polity; or at least unexperienced, and almost as unfit to judge, as of matters of war or navigation.

4. Take heed of giving the magistrate's power to the clergy, and setting up secular, coercive power under the name of the power of the keys: and it had been happy for the church if God had persuaded magistrates in all ages to have kept the sword in their own hands, and not have put it into the clergy's hands, to fulfil their wills by:[110] for, 1. By this means the clergy had escaped the odium of usurpation and domineering, by which atheistical politicians would make religion odious to magistrates for their sakes. 2. And by this means greater unity had been preserved in the church, while one faction is not armed with the sword to tread down the rest: for if divines contend only by dint of argument, when they have talked themselves and others aweary they will have done; but when they go to it with dint of sword, it so ill becometh them, that it seldom doth good, but the party often that trusteth least to their reason, must destroy the other, and make their cause good by iron arguments. 3. And then the Romish clergy had not been armed against princes to the terrible concussions of the christian world, which histories at large relate, if princes had not first lent them the sword which they turned against them. 4. And then church discipline would have been better understood, and have been more effectual; which is corrupted and turned to another thing, and so cast out, when the sword is used instead of the keys, under pretence of making it effectual: none but consenters are capable of church communion: no man can be a christian, or godly, or saved against his will; and therefore consenters and volunteers only are capable of church discipline: as a sword will not make a sermon effectual, no more will it make discipline effectual: which is but the management of God's word to work upon the conscience. So far as men are to be driven by the sword to the use of means, or restrained from offering injury to religion, the magistrate himself is fittest to do it. It is noted by historians as the dishonour of Cyril of Alexandria, (though a famous bishop,) that he was the first bishop that like a magistrate used the sword there, and used violence against heretics and dissenters.

5. Above all, abuse not the name of religion for the resistance of your lawful governors: religion must be defended and propagated by no irreligious means. It is easy before you are aware, to catch the fever of such a passionate zeal as James and John had, when they would have had fire from heaven to consume the refusers and resisters of the gospel: and then you will think that any thing almost is lawful, which doth but seem necessary to the prosperity of religion. But no means but those of God's allowance do use to prosper, or bring home that which men expect: they may seem to do wonders for awhile, but they come to nothing in the latter end, and spoil the work, and leave all worse than it was before.

_Direct._ XL. Take heed of mistaking the nature of that liberty of the people, which is truly valuable and desirable, and of contending for an undesirable liberty in its stead.[111] It is desirable to have liberty to do good, and to possess our own, and enjoy God's mercies, and live in peace: but it is not desirable to have liberty to sin, and abuse one another, and hinder the gospel, and contemn our governors. Some mistake liberty for government itself; and think it is the people's liberty to be governors: and some mistake liberty for an exemption from government, and think they are most free, when they are most ungoverned, and may do what they list: but this is a misery, and not a mercy, and therefore was never purchased for us by Christ. Many desire servitude and calamity under the name of liberty: _optima est reipublicæ forma_, saith Seneca, _ubi nulla libertas deest, nisi licentia pereundi_. As Mr. R. Hooker saith, lib. viii. p. 195, "I am not of opinion, that simply in kings the most, but the best limited, power is best, both for them and the people: the most limited is that which may deal in fewest things: the best, that which in dealing is tied to the soundest, perfectest, and most indifferent rule, which rule is the law: I mean not only the law of nature and of God, but the national law consonant thereunto: happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest things, than that whose king is himself their law."

Yet no doubt but the lawgivers are as such, above the law as an authoritative instrument of government, but under it as a man is under the obligation of his own consent and word: it ruleth subjects in the former sense; it bindeth the _summam potestatem_ in the latter.

_Direct._ XLI. When you have done all that you can in just obedience, look for your reward from God alone. Let it satisfy you that he knoweth and approveth your sincerity. You make it a holy work if you do it to please God; and you will be fixed and constant, if you take heaven for your reward (which is enough, and will not fail you); but you make it but a selfish, carnal work, if you do it only to please your governors, or get preferment, or escape some hurt which they may do you, and are subject only in flattery, or for fear of wrath, and not for conscience sake. And such obedience is uncertain and unconstant; for when you fail of your hopes, or think rulers deal unjustly or unthankfully with you, your subjection will be turned into passionate desires of revenge. Remember still the example of your Saviour, who suffered death as an enemy to Cæsar, when he had never failed of his duty so much as in one thought or word. And are you better than your Lord and Master? If God be all to you, and you have laid up all your hopes in heaven, it is then but little of your concernment (further than God is concerned in it) whether rulers do use you well or ill, and whether they interpret your actions rightly, or what they take you for, or how they call you; but it is your concernment that God account you loyal, and will judge you so, and justify you from men's accusations of disloyalty, and reward you with more than man can give you. Nothing is well done, especially of so high a nature as this, which is not done for God and heaven, and which the crown of glory is not the motive to.

I have purposely been the larger on this subject, because the times in which we live require it, both for the settling of some, and for the confuting the false accusations of others, who would persuade the world that our doctrine is not what it is; when through the sinful practices of some, the way of truth is evil spoken of, 2 Pet. ii. 2.

_Tit. 2. A fuller resolution of the cases, 1. Whether the laws of men do bind the conscience? 2. Especially smaller and penal laws?_

The word conscience signifieth either, 1. In general according to the notation of the word, The knowledge of our own matters; _conscire_; the knowledge of ourselves, our duties, our faults, our fears, our hopes, our diseases, &c. 2. Or more limitedly and narrowly, The knowledge of ourselves and our own matters in relation to God's law and judgment; _Judicium hominis de seipso prout subjicitur judicio Dei_, as Amesius defineth it.

2. Conscience is taken, 1. Sometimes for the act of self-knowing. 2. Sometimes for the habit. 3. Sometimes for the faculty, that is, for the intellect itself, as it is a faculty of self-knowing. In all these senses it is taken properly. 4. And sometimes it is used (by custom) improperly, for the person himself, that doth _conscire_; or for his will (another faculty).

3. The conscience may be said to be bound, 1. Subjectively, as the _subjectum quod_, or the faculty obliged. 2. Or objectively, as _conscire_, the act of conscience, is the thing _ad quod_, to which we are obliged.

And upon those necessary distinctions I thus answer to the first question.

_Prop._ 1. The act or the habit of conscience is not capable of being the subject obliged; no more than any other act or duty: the act or duty is not bound, but the man to the act or duty.

2. The faculty or judgment is not capable of being the object, or _materia ad quam_, the thing to which we are bound. A man is not bound to be a man, or to have an intellect, but is made such.

3. The faculty of conscience (that is, the intellect) is not capable of being the immediate or nearest _subjectum quod_, or subject obliged. The reason is, Because the intellect of itself is not a free-working faculty, but acteth necessarily per _modum naturæ_ further than it is under the empire of the will; and therefore intellectual and moral habits are by all men distinguished.

4. All legal or moral obligation falleth directly upon the will only: and so upon the person as a voluntary agent; so that it is proper to say, The will is bound, and The person is bound.

5. Improperly and remotely it may be said, The intellect (or faculty of conscience) is bound, or the tongue, or hand, or foot is bound; as the man is bound to use them.

6. Though it be not proper to say, That the conscience is bound, it is proper to say, That the man is bound to the act and habit of conscience, or to the exercise of the faculty.

7. The common meaning of the phrase, that we are bound in conscience, or that conscience is bound, is that we are bound to a thing by God, or by a divine obligation, and that it is a sin against God to violate it; so that divines use here to take the word conscience in the narrower theological sense, as respect to God's law and judgment doth enter the definition of it.

8. Taking conscience in this narrower sense, to ask, Whether man's law as man's do bind us in conscience, is all one as to ask, Whether man be God.[112]

9. And taking conscience in the large or general sense, to ask, Whether man's laws bind us in conscience subjectively, is to ask, Whether they bind the understanding to know our duty to man? And the tenor of them will show that, while they bind us to an outward act, or from an outward act, it is the man that they bind to or from that act, and that is, as he is a rational, voluntary agent; so that a human obligation is laid upon the man, on the will, and on the intellect, by human laws.

10. And human laws, while they bind us to or from an outward act, do thereby bind us as rational free agents, knowingly to choose or refuse those acts; nor can a law which is a moral instrument any otherwise bind the hand, foot, or tongue, but by first binding us to choose or refuse it knowingly, that is, conscientiously, so that a human bond is certainly laid on the mind, soul, or conscience, taken in the larger sense.

11. Taking conscience in the stricter sense, as including essentially a relation to God's obligation, the full sense of the question plainly is but this, Whether it be a sin against God to break the laws of man? And thus plain men might easily understand it. And to this it must be answered, That it is in two respects a sin against God to break such laws or commands as rulers are authorized by God to make; 1. Because God commandeth us to obey our rulers: therefore he that (so) obeyeth them not, sinneth against a law of God. God obligeth us in general to obey them in all things which they are authorized by him to command; but their law determineth of the particular matter; therefore God obligeth us (in conscience of his law) to obey them in that particular. 2. Because by making them his officers, by his commission he hath given them a certain beam of authority, which is divine as derived from God; therefore they can command us by a power derived from God: therefore to disobey is to sin against a power derived from God. And thus the general case is very plain and easy, How man sinneth against God in disobeying the laws of man, and consequently how (in a tolerable sense of that phrase) it may be said, that man's laws do or do not bind the conscience, (or rather, bind us in point of conscience,) or by a divine obligation. Man is not God; and therefore, as man, of himself can lay no divine obligation on us. But man being God's officer, 1. His own law layeth on us an obligation derivatively divine (for it is no law which hath no obligation, and it is no authoritative obligation which is not derived from God). 2. And God's own law bindeth us to obey man's laws.

_Quest._ II. But is it a sin to break every penal law of man?

_Answ._ 1. You must remember that man's law is essentially the signification of man's will; and therefore obligeth no further than it truly signifieth the ruler's will.

2. That it is the act of a power derived from God; and therefore no further bindeth, than it is the exercise of such a power.

3. That it is given, 1. Finally for God's glory and pleasure, and for the common good (comprehending the honour of the ruler and the welfare of the society ruled). And therefore obligeth not when it is, (1.) Against God. (2.) Or against the common good. 2. And it is subordinate to God's own laws, (in nature and Scripture,) and therefore obligeth not to sin, or to the violation of God's law.[113]

4. You must note that laws are made for the government of societies as such universally; and so are fitted to the common case, for the common good. And it is not possible but that a law which prescribeth a duty which by accident is so to the most, should meet with some particular subject to whom the case is so circumstantiated as that the same act would be to him a sin: and to the same man it may be ordinarily a duty, and in an extraordinary case a sin. Thence it is that in some cases (as Lent fasts, marriages, &c.) rulers oft authorize some persons to grant dispensations in some certain cases: and hence it is said, that necessity hath no law.

Hereupon I conclude as followeth:

1. It is no sin to break a law which is no law, as being against God, or not authorized by him, (as of a usurper, &c.) See R. Hooker, Conclus. lib. viii.

2. It is no law so far as it is no signification of the true will of the ruler, whatever the words be: therefore so far it is no sin to break it.

3. The will of the ruler is to be judged of, not only by the words, but by the ends of government, and by the rules of humanity.

4. It being not possible that the ruler in his laws can foresee and name all exceptions, which may occur, it is to be supposed that it is his will that the nature of the thing shall be the notifier of his will, when it cometh to pass; and that if he were present, and this case fell out before him, which the sense and end of the law extendeth not to, he would say, This is an excepted case.

5. There is therefore a wide difference between a general law, and a personal, particular mandate; as of a parent to a child, or a master to a servant; for this latter fully notifieth the will of the ruler in that very case, and to that very person. And therefore it cannot be said that here is any exception, or that it is not his will; but in a universal or general law, it is to be supposed that some particular excepted cases will fall out extraordinarily, though they cannot be named; and that in those cases, the ruler's will dispenseth with it.

6. Sometimes also the ruler doth by the mere neglect of pressing or executing his own laws, permit them to grow obsolete, and out of use; and sometimes he forbeareth the execution of them for some time, or to some sort of persons; and by so doing, doth notify that it was not his will that at such a time, and in such cases, they should oblige. I say not that all remissness of execution is such a sign; but sometimes it is: and the very word of the lawgiver may notify his dispensation or suspending will. As for instance, upon the burning of London, there were many laws (about coming to parish churches, and relief of the poor of the parish, and the like) that the people became uncapable of obeying; and it was to be supposed, that the ruler's will would have been to have excepted such cases if foreseen; and that they did dispense with them when they fell out.

7. Sometimes also the penalty of violating a law, is some such mulct or service, which the ruler intendeth as a commutation for the duty, so that he freely leaveth it to the choice of the subject which he will choose. And then it is no sin to pay the mulct, and omit the action; because it crosseth not the lawgiver's will.

8. Sometimes also the law may command this principally for some men's sake, which so little concerns others, that it should not extend to them at all, were it not lest the liberty of them should be an impediment to the obedience of others, and consequently of the common good. In which case, if those persons so little concerned, do but omit the action secretly, so as to be no scandal or public hurt, it seemeth that they have the implicit consent of the rulers.

9. Sometimes particular duties are commanded with this express exception, "Unless they have just and reasonable impediment." As for coming every Lord's day to church, &c.; which seemeth to imply, that (though in cases where the public good is concerned, the person himself shall not be judge, nor at all as to the penalty, yet that) in actions of an indifferent nature in themselves, this exception is still supposed to be implied, "unless we have just and reasonable impediments," of which in private cases, as to the crime, we may judge.

10. I need not mention the common, natural exceptions: as that laws bind not to a thing when it becometh naturally impossible; or _cessante materia, rel capacitate subjecti obligati_, &c.

11. Laws may change their sense in part by the change of the lawgiver; for the law is not formally to us his law that is dead and was once our ruler, but his that is alive and is now our ruler. If Henry the Eighth make a law about the outward acts of religion, (as for coming to church, &c.) and this remain unrepealed in King Edward's, Queen Mary's, Queen Elizabeth's, King James's days, &c., even till now; as we are not to think that the lawgivers had the same sense and will, so neither that the law hath the same sense and obligation; for if the general words be capable of several senses, we must not take it as binding to us in the sense it was made in, but in the sense of our present lawgivers or rulers, because it is their law.

12. Therefore if a law had a special reason for it at the first making, (as the law for using bows and arrows,) that reason ceasing, we are to suppose the will of the lawgiver to remit the obligation, if he urge not the execution, and renew not the law.

13. By these plain principles many particular difficulties may be easily resolved, which cannot be foreseen and named, e. g. the law against relieving a beggar bindeth not, when he is like to die if he be not relieved; or in such a case as after the burning of London, when there was no parish to bring him to. A law that is but for the ordering of men's charity, (to soul or body, by preaching or alms,) will not disoblige me from the duties of charity themselves, in cases where Scripture or nature proveth them to be imposed by God. A law for fasting will not bind me, when it would be destructive to my body; even on God's sabbaths duties of mercy were to be preferred to rest and sacrifices.

14. If God's own laws must be thus expounded, that When two duties come together, and both cannot be done, the lesser ceaseth at that time to be a duty, and the greater is to be preferred, man's laws must also be necessarily so expounded: and the rather, because man's laws may be contradictory, when God's never are so, rightly understood.

15. Where the subject is to obey, so far he must discern which of the laws inconsistent is to be preferred; but in the magistratical execution, the magistrate or judge must determine.

E. g. One law commandeth that all the needy poor be kept on the parish where they were born or last lived. Another law saith, that nonconformable ministers of the gospel, who take not the Oxford oath, shall not come within five miles of city or corporation, (though they were born there,) or any place where they have been preachers. In case of necessity what shall they do? _Answ._ Whither they shall go for relief, they must discern as well as they can; but whither they shall be carried or sent, the magistrate or constable must discern and judge.

Also whether he shall go with a constable that by one law bringeth him to a place, which by the other law he is forbid on pain of six months' imprisonment in the common gaol to come to? _Answ._ If he be not voluntary in it, it is not his fault: and if one bring him thither by force, and another imprison him for being there, he must patiently suffer it.

16. But out of such excepted cases, the laws of our rulers (as the commands of parents) do bind us as is afore explained; and it is a sin against God to violate them.

17. Yea, when the reason of the law reacheth not our particular case and person, yet when we have reason to judge, that it is the ruler's will that all be bound for the sake of some, and the common order and good will be hindered by our exemption, we must obey to our corporal detriment, to avoid the public detriment, and to promote the public good.

[36] Nihil Deo qui omnem mundum hunc regit, acceptius, quam concilia cœcusque nominum quæ civitates appellantur. Cicero.

[37] Grotius de Imper. Sum. Potest. c. i. p. 7, 8. Sunt qui objiciant reges quædam imperare non posse, nisi consensus ordinum accesserit: sed hi non vident quibus in locis id juris est, ibi summum imperium non esse penes reges, sed aut penes ordines, aut certe penes id corpus, quod rex et juncti constituunt, ut Bodinus, Suarezius, Victoria, aliique, aliunde demonstrarunt: certum summum imperium totum, et aliquid imperare non posse, ideo tantum quod alter vetet aut intercedat, plane sunt ἀσύστατα.

[38] So foolish and bad is the multitude too often, that it made Aristippus hold it as probable, that a wise man should not endanger himself for his country, because wisdom is not to be cast away for the commodity of fools. Laert. in Aristip. But a wise man must be wise for others, and not only for himself.

[39] It was one of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, Vendendi filium patri potestas esto. But this law rather giveth the father that power, than declareth it to be naturally in him. Nature alloweth him no other selling of him, than what is for his child's own good.

[40] So p. 23. The same error of the original of power hath Acosta, 1. ii. c. 2. p. 208. with many other Jesuits and papists.

[41] Bishop Andrews in Tortur. Tort. p. 385. Actuus homo non distinguit inter formam, atque authoritatem regiminis; forma de hominibus esse potest: de cœlo semper est authoritas. An rex sit supra leges, Vid. Seb. Fox. lib. ii. de Instit. Reg.

[42] Dion Cass. saith, that when Euphates the philosopher would kill himself, Veniam dederat ei Adrianus citra ignominiam et infamiam, ut cicutam tum propter senectutem, tum etiam propter gravem morbum, bibere possit. In vita Adrian.

[43] Against the people's being the givers of power, by conjoining all their own in one, in church or state, see Mr. D. Cawdry's Review of Mr. Hooker's Survey, p. 154, &c.

[44] So lib. viii. p. 211, 218, 220.

[45] Lib. viii. p. 195. Trita in scholis, neminem sibi imperare posse; neminem sibi legem posse dicere, a qua mutata voluntate nequeat recedere: summum ejus esse imperium qui ordinario jure derogare valeat. Et quibus evincitur jus summæ potestatis non limitari per legem positivum. Hinc et Augustinus dixit imperatorem non esse subjectum legibus suis.--Grotius de Imp. p. 149, 150.

[46] Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam. Legem nec hominum ingeniis excogitatam, nec scitum aliquod esse populorum; sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Cicero de Leg.

[47] How considerable a part of England is London! Yet in this convocation, which hath made the new changes in the liturgy and book of ordination, London had not one clerk of their choosing: for being to choose but two, they chose only Mr. Calamy and myself; who were neither of us accepted, or ever there. Now if your opinion be true; Quær. 1. Whether you make not this convocation's decrees to be but counsels to us? 2. Or at least whether the city of London, or the London ministers, be not made free from detriment, as not consenters? You will free them and me, especially from detriment for our not conforming to this convocation's acts as such; upon reasons which I do not own myself, as generally by you laid down.

[48] Potestas maritalis est a Deo: applicatio ejus potestatis ad certam personam ex consensu venit quo tamen ipsum jus non datur. Nam si ex consensu daretur, posset consensu etiam dissolvi matrimonium, aut conveniri ne maritus fœminæ imperaret. Quod minime verum est. Imperatoria potestas non est penes electores: ergo nec ab ipsis datur; sed ab ipsis tamen certæ personæ applicatur. Jus vitæ et necis non est penes cives antequam in rempublicam coeant. Privatus enim jus vindictæ non habet: ab iisdem tamen applicatur ad cœtum aut personam aliquam. Grotius de Imperio, p. 270.

[49] Greg. Nazianzen cited by Bilson of Subjection, p. 361. Thou reignest together with Christ; rulest with him; thy sword is from him; thou art the image of God.

[50] Victor. Utic. saith of Victorianus proconsul of Carthage, that even to an Arian persecuting, usurping tyrant, Pro rebus sibi commissis semper fidelissimus habebatur; and the like of Sebastian and others, p. 460.

[51] Mark vii. 10; x. 19.

[52] Lamprid. saith of Alex. Severus that, Amavis literatos homines, vehementer eos etiam reformidans, nequid de se asperum scriberent. Universal. Histor. p. 132. Tiberius bellua luto et sanguine macerata; sui tegendi peritissimus artifex; totus tamen posteritatis oculis patuit, Deo hypocrisim detractione larvæ; plectente.

[53] Matt. xviii. 6; Mark ix. 42; Luke xvii. 2; Jude 7-9.

[54] Sext. Aurel. Victor, de Calig. De quo nescio an decuerit memoriæ prodi, nisi forte quia juvat de principibus nosse omnia, ut improbi saltem famæ metu talia declinent.

[55] They are dangerous passages which Petrarch hath, though a good, learned, and moderate man. Dial. 49. Non tot passim essent domini nec tam late furerent, nisi populi insanirent et cuique civium pro se charior foret res privata quam publica; voluptas quam gloria, pecunia quam libertas, vita quam virtus--Et statim--Et sane si vel unum patria civem bonum habeat, malum dominum diutius non habebit. The meaning is too plain; abundance of the most learned writers have such passages which must be read with caution; though I would draw none to the other extreme. Petrarch's 68 Dial. and 85 Dial. de bono domino, is as smart as the former; but yet speaketh not all that contra reges, which he doth contra dominos. However he says that, Inter regem et tyrannum non discernunt Graii, &c.----So Sir Thomas More in his Poems: Regibus e multis regnum bene qui reget unum: vix tamen unus erit, si tamen unus erit. And that of Senec. Trag. ult. Tantum ut noceat, cupit esse potens.--

[56] Bias interrogatus, quidnam esset difficile? Ferre, inquit, fortiter mutationem rerum in deterius. Laert. p. 55.

[57] Phil. iii. 7, 8, 11, 12.

[58] Univers. Hist. p. 140. Dicas imperatorem orbis Epictetum, Neronem mancipium: irrisum esse summo fastigio, cum servaret dignus, imperaret indignus; nullumque esse malum, quin aliqua boni gutta cordiatus.

[59] Numb. xvi.

[60] Psal. xii. 6, 7; Prov. xvi. 18; xix. 13.

[61] Matt. vii. 1-3.

[62] Object. Si id juris orbis obtineat status religionis erit instabilis; mutato regis animo religio mutabitur. Resp. Unicum hic solatium in Divina est providentia; omnium animos Deus in potestate sua habet; sed speciali quodam modo cor regis in manu Domini. Deus et per bonos et per malos reges opus suum operatur. Interdum tranquillitas, interdum tempestas ecclesiæ utilior. Nempe si pius est qui impepat, si diligens lector sacræ Scripturæ, si assiduus in precibus, si Ecclesiæ Catholicæ reverens, si peritos attente audiens, multum per ilium proficit veritas. Sin distorto est et corrupto judicio, pejus id ipsi cedit quam ecclesiæ. Nam ipsum grave manet judicium regis ecclesiæ, qui ecclesiam inultam non sinet. Grotius de Imper. p. 210. John xviii. 36.

[63] Dicunt Stoici, sapientes non modo liberos esse verum et reges: cum sit regnum imperium nemini obnoxium, quod de sapientibus solis asseritur. Statuere enim oportere principem de bonis et malis; hæc autem malorum scire neminem. Similiter ad magistratus, et judicia et oratoriam solos illos idoneos, neminemque malorum. Laert. in Zenone.

[64] Eam rempublicam optimam dicunt Stoici, quæ sit mixta ex regno et populari dominatu, optimorumque potentia. Laert. in Zenone.

[65] Bad people make bad governors: in most places the people are so wilful and tenacious of their sinful customs, that the best rulers are not able to reform them. Yea many a ruler hath cast off his government, being wearied with mutinous and obstinate people. Plato would not meddle with government in Athens. Quia plebs altis institutis et moribus assueverat. Laert. in Platone. And many other philosophers that were fittest for government, refused it on the same account, through the disobedience of the people.

[66] Of these things see my propositions of the difference of the magistrate's and pastor's power to Dr. Lud. Moul.

[67] The Rex sacrorum among the Romans, was debarred from exercising any magistracy. Plut. Rom. Quest. 63.

[68] See Bilson of Subject. p. 238, 256. Princes only be governors in things and causes ecclesiastical; that is, with the sword. But if you infer, ergo, Bishops be no governors in those things, meaning, no dispensers, guiders, nor directors of those things, your conclusion is larger, &c. So p. 256.

[69] It was somewhat far that Carolus Magnus went to be actual guide of all in his chapel in reading even in all their stops, as it is at large declared by Abbas Usperg. Chron. pag. 181.

[70] Bishop Bilson, pag. 313. We grant they must rather hazard their lives, than baptize princes which believe not, or distribute the Lord's mysteries to them that repent not, but give wilful and open signification of impiety, &c. Beda Hist. Eccles. lib. ii. c. 5, telleth us, that Melitus bishop of London, (with Justus,) was banished by the heirs of king Sabereth, because he would not give them the sacrament of the Lord's supper, which they would needs have before they were baptized.

[71] Bishop Andrews in Tort. Tort. p. 383. Cohibeat Regem Diaconus, si cum indignus sit, idque palam constet, accedat tamen ad sacramentum: cohibeat et medicus si ad noxium quid vel insalubre manum admoveat: cohibeat et equiso inter equitandum adigat equum per locum præruptum, vel solebrosum, cui subsit periculum: etiamne medico? etiamne equisoni suo subjectus rex? Sed de majori potestate loquitur; sed ea, ad rem noxiam procul arcendam. Qua in re charitatis semper potestas est maxima. Here you see what church government is, and how kings are under it, and how not, in Bishop Andrews' sense.

[72] Bilson, p. 399, saith, The election of bishops in those days belonged to the people, and not the prince, and though Valens by plain force placed Lucius there, yet might the people lawfully reject him as no bishop, and cleave to Peter their pastor.

[73] Too many particular laws about little matters breed contention. Alex. Severus would have distinguished all orders of men by their apparel: sed hoc Ulpiano, et Paulo displicuit; dicentibus plurimum rixarum fore, si faciles essent homines ad injurias. And the emperor yielded to them. Lamprid. in Alex. Severus. Lipsius, ubi leges multæ, ibi lites multæ et vita moresque pravi. Non multæ leges bonos mores faciunt, sed paucæ fideliter servatæ.

[74] N. B. Quæ habet Andrews Tort. Tort. p. 310. Quando et apud vos dictio juris exterior, clavis proprie non sit: eamque vos multis sæpe mandatis, qui liacorum in sorte sunt, exortes sane sacri ordinis universi.

[75] Lege Epist. Caroli Calvi ad Papam inter Hinc mari Rhemensis Epistolas Cont. Papæ Usurpationes. Isidor. Hispal. sent. iii. cap. 51. Cognoscant principes seculi, Deo debere se rationem reddere propter ecclesiam quam a Christo tuendam suspiciunt. Nam sive augeatur pax et disciplina ecclesiæ per fideles principes, sive solvatur, ille ab eis rationem exigit, qui eorum potestati suam ecclesiam credidit. Leo Epist. ad Leonem Imp. Debes incunctantur advertere, regiam potestatem, tibi non solum ad mundi regimen, sed maxime ad ecclesiæ præsidium esse collatam. See the judgment of Jo. Parisiensis, Franciscus Victoria, and Widdrington in Grot. de Imper. pag. 23. Lege Lud. Molinæi Discourse of the Powers of the Cardinal Chigi.

[76] Perjurii pœna divina exitium, humana dedecus. Cicero. Agesilaus sent thanks to his enemies for their perjury, as making then no question of their overthrow. Perjuri numinis contemptores. Plutarch. Theodosius execrabatur cum legisset superbiam dominantium, præcipue perfidos et ingratos. Paul. Diaconus, 1. 2.

[77] See the instance of loyalty in Mascelzer against his own brother Gildo (a rebel). Paul. Diacon. lib. iii. initio.

[78] Bilson of Subject, p. 236. Princes have no right to call or confirm preachers, but to receive such as be sent of God, and give them liberty for their preaching, and security for their persons: and if princes refuse so to do, God's labourers must go forward with that which is commanded them from heaven; not by disturbing princes from their thrones, nor invading their realms, as your holy father doth, and defendeth he may do; but by mildly submitting themselves to the powers on earth, and meekly suffering for the defence of the truth, what they shall inflict. So he.

[79] Prov. xvi. 7.

[80] Rom. xiii. 1-4; xi. 36.

[81] Si aliquid; jusserit proconsul, aliud jubeat imperator, nunquid dubitatur, illo contempto, illi esse serviendum? Ergo si aliud imperator, aliud jubeat Deus, quid judicatur? Major potestas Deus: da veniam O imperator. August, de Verb. Domin. Matth. Serm. 6.

[82] Vetus est verumque dictum, Miser est imperator cui vera reticentur. Grotius de Imp. p. 245. Principi consule non dulciora, sed optima; is one of Solon's sentences in Laert. de Solon. Therefore it is a horrid villany of the Jesuits, which is expressed in Secret. Instruct. in Arcanis Jesuit. p. 5-8, 11. To indulge great men and princes in those opinions and sins which please them, and to be on that side that their liberty requireth to keep their favour to the society. So Maffæinus, 1. iii. c. 11. in vita ipsius Loyolæ. Alexander Severus so greatly hated flatterers, that Lampridius saith, Siquis caput flexisset aut blandius aliquid dixisset, uti adulator, vel abjiciebatur, si loci ejus qualitas pateretur; vel ridebatur ingeuti cachinno, si ejus dignitas graviori subjacere non posset injuriæ Venit ad Attilam post victoriam Marullus poeta ejus temporis egregius, compositumque in adulationem carmen recitavit: in quo ubi Attila per interpretem cognovit se Deum et Divina stirpe ortum vanissime prædicari, aspernatus sacrilegæ adulationis impudentiam, cum autore carmen exuri jusserat. A qua severitate subinde temperavit, ne scriptores cæteri a laudibus ipsius celebrandis terrerentur. Callimach. Exp. in Attila, p. 353.

[83] Melch. Adam. in vit. Barth. Pitisci.

[84] It was one of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, Justa imperia sunto, iisque cives modeste ac sine recusatione parento.

[85] Eccl. Polit. lib. viii. p. 224.

[86] On second thoughts this case is fullier opened afterward.

[87] Leg. quæ de Grotio post, p. 731.

[88] So Hollingshed maketh parliaments so mighty as to take down the greatest kings, &c.

[89] As Aug. Traj. the Antonines, &c. It is confessed that most historians write much for liberty against tyranny. But the heathens do it much more than the christians.

[90] Langius saith, that in his own hearing, Jodocus Præses Senat. Mechlin. Magna contentione tuebatur, neminem posse vel unius legis intelligentiam consequi, qui quicquam sciret in bonis literis, et addebat, vix esse tres in orbe qui leges Cæsareas intelligerent.

[91] Read Bishop Andrews Tort. Tort., Bishop Bilson of Christian Subjection, Robert Abbot, Jewel, Field, &c., who will fully show that true church power is no way injurious to kings. De regum authoritate, quod ex jure divino non sit Tortus probat: asseri enim scriptorum sententia communi: at nec omnium, nec optimorum. Andr. Tort. Tort. p. 384.

[92] Just such occasions as papists bring against the reformers, did the heathens bring against the christians, as you may see in Eunapius in Ædesio. At egregii illi viri et bellicosi confusis perturbatisque rebus omnibus debellasse Deos incruentis quidem, sed ab avaritiæ crimine non puris manibus gloriabantur, sacrilegium et impietatis crimen laudi sibi assumentes, idem postea in sacra loca invexerunt Monachos, sic dictos homines quidem specie, sed vitam turpem porcorum more exigentes, qui in popatulo infinita et infanda scelere committebant, quibus tamen pietatis pars videbatur, sacri loci reverentiam proculcari. O partiality!

[93] Rom. xii. 17, 19, 20; Luke vi. 28-30; Matt. v. 39-41; Luke xx. 25, 26.

[94] Le Blanc in his Travels, p. 88, saith of some heathen kings, They are all jealous of our religion, holding, that the christians adore one God, great above the rest, that will not suffer any others; and that he sets a greater esteem and value upon innocent, poor, and simple people, than upon the rich, kings and princes; and that princes had need to preserve to themselves the affections and esteem of their subjects, to reign with greater ease.

[95] So Bishop Bilson of Subject, p. 243. Princes be supreme; not in respect that all things be subject to their wills, which were plain tyranny, not christian authority: but that all persons within their realms are bound to obey their laws, or abide their pains. So p. 242.

[96] The differences are oft among the lawyers which set the commonwealth on fire, and then they are charged on divines, e. g. Grotius de Imper. p. 55. Si arma in eos reges sumpta sunt in quos totum populi jus translatum erat, ac qui proinde non precario sed proprio jure imperabant, laudari salva pietate non possunt, quemcunque tandem prætextum aut eventum habuerint. Sin alicubi reges tales fuere qui pactis, sive positivis legibus, et senatus alicujus aut ordinum decretis astringerentur, in hos ut summum imperium non obtinent, arma ex optimatum tanquam superiorum sententia, sumi, justis de causis potuerint. Multi enim reges, etiam qui sanguinis jure succedunt, reges sunt nomine magis quam imperio--Sed fallit imperitos quod illam quotidianam et maxime in oculos incurrentem rerum administrationem, quæ sæpe in optimatum statu penes unum est, ab interiore reipublicæ constitutione non satis discernunt. Quod de regibus dixi, idem multo magis de iis acceptum volo, qui et re et nomine non reges sed principes fuere, h. e. non summi, sed primi. p. 54.

[97] Jactavit caput inter præcisos phanaticos et genitalia sibi devinxit, &c. Lamprid.

[98] Eunapius saith of his master Chrysanthius, that when Julian had made him, Primarium pontificem totius illius ditionis, in munere tamen suo non morose ac superbe se gessit; junioribus urgendo haud gravis (sicut plerique omnes in unum consentientes, callide ferventerque faciundum censebant); neque christianis molestus admodum: quippe tanta erat morum in eo lenitas atque simplicitas, ut per Lydiam propemodum ignorata fuerit sacrorum in pristinum restitutio. Eo factum est, ut cum priora aliter cecidissent, nihil innovatum neque mutatio insignis accepta videretur, sed præter expectationem cuncta placide sapirentur. Moderation in a heathen was his benefit.

[99] Vestra doctrina est, nisi princeps vobis ex animo sit, quantumvis legitimus hæres sit, regno excludi, alium eligi posse. Posse dixi? immo oportere. Hæc Clementina vestra fuit. Bishop Andrews of the Papists, Tort. Tort. p. 327.

[100] So p. 381, 382. "If others do but stand on their guard to keep their lives and families from the bloody rage of their enemies, seeking to put whole towns and provinces of them to the sword, against all law and reason, and to disturb the kingdoms in the minority of the right governors: or if they defend their ancient and christian liberties, covenanted and agreed on by those princes, to whom they first submitted themselves, and ever since confirmed and allowed by the kings that have succeeded: if in either of these two cases the godly require their right, and offer no wrong, impugn not their princes, but only save their own lives, you cry, Rebellious heretics, rebellious Calvinists, fury, frenzy, mutiny; and I know not what. You may pursue, depose, and murder princes, when the bishop of Rome biddeth you, and that without breach of duty, law, or conscience, to God or man, as you vaunt, though neither life nor limbs of yours be touched. We may not so much as beseech princes that we may be used like subjects, not like slaves; like men, not like beasts, that we may be convented by laws before judges, not murdered in corners by inquisitors. We may not so much as hide our heads, nor pull our necks out of the greedy jaws of that Romish wolf, but the foam of your unclean mouth is ready to call us by all the names you can devise." So far Bilson.

[101] Rom. xv. 1-4.

[102] Bishop Bilson ubi sup. p. 259. As bishops ought to discern which is truth before they teach; so must the people discern who teacheth right before they believe. Pag. 261, 262. Princes as well as others must yield obedience to bishops speaking the word of God; but if bishops pass their commission, and speak beside the word of God, what they list, both prince and people may despise them. See him further, p. 259-262, proving that all have a _judicium discretionis_.

[103] Cicero saith, that every good man was in his heart, or as much as in him lay, one that killed Cæsar.

[104] 1 Pet. iv. 12.

[105] Luke xiv. 9, 33.

[106] Ungebantur reges non per dominum, sed qui cæteris crudeliores existerent, et paulo post ab unctoribus non pro veri examinatione, trucidabantar, aliis electis trucioribus. Gildas de exc. Brit.

[107] Rom. xiv.; xv. 1; Gal. vi. 1-4; James iii. 15-17; Tit. iii. 2.

[108] Luke xx. 18; Matt. xxi. 42, 44; Acts iv. 11; 1 Pet. ii. 7, 8; Zech. xii. 3.

[109] Read the lives of all the philosophers, orators, and famous men of Greece or Rome, and try whether the christians or they were more for monarchy. Arcesilaus regum neminem magnopere coluit: quamobrem legatione ad Antigonum fungens pro patria, nihil obtinuit. Hesich. in Arces. It is one of Thales's sayings in Laert. Quid difficile? Regem vidisse tyrannum senem. Chrysippus videtur aspernator regum modice fuisse. Quod cum tam multa scripserit (libros 705.) nulli unquam regi quicquam adscripserit. Seneca saith (Traged. de Here. fur.) perilously, Victima haud ulla amplior potest, magisque opima mactari Jovi, Quam rex iniquus. Cicero pro Milon. Non se obstrinxit scelere siquis tyrannum occidat, quamvis familiarem. Et 5. Tusc. Nulla nobis cum tyrannis societas est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum quem honestum est necare. Plura habet similia.

[110] See Bilson of Subject, p. 525, 526. Proving from Chrysostom, Hilary, Origen, that pastors may use no force or terror, but only persuasion, to recover their wandering sheep. Bilson, ibid. p. 541. Parliaments have been kept by the king and his barons, the clergy wholly excluded, and yet their acts and statutes good: and when the bishops were present, their voices from the Conquest to this day were never negative. By God's law you have nothing to do with making laws for kingdoms and commonwealths: you may teach, you may not command: persuasion is your part, compulsion is the prince's, &c. Thus Bishop Bilson. So p. 358.

[111] 1 Pet. ii. 16; Gal. v. 13; 2 Pet. ii. 19; Gal. iv. 26; 2 Cor. iii. 17.

[112] Having spoken of this controversy, in my "Life of Faith," as an easy thing, in which I thought we were really agreed, while we seemed to differ, which I called a pitiful case, some brethren (who say nothing against the truth of what I said) are offended at me as speaking too confidently, and calling that so easy which Bishop Sanderson and so many others did make a greater matter of; I retract the words, if they be unsuitable either to the matter or the readers: but as to the matter and the truth of the words, I desire the reader but to consider how easy a case Mr. P. maketh of it, Eccl. Pol. and how heinous a matter he maketh of our supposed dissent: and if after all this it shall appear, that the nonconformists do not at all differ from Hooker, Bilson, and the generality of the conformists in this point, let him that is willing to be represented as odious and intolerable to rulers and to mankind, for that in which we do not differ, proceed to backbite me for saying that it is a pitiful case; and pretending that we are agreed.

[113] It is not Mr. Humphrey alone that hath written that laws bind not in conscience to obedience which are against the public good. The greatest casuists say the same, excepting the case of scandal: he that would see this in them may choose but these two special authors, Bapt. Fragos. de Regimine Reipublicæ, and Greg. Sayrus in his Clavis Regia, and in them he shall find enough more cited. Though I think some further cautions would make it more satisfactory.