CHAPTER XVIII

THE PERIOD OF CLASSIC SCHOLASTICISM (1200–1453)

=The General Character of this Last Period.= The first one hundred and fifty years of this period was the golden age of scholasticism; the remaining one hundred years was a period of decline. The period of Classic Scholasticism was a natural growth from the Transitional Period. At the end of the Transitional Period the church, in spite of Mohammedans, Jews, heretics, and the classics, outshone all else, and its life and dogma were the most worth while. In this period appeared a theology, adequate to its life and dogma,――a theology which was floated by the wave of piety of the Mendicant Orders. Acquaintance with the true Aristotle was the needed stimulus. The favorable conditions for that stimulus were (1) the triumph of the church and papacy, (2) the intense piety of the Mendicants, (3) the general culture derived from an inner development of the church and from contact with the East in Constantinople, Palestine, and Spain. Aristotle and the Mendicants were the new forces, and they achieved their position against the hostility of the old Orders, the universities, and the teachers. The triumph was possible because the new forces contributed nothing really new, but merely completed the old scheme of things. The new Aristotle, as it was understood, taught metaphysics, epistemology, and politics in a way to vindicate dogma as against the opposition of William of Champeaux and Roscellinus. The Mendicants on their part vindicated all dogma by blending it with faith on the one hand, and with reason on the other.

The scholasticism of the Transitional Period was predominantly controversial, while the character of this period, which we are now entering, is synthetic and constructive. The infusion of fresh blood into culture, from not only the logical but the physical works of Aristotle, resulted in the renewal of interest in the dialectic and in the construction of systems of metaphysics and psychology. _The central problem now concerns the respective scopes of reason and faith_, and to its solution logic and psychology are applied. A complete solution seemed to be made by Thomas Aquinas, which had its literary expression in Dante. Without the introduction of any new philosophical principle the world of nature, as interpreted by Aristotle, was apparently brought by Thomas into theoretical harmony with the Augustinian conception of the world of grace. But no sooner did Thomas seem to have formulated scholastic philosophy for all time, than controversy broke out afresh. For pantheistic mysticism gained its independence through one of Thomas’s own brother Dominicans, Eckhart; then Duns Scotus, a Franciscan, drew up a metaphysical programme based upon the Augustinian theory of the will, and gave a new direction to philosophy; and furthermore nominalism grew great upon Aristotle’s logic and the new empirical psychology. For the churchman, philosophy reached its completeness in Thomas Aquinas. The later tendencies are regarded by the churchman as deteriorations, and even modern philosophy is looked upon as but temporizing with the classic system of Thomas.

Illustration: GROWTH OF MOHAMMEDANISM DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, SHOWING ITS CONTACT WITH CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION

The Conquests of the Mohammedans during the different epochs are shown by the different shading and the dates placed on the map.

=The Two Civilizations.= This is one of the periods of thought resulting from the shiftings of distinct civilizations. We have already noted the influence of the struggles of the Orient and the Occident in the Persian wars and in the campaigns of Alexander; and we have lately seen an entirely new epoch ushered in by the invasions of the northern tribes into Rome. With the new epoch before us, we find ourselves confronted with another new ethnic situation. The civilization of the Mohammedan had grown in mighty strength in the East, had possessed itself of Asia Minor, northern Africa, and Spain, and was now facing Europe from the east, west, and south. All through the First Period of the Middle Ages the Christian and Mohammedan civilizations had been contestants for supremacy. Only as late as 732 the Mohammedan claim upon Europe had been defeated at the battle of Tours. Mohammed (570–632) converted the whole of Arabia to Islam during the ten years between his Hegira (622) and his death. His successors took Palestine (637), Syria (638), Egypt (647), Persia (710), all north Africa (by 707), invaded Spain (711), and were repulsed at Tours (732). All this occurred within a century, and for the next two hundred years (800–1000) the Mohammedans harassed Rome and the islands of the Mediterranean. With the two civilizations facing each other on the Mediterranean, only mutual religious fanaticism could stand in the way of their mutual cultural influence. In point of fact, because of fanaticism the cultures of the two civilizations during the first centuries of the Middle Ages touched each other but little. In those first centuries of the Middle Ages, when western Europe was shrouded in darkness, the schools of the Arabs at Bagdad, Basra, Kufa, and other cities were enjoying a splendid intellectual life. From 850 to 1100 the centre of learning of the world was in the Arabian cities of the East.[58] In 1100 the fanatical faction of the Arabians crushed this intellectual movement in the East, the scholars fled to Spain, and for a century longer Saracen learning flourished in Spain, especially in Cordova. In 1200 the Arabian orthodoxy made itself felt in Spain, and the Arabian scholars there had to find refuge among the Jews or Christians.

=The First Contact of the Two Civilizations.= From the beginning of the Middle Ages the point of contact between the two civilizations was either war or commerce. The Jew was the globe-trotter of that day, and was constantly bringing into Europe reports of Arabian civilization. He was a philosopher, a monotheist, a Semite, like the Arab, and he had an interest in more than commercial matters. About the end of the Early Period of the Middle Ages he found it profitable to make first Hebrew and then Latin translations of Arabian learning, and to sell them in Europe. In this form, between 1000 and 1100, medical and astronomical knowledge entered Europe. Greek philosophical writings came next in translations from the Arabic, which had previously been translated from the Syriac. Thus for the two hundred years, between 1000 and 1200, the Christian schools were beginning to read portions of Greek philosophy in Latin, which had previously passed through Syriac and Arabian (and sometimes Hebrew) translations. Before 1200, there were none but these Arabic versions. A pertinent example of these was the works of Aristotle. Before 1200 all of Aristotle’s writings, except the _Organon_, appeared in Europe in this form, and the _Organon_ as a whole was not known until 1150. In 1125 some of Aristotle’s physics was known by the school of Chartres; in 1200 all the physics, metaphysics, and ethics were known in translations from the Latin and Hebrew. These were accompanied by Arabian commentaries, which interpreted Aristotle as if he were a neo-Platonic pantheist. There were many churchmen interested in the work of translation, as, for example, Gerbert, and Raymond of Toledo. Roger II of Sicily (d. 1154) and Frederick II (d. 1250) had their courts filled with Arabian philosophers. Frederick had many translations made and presented to the Universities of Oxford, Paris, and Bologna.

Thus the influence of the Arabian upon the Christian culture before the Classic Period of the Middle Ages was not inconsiderable. But this must be said of Arabian culture――it was mainly borrowed. Arabia[59] acted merely as a transmitter of the materials of knowledge from the Greeks and Hindoos; and so far as philosophy was concerned, the Arab was returning to Europe, in a perverted form, the Aristotle which had been deposited with him centuries before. The Mohammedans were the world’s carriers of a considerable body of science and of many new agricultural products; and of the amount which they introduced into Europe only a small portion was their own. At the end of the twelfth century the Christian at Rome and York was richer in the principles of discovery, but poorer in the amount of traditional learning and of scientific wealth, than the Mohammedan at Bagdad and Cordova.

=The Conflict between the Two Civilizations.――The Crusades.[60]= The rivalry between the two civilizations became intensified into an open conflict about the year 1100. Up to the year 1000 the Mohammedan leaders were Arabians, but in the eleventh century these Arabians were conquered by tribes of Turks or Mongolians from the north of Asia. These became converted to Mohammedanism, but they had no love for culture nor reverence for the places in Palestine, which were sacred alike to the Christian and the Arab. From the fourth to the twelfth century the pilgrimages of the Christians, individually or in multitudes, largely increased, but in the eleventh century the new race of Mohammedan Turks made the access to Jerusalem more difficult. They began to subject the pilgrims to cruelties, so that the Christian was beginning to find the door of his Holy Land closed to him. Then did Platonic Christianity rush to the rescue of those sacred places that symbolized its ideals. This onslaught upon the Mohammedans came in a series of surges, traditionally spoken of as the eight Crusades.[61] The Crusades resulted quite contrary to the expectations of the church, for the Crusaders failed in permanently recapturing Jerusalem. But the Crusades accomplished the unexpected thing――they awakened Europe. The effect of the Crusades upon Europe was far greater than upon the Orient. The results may be enumerated as follows:――

1. The dormant European intellect was shaken up by contact with the heathen, whom the Europeans had previously despised, but whom they found to be their superiors.

2. A new national rivalry was aroused among the Christian soldiers. This national spirit was helped negatively by the losses among the feudal lords.

3. Commercial activity was given an immense impulse. A new social class was formed, which allied itself with the kings against the feudal lords. Trade was opened with the East, revealing new luxuries and new needs. Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, and in a secondary way also the German, French, and English towns, became prosperous commercial centres.

4. The power of the Latin church was extended.

5. _The works of Aristotle were introduced in translations direct from the original Greek._ In the fourth Crusade Constantinople was captured by the Crusaders (1204), and in this way the treasures of the Greeks were opened to the western scholars. The complete works of Aristotle were introduced into western Europe at a time when Aristotle was being interpreted as a pantheist by the Arabian commentators.

=The Revival of Learning.= The need of learning, that had been felt in the twelfth century, was now being satisfied. The entire logic of Aristotle and his entire natural science gave the new materials for knowledge. These came into Europe within the century between 1150 and 1250, (1) through translations from the Arabic, and then (2) directly through translations from the Greek. Aristotle’s logic revived scholasticism and his science became the foundation of metaphysics. Mediæval thought was ready for this and _there was a complete readjustment without the introduction of a new philosophical principle_. The side of Augustine’s teaching that emphasized the intellect rather than the will, gained by being confirmed by the systematic intellectualism of Aristotle. The founder of this was Albert of Bollstaedt; the organizer and literary codifier was Thomas Aquinas; the poetic expression was Dante. The new centres of learning were Paris and Constantinople. The centres of teaching were transferred from the monasteries to the new Universities (1100–1300). Salerno had its beginnings in the latter part of the eleventh century. Bologna in law, Oxford in general culture and theology, Paris in the same studies, show traces of general organization between 1160 and 1200. There were established seventy-nine of these universities between 1150 and 1500. They were not “founded,” but grew up as part of this movement.[62]

Illustration: DIAGRAM OF DANTE’S POETIC CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE

From Rossetti’s _Shadow of Dante_

(Showing its divisions of Hell (at centre of the earth), Purgatory, and the nine heavens. The evident plan beneath this is the Ptolemaic cosmography.)

Nevertheless, the struggle was a full century long before official recognition of Aristotle came. The name of Aristotle had been associated with pantheism for many years, on account of the Arabian versions of his teaching. The neo-Platonic doctrine of emanations, with its pantheism in the Arabian versions, was a tendency of which the church had been shy since the days of Erigena. Until the theistic character of Aristotle’s teaching became assured by the direct Latin translations from the Greek, there was a powerful reaction against the whole of the new learning. The church had condemned the _Physics_ in 1209 and the _Metaphysics_ in 1215. But in 1254 Aristotle was officially recognized, and fifty years later he became the guide of the church, whom no one could contradict without being accused of heresy.

The Catholic church never showed its ability to greater advantage than in its dealings with the new problems of this period. The people of a purely religious epoch now came into possession of Aristotelianism. For centuries the intellect had been starving on formal logic. An intellectual revolution was imminent. Here in Aristotle was presented a rich theory of nature that the church had never considered. Yet it is doubtful if Aristotle would have been accepted, had the Mendicant Friars――the Dominicans and Franciscans――not succeeded in establishing chairs in the University of Paris. These monks did not love philosophy in itself. They saw, however, that philosophy must be able to defend itself against infidel philosophy by the weapons of philosophy. But curiously enough, Aristotelianism, which was the spring of this renaissance, became, by its incorporation into the church, the great obstacle to the real Renaissance two hundred and fifty years later.

=The Strength and Burden of Aristotle to the Church.=

=1. The Strength of Aristotle to the Church:= (1) Aristotle elaborated for the church, with great clearness, the conception of a transcendent God. This was a weapon for the church against neo-Platonism and mysticism. (2) Aristotle gave to the church a theory of nature that supplemented its theory of grace. (3) Aristotle established a philosophical standard for the truth of things. This proved of great value to the church because it was under the control of the church. In the first two periods of the Middle Ages philosophical thought had a relative independence because it was without a recognized standard; now philosophy could be controlled by the standard of Aristotle. For example, with the coming of Aristotle there came certain standard definitions of substance, person, nature, accident, mode, potency, and act.

=2. The Burden of Aristotle to the Church:= (1) Aristotle encouraged a taste for science and analysis. At first the Aristotelian influence in this direction was very small, but its growth was only a question of time. (2) Aristotle became for the church a second standard. The problem for the churchman now became a double one: (a) Is my teaching consistent with church dogma? (b) Is my teaching consistent with Aristotle? “My son,” was the reply to a youth who thought he had discovered spots on the sun, “I have read Aristotle many times and I assure you there is nothing of the kind in him.” Dogma, not now the only standard, is not infallible. The reason need not follow dogma, but its own standard. Revelation became a realm of mystery which the reason could not reach, but to which it pointed. A doctrine thus might be of such a nature that it might be philosophically true, but theologically not true.

=The Predecessors of Aquinas.= Many distinguished names stand at the close of the Transitional Period and the beginning of the Classic Period. These express the transitional character of the thought of the threshold of this time. They show, like Abelard, the tendency toward rationalism. Alexander of Hales (d. 1264), William of Aubergne (d. 1249), Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1246), Albert of Bollstaedt, called Albertus Magnus (d. 1280), show the influence of the new Aristotelian science. Albert was the teacher of Thomas Aquinas. The attempt of Thomas to form a theological system for the church was anticipated by the so-called _Sums_ of the twelfth century, of which the work of Peter the Lombard was the model. The four books of _Sums_ of Peter were collections of opinions of the Fathers on questions of dogma. They show the influence of Aristotle and the method of Abelard. The _Sums_ of Peter became for several centuries the text-book of the schools and the subject of innumerable commentaries. It was the core of Classic scholastic literature, and around it grew up the problems of metaphysics and psychology.

=The Life of Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274).――The Founder of the Dominican Tradition.= Thomas belonged to a noble house which was related to the royal family. He studied in the University of Naples, but at the age of nineteen, upon resolving to enter the Dominican order, he was captured and kept a prisoner by his brothers. After two years he made his escape, and, his family having consented to his taking orders, he went to Cologne under the instruction of Albert. He was then sent to Paris, where he obtained his degree in 1257. He was a successful lecturer at Paris until 1261, when he was called by the Pope to teach philosophy in Rome, Bologna, and Pisa. During this period he composed his greatest work, _Summa Theologiae_. He declined preferment and finally resided at Naples. He always enjoyed the highest consideration of the church authorities.

Thomas, the founder of the “Dominican tradition,” was the first to formulate Christian Aristotelianism and to draw for the church the line between the realms of reason and faith. He did not so much create doctrine as he transformed and assimilated it. The sources from which he drew were many: the Scriptures, the Fathers, Greek philosophy, and the teaching of contemporary Arabians and Jews. If, as some historians maintain, he was not a thinker of the first rank, he at least relieved the church from a delicate situation by means of a conciliating theology. Certainly his predecessors and contemporaries stand eclipsed by him. He satisfied the mediæval demand for order and he prevented deterioration in the church doctrine. He did not rise above his age, although he stood at the head of its intellectual movement. He was, on the contrary, the most perfect expression of scholasticism, and he was affectionately regarded as _doctor angelicus_ and again as _doctor universalis_.

=The Central Principle of Thomas’s Doctrine――The Twofold Truth.= The life-purpose of Thomas was to bring Christianity into closer relation with civilization and science. He sought to give all departments of knowledge their rights and at the same time to protect the ascendency of religion. This was to him the same as bringing Christianity and Aristotle together, for Aristotle meant to him the entire product of ancient civilization. To the mediæval world of grace he added a world of nature, and, fully dominated by the mediæval love of order, he unfolded so comprehensive a view of life that he included all its problems. He felt that the natural and the revealed must not become a contradiction.

To accomplish this Thomas found in Aristotle his own ideal estimate of things. Looking at Aristotle through his own neo-Platonism, he naturally found in Aristotle more of the inner and religious estimate of nature than the facts will allow. Yet it was evident to Thomas that there was in Aristotle a great interest in nature and a great reserve on ultimate questions. Nature was, according to Aristotle, an essence unfolding in a system of grades. This became the central principle of Aquinas in this form: _Nature is a sketch in outline of the world of grace_. Before the eye of the religious mind these two truths should appear: (1) the world of faith and the world of nature are two properly distinct worlds; (2) the world of faith is a continuation of the world of nature. The world of grace and the world of nature are two grades of the whole of existence. Nature is the lower stage of development, and the point of contact between it and the world of grace is the soul of man. Religion and philosophy thus have different spheres, but they are not contradictory. Grace does not destroy, but it perfects nature. Nature is subordinate to grace as man is subordinate to the Christian, the state to the church, the Emperor to the Pope.[63]

The difference between philosophy and theology is not that theology treats of God and divine truths, and philosophy does not. Philosophy discusses divine truths. But the difference lies here, that theology views truths in the light of revelation, while philosophy views them in the light of reason. Yet there are truths that belong to philosophy, truths that belong to theology, and truths that belong to both. The problems of the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the relation of the world to God are theological problems, yet they can also be demonstrated by the reason of philosophy; but the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the temporal creation are beyond the scope of the reason and belong to theology. Philosophy and theology are distinct, yet they are in harmony. Theology supplements philosophy with faith; philosophy supplements theology by (1) establishing preliminary motives, (2) supplying analogies, (3) answering objections. Thomas accepts both propositions which had divided his predecessors: _credo ut intelligam_ and _intelligo ut credam_.

Above historical revelation there is something even higher, which could be called another realm, were it not more of a hope than a possession of man. Its appearance in the doctrine of Thomas shows the influence of Plato upon him. It is the immediate union of the individual with God in mystic ecstasy.[64] It is the dome of the religious temple that Thomas has built. But Thomas was careful to insist that this heavenly glory could not be gained except through the offices of the church. The individual cannot reach God through his own unaided efforts, but the sacraments of the church form the mysterious background of the religious life.

=The Problem of Individuality――The Relation of Particulars and Universals.= The all-absorbing question of the Transitional Period, of the relation of particulars and universals, became for Thomas and his successors the problem of individuality. For the schoolman was obliged to define the individual and fix his place in his Aristotelian world, if he was to be successful against the pantheism of the Arabian Aristotelianism. What is the nature and standing of the individual? What constitutes the difference between individuals? The whole theological edifice of Thomas would collapse in mystic unity, the immortality of the soul would be lost and the offices of the church would be nullified, unless Thomas showed the positive nature of the individual. In this connection we must remember that on the whole the Middle Ages had accepted Abelard’s analysis of the problem of the relation of universals and particulars: the universals exist in three ways, _ante rem_ or in God’s mind; _post rem_ or in man’s mind; _in re_ or in nature. To Thomas the universals as abstractions (_universalia post rem_) in the human mind cannot be individuals, for they have no real existence. To have real existence the universal must exist _in re_, in the many, as the essence of things; not as abstraction _beside_ the many.

The question of individuality therefore to Thomas concerns properly only objects _in re_, or objects in the corporeal world.[65] These are objects of Form and Matter. The question is, whether the Form or the matter of corporeal things is the principle of its individuality. Thomas says that matter is this principle,――not indeterminate matter, but matter with quantitative determinations. The difference between earthly individuals is numerical――a difference of time and space relations. The Forms of nature objects change continually according to their material conditions, but these conditions do not change. Nevertheless the quantitative determinations of individuals are not the cause, but the condition, of their existence.

But the question about the status of beings in the spiritual world, “separate Forms,” is a more difficult one for Thomas. This is the problem about God, the angels, and the souls of men. They are evidently not individualized by matter. What is the principle that distinguishes them from one another? They are Forms without matter and they are individualized through themselves, since they have no need of material determinations. Thus God is distinguished from everything else as pure Form or pure actuality. He is the unique individual in whom all differences merge. But so also are the angels actualized through themselves. What is the difference between God and the angels? God is an absolute genus; the angel is a relative genus, _i. e._ it is the only one of its kind. But what is the condition of the souls of men? Are they all alike or do they have a principle of distinction? Yes, they are distinguishable, for each soul upon separation from its body carries with it a love for its former body, and that distinguishes it from other souls.

=The Primacy of the Will or the Intellect.= Up to this time there had been no psychological dispute as to which of the faculties was fundamental. Now the question appears in full force. Much of the literature of this period is upon the question of the primacy of the will or the intellect, and it appears to be almost the leading motive of the time. Augustine had placed the will in the foreground of his teaching. His successors had never disputed the subject, but had been engaged in discussing what products of the intellect are real――the particulars or the universals. With the introduction of the intellectualism of Aristotle, there almost immediately arose defenders of Augustine. To them Aristotelianism was too rationalistic. Thomas follows Aristotle unconditionally, and with him stand the German mystics. Intellectualism becomes the central principle of what is known as the “Dominican tradition.” Duns Scotus was a Franciscan monk. He took up arms for the primacy of the will, and this became the central principle of the “Franciscan tradition.” On this point the nominalists were his allies.

The problem of the will arose first with reference to the human will. Thomas contended against Duns Scotus that man is free so far as he follows his knowledge of the good. The intellect is therefore primal, for it determines the will by showing the will what the good is.

The question next arose as to the priority of the faculties in God. Does God’s will dominate His intellect or His intellect dominate His will? This was a vital point in the Augustinian theodicy. Does God will the good to be good, or does His will act according to what He knows to be good? Here lies the point at issue between the Dominican Thomas and the Franciscan Scotus. Thomas maintained that the intellect of God determines His will. The intellect is determined by the truth so long as the intellect is true to itself. Why should not the will be determined by the truth in the same way? With God this freedom for the truth is God himself. The world is the best possible world, for God has willed it out of himself.

The world is determined by goodness and man’s will is determined by the same goodness. When the sense conquers the morally determined will, there is sin. The senses, and not the will, are the cause of sin.

=Duns Scotus (1270–1308), the Founder of the Franciscan Tradition――Life and Philosophical Position.= Thus the Middle Ages did not come to a standstill with Thomas. A greater movement existed after him than is often thought. The leading minds who succeeded Thomas refused to follow the middle course which he had mapped out. New attempts were made to relate the world of grace and the world of nature. One was mysticism, represented by Eckhart (d. 1372). The other was the reaction of the Augustinians against the intellectualism of the new Aristotelianism as represented by Thomas. The leader in this was Duns Scotus. The seat of this movement was Oxford.[66]

Duns Scotus was born in Ireland and at an early age he joined the Franciscan order. He graduated from Oxford, which at that time was anti-Thomistic. He then taught theology and philosophy at Oxford for ten years. His lectures were largely attended and his fame spread over Europe. He went to Paris in 1304, where he taught for four years. He was then transferred to Cologne, where he died.

Scotus was the Kant of scholasticism. The time of construction of scholasticism had passed, and the time of criticism and analysis had come. Scotus was the intellectual knight-errant who refused to accept any theory without subjecting it to criticism. He was the acutest mind of the Middle Ages and was called the _doctor subtilis_.

=Duns Scotus’s Conception of the Twofold Truth.――The Separation of Science and Religion.= The distinction between revelation, theology, and philosophy, that appears in this period of Classic Scholasticism, was sharply drawn by Scotus. In Thomas’s conception of a graded world of development the distinction between theology and philosophy was not emphasized. Philosophy now in the hands of Scotus becomes science, having the marks of exactness that compel belief, but is, however, restricted to its own realm. By philosophy Scotus means logic. In matters of faith logic has nothing whatever to say, for at that extreme stands revelation possessing the absolute truth that compels faith. Between revelation and philosophy Scotus squeezes theology――the science that his predecessors had used to clarify revelation. With Scotus it becomes a domain that is poor indeed. Its objects are the highest, but it can never reach them. It has not the divine assurance of revelation nor the exactness of logical science. Its highest conclusions are only probable, and it can help revelation only in a negative way. It cannot prove the doctrine of the Trinity, incarnation, creation, immortality, and even its proofs for the existence of God have no cogency. Philosophy and revelation both profit at the expense of scholastic theology. After Scotus scientific heresy frequently shielded itself on the ground that its conclusions apply only to the realm of science, while the opposite may be true in revelation.

=The Inscrutable Will of God.= Revelation is thus placed beyond the reach of the human reason because it rests on the inscrutable will of God. Revelation is God’s free act. God must be free. If Thomas’s conception of God’s will as determined by his intellect were true, God would not be free. The intellect in man or God must be the servant of the will, if the will be free. In man consciousness produces at first a number of indistinct and imperfect ideas. Those ideas become distinct upon which the will fixes its attention, while the others cease to exist because they are unsupported by the will.

God’s will is more fundamental than the good. God makes the good to be good. Both Thomas and Scotus say that the moral law is the command of God. Thomas conceives it to be God’s command because it is in accord with the good; Scotus, for no other reason than that it is God’s command. The good might be different if God so created it. In opposition to Thomas, Scotus maintained that God does not have to create what He does create, and that this is not the best possible world. God creates what He wills; He can, therefore, grant dispensation, and so can the church. If God’s will were determined by His intellect, He would have no independence, He would not even exist, He would be only nature or one of its causes, there could be no evil nor accident. He can supersede the moral law by a new law, just as He superseded the Mosaic law by the Gospel. Individuality, revelation, salvation, and all objects of faith have their existence only in the groundless and inscrutable will of God. For this reason there can be no rational theology.

This founder of the “Franciscan tradition” of practical piety and meritorious action could not have other than the freedom of the will as his central principle. An Augustinian he refused, however, to follow Augustine in centralizing freedom in God. The object of faith is the will of God, the subject of faith is the will of man. Human freedom consists in coöperation with divine grace. Man can help in the work of God. His freedom is partly formal: he can will or not will. It is partly material: he can will A or B. There is no ulterior ground to determine the human will, and this undetermined freedom is the ground for merit, provided the human will coincides with the divine.

=The Problem of Individuality.= The problem of individuation was a favorite one with Scotus. While Scotus agrees with Thomas as to the threefold existence of the universal, the individual and not the universal is the ultimate fact. The individual cannot be deduced from the universal, nor can it be constituted by the quantitative determinations of matter. It is already individualized and substantialized. Form, not matter, individualizes. The definite individual form, the “thisness” (_hæcceitas_), is the ultimate fact. The individual can only be verified as actual fact. The individual is irreducible, and no further explanation can be made than to say that it is an individual. Thus the inquiry into the _Principium individuationis_ has no meaning.

=After Duns Scotus.= The church failed to canonize Scotus; for though he claimed to be its most faithful son, he taught the dangerous doctrine of freedom of the individual will. His doctrine also marks the beginning of empirical investigation of nature and the decadence of formal logic. Although a most faithful follower of the church, he brought scholasticism to the point where it no longer served the church. The result was ultrarationalism――not what Scotus intended. But when revelation no longer rests upon rational ground, and when there exists by its side a philosophical science whose basis is rational, it is only a question of time when revelation shall lose its authority for men. When philosophy passed from Scotus to Ockam, Ockam’s conception of the individual as the ultimately real and of the unrationality of revelation gave him the old name of nominalist. This is a misnomer, for the doctrine of Ockam is quite different from the nominalism of Roscellinus. The temper of the time was different from those days when Roscellinus followed upon Anselm, for the superior minds were now turning away from orthodoxy. Disciples of both Thomas and Scotus were becoming nominalists. It was an epoch when scholasticism was being discredited by the universities, when theology was less a study in the curricula, when religion was being superseded by magic, when there were rival claimants for the Pope’s chair, when there was strife between the church and the state. The spirit of the age was toward nominalism in every form. The command, in 1339, to the University of Paris not to use Ockam’s works shows how powerful had become his following during his lifetime. Dominicans and Augustinians went over in crowds to nominalism. This beginning of nominalism betrays the growth of European national life, modern languages, art, and the sciences. It shows the beginning of Protestantism in all departments. The church attempted to crush it in the way that it had crushed Roscellinus. But this nominalism had too deep root.

=William of Ockam (1280–1349): Life and Teaching.= Ockam was called _Doctor Invincibilis_. He was born in Ockam, England, and studied at Oxford, where he probably had Scotus as a teacher. After teaching in Paris (1320–1325), he left Paris and joined the opponents of the temporal power of the Pope. He was imprisoned at Avignon, but escaped to the court of Louis of Bavaria, where he died. To Louis he made his celebrated promise, “If you will defend me with your sword, I will defend you with my pen.” He has been called “the first Protestant.”

The nominalism of Ockam was more complex than that of Roscellinus, and yet it was essentially a tendency to simplification by discarding all metaphysics and psychology as useless. “Ockam’s razor” was the nickname of his philosophy. He regarded concepts as subjective signs or “terms” of actual facts. Hence his philosophy was also called terminism. There was also in it a naturalistic tendency which was the result of the scientific studies of the Aristotelian Arabians. With these logical and naturalistic motives were united the Augustinian doctrine of the will. These were the three factors of a nominalism that felt the conviction of the importance of the inner life as well as the need of an extended investigation of nature.

It is, moreover, no accident that Ockam was conservative, for he belonged to the Franciscans, the most conservative of the monastic bodies. This nominalism was a reaction against scholasticism, in order to strengthen the supernatural character of dogma. Ockam felt that scholasticism had waxed too great――that under the guise of serving religion it had virtually subordinated religion. The reactionary Franciscans proclaimed the entire separation of religion and philosophy in order to make room for faith. Faith could be purified only by renouncing scholasticism. The temporal power must be given up by the church, the state and the church must be separated. No new knowledge about faith can be obtained. The dogma must be left impregnable, even though scientifically men become skeptics.

Consistent, therefore, was it for this movement to disjoin entirely the parts of the twofold truth. Scotus had almost crowded out natural theology; Ockam completed the work of Scotus. Scholasticism or natural theology is a rubbish-heap of hypotheses. The church should abandon speculation and emphasize faith. It should return to the simplicity and holiness of the Apostolic church. Ockam was devoted to the true upbuilding of the church and was a follower of St. Francis. It was his love for the church that made him take sides against her pretensions to temporal power.

Ockam was the natural precursor of his fellow countryman John Locke, and the English empirical school. Individual things have the reality of original Forms, for they come to us intuitively. Our ideas are only signs of them. This is a relation of the “first intention.” As individual ideas are related to individual things, so general ideas are related to individual ideas. This is the relation of the “second intention.” The general idea referring thus indirectly to an individual thing is therefore arbitrary and capricious. Real science deals with things intuitively observed; rational science only with the relations between ideas. Nevertheless real science deals only with an inner world, even if its material is intuitively known. Intuitions are only representatives of the real world. How much less real must the world of rational science then be, since it presupposes these inner intuitions of real science. The universal, therefore, has no reality. It is a name, a sign of many things, a term. Only the individual is real.

=After Ockam.= William of Ockam was the last schoolman. When his doctrine of terminism was united with Augustine’s powerful doctrine of the will,――forming an extreme individualism,――the glimmering of the dawn of modern times appears. The movement was made still stronger by the study of the history of development psychologically, and it became a kind of idealism of the inner life. Already, too, there were beginning investigations in natural science, based upon empirical study. Modern subjectivism was at hand; scholasticism had run its course. The representatives of the scholastic philosophy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries forgot the principle of the Classic Schoolmen and became mere commentators of the leaders of the tradition to which they belonged. Their verbal subtleties were too refined to be understood. The efforts of Nicolas Cusanus to bring secular science under a system of scholastic mysticism only promoted the modern movement. Cusanus therefore belongs to the next period, and of him we shall subsequently hear.

INDEX

Abdera 107, 119. _See_ Atomists.

Abelard life of, 363; his conceptualism, 364; his rationalism, 365–367.

Academy, the what it was, 124; after the death of Plato, 166; and Aristotle, 169–171; Older, Middle, and New, 220, 221; the skepticism of, 266–268; eclecticism in, 270.

Adams, G. B. _Civilization during the Middle Ages_, 374 n.

Adamson, Robert _The Development of Greek Philosophy_ quoted, 255.

Ænesidemus Skeptic, 268.

Agrippa Skeptic, 268, 269.

Albertus Magnus _See_ Bollstaedt.

Alcidamus Sophist, 68.

Alcuin 349, 350.

Alexander of Hales 379.

Alexandria a centre of Hellenism, 215; in the Middle Ages, 282.

Alexandrian School of neo-Platonism 290–298.

Ammonius Saccas 290, 314.

_Anamnesis_ 147–149.

Anaxagoras his life, 43; his philosophy, 45–47.

Anaximander 24, 25.

Anaximenes 25.

Ancient Philosophy length of, 1; underlying character of, 2; divisions of, 4, 5; literary sources of, 6.

Animism 19.

Anselm life and position in mediæval philosophy, 359–361; his arguments for the existence of God, 361; on reason and dogma, 365.

Anthropological period of Greek philosophy 12, 13; discussion of, 55–97; historical summary of, 55.

Anthropologists 103.

Anthropology defined, 13.

Antiochus of Ascalon 270, 271.

Antisthenes founder of the Cynic school, 93, 95.

Apathy Stoic, 251.

Apollonius neo-Pythagorean, 285.

Apologists, the 307–309.

Aquinas, Thomas on the problem of reason and faith, 369, 377; the predecessors of, 379, 380; life of (founder of the Dominican tradition), 380, 381; the central principle of his doctrine, 381–383; the problem of individuality according to, 383–385; on the will and the intellect, 385, 386.

Arabian schools, 371, 372; translations of Greek works, 372, 373.

Arcesilaus 267.

ἀρετή meaning of, 84.

Aristippus founder of the Cyrenaic school, 93, 96; and Epicurus, 229, 230.

Aristophanes opposed the Sophists, 74.

Aristotle his place in Greek history, 98–100, 103; conceptualist, 104; advanced age at which he finished his education, 125; in the Academy and Lyceum, 166–168; chronological sketch of his life, 168, 169; his biography in detail, 169–173; the writings of, 173–176; his starting-point, 176, 177; the fundamental principle in his philosophy, 177–180; his logic, 180–185; his metaphysics, 185–194; development is purposeful, 185–187; his two different conceptions of purpose, 187–190; his conception of God, 190, 191; his conception of matter, 191, 192; his conception of nature, 192–194; his theory of physics, 194–196; his psychology, 196–199; his ethics, 199–202; his political philosophy, 202, 203; in the Middle Ages, 332, 363, 368, 369; Arabic versions of his works, 372, 373; works of, introduced into Western Europe, 375–378; the strength and burden of, to the church, 378, 379; and Thomas Aquinas, 380, 381.

Arnold, Matthew 43 n.

Astronomy of the Pythagoreans, 49–52, 53; Ptolemaic, 322–325.

_Ataraxia_ of Epicurus, 231, 233; of the Skeptics, 266.

Athenian school of neo-Platonism 290, 299–301.

Athens rise of, 57, 58; and Socrates, 91; and Abdera, 119; a centre of Hellenism, 213–215.

Atomism of Epicurus, the 238–240.

Atomistic school, the 107.

Atomists, the philosophy of, 47, 48.

Atoms of Democritus, the 109–114, 116, 117.

Augustine the historical position of, 306, 318, 335–338; the life of, 339, 340; the two elements in his teaching, 340, 341; the neo-Platonic element: the inner certainties of consciousness, 341–345; the authority of the church according to, 345–347.

Aurelius, Marcus 243, 246.

Bacon, Francis _Essay on Love_, 153 n.

Bacon, Roger 387 n.

Bardesanes Gnostic, 310.

Basilides Gnostic, 310.

Becoming word how used, 22; in Heracleitus’s doctrine, 29; according to Plato, 133, 136, 139.

Being word how used, 22; in Parmenides’ doctrine, 33–35; Pythagorean conception of, 49–51; aspects under which it was conceived of, in Greek philosophy, 103, 104; according to Plato, 133, 136, 139.

Benedictine Age, the 350.

Berengar of Tours 359.

Boëthius 300.

Bollstaedt, Albert 377, 379.

Bologna University of, 377.

Burnet, John _Early Greek Philosophers_ cited, 17 n.

Bury, J. B. _History of Greece_ cited, 12 n.; quoted, 16.

Carneades 267.

Carpocrates Gnostic, 310.

Carthage 15, 16.

Catechists the School of, 314–318.

Catholic theologians the old, 312–314.

Cause teleological, final, mechanical, and efficient, 105 n. _See_ Final cause, Efficient cause.

Causes Aristotle’s, 187.

Change Heracleitus’s doctrine of, 28, 29; has no existence in Parmenides’ philosophy, 34, 35; as conceived by the Pluralists, 40.

Charlemagne the revival of, 349, 350.

Christianity and neo-Platonism, difference in their conception of inspiration, 276, 277; rise of, 279, 280; summary of its history, 281; and neo-Platonism, 288–290; the Hellenizing of, 302–318; the early situation of, 302–305; the philosophies influencing, 305, 306; early, the periods of, 306, 307; the Apologists, 307–309; the Gnostics, 310–312; the reaction against Gnosticism (the old Catholic theologians), 312–314; Origen and the School of Catechists, 314–318; and Mohammedanism, 371–375.

Chrysippus 242, 244, 245.

Church authority of, according to Augustine, 345–347; strength and burden of Aristotle to, 378, 379; and state, Aquinas’s and Dante’s views of, 382.

Cicero on Aristotle, 167; his work, 271, 272.

Civilizations Christian and Mohammedan, 369–372; the first contact of, 372, 373; the conflict between, 374, 375.

Classic Scholasticism period of, 333, 368–394.

Cleanthes 242, 244–246.

Clement 314.

Conception and perception, 83 n.; importance of, to Socrates, 83; according to Plato, 134, 135; in Aristotle, 177–179.

Conceptualism of Aristotle, 104; in the Middle Ages, 358, 364, 365.

Consciousness formulation of the psychological conception of, 294; the inner certainties of, according to Augustine, 341–345.

Constantinople an intellectual centre, 372 n.

Cosmas map, the 335.

Cosmological period of Greek philosophy 12, 13; treated, 15–54.

Cosmologist characteristics of the, 18–20; table of, 20; their philosophical question, 20, 21; where they lived, 21; results of their philosophy, 53, 54.

Cosmology defined, 13.

Crates of Thebes 95.

Critical attitude of mind among the Greeks, 61–64; of Socrates, 80.

Crusades, the 374, 375.

Cusanus, Nicolas 394.

Cynic school, the 93–97.

Cynics and Stoics 246, 247.

Cyrenaic school, the 93–97.

Cyrenaics their teaching, and Epicureanism, 229, 230.

Dante on Aristotle, 167; used Ptolemaic conception of the universe, 324, 325; diagram of his poetic conception of the universe, 376; his view of the state and the church, 382 n.; placed the intellectual virtues above the practical, 383 n.

Dark Ages, the 347–349.

Deduction 182.

Definition Socrates one of the first to use it correctly, 92.

Democritus his place in Greek history, 98–100, 103; and Plato, their similarities and differences, 104–106; life of, 106–108; comprehensiveness of his aim, 108; the enriched physics of, 109–111; the materialistic psychology of, 111–114; his theory of knowledge, 114–116; the ethical theory of, 116–118; a wide traveler, 123; advanced age at which he finished his education, 125.

Development according to Aristotle, 178, 179, 185–187.

De Wulf _History of Mediæval Philosophy_, 336 n., 384.

Dialectic defined, 60, 131.

Dill, Samuel _Roman Society_ cited, 274 n.

Diogenes 95.

Dionysiodorus 68.

Dogma _See_ Reason.

Dominican tradition Thomas Aquinas the founder of, 380, 381; intellectualism the central principle in, 385.

Doxography 6.

Drama the Greek, 60, 61.

Dualism defined, 51 n.; the Pythagorean, 51, 52; of the Systematic period of Greek philosophy, 102, 103.

Dynamic pantheism of Plotinus 293.

Eckhart 369, 386.

Eclectic Platonists, the 285.

Eclecticism 264, 265, 269–272.

Efficient cause introduction of conception of, by the Pluralists, 41; defined, 105 n.; Aristotle’s conception of, 187.

Elean-Eretrian school, the 93.

Eleatic school and Milesian school, Xenophanes the connecting link between, 26; lives of Parmenides and Zeno, 32, 35; teaching of, compared with that of the Milesians and Heracleitus, 22 f.; the philosophy of, 33–37; and Heracleitus, results of the conflict between, 37, 38.

Element, the as conceived by the Pluralists, 40, 41.

Eleusinian _See_ Mysteries.

Emanations the world of, according to Plotinus, 294–297.

Emerson, R. W. _Essay on Love_, 153 n.; _Initial, Dæmonic, and Celestial Love_, 153 n.

Emerton, Ephraim _Mediæval Europe_, 374 n.

Empedocles his conception of change, 40; his conception of the element, 40; his doctrine of the efficient cause, 41; his life, 43; the philosophy of, 44, 45.

Empiricism 104 n.

End defined, 105 n.

_Entelechy_ 186.

Epic, Greek importance of the, 8–10.

Epictetus 243, 246.

Epicureanism one of the New Schools, 222–225; and Stoicism, summary of agreements and differences, 225, 226; and the teaching of Aristippus, 229; ideal of, 230–233; the place of virtue in, 233; the Wise Man of, 234–236. _See_ Epicurus.

Epicureans, the 228.

Epicurus life of, 227, 228; and Aristippus, 229; his ideal, 230–233; his conception of the physical world, 238–240. _See_ Epicureanism.

Epistemology Democritus’ contribution to, 114–116.

Erigena, John Scotus 349, 350; life and teaching of, 350–352; the Greek principle which he formulated for the Middle Ages, 352, 353.

Eristic defined, 60.

Ethical period of the Hellenic-Roman period 208; general characteristics of, 215–218.

Ethics tendency toward, among early Greeks, 11, 12; of the Sophists, 71–73; of Democritus, 116–118; Plato’s theory of, 153–158; of Aristotle, 199–202; of Plotinus, 297, 298.

Eucken, Rudolf _Problem of Human Life_, 336 n.

Euclid founder of the school at Megara, 93.

Eudæmonism 87.

Euhemerism 96.

Eusebius on Aristotle, 167.

Euthydemus 68.

Evil the problem of, according to Stoicism, 260, 261.

Fairbanks, Arthur _First Philosophers of Greece_, 6 n.

Falckenberg, Richard _History of Modern Philosophy_, 3 n.

Final cause defined, 105 n.; according to Aristotle, 187.

Fire Heracleitus’s doctrine of, 30–32.

Form and Matter in Aristotle, 186–192, 197–199; in Thomas Aquinas, 384.

Formal cause 187.

Franciscan tradition, the 385–387.

Freedom the problem of, according to Epicurus, 240; according to Stoicism, 260, 261; according to Origen, 316, 317; according to Augustine, 345; according to Duns Scotus, 389.

Gerbert 350.

Glaber quoted, 354.

Gnomic poets Greek, 10–12.

Gnosticism 310–312; the reaction against, 312–314.

God Plato’s conception of, 141, 142; Aristotle’s conception of, 190, 191; His will and His intellect, 386, 388, 389.

Goethe quoted, 129, 167.

Good Plato’s Idea of the, 140–142, 144; Plato’s theory of the, development of, 153, 154; the, of the Stoics, 250, 251.

Gorgias 66, 67; the nihilism of, 70, 71.

Gospel the Hellenizing of, 302–318. _See_ Christianity.

Greece after the Persian Wars, 57–64.

Greek Enlightenment, the 58–64, 82.

Greek-Jewish philosophy of Philo 281–284; and neo-Platonism, 288.

Greek nation the fall of, and the persistence of its civilization, 204–208.

Greek national spirit waning of, 98.

Greek philosophy three periods of, 12–14; summary of, 102, 103.

Greek thought was objective, 2, 100, 101.

Greeks, early geographical environment of, 7; political environment of, 8, 9, 15, 16; native tendencies of, 9–12; perils to, in the new religion, 16–18; monistic philosophies, 22 f.

Grote, George _History of Greece_, 61 n.; _Plato_, 267 n.

Happiness according to Socrates, 86; according to the Cynics and the Cyrenaics, 94–97; according to Democritus, 117, 118; according to Aristotle, 200; according to Epicurus, 233–238.

Harnack, Adolf _Outlines of the History of Dogma_ quoted, 308, 336, 344, 354; cited, 315 n., 345 n.

Hatch, Edwin _Hibbert Lectures_ quoted, 305.

Hedonism and eudæmonism, 87; some types of, 228, 229.

Hellenic-Roman period 204–318; its time length, 204; the fall of the Greek nation and the persistence of its civilization, 204–208; the two parts of, 208, 209; the undercurrent of skepticism in, 209–211; the fundamental problem of, 211–213.

Hellenism 205–208; the centres of, 213–215.

Hellenizing of the Gospel 302–318.

Heracleitus life, 28; his teaching compared with that of the Milesians and Eleatics, 22, 23; his philosophy, 28–31; and Parmenides, results of the conflict between, 37, 38; practical philosophy of, 31.

Hesiod 11.

Hicks, R. D. _Stoic and Epicurean_, 227 n.; cited, 267 n.

Hipparchia 95.

Hippias 66, 68.

Hippodamus 68.

Hippolytus 313.

_Homoiomeriai_ 46.

Human nature value set upon, by Socrates, 81.

Hylozoism defined, 19; and Pluralism, 41; the breaking up of pre-Socratic, 47; becomes materialism with Democritus, 109–111.

Hylozoists the Cosmologists were, 19.

Hypatia 298.

Idea development of the meaning of (Democritus and Plato), 105.

Ideal of Socrates, the 83–85; what it involves, 85–88.

Idealism of the Greeks, 100; objective, 104.

Ideas of Plato, 133, 135; the development of, in the two drafts, 136, 137; brief comparison of the two drafts of 137; fuller comparison of the two drafts of, 137–141; in the doctrine of _anamnesis_, 147, 148.

Immortality Plato’s doctrine of, 146–150.

Individuality the problem of, according to Thomas Aquinas, 383–385; the problem of, in Duns Scotus, 389, 390.

Induction 92, 183.

Intellect or will the question of the primacy of, 385, 386, 388, 389.

Ionic School _See_ Milesian school.

Irenæus 313.

Irish learning, the 349.

Irony Socratic, 90.

Jackson, H. article “Sophists,” in _Encyclopædia Britannica_, 68 n.

Jamblichus 298, 299.

Jewish (Greek-) philosophy of Philo 281–284; and neo-Platonism, 288.

Julian, Emperor 298.

Justin Martyr 308.

Kingsley, Charles _Hypatia_, 298 n.

Knight, William A. _Life and Teaching of Hume_, 3 n.

Knowledge in Socrates’ ideal, 83–86, 88; according to the Cynics, 95; Democritus’ theory of, 114–116.

Lanfranc 359.

Law positive and natural, 72.

Learning the impulse for, among the Greeks, 58, 59; the Revival of, 375–378.

Leucippus his life, 43, 44; his philosophy, 47, 48, 109, 110; founder of the Atomistic school, 107.

Logic Aristotle’s, 180–185.

Love Platonic, 151–153.

Love and Hate Empedocles’ doctrine of, 44.

Lucretius 228.

Lyceum, the Aristotle in, 166, 167, 172, 173; after Aristotle, 220–222; eclecticism in, 270.

Lycophron 68.

Maine, Sir Henry cited, 72.

Man the philosophy of, 13, 55–97; Plato’s conception of, 144–146.

Material cause 187.

Materialism hylozoism becomes, with Democritus, 103, 109–111; Stoic, 254, 255.

Materialistic psychology of Democritus 111–114.

Matter and Form, in Aristotle, 186–192, 197–199, 384; of Plotinus, 295, 296.

Mean, the Aristotle’s doctrine of, 201, 202.

Mechanical series of Aristotle 194–196.

Mediæval geography 335.

Mediæval library, a 326–328.

Mediæval Man, the 320, 321; how the universe appeared to, 322–325; at school, 325, 326; summary of the political and educational worlds of, 330–333.

Mediæval philosophy length of, 1; underlying character of, 3; divisions of, 4; treated, 319–394.

Megarian school 93.

Mendicants, the 368.

Metaphysical problem, the early formulation of, 22, 23.

Metaphysics Plato’s, the formation of, 132–136; Plato’s, the development of, 136–141; Aristotle’s, 185–194; abandonment of, in Hellenic-Roman period, 216; of Plotinus, 294–297.

Metrocles 95.

Middle Ages characteristics and conditions of, 319–333; and the Hellenic-Roman period, comparison of, 319, 320; the mediæval man, 320, 321; how the universe appeared to the mediæval man, 322–325; the mediæval man at school, 325, 326; a mediæval library, 326–328; the three periods of, 328–330; summary of the political and educational worlds of the mediæval man, 330–333; the early period of, 330–332, 334–353; the transitional period of, 332, 354–367; the period of classic scholasticism, 333, 368–394.

Milesian school 24; the members of, 24, 25; the philosophy of, 25, 26 the teaching of, compared with that of Heracleitus and the Eleatics, 22, 23.

Milton, John 325.

Modern philosophy length of, 1; underlying character of, 3; divisions of, 4.

Mohammedanism growth of, during the Middle Ages, 370–372; first contact with Christianity, 372, 373; conflict with Christianity, 374, 375.

Monism defined, 10 n.; of the early Greeks, 10; displaced by pluralism in Greek philosophy, 39.

Monists list of early Cosmologists who were, 20; discussion of the, 22–38.

Monotheism defined, 10 n.; for the first time conceptually framed, 191.

Monte Cassino founding of the monastic school at, 348.

Moral postulate philosophy for the first time founded upon, 85; of Socrates, 85–88.

Motion according to Aristotle, 195, 196.

Mysteries Orphic and Eleusinian, 16–18, 38; Orphic, dangers of, averted by Cosmologists, 54.

Mysticism in neo-Platonism, 287.

Natural Science _See_ Physics.

Nature the philosophy of, 15–38; the word as used by the Sophists, 72, 73; a logical, Socrates’ attempt to find, 92; physical, Plato’s conception of, 142–144; Aristotle’s conception of, 192–194; Stoic conception of, 251–257.

Neo-Platonism and Christianity, difference in their conception of inspiration, 276, 277; rise of, 279, 280; summary of its history, 281; and Platonism, 287, 288; and the philosophies of Philo and the neo-Pythagoreans, 288; and Christianity, 288–290; the periods of, 290; the Alexandrian school (scientific theory of neo-Platonism, life and writings of Plotinus), 290–298; the Syrian school (the systematizing of polytheism, Jamblichus), 290, 298, 299; the Athenian school (Proclus), 290, 299–301; its influence on Christianity, 306.

Neo-Pythagoreanism 281, 285–287; and neo-Platonism, 288.

Nominalism 103, 358, 362–365, 391, 392.

Norton, Arthur O. _Readings in the History of Education_, 377 n.

_Nous_ Anaxagoras’ conception of, 47; of Plotinus, 294.

Numbers Pythagorean conception of, 49–51.

Objective character of Greek philosophy 2, 100, 101.

Objective Idealism 104.

Objective Realism 104.

Ockam, William of 387 n., 390; the course of philosophy after, 393, 394.

Order thought of, developed into clearness by Cosmologists, 54.

Origen 280, 281, 314–318.

Orphic _See_ Mysteries.

Oxford, University of 377.

Palmer, G. H. on Socrates, 79.

Panætius 270, 271.

Pantheism defined, 10 n.; dynamic, of Plotinus, 293; of Erigena, 351–353; of the realists, 363.

Paris, University of 377.

Parker, C. P. cited, 258 n.

Parmenides life, 32; develops the doctrine of Xenophanes, 32 f.; his philosophy, 33–35; and Heracleitus, results of the conflict between, 37, 38. _See_ Eleatic School.

Particulars and Universals according to Thomas Aquinas, 383–385.

Pater, Walter _Marius the Epicurean_, 227 n.

Patmore, Coventry _Angel in the House_, 153 n.

Patristics 302–318.

Perception and conception, 83 n.; according to Plato, 134; in Aristotle, 177–179.

Pericles 58.

Periods of philosophy, the three general, 1–4; of Greek philosophy, 12–14.

Peripatetics _See_ Lyceum.

Persia 15, 16.

Persian Wars their importance, 55–57, 62.

Personality spiritual, increased importance of, in history, 277–279.

Pessimism result of theory of Cyrenaics, 97.

Peter the Lombard 379, 380.

Phædo founder of the Elean-Eretrian school, 93.

Philo Greek-Jewish philosophy of, 281–284; and neo-Platonism, 288.

Philoponus 299.

Philosophic skepticism _See_ Skepticism.

Physical universe early Greek tendency toward scientific explanation of, 10, 11.

Physics Socrates’ view of, 80; enrichment of, under Democritus, 109–111; Plato’s conception of, 142–144; Aristotle’s theory of, 194–196; of Epicurus, 238–240.

Plato 104; parts of works to be read, 75 n.; his place in Greek history, 93, 98–100, 103, 104; and Democritus, their similarities and differences, 104–106; the period of his life, 119, 120; the difficulties in understanding the teaching of, 120, 121; the chronology of his dialogues, 119, 120; the life and writings of, 121, 126; his student life, 121, 122; as traveler, 122–124; as teacher of the Academy, 124–126; concerning his dialogues, 126–128; the factors in the construction of his doctrine, 128–131; his inherited tendencies, 128–130; his philosophical sources, 130, 131; the divisions of his philosophy, 131, 132; summary of his doctrine, 132; the formation of his metaphysics, 132–136; the development of his metaphysics (the development of his ideas in the two drafts), 136–141; his conception of God, 141, 142; his conception of physical nature, 142–144; his conception of man, 144–146; his doctrine of immortality, 146–150; the two tendencies in, 150, 151; Platonic love, 151–153; his theory of ethics, 153–158; development of his theory of the Good, 153, 154; the four cardinal virtues, 154, 155; his theory of political society, 155–158; a selection of passages from, for English readers, 158–165; in the Middle Ages, 331, 337, 338, 360, 363.

Platonism the revival of, 279; and neo-Platonism, 287, 288.

Platonists Eclectic, 285.

Pleasure of Epicurus, 230–233. _See_ Happiness.

Plotinus 280, 287, 288; life and writings of, 290, 291; general character of his teaching, 291, 292; the mystic God of, 292, 293; the two problems of, 293; the metaphysical problem of, 294–297; the ethical problem of, 297, 298.

Pluralism tried to reconcile extremes of Milesian school, 39, 40; and hylozoism, 41.

Pluralists list of later Cosmologists who were, 20; their new conception of change, 40; their new conception of the unchanging, 40, 41; introduction of conception of efficient cause by, 41; summary of similarities and differences in theories of, 41, 42; their lives span the fifth century, 42. _See_ Empedocles, etc.

Plutarch neo-Platonist, 299.

Political philosophy of Aristotle 202, 203.

Political society Plato’s theory of, 155–158.

Polytheism Homeric, 19.

Polytheisms the systematizing of, 298, 299.

Porphyry 291, 298, 357.

Posidonius 270, 271.

Primary and secondary qualities 116.

Probabilism in Stoicism 262.

Proclus 299–301.

Prodicus 66, 68.

Protagoras 66, 67; the relativism of, 69, 70; his point of view compared with that of Socrates, 81.

Psychology materialistic, of Democritus, 111–114; Plato’s, 144–146; of Aristotle, 196–199; the Stoic, 248–250.

Ptolemy his cosmography, 322–325.

Purpose Aristotle’s conceptions of, 186–190.

Pyrrho 266.

Pyrrhonism 265, 266.

Pythagoras 17.

Pythagoreanism neo-, 281, 285–287; and neo-Platonism, 288.

Pythagoreans the early, 17; the later, 44, 48, 49; their conception of Being, 49–51; their astronomy, 49, 52, 53; their dualism, 51, 52.

Qualitative changes of phenomena 196–202.

Rationalism defined, 104 n.; of Plato and Democritus, 104; of Abelard, 365–367.

Realism 100, 104, 358, 362–365; objective, 104.

Reason and dogma the relation between, 355, 356, 360–362, 365–367.

Reconcilers _See_ Pluralists.

Relativism of Protagoras, 69, 70; represented by the anthropologists, 103.

Religion of the Greeks, organization of, 8, 9, 10; the new, perils of, 16–18; in Epicurus’s system, 236, 237; and science, the separation of, under Duns Scotus, 387, 388.

Religious feeling two causes of the rise of, 272–274.

Religious period of the Hellenic-Roman period 208, 209; treated, 273–301; the divisions of, 280, 281.

Religious philosophies Hellenic, rise of, 280, 282; summary of history of, 281; introductory period of, 281–287; development period of, 281, 287, 288.

Revival of Learning, the 375–378.

Rhabanus Maurus 350.

Rhetoric among the Greeks 60.

Romans their conquest of Greece, 205–208.

Roscellinus life and teaching, 361, 362.

Rossetti, Christina _Shadow of Dante_ cited, 325 n.

Rousseau and Epicurus 229.

St. Ambrose 306.

Salerno, University of 377.

Scholasticism what it is, 355–359; of Anselm, 359–361; of Roscellinus, 361, 362; of Abelard, 363–367; classic, period of, 333, 368–394.

School in early Greek philosophy, meaning of, 19.

Schools, the 214, 218–226; fusion of doctrines in, 269; after 150 B. C., notable names in, 271. _See_ Academy, Lyceum, etc.

Science early tendencies toward, among the Greeks, 10, 11; growth of, in Hellenic-Roman period, 216, 217; secular, of the age of Augustine, 339; and religion, the separation of, under Duns Scotus, 387, 388.

Scotus, Duns gave a new direction to philosophy, 369; upheld the primacy of the Will, 385, 386; the founder of the Franciscan tradition (life and philosophical position of), 386, 387; his conception of the twofold truth, 387; the inscrutable will of God, according to, 388, 389; the problem of individuality, according to, 389, 390; the course of philosophy after, 390, 391.

Secondary and primary qualities 116.

Secular science of the age of Augustine 339.

Seignobos, Charles _History of Mediæval Civilization_, 373 n.

Seneca quoted, 234.

Sensationalism defined, 104 n.

Sensationalistic skepticism 268, 269.

Sextus Empiricus 268.

Sill _The Two Aphrodites_, 153 n.

Simplicius 299.

Skepticism what it is, 69; the undercurrent of, in the Hellenic-Roman period, 209–211; philosophic, the appearances of, 264, 265; the three phases of, 265–269; of the Academy, 266–268; sensationalistic, 268, 269.

Socrates, and Aristophanes opposed the Sophists, 74; works on, for reading, 75; personality and life of, 75–80; his dæmon, 77, 83; and the Sophists, 80–82; unsystematic character of his philosophy, 82, 83; the ideal of, 83–85; what his ideal involves, 85–88; the two steps of his method, 88–91; and Athens, 91; the logical expedients of, 92, 93; and the Lesser Socratics, 93–95.

Socratics the Lesser, and Socrates, 93–95.

Sophists significance of, 64–67; the prominent, 67, 68; the philosophy of, 68–71; the ethics of, 71–73; summary of their work, 73; met in two ways by Socrates and Aristophanes, 74; and Socrates, 80–82.

Soul Plato’s doctrine of, 145–150; according to Aristotle, 196, 197; of Plotinus, 295, 297, 298.

Spenser, Edmund _Hymn in Honor of Beauty_, 153 n.

Spiritual authority the need of, 275–277; the turning to the present for, 287, 288.

Spirituality rise of the conception of, 277–279.

State Plato’s doctrine of, 155–158; and church, Aquinas’s and Dante’s views of, 382.

Stoic school, the 222–225; inclines to eclecticism, 269, 270.

Stoicism and Epicureanism, summary of agreements and differences, 225, 226; position of, in antiquity, 241, 242; the three periods of, 242, 243; leaders of, 243–246; writings of, 246; the two prominent conceptions of, 247, 248; the conception of personality, 248; the psychology of, 248–250; the highest good, 250, 251; the conception of nature, 251–256; conceptions of nature and personality supplement each other, 256, 257; and society, 257–259; duty and responsibility, 259, 260; the problem of evil and the problem of freedom, 260, 261; modifications of, after the first period, 261–263; its influence on Christianity, 305.

Stoics and Cynics 246, 247.

Storm and Stress 362, 363.

_Sums_ of Peter the Lombard, 379, 380.

Syllogism, the 182.

Syrian school of neo-Platonism 290, 298, 299.

Syrianus 299.

Systematic period of Greek philosophy 12–14; treated, 98–203; the three philosophers of, their place in Greek history, 98–100; the fundamental principle of, 100–102.

Tatian 313.

Teleology defined, 105 n.

Terminism 392.

Tertullian 313.

Teuffel, W. S. _History of Roman Literature_, 227 n.

Thales 24, 25.

Theological series of Aristotle 196–202.

Thrasymachus 68.

Timon 266.

Transitional period of Middle Ages 332, 354–357.

Turner, William _History of Philosophy_, 336 n.

Twofold reality world of, Democritus’ theory of, 114–116.

Ueberweg _History of Philosophy_, quoted, 6; cited, 269 n.

Unchanging, the as conceived by the Pluralists, 40, 41.

_Universalia ante rem_ 104, 358, 362–365, 384.

_Universalia in re_ 104, 358, 364, 365, 384.

_Universalia post rem_ 103, 358, 362–365, 384.

Universals and particulars according to Thomas Aquinas, 383–385.

Universe diagram of Dante’s conception of, 376.

Universities the establishment of, 377.

Useful, the according to Socrates, 87, 88.

Valentinus Gnostic, 310.

Vincent of Beauvais 379.

Virtue meaning of, 84; according to Socrates, 84–88; according to the Cynics, 95; according to Aristotle, 199–202; place of, in Epicureanism, 233.

Virtues the four cardinal, in Plato, 154, 155.

Weber _History of Philosophy_ cited, 269 n.

Wheeler, B. I. _Life of Alexander the Great_, cited, 56 n.; quoted, 172.

Will freedom of. _See_ Freedom.

Will or intellect the question of the primacy of, 385, 386, 388, 389.

William of Aubergne 379.

William of Champeaux 363.

Windelband _History of Ancient Philosophy_, 37 n.; cited, 121 n., 311 n.; quoted, 254.

Witte, Karl _Essays on Dante_, 325 n.

Wordsworth, William _Dion_, 123 n.; _Ode on Intimations of Immortality_ quoted, 148.

Xenophanes religious philosopher, 26 f.; philosophy of, 27 f.

Xenophon parts of works to be read, 75 n.; on Socrates, 76, 93.

Zeller, Edward _Pre-Socratic Philosophy_, 3 n., 100 n.; quoted, 101, 102; _Greek Philosophy_, 37 n.

Zeno Eleatic, his life, 35 f.; his philosophy, 36, 37. _See_ Eleatic school.

Zeno Stoic, 242, 244, 245.

Footnotes.

1 – Read Knight, _Life and Teaching of Hume_, pp. 102 f. (Blackwood Series); Falckenberg, _Hist. Modern Phil._, p. 10; Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, pp. 161 f.

2 – Read Fairbanks, _First Philosophers of Greece_, pp. 263 ff., especially the résumé.

3 – Ueberweg, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. i, p. 7.

4 – Monism is the belief that reality is a oneness without any necessary implication as to the character of that oneness. Monotheism is a kind of monism, in which some definite character is ascribed to the oneness, like the active principle in the world or the cause of the world. Pantheism, on the other hand, is a kind of monism in which the emphasis is upon the all-inclusive character of reality. In pantheism God and nature are two inseparable aspects of reality.

5 – Bury, _Hist. of Greece_, p. 321, calls the tradition of the Wise Men a legend.

6 – Bury, _History of Greece_, p. 311.

7 – Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophers_, p. 104, for injunctions upon the private life of the early Pythagoreans.

8 – Note further that in future philosophical discussions of this problem, the technical word “Being” is used for the Unchanging or the substance that remains forever like itself, and the technical word “Becoming” is used for the changing processes of Nature.

9 – “Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world.”

10 – Read Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, pp. 67 ff.; Zeller, _Greek Philosophy_, pp. 63 ff.

11 – Read Matthew Arnold, _Empedocles_ (a poem).

12 – Read Plato, _Phaedo_, 97, B.

13 – Dualism: the belief that the world is to be explained by two independent and coexistent principles.

14 – Wheeler, _History of Alexander the Great_.

15 – Read Grote, _History of Greece_, vol. viii, pp. 334–347.

16 – Read H. Jackson in _Encyclopædia Britannica_, article “Sophists”.

17 – The student should read the following references in Plato’s dialogues and Xenophon’s _Symposium_ and _Memorabilia_. The translations referred to here are Jowett’s Plato and Cooper, Spelman, etc., translation, _Whole Works of Xenophon_. (1851.)

For the method of Socrates, read _Charmides_, _Lysis_, and _Laches_.

For the personal appearance of Socrates, read Plato, _Symposium_, pp. 586 ff. and Xenophon, _Symposium_, p. 615.

For the physical endurance of Socrates, read Plato, _Symposium_, p. 591.

For Socrates’ dislike of nature, read Plato, _Phædrus_, p. 435, and Xenophon, _Memorabilia_, p. 521.

For the charges, defense, and trial of Socrates, read Plato, _Apology_, pp. 116 and 129.

For the confinement of Socrates in prison, read _Crito_, beginning and end of the dialogue.

For description of the death scene of Socrates, read Plato, _Phædo_, beginning and end of the dialogue.

For description of the dæmoniacal sign, read Plato, _Apology_, pp. 125–126, and Xenophon, _Memorabilia_, pp. 531 ff., 585 ff.

For the oracle’s statement that Socrates is the wisest of men, read Plato, _Apology_, p. 114.

18 – What is the difference between perception and conception? We have heard a good deal about perceptions in the doctrine of Protagoras. We have now reached a point where many of the theories will involve a comparison of perception with conception. An understanding of the difference between perception and conception will be necessary for an understanding of the doctrines, especially of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. In general, perception is the consciousness of an object in which some actual sensation of it is present; a conception is the consciousness of an object in which no actual sensation of it is present. Thus I perceive a tree, when my retina is actually stimulated; I conceive a tree, when I turn my head away and no sense organ is actually stimulated, _i. e._ I do not touch, see, hear the tree. To the Greek the perception was particular and transient; the conception was, on the other hand, universal or general and permanent.

19 – Read Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, pp. 138–149, concerning the objective character of Greek morality, art, and philosophy.

20 – Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, p. 162.

21 – Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, p. 162.

22 – Rationalism and sensationalism refer to the sources from which knowledge is obtained. Rationalism is to be contrasted with sensationalism. Rationalism is the belief that the reason is an independent source of knowledge and has a higher authority than sense-perception. Sensationalism is the belief that all our knowledge originates in sensations. Empiricism is often used for sensationalism.

23 – Teleology is the doctrine that things exist for some purpose. A teleological cause, which is the same as “final cause” or “end,” is the purpose involved in an action. It is contrasted with mechanical or efficient cause. A trolley car is moving and a man runs to catch it. Electricity is the mechanical cause of the movement of the car. The purpose of the man is the teleological cause of his running; the strength in his legs is the mechanical or efficient cause of his running.

24 – Atoms differ primarily in form (ἰδέα); size is referred in part to form.

25 – These all reduce to form,――see above.

26 – Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, pp. 183–189.

27 – Read Wordsworth, _Dion_.

28 – B. Jowett, _Dialogues of Plato_, trans. into English with analyses and introductions, 4 vols.

See p. 158 for selections from the dialogues made by Jowett for English readers.

29 – Goethe.

30 – For the distinction between perception and conception, see p. 83.

31 – Read Wordsworth’s _Ode on Intimations of Immortality_.

32 – Read Edmund Spenser, _Hymn in Honor of Beauty_; Emerson, _Essay on Love_, also the poem on _Initial, Dæmonic, and Celestial Love_; Bacon, _Essay on Love_; Patmore, _Angel in the House_; Sill, _The Two Aphrodites_.

33 – B. I. Wheeler, _Life of Alexander the Great_.

34 – Read Walter Pater, _Marius the Epicurean_; Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, p. 184, for the _Golden Maxims_ of Epicurus; Teuffel, _History of Roman Literature_, pp. 83–86.

35 – Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, p. 183.

36 – Adamson, _The Development of Greek Philosophy_, p. 267.

37 – Professor C. P. Parker.

38 – A. Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp. 322 ff.

39 – Read Grote, _Plato_, vol. iii, pp. 482–490, for the interesting sophistical problems of the Liar, the Person Disguised under a Veil, Electra, Sorites, Cornutus, and the Bald Man.

40 – For a statement of these tropes, see Weber, _Hist. of Phil._, p. 153.

41 – Ueberweg, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. i, p. 216.

42 – Read Dill, _Roman Society_, first three chapters.

43 – Read Charles Kingsley, _Hypatia_, a novel.

44 – Hatch, _Hibbert Lectures_, 1888, p. 182.

45 – Harnack, _Outlines of the Hist. of Dogma_, p. 120.

46 – Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, p. 357.

47 – Harnack, _Outlines of the History of Dogma_, p. 159.

48 – Read Rossetti, _Shadow of Dante_, pp. 9–14; Karl Witte, _Essays on Dante_, pp. 99 ff.

49 – Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 219–221, 232, 236, 245–248; Turner, _Hist. of Philosophy_, p. 226; De Wulf, _Hist. of Mediæval Phil._, pp. 90–98; Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, pp. 3–6.

50 – Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, p. 247.

51 – Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 3.

52 – There is this difference between Augustine’s position and that of Descartes. Augustine’s _Quod si fallor, sum_ is a refutation of the doctrine of probability of the Academy, not a demonstration; Descartes’ _Cogito, ergo sum_ is positive,――a subtle but an important difference between the two thinkers.

53 – Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 337.

54 – Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 112, n. 4.

55 – Harnack, vol. vi, p. 7.

56 – Glaber, _Hist._, lib. III, 4.

57 – In this period the conceptualists were confused with nominalists and called nominalists.

58 – Historians are attaching more importance than formerly to Constantinople as an intellectual centre of that time.

59 – Read on this point Seignobos, _Hist. of Mediæval Civilization_, pp. 117 f.

60 – Read Emerton, _Mediæval Europe_, pp. 358–397; Adams, _Civilization during the Middle Ages_, pp. 258–278.

61 – THE CRUSADES

_Major Crusades_

First Crusade, 1096–1099 Second Crusade, 1147–1149 Third Crusade, 1189–1192 Fourth Crusade, 1202–1204 Children’s Crusade, 1212

_Minor Crusades_

Fifth Crusade, 1216–1220 Sixth Crusade, 1228–1229 Seventh Crusade, 1248–1254 Eighth Crusade, 1270–1272

It will be noted that five of these nine Crusades occurred within thirty years of the year 1200. The First Crusade resulted in the capture of Jerusalem and the founding of a kingdom. The other Crusades were directly or indirectly concerned with the defense or recapture of that kingdom.

62 – Read Norton, _Readings in the Hist. of Education_, pp. 102–103.

63 – Dante in _De Monarchia_ did not share in Thomas’s subordination of the state to the church. Both Dante and Thomas believed that destiny lies in the race, but the great poet regarded man as destined equally for earthly and heavenly happiness. To Dante the church and the state are powers of like authority.

64 – Dante follows Thomas in placing the intellectual virtues above the practical, and in pointing to the intellectual intuition of God as the goal of human attainment. Beatrice is Dante’s expression of this ideal.

65 – De Wulf, _Hist. of Mediæval Phil._, p. 323.

66 – Roger Bacon (1214–1292) lived at Oxford two generations before Scotus. He was so versatile that he was not able to dogmatize in any one field. He believed that theology was based on the will of God, all other science on the reason. He influenced both Scotus and Ockam to turn from authority to experience. Morality was to him the content of universal religion.

Transcriber’s Notes.

The following corrections have been made in the text:

Page 9: Sentence starting: The passionate party strife.... – ‘familes’ replaced with ‘families’ (old, ruling families of nobles)

Page 193: Sentence starting: On the other hand,... – ‘evolulution’ replaced with ‘evolution’ (Darwin’s theory of evolution.)

Page 196: Sentence starting: Studying the organic realm,... – ‘organism’ replaced with ‘organisms’ (we find organisms to consist of)

Page 215: Sentence starting: There were many other.... – ‘Pergamus’ replaced with ‘Pergamos’ (Rhodes, Antioch, Alexandria, Pergamos, Tarsus,)

Page 337: Sentence starting: By means of neo-Platonism.... – ‘judye’ replaced with ‘judge’ (God as a judge )