Demoniality; or, Incubi and Succubi
Part 5
37. It may seem strange, yet it must be admitted not to be unlikely. If, in fact, Theologians concur in establishing amongst Angels a specific, and therefore essential, diversity so considerable that, according to St. Thomas, there are not two Angels of the same species, but that each of them is a species by himself, why should not certain Angels be most pure spirits, of a consequently very superior nature, and others corporeal, therefore of a less perfect nature, differing thus from each other in their corporeal or incorporeal substance? This doctrine has the advantage of solving the otherwise insoluble contradiction between two Œcumenical Councils, namely the Seventh General Synod and the above-mentioned Council of Lateran. For, during the fifth sitting of that Synod, the second of Nicea, a book was introduced written by John of Thessalonica against a pagan Philosopher, wherein occur the following propositions: “_Respecting Angels, Archangels and their Powers, to which I adjoin our own Souls, the Catholic Church is really of opinion that they are intelligences, but not entirely bodyless and senseless, as you Gentiles aver; she on the contrary ascribes to them a subtile body, aerial or igneous, according to what is written: He makes the spirits His Angels, and the burning fire His Minister_”. And further on: “_Although not corporeal in the same way as ourselves, made of the four elements, yet it is impossible to say that Angels, Demons and Souls are incorporeal; for they have been seen many a time, invested with their own body, by those whose eyes the Lord had opened_”. And after that book had been read through before all the Fathers in Council assembled, Tharasius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, submitted it to the approval of the Council, with these words: “_The Father showeth that Angels should be pictured, since their form can be defined, and they have been seen in the shape of men_”. Without a dissentient, the Synod answered: “_Yes, my Lord_”.
38. Hanc autem Conciliarem adprobationem de materia ad longum pertractata a D. Joanne in libro coram Patribus lecto, statuere articulum fidei circa corporeitatem Angelorum, perspicuum est: unde ad tollendam contradictionem hujus, cum allata definitione Concilii Lateranensis, multum desudant Theologi. Unus enim, Suarez, =de Angelis=, ait, quod Patres non contradixerunt tali asserto de corporeitate Angelorum, quia non de illa re agebatur. Alius, Bann., in p. p. q. 10, ait, quod Synodus adprobavit conclusionem, nempe Angelos pingi posse, non tamen adprobavit rationem, =quia corporei sunt=. Alius, Molin., in p. p., q. 50. a. 1, ait, quod definitiones Conciliares in illa Synodo factæ sunt solum =actione septima=, proinde ea quæ habentur in actionibus præcedentibus non esse definitiones de fide. Alii, Joverc. et Mirand., =Sum. Conc.=, scribunt nec Nicænum, nec Lateranense Concilium intendisse definere de fide quæstionem; et Nicænum quidem locutum fuisse juxta opinionem Platonicorum, quæ ponit Angelos corporeos, et tunc prævalebat; Lateranense autem locutum esse juxta mentem Aristotelis, qui, l. 12. =Metaphys.=, tex. 49, ponit intelligentias incorporeas, quæ sententia contra Platonicos apud plerosque Doctores invaluit expost.
38. That this approbation by a Council of the doctrine set forth at length in the book of John establishes an article of belief with regard to the corporeity of Angels, there is not a shadow of doubt: so Theologians toil and moil in order to remove the contradiction apparent between that decision and the definition, above quoted, by the Council of Lateran. One of them, Suarez, says that if the Fathers did not disprove such an assertion of the corporeity of Angels, it is because that was not the question. Another contends that the Synod did approve the conclusion, namely that Angels might be pictured, but not the motive given, _their corporeity_. A third, Molina, observes that the definitions issued in Council by the Synod were thus issued only at the _seventh sitting_, whence he argues that those of the previous sittings are not definitions of belief. Others, lastly, write that neither the Council of Nicea nor that of Lateran intended defining a question of belief, the Council of Nicea having spoken according to the opinion of the Platonists, which describes Angels as corporeal beings and was then prevailing, whilst that of Lateran went with Aristoteles, who, in his 12th. book of _Metaphysics_, lays down the existence of incorporeal intelligences, a doctrine which has since carried the day with most Doctors over the Platonists.
39. Sed quam frigidæ sint istæ responsiones nemo non videt, ac eas minime satisfacere oppositioni palmariter demonstrat Bonaventura Baro, =Scot. Defens.=, tom. 9, apolog. 2, actio 1, § 2 per totum. Proinde ad tollendam contradictionem Conciliorum dicendum est, Nicænum locutum esse de una, Lateranense autem de alia specie Angelorum, et illam quidem corpoream, hanc vero penitus incorpoream; et sic conciliantur aliter irreconciliabilia Concilia.
39. But any one can discern the invalidity of those answers, and Bonaventure Baro (_Scot. Defens._, tome 9) proves to evidence that they do not bear. In consequence, in order to agree the two Councils, we must say that the Council of Nicea meant one species of Angels, and that of Lateran another: the former, corporeal, the latter on the contrary absolutely incorporeal; and thus are reconciled two otherwise irreconcilable Councils.
40. Præmittendum 2º, nomen Angeli esse nomen officii, non naturæ, ut concorditer scribunt S. S. Patres: Ambros. in c. 1 =epist. ad Hebr.=, Hilaris, l. 5 de Trin., Augustinus, lib. 15 =de Civit. Dei= c. 23, Gregorius, =Hom. 34 in Evang.=, Isidorus, l. =de Sum. Bonit.=, c. 12; unde præclare ait D. Ambrosius: Angelus non ex eo quod est spiritus, ex eo quod agit, Angelus, quia =Angelus= Græce, Latine =Nuntius= dicitur; sequitur igitur ex hoc, quod illi, qui ad aliquod ministerium a Deo mittuntur, sive spiritus sint, sive homines, Angeli vocari possunt; et de facto ita vocantur in Scripturis Sacris: nam de Sacerdotibus, Concionatoribus ac Doctoribus, qui tanquam Nuntii Dei explicant hominibus divinam voluntatem, dicitur, =Malach.= c. 2. v. 7: =Labia Sacerdotis custodient scientiam, et legem requirent ex ore ejus, quia Angelus Domini exercituum est=. D. Joannes Baptista ab eodem Propheta, c. 3 v. 1, vocatur Angelus, dum ait: =Ecce ego mitto Angelum meum, et præparabit viam ante faciem meam=. Et hanc prophetiam esse ad litteram de S. Joanne Baptista testatur Christus Dominus in =Evangelio Matthæi=, 11, v. 10. Immo et ipse Deus, quia fuit missus a Patre in mundum ad evangelizandum legem gratiæ, vocatur Angelus. Ita in prophetia Isaiæ, c. 9 v. 6, juxta versionem Septuaginta: =Vocabitur nomen ejus magni consilii Angelus=, et clarius in Malachiæ c. 3 v. 1: =Veniet ad templum sanctum suum Dominator quem vos quæritis, et Angelus testamenti quem vos vultis=. Quæ prophetia ad litteram est de Christo Domino. Sequitur igitur nullum absurdum sequi ex hoc, quod dicimus Angelos quosdam esse corporeos, nam et homines, qui corpore constant, Angeli vocabulo efferuntur.
40. Secondly, I premise that the word Angel applies, not indeed to the kind, but to the office: the Holy Fathers are agreed thereupon (St. Ambrose, on the _Epistle to the Hebrews_; St. Austin, _City of God_; St. Gregory, _Homily 34 on Scripture_; St. Isidorus, _Supreme Goodness_). An Angel, very truly says St. Ambrose, is thus styled, not because he is a spirit, but on account of his office; Ἁγγελος in Greek, _Nuntius_ in Latin, that is to say _Messenger_; it follows that whoever is entrusted by God with a mission, be he spirit or man, may be called an Angel, and is thus called in the Holy Scriptures, where the following words are applied to Priests, Preachers and Doctors, who, as Messengers of God, explain to men the divine will (Malachi, chapt. 2, v. 7). “_The priest’s lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth, for he is the Angel of the Lord of Hosts._” The same prophet, chapt. 3, v. 1, bestows the name of Angel on St. John the Baptist, when saying: “_Behold, I will send my Angel and he shall prepare the way before me._” That this prophecy literally applies to St. John the Baptist is testified by our Lord Jesus-Christ, in the Gospel, according to St. Matthew, chapt. 11, v. 10. Still more: God himself is called an Angel, because he has been sent by His Father to herald the law of mercy. To witness, the prophecy of Isaiah, chapt. 9, v. 6, according to Septuagint: “_He shall be called an Angel of Wonderful Counsel._” And more plainly still in Malachi, chapt. 3, v. 1; “_The Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to his temple, even the Angel of the covenant whom ye delight in_”, a prophecy which literally applies to our Lord Jesus-Christ. There is consequently nothing absurd in the contention that some Angels are corporeal, since men, who assuredly have a body, are called Angels.
41. Præmittendum 3º, nondum rerum naturalium, quæ sunt in mundo, satis perspectam esse existentiam, aut naturam, ut proinde aliquid negandum sit ex eo, quod de illo nunquam alias dictum, aut scriptum fuerit. Patet enim tractu temporis detectas esse novas terras, quas Antiqui nostri ignorarunt, novaque animalia, herbas, plantas, fructus, semina nunquam alias visa; et si pervia esset Terra Australis incognita, cujus indagatio, et lustratio a multis hucusque incassum tentata est, adhuc nova nobis alia panderentur. Patet adhuc, quod per inventionem microscopii, et alias machinas, et organa Philosophiæ experimentalis modernæ, sicut etiam per exactiorem indaginem Anatomistarum, multarum rerum naturalium existentiam, vires, naturamque tum innotuisse, tum dietim innotescere, quæ præcedentes Philosophi ignorarunt, ut patet in auro fulminante, phosphoro, et centum aliis chymicis experimentis, circulatione sanguinis, venis lacteis, vasis lymphaticis, et aliis hujusmodi quæ nuper Anatomistæ adinvenerunt. Proinde ineptum erit aliquod exsibillare ex hoc quod de eo nullus Antiquorum scripserit, attento maxime Logicorum axiomate, quod locus ab auctoritate negativa non tenet.
41. Thirdly, I premise that neither the existence nor the nature of the natural things in this world has been sufficiently investigated to allow of denying a fact, merely because it has never been previously spoken of or written about. In the course of time have not new lands been discovered which the Ancients knew not of? New animals, herbs, plants, fruits and seeds, never seen elsewhere? And if that mysterious Austral land came at last to be explored, as has been to this day vainly tried by so many travellers, what unforeseen disclosures would be the result! Through the invention of the microscope and other instruments used by modern experimental Philosophy, combined with the more exact methods of investigation of Anatomists, have there not been, and are there not, every day, brought to light the existence, qualities and characteristics of a number of natural things unknown to ancient Philosophers, such as fulminating gold, phosphorus, and a hundred other chemical compounds, the circulation of the blood, the lacteal vessels, the lymph-ducts and other recent anatomical discoveries? To deride a doctrine because it does not happen to be mentioned in any ancient author would therefore be absurd, especially bearing in mind this axiom of Logic: _locus ab auctoritate negativa non tenet_.
42. Præmittendum 4º, quod in Sacra Scriptura, et Ecclesiasticis traditionibus non traditur nisi id, quod ad animæ salutem necessarium est, quoad credendum, sperandum et amandum; unde inferre non licet ex eo, quod nec ex Scriptura, nec ex traditione aliquod habetur, proinde negandum sit, quod illud tale existat: aut nos quidem Fides docet, Deum per Verbum suum omnia creasse visibilia, et invisibilia; pariterque ex Jesu Christi Domini nostri meritis tum gratiam, tum gloriam omni, et cuivis rationali creaturæ conferri. Num autem alius Mundus a nostro, quem incolimus, sit, et in eo alii homines non ab Adam prognati, sed alio modo a Deo creati existant (sicut ponunt illi qui lunarem globum habitatum opinantur); pariterque num in hoc Mundo, quem incolimus, aliæ existant creaturæ rationales ultra homines, et Spiritus Angelicos, quæ regulariter hominibus sint invisibiles, et per accidens, et earum executiva potentia fiant visibiles: hoc nullo modo spectat ad fidem, et hoc scire, aut ignorare non est ad salutem hominis necessarium, sicut nec scire rerum omnium physicarum numerum aut naturam.
42. Fourthly, I premise that Holy Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition do not teach us any thing beyond what is requisite for the salvation of the soul, namely Faith, Hope and Charity. Consequently, from a thing not being stated either by Scripture or tradition it must not be inferred that that thing is not in existence. For instance, Faith teaches us that God, by His Word, made things visible, and invisible, and also that, through the merits of our Lord Jesus-Christ, grace and glory are conferred on every rational creature. Now, that there be another World than the one we live in, and that it be peopled by men not born of Adam but made by God, in some other way, as is implied by those who believe the lunar globe to be inhabited; or further, that in the very World we dwell in, there be other rational creatures besides man and the Angelic Spirits, creatures generally invisible to us and whose being is disclosed but accidentally, through the instrumentality of their own power; all that has nothing to do with Faith, and the knowledge or ignorance thereof is no more necessary to the salvation of man than knowing the number or nature of all physical things.
43. Præmittendum 5º, nullam inveniri repugnantiam, nec in Philosophia, nec in Theologia; quod dari possint creaturæ rationales constantes spiritu et corpore, aliæ ab homine, quia si esset repugnantia, hoc esset vel ex parte Dei (et hoc non quia ipse omnipotens est), vel ex parte rei creabilis; et neque hoc, quia sicut creatura mere spiritualis, ut Angeli, creata est, et mere materialis, ut Mundus, et partim spiritualis, partim corporea, corporeitate terrestri, et crassa, ut homo, ita creabilis est creatura constans spiritu rationali, et corporeitate minus crassa, sed subtiliore, quam sit homo. Et profecto post Resurrectionem anima Beatorum erit unita corpori glorioso dote subtilitatis donato: ut proinde concludi posset, potuisse Deum creare creaturam rationalem corpoream, cui naturaliter indita sit corporis subtilitas, sicut per gratiam corpori glorioso confertur.
43. Fifthly, I premise that neither Philosophy nor Theology is repugnant to the possible existence of rational creatures having spirit and body and distinct from man. Such repugnance could be supported only on God, and that is inadmissible, since he is all-mighty, or on the thing to be made, and that likewise cannot be supported; for, as there are purely spiritual creatures, such as Angels, or merely material, such as the World, or lastly semi-spiritual and semi-corporeal, of an earthly and gross corporeity, such as man, so there may well be in existence a creature endowed with a rational spirit and a corporeity less gross, more subtile than man’s. No doubt, moreover, but that after Resurrection, the souls of the blessed will be united with a glorious and subtile body; from which may be inferred that God may well have made a rational and corporeal creature whose body naturally enjoys the subtilty which will be conferred by the grace on the glorious body.
44. Astruitur autem magis talium creaturarum possibilitas ex solutione argumentorum, quæ contra positam conclusionem fieri possunt, pariterque ex responsione ad interrogationes, quæ possunt circa eam formari.
44. But, the possible existence of such creatures will be still better set forth by solving the arguments which can be adduced against our conclusion, and replying to the questions it may raise.
45. Prima interrogatio est, an tales creaturæ dicendæ essent animalia rationalia? Quod si sic, quomodo different ab homine, cum quo communem haberent definitionem?
45. First question: should such creatures be styled rational animals? And if so, in what do they differ from man, with whom they would have that definition in common?
46. Respondeo quod essent animalia rationalia sensibus et organis corporis prædita, sicut homo: differrent autem ab homine non solum ratione corporis tenuioris, sed etiam materiæ. Homo siquidem ex crassiore elementorum omnium parte, puta ex luto, nempe aqua et terra crassa formatus est, ut constat ex Scriptura, =Gen.= 2. v. 7.; ista vero formata essent ex subtiliore parte omnium, aut unius, seu alterius elementorum; ut proinde alia essent terrea, alia aquea, alia aerea, et alia ignea; et ut eorum definitio cum hominis definitione non conveniret, addendum esset definitioni hominis crassa materialitas sui corporis, per quam a dictis animalibus differret.
46. I reply: Yes, they would be rational animals, provided with senses and organs even as man; they would, however, differ from man not only in the more subtile nature, but also in the matter of their body. In fact, as is shown by Scripture, man has been made from the grossest of all elements, namely clay, a gross mixture of water and earth: but those creatures would be made from the most subtile part of all elements, or of one or other of them; thus, some would proceed from earth, others from water, or air, or fire; and, in order that they should not be defined in the same terms as man, to the definition of the latter should be added the mention of the gross materiality of his body, wherein he would differ from said animals.
47. Secunda interrogatio est, quandonam hujus modi animalia fuissent condita, et num cum brutis producta a terra, aut ab aqua, ut quadrupedia, et aves respective; an vero a Domino Deo formata, ut fuit homo?
47. Second question: At what period would those animals have been originated, and wherefrom? From earth, like the beasts, or from water, like quadrupeds, birds, etc.? Or, on the contrary, would they have been made, like man, by our Lord God?
48. Respondeo quod de fide est, quod posito, quod existant de facto, creata sint a principio Mundi: sic enim definitur a Concilio Lateranensi (Firm. de sum. Trinit. et fide cathol.); nempe quod Deus sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem. Sub illa etenim Creaturarum generalitate etiam illa animalia essent comprehensa. Quo vero ad eorum formationem, decuisse ipsorum corpus a Deo ministerio Angelorum formatum fuisse, sicut a Deo formatum legimus corpus hominis, quia ipsi copulandus erat spiritus immortalis, quandoquidem spiritus incorporeus et proinde nobilissimus corpori pariter originaliter nobiliori cæteris brutis jungendus erat.
48. I reply: It is an article of belief, expressly laid down by the Council of Lateran, that whatever is in fact and at present, was made in the origin of the world. By His all-mighty virtue, God, from the beginning of time, raised together from nothing both orders of creatures, spiritual and corporeal. Now, those animals also would be included in the generality of creatures. As to their formation, it might be said that God Himself, through the medium of Angels, made their body as he did man’s, to which an immortal spirit was to be united. That body being of a nobler nature than that of other animals, it was meet that it should be united to an incorporeal and highly noble spirit.
49. Tertia interrogatio, an talia animalia habuissent originem ab uno solo, velut omnes homines ab Adam, an vero plura simul formata essent sicut fuit de cæteris animantibus a terra et aqua productis, in quibus fuerunt mares et fœminæ quæ speciem per generationem conservant? Et si hoc oporteret inter talia animalia esse distinctionem sexus; ipsa nasci, et interire; passionibus sensus affici, nutriri, crescere; et tunc quo alimento vescerentur, esset quærendum; præterea an vitam socialem ducerent, ut homines; qua politica regerentur; num urbes ad habitandum struxissent; num artes, studia, possessiones, et bella inter ea essent, sicut est in hominibus.
49. Third question: Would those animals descend from one individual, as all men descend from Adam, or, on the contrary, would many have been made at the same time, as was the case for the other living things issued from earth and water, wherein were males and females for the preservation of the kind by generation? Would there be amongst them a distinction between the sexes? Would they be subject to birth and death, to senses, passions, want of food, power of growth? If so, what their nutrition? Would they lead a social life, as men do? By what laws ruled? Would they build up cities for their dwellings, cultivate the arts and sciences, hold property, and wage war between themselves, as men are wont to?
50. Respondeo: potuit esse quod omnia ab uno, velut homines ab Adam, sint progenita; potuit pariter esse, quod ex iis multi mares, et plures fœminæ fuissent formatæ, a quibus per generationem eorum species essent propagatæ. Ultro admitteremus talia animalia oriri et mori; mares alios, alias fœminas inter ea esse; passionibus, sensibus agitari velut homines; nutriri et crescere secundum molem sui corporis; cibum autem ipsorum non crassum qualem requirit crassities corporis humani, sed substantiam tenuem et vaporosam emanantem per effluvia spirituosa a rebus physicis pollentibus corpusculis maxime volatilibus, ut nidor carnium maxime assatarum, vapor vini, fructuum, florum, aromatum, a quibus copiosa hujusmodi effluvia usque ad totalem partium subtiliorum ac volatilium evaporationem scaturiunt. Talia autem animalia civilem vitam ducere posse, et inter ea distinctos esse gradus dominantium ac servientium pro conditione naturæ ipsorum, artesque, scientias, ministeria, exercitia, loca, mansiones, ac alia necessaria ad eorum conservationem, nullam penitus importat repugnantiam.
50. I reply: It may be that all descend from one individual, as men descend from Adam; it may be also that a number of males and females were made initially, who preserved their kind by generation. We will further admit that they are born and die; that they are divided into males and females, and are moved by senses and passions, as men are; that they feed and grow according to the size of their body; their food, however, instead of being gross like that required by the human body, must be delicate and vapoury, emanating through spirituous effluvia from whatever in the physical world abounds with highly volatile corpuscles, such as the flavour of meats, especially of roasts, the fume of wine, the fragrancy of fruit, flowers, aromatics, which evolve an abundance of those effluvia until all their subtile and volatile parts have completely evaporated. To their being able to lead a social life, with distinctions of rank and precedence; to their cultivating the arts and sciences, exercising functions, maintaining armies, building up cities, doing in short whatever is requisite for their preservation, I have in the main no objection.
51. Quarta interrogatio est, qualis esset eorum corporis figuratio, an humanam, an aliam formam, et qualem haberent, et an partes corporis ipsorum haberent ordinem essentialem inter se, ut corpora cæterorum animalium, an vero accidentalem tantum, ut corpora fluidarum substantiarum, ut olei, aquæ, nubis, fumi, etc.; et num substantiæ suarum partium organicarum diversimode constarent, ut organa hominum, in quibus sunt aliæ partes crassissimæ, ut ossa, aliæ minus crassæ, ut cartilagines, aliæ tenues, ut membranæ.