Chapter 1

§§1--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic., after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2, 3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12). Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).

§1. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus than of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a mistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's house_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like _audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius villa_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic. Epistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse Roma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse officio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum longo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se visentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_ (Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition of pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is often repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V. 22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word _eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_). Some editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_, which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." The words _satis longo intervallo_ simply = "after a tolerably long halt." For the clause _ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13.

§2. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar passages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm brackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid forte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_ is omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is clearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false derivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The MSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd. _ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is present. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads _velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._ I. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in the place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav. gave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_, after Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's G). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for expressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point. Of course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether. _Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12.

§3. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cæsar _B. Civ._ III. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have _eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ... requirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum simul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare monumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1, _T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_ (Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314. _Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V. 69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean "department of literature." _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter has _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in Davies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight variation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves. _Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss. I. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf. _De Off._ I. 105

§4. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge possessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._ II. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who half a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and moreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and clauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense desire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really no conditional force, _si qui_ like ειτινες merely means "all who," for a strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi sunt, si qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar expressions occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared with this prologue throughout.

§5. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti enim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ, has _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_: Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus, I believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to say that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances have written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf. Introd. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_: Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g. Bentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure. _Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of questions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that _interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See also _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of denoting the Greek ‛ρητορικη and διαλεκτικη; note on 32. _Et oratorum etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX. 25, 3, the two words even occur without any other word to separate them. For _oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used in Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp. after Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for _virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, δυναμις) may be called in Gk. αρετη, in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._ III. 65, will remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_: MSS. have _quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf. _M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli (after Ernesti) thinking the phrase "_arrogantius dictum_" places _quidem_ after _accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks, implies no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. ουδε. _Suscipiatur labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.

§6. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV. 13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._ I. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then govern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. ποιητικος). But the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are the _res efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus est rerum efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less fully. _Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated ατομος. _Quae cum contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must be kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig (_Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108) tacitly reads _continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_: Durand's em. for _quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv. (_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking a rapid transition from one subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like the Gk. επει, only one parallel instance, however, was adduced (_T.D._ III. 14) and the usage probably is not Latin. _Adducere?_: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence, so far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true system of physics. If _quoniam_ is read and no break made at _adducere_, all after _quoniam_ will refer to ethics, in that case there will be a strange change of subject in passing from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which expressions will be nominatives to _poterit_, further, there will be the almost impossible ellipse of _ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind after _haec ipsa_. On every ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable. _Quid, haec ipsa_: I have added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to have fallen out. [The technical philosophical terms contained in this section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_: "frankly," cf. _Ad Fam._ VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139.

§7. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum est_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod bonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp _T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek preserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by Athenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this MSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has conclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin. Christ supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec suspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II. 20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus is dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere quidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp frequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind (_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of sentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_ without _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous passages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_, but _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the infinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in _Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure from Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not _si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and exhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with other instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read _sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_: cf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by other words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am surprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical objection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the MSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied from it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam obscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply _clearness_, it means merely "acutely". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have _quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only follows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good instance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions of firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word, cf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by Cic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64.

§8. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss. But Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight variations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of slightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I therefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_: Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read _e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow _haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, "to hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often applied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus in _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written in two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio opere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_: MSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the master of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See Quintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3. _Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict. Biogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and have often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner). _Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the right use to be made of Greek models. _†Quae quo_: these words are evidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter. Varro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in order that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault lies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_, which would be written _quō_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be "Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned read." _Laudationibus_: λογοις επιταφιοις, cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48 where Varro's are mentioned. _†Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give _philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong, _physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_, _musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the phrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V. 121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his explanation is, as Orelli gently says, "vix Latina." I can scarcely think Halm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic. almost condemns it by his use of the Greek φιλοσοφως (_Ad Att._ XIII. 20). In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is φιλοσοφος used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_ adjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121, _Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he uses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III. 45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57) Might we not read _philosophis_, in the dative, which only requires the alteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would then be "to write _for_ philosophers," which would agree with my emendation _cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_ would be a tempting alteration, but that the word φιλοσοφικος is not Greek, nor do _philosophicus_, _philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times. _Si modo id consecuti sumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316.

§9. _Sunt ista_: = εστι ταυτα, so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd. have _sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for _deduxerunt_, which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's remark, "_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus humanitatis_." The words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._ 63. In _Lael._ 12, _Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule requires _deducere_, on the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites domum deducere. Aetatem patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3) describes Varro's "_Libri Antiquitatum_" (referred to in 8), in which most of the subjects here mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_: lists of dates, so χρονοι is technically used for dates, Thuc. V. 20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_: after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the balance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of formal accuracy. _Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf. _Brut._ 49, _De Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to have been quoting from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd. here give _sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making the three genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the accusatives, _nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using _sedes_, _locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_, 171, quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the frequent references of Aug. it appears that the "_Libri Antiquitatum_" were divided into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res divinae_ (_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for _luminis_, cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26. Varro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis incohasti_: Varro's book "_De Philosophia_" had apparently not yet been written.

§10. _Causa_: = προφασις. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_: Halm with his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives _nescient_ to suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm himself allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed da mihi nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj. _sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while Halm after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far from the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though _da mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut., Goer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported by 12, _Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the old spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation, and cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section throughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II.

§11. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_ see Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac refertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so και in Greek. _Inclusa habebam_: cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is noteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant _perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of Tullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and Introd. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an excuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See Introd. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the exordium of _N.D._ I.

§12. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus Graecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm (and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca desideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483, approves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans to have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for Greece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if she is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6, _D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a Graecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem sententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8.

§13. _Sine te_: = σου διχα. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits _esse_, see note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p. 20. _Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_ would be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_ 16, Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can scarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The reading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam veterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises the last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et emendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words often occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of expression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37. _Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after _quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some conditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70. Nothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for the pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_: see II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy refer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_ merely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom. (1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex Apollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied from _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ περι ψυχης _utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the preceding letter, cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's _Philonia_ is improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective _Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a heroic remedy. To make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_ together, supplying _auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by _D.F._ V. 13.

§14. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_, changed by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he gave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's "_praestantissima recensio_," and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's crushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads _revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536. From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it. _Renovare_ in Cic. often means "to refresh the memory," e.g. 11, _Brut._ 315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the common _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_, which would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for the late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for _quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without _essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse so commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if not familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly, most MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable therefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the hexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and Augustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also _consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De Or._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to Goer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of _laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81.

§§15--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance. Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the Academic (17, 18).

§15. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in these words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10, _N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of _ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is personified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear. _Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the metaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_: this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's time, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were curiously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult question the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates and the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it relates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_: _valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes it more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius vainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39, _T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in _De Leg._ I. 6.

§16. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43. _Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic. would let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf. II. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad Fam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on _T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the omission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99. "_Eoque praestare ceteris_" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_, Plato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_: Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7, 9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter also. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic he gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is due to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often confused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78, where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum ... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ... tum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad virtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue; see Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote.

§17. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to account for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For _multiplex_ "many sided," cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is an opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in _D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf. _D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have been first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his theory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In _D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole of philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light of such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about ιδεαι, which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p. 51, has some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic. does not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines _nomen_ to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not use _vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66, etc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus "_ex asse heredem, secundos autem_" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is difficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely have been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and Halm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the _Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of Cic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably wrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not _Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. Χαλκηδονιον. _Praestantissimos_: Halm wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for Cic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down from antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in -ης into Latin nouns in _-a_. See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis ubertate_: cf. Quintilian's "_illa Livii lactea ubertas_." _Plenum ac refertam_: n. on 11. _Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives _dubitantem_, Baiter _dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_: before these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably from the line above, Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while Lamb., Day read _philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and Peripatetics. _Ars_ = τεχνη, a set of definite rules, so Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this old school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_: so Halm here, but often _discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198 and 200, has thrice _discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never.

§18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in 44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see _M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum fugiendarumque_: ‛αιρετων και φευκτων, about which more in n. on 36. The Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would have considered most valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf. Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the _Academica_, also quotes Plutarch _Præc. Polit._ 7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra atque nostros_: few of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian, and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the words "_tui cives_," meaning the Athenians, often occur. _Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_. _Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist. For the omission of _me_, cf. note on 7.

§§19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary. The threefold division of philosophy into ηθικη, φυσικη, διαλεκτικη. Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account of action and duty (23).

§19. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time, so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by Diog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics, to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably first brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf. esp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have _et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the awkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes to read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V. 68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II. 22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et moribus_ for ηθικη, etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as we shall see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30. _A natura petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and Aristotle is difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see _D.F._ V. 24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro in Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the ιδεα of the Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the abstract φυσις, that he scarcely appeals even incidentally to φυσις in his ethical works. The abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse omnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._ V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33, 34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore et vita_: this is the τριας or τριλογια των αγαθων, which belongs in this form to late Peripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a development from the βιος τελειος of Aristotle. The τριας in this distinct shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus, _Ethica_ II. 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to merge the two last divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This agrees better with _D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the Antiochean _finis_ see more in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of _bona_, see n. on 13. _Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the same distinction is in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35. _Pulchritudinem_: Cic. _Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a doubt; it often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only _pulcrai_, _pulcrum_, etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found once (_Corp. Inscr._ I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an early time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher in Curtius' _Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false derivation from πολυχροος may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger derived it from πολυ χειρ (Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For _valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf. the ‛υγιεια ισχυς καλλος of Stob. _Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V. 22. _Sensus integros_ ευαισθησια in Stob., cf. also _D.F._ V. 36 (_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_). _Celeritatem_: so ποδωκεια in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Claritatem in voce_: cf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al. _expressionem_. For the former cf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._ III. 41, which will disprove Klotz's remark "_imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit_." See also _De Off._ I. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which, though not itself Ciceronian, recalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149. Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has _expressit explanavitque verba_; he and Quintilian often so use _exprimere_.

§20. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and _animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae natura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in II. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs αρεται into διανοητικαι and ηθικαι (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13, _Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In _D.F._ V. 38 the διανοητικαι are called _non voluntariae_, the ηθικαι _voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam_: cf. the ευμαθεια, μνημη of Arist. (who adds αγχινοια σοφια φρονησις), and the _docilitas, memoria_ of _D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a translation from the Greek, as frequently, here probably of εθισμος (_Nic. Eth._ II. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason bears to virtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in moribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate aim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the Stoic προκορη, προκοπτειν εις αρετην, cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R. and P. 392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_: cf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as the perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and Madvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et Plat._ c. 5, ‛η αρετη τελειοτης εστι της ‛εκαστου φυσεος. _Una res optima_: the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX. 3, cf. also _D.F._ V. 36, 38.

§21. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their αδιαφορα as the practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in Aug. XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place here. _Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_ between _cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_ and also before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may be seen from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also _T.D._ V. 22. In Stob. II. 6, 8, the τελος of the Peripatetics is stated to be το κατ' αρετην ζην εν τοις περι σωμα και τοις εξωθεν αγαθοις, here _quibusdam quae_ etc., denote the εξωθεν or εκτος αγαθα, the third class in 19. _Hominem ... societate_: all this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob. II. 6, 7 (κοινη φιλανθρωπια), etc., doubtless the humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the φυσει ανθρωπος πολιτικον ζωον theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66, _De Leg._ I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions _hominem_, _humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V. 108, Varro, however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_: what are these _cetera?_ They form portion of the εκτος αγαθα, and although not strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary to enrich it and preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8, 13, φιλια, φιλοι would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while πλουτος αρχη ευτυχια ευγενεια δυναστεια would be included in _cetera_. The same distinction is drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most MSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_ corresponds best with the division of αγαθα into ποιητικα and φυλακτικα, Stob. II. 6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54.

§22. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum appellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by the writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of the Gr. εδοκει, "it was their dogma," so often. _Adipisci_: cf. _adeptum esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For the various modes of denoting the πρωτα κατα φυσιν in Latin see Madvig's _Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s philosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could not stand alone, for τα πρωτα τη φυσει is one of Goerenz's numerous forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A comparison of this statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19 and the passages quoted in my note there, will show that Cic. drew little distinction between the Stoic τα πρωτα κατα φυσιν and the Peripatetic τριλογια. That this is historically absurd Madvig shows in his _Excursus_, but he does not sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly correctly reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 3) coincides with Cic.'s in every particular. Even the _inexplicabilis perversitas_ of which Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen from Augustine XIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among the _prima naturae_. A little reflection will show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained the practical identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I regret that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject farther. For the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν see Zeller, chap XI. _Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. ‛αιρετα, which is applied to all things contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic _finis_ was αρετη only, that alone to them was ‛αιρετον, their πρωτα κατα φυσιν were not ‛αιρετα, (cf. _D.F._ III. 21). Antiochus' _prima naturae_ were ‛αιρετα to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3, _prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6, 7, demonstrates each branch of the τριλογια to be καθ' ‛αυτο ‛αιρετον. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, τα πλειστα και κυριωτατα. _Ea sunt maxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much misunderstood by edd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 6. _Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen beatissimam_: the question whether αρετη was αυταρκες προς ευδαιμονιαν was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to Antiochus, consult _M.D.F._ V. 67.

§23. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. πραξεως, the usual translation, cf. II. 24, 37. _Officii ipsius initium_: του καθηκοντος αρχην, Stob. II. 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action and duty, see II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the Stoa. _Earum rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out, _susceptio_ however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS. (G) gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_ above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._ IV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of επιεικεια. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of course _haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian. _Voluptatibus_: a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33.

§§24--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_. Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity (ποιον τι or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either _primary_ or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two first having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle added a fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless matter, matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or form acts on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind, Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the same thing (28, 29).

§24. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a translation both of φυσις and ουσια. Here it is ουσια in the broadest sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in the universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however probably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this read carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of Aristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important coincidence of Force with logical _genus_ (ειδος), and of Matter (‛υλη) with logical _differentia_ (διαφορα). For the _duae res_, cf. _D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt to translate το ποιουν and το πασχον of the _Theaetetus_, το οθεν and το δεχομενον of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._ has _efficere_ and _pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea quae_: so Gruter, Halm for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by an active generative form results in an _aliquid_, a τοδε τι as Aristotle calls it. Passive matter ‛υλη is only potentially τοδε τι, passing into actual τοδε τι, when affected by the form. (Cf. τοδε, τουτο, Plato _Tim._ 49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A figurative description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo quod efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii sermonis egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by laboured periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but _equivalent_ to _vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam quandam_: it is extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over _quandam_ and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below) simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use, in the Greek ‛υλη the strangeness had had time to wear off. _In utroque_: for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et materia_) _fit_, the meaning is clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above. _Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the meaning of this is clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space _(alicubi)_, it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless _est_ be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence the Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent the belief of Aristotle and Plato. The ιδεαι for instance, though to Plato in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle explicitly says this, _Phys._ III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P. 289). Cic. perhaps translates here from _Tim._ 52 B, φαμεν αναγκαιον ειναι που το ‛ον ‛απαν εν τινι τοπω. For ancient theories about space the student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair summary is given by Stob. _Phys._ περι κενου και τοπου και χωρας, ch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note that _corpus_ is _formed_, as contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter. _Qualitas_ is here wrongly used for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the product of Force and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves sometimes confuse ποιοτης and ποιον, the confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the phrase το ποιον in Greek, which may either denote the τοδε τι as ποιον, or the Force which makes it ποιον, hence Arist. calls one of his categories το ποιον and ποιοτης indifferently For the Stoic view of ποιοτης, see Zeller, 96--103, with footnotes.

§25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._ III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_: Hülsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called αλλοκοτον ονομα. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5. _Suis utuntur_: so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = μεταφερειν, which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor, _De Or._ III. 153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the spelling _secula_ is wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from _secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is exceedingly fond of separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from the words with which they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. _Lael._ 53 _quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_, II. 68 _tam in praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.

§26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his ortae_: the Greek terms are ‛απλα and συνθετα, see Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2 (R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi multiformes_: evidently a trans. of πολυειδεις, which is opposed to ‛απλους in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A, and often. Plato uses also μονοειδης for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch. VII., a transl. of Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc. _qualitates_) is the needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ = _genera_, ειδη. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._ I. 19; cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the section of Stob. _Phys._, entitled περι αρχων και στοιχειων και του παντος. It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and _elementa_ here and in 39 (αρχαι and στοιχεια) convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements στοιχεια but _not_ αρχαι, which term would be reserved for the primary Matter and Force. _Aër et ignis_: this is Stoic but _not_ Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these properties, _one_ active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements; each therefore is to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only _one_ property to each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II. 26), moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq. _Accipiendi ... patiendi_: δεχεσθαι often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum genus_: the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39. _Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153; cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.

§27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the ‛υποκειμενη ‛υλη of Aristotle, from which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_: _species_ here = _forma_ above, the ειδος or μορφη of Arist. _Omnibus_ without _rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21 in _quibusdam_, _quae_. _Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. _expressa effigies_ _De Off_. III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter (see II. 77); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter is called an εκμαγειον in Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these words have given rise to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. _Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf. _materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_ cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50 B (δεχεται γαρ ηι τα παντα), 51 A (ειδος πανδεχες). The word πανδεχες is also quoted from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in taking _tota_ and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the _Tim._ well and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between Plato's ‛υλη and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.; Halm after Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said loosely of the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of course the προτε ‛υλη, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is imperishable (cf. _Tim._ 52 A. φθοραν ου προσδεχομενον). _Non in nihilum_: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that infinite subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing and their reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere. _Infinite secari_: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne illud quidem physici credere esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 ουκ εστιν ελαχιστον μεγεθος. The history of ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie close enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates, tripping over the old αντιφασις of the One and the Many, denied παν μεγεθος διαιρετον ειναι και μερος εχειν (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is the theory of motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf. also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the existence of void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its possibility within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1), the Stoics did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae intervalla ... possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.

§28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has _ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_. Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_ is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as ουσια = existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_, themselves existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. _totam commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was formed." For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast, substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II. 19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._ II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of αισθητη ουσια = substance which can affect the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should not be forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself sentient, cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf. _N.D._ II. 29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms with the Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while believing that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being _in_ the Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34) In a curious passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life, extends through all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119 and _N.D._ II. 118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob. I. 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the Universal World God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some Stoics however denied the εκπυρωσις. _Nihil enim valentius_: this is an argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid potest esse mundo valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo intereat_: _interire_ here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. αναστηναι, εκπιπτειν ‛υπο τινος.

§29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do. The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance, Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_. Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics. _Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi prudentium quandam_: the Greek προνοια is translated both by _prudentia_ and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in _N.D._ II. 77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World God is perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160 (where there is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. _Necessitatem_: αναγκην, which is ειρμος αιτιων, _causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf. _N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I. 125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before). This is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. Τυχη therefore is defined as αιτια αδηλος ανθρωπινωι λογισμωι (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on _posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), ουδε τι γιγνεται εργον επι χθονι σου διχα δαιμον. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a trans. of the Gk. κατηναγκασμενον. I see no reason for suspecting _inter_, as Halm does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De Div._ II. 49; cf. also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to studying the reff. given above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's _Physica_ II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation, for the views of Aristotle about τυχη and το αυτοματον, also ch. 8--9 for αναγκη. Plato's doctrine of αναγκη, which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in _Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.

§§30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary. Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense, or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31). Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they _defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric (32).

§30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic ην, = was, as we said. _In ratione et disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._ I. 22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is inexact, it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the criterion of truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n. _Iudicium_: the constant translation of κριτηριον, a word foreign to the older philosophy. _Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with his pet MS. writes _esse rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before and after, so that there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam censebant ... tale quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus translated by Cic., _Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius modi_ (αει κατα ταυτα εχουσης cf. 28 A. το κατα ταυτα εχον) _et sui simile_, cf. also _T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper tale sit quale sit, quam_ ιδεαν _appellat ille, nos speciem_, and _Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ ιδεαν, etc.: there is more than one difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to exclude Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic tractabatur ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of ιδεαι, and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's ιδεαι and Aristotle's τα καθαλου would naturally seem microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato has, however, probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more cautious step.

§31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull, reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 9, τα ‛υποπιπτοντα τη αισθησει. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.: this strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For _constans_ cf. εστηκος, which so often occurs there and in the _Sophistes_. _Ne idem_: Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_, Heraclitus' theory of flux is carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even the word εμε is stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas the subject is changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore ought to be τους εμε. _Continenter_: ουνεχως; cf. Simplicius quoted in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, εν μεταβολη γαρ συνεχει τα οντα. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases ‛ροη, παντα ‛ρει, ‛οιον ‛ρευματα κινεισθαι τα παντα, etc., which are scattered thickly over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a very similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: δοξαστην, so _opinabile_ = δοξαστον in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely used by Xenocrates (R. and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between the δοξαστον and the επιστητον, e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33 (qu. R. and P. 264).

§32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for _motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation for εννοια, which is Stoic. This statement might have been made both by Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on the word _notio_. Επιστημη in Plato is of the ιδεαι only, while in Aristotle it is τον καθολου; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R. and P. 264), λεγω νουν αρχην επιστημης. _Definitiones rerum_: these must be carefully distinguished fiom _definitiones nominum_, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and P. 265, note b. The _definitio rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to Aristotle from the passages quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as clear as it can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_: this is quite a different thing from those _definitiones nominum_ just referred to; it is _derivation_, which does not necessitate definition. ετυμολογιαν: this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek Prose, as are ετυμος and all its derivatives. (Ετυμως means "etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The word ετυμολογια is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather ονοματων ορθοτης (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of their books on the subject preserved by Diog. is generally "περι των ετυμολογικων" The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had given the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic etymology are given in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62 _in enodandis nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in _Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation _veriloquium_ of ετυμολογια and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_ (Greek συμβολον) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro translated ετυμολογια by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28). Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology, and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for _notas ducibus_, the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of etymology, and not for particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74) describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for _notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_ in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I conclude this wearisome note. The _quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of συμβολον. Davies therefore ought not to have placed it before _ducibus_, which word, strong as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance in _T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for _in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to 30 _pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in ea parte in qua_) is violent, while Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj. _in quo_, Cic. does often use the neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf. _huic_ below). _Dialecticae_: as λογικη had not been Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word to denote λογικη, of which διαλεκτικη is really one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, ‛ρητορικη which is mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70. _Orationis ratione conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which becomes _oratio perpetua_ under the influence of ‛ρητορικη. _Quasi ex altera parte_: a trans. of Aristotle's αντιστροφος in the beginning of the _Rhetoric_. _Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf. however a close parallel in _Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive (_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_ being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_: το πιθανον is with Arist. and all ancient authorities the one aim of ‛ρητορικη.

§§33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the ιδεαι of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_ to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes, some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_ belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things _preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_ of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40). Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41). _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect wisdom (42).

§33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_, comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for _disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase _disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's _Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf. _et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_: "system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded. _Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of the relation in which Plato's ιδεαι stand to his notion of the deity. _Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._ 161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq., _T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in 22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of ευδαιμονιαν. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does not elsewhere employ them.

§34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the αγαθον. _Diligenter ... tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, cf. Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P. _Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ... Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, συμφοιτωντες παρα Πολεμωνι εφιλο τιμηθησαν. Dates are against the theory, see Zeller 500.

§35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl. missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl. _partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in _Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III. 83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._ 135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right). Plato uses νευρα εκτεμνειν metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but _poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS. _quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_" with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.

§36. _Cetera_: Stoic αδιαφορα, the presence or absence of which cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being called either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great battle grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ... contraria_: Gr. κατα φυσιν, παρα φυσιν. _His ipsis ... numerabat_: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words _quae minoris_ below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm). The word _media_ is the Gk. μεσα, which word however is not usually applied to _things_, but to _actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. ληπτα. _Aestimatione_: αξια, positive value. _Contraque contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a word to express απαξια (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that passage coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V. 73.

§37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic. appears at first sight to have made the αποπροηγμενα a subdivision of the ληπτα (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads _media_ in the place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the αποπροηγμενα formed a branch of the ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in 36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα, nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae secundum locum obtinent_, προηγμενα _id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα, though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes _fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and _ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these virtues.

I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_ Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and _minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek, _not_ different degrees of αξια (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_ should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (_Adv. Math._ XI. 62--64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (_Pyrrhon. Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα. I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_" (_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ, which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P. 393.) _Recte factum_ = κατορθωμα, _peccatum_ = ‛αμαρτημα, _officium_ = καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ V. 64.

§38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes natura perfectae_, the διανοητικαι αρεται of Arist., could be said to belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are Aristotle's ηθικαι αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and Arist. το μεν ‛ως λογον εχον, το δε επιπειθες λογωι); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name ‛ηγεμονικον (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248, _D.F._ III. _passim_). When the ‛ηγεμονικον was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the _Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless; ‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.

§39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object; cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the _De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. _Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189, 190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι, (Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp. 134, 135.

§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum_, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44 _e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav. _punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say. Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_ probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = συγκαταθεσιν. _In nobis positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is involuntary (ακουσιον Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as _involuntary,_ while the καταληπτικη φαντασια _compels_ assent (see II. 38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.

§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. _Declarationem_: εναργειαν, a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the _things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_: this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_. Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity _Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus answers as in 14, 25, 33. Καταληπτον: strictly the _thing_ which emits the _visum_ is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. _Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. _Quae manu prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.

§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. _Soli_: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk. word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic εννοιαι; Zeller 81--84, R. and P. 367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. _Non principia solum_: there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof. (See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's _Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's _Aristotle._) Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see _M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant. _Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._ III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The _firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the _sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In his constitit_: cf. II. 134.

§§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy. Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (46).

§43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_. This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15, _aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from Cic.

§44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II. 14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.) was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ... idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107. _Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada vitai tradunt_, etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. 32. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_: νομω of Democritus, see R. and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance. _Deinceps omnia_: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read _denique_ for _deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm. _Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this because of _dixerunt_ above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often thus repeated by Cic.

§45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_ though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II. 122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. επεχειν, which we shall have to explain in the _Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see II. 66, note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria momenta_: this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility of the _probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II. 124, for the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of Arcesilas, ειναι γαρ παντα ακαταληπτα και τους εις εκατερα λογους ισοκρατεις αλληλοις, Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 ισοσθενεις λογοι; in the latter writer the word ισοσθενεια very frequently occurs in the same sense, e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10, _rationis momenta_)

§46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 τον Πλατωνα οιν ‛οι μεν δογματικον εφασαν ειναι, ‛οι δε απο ητικον, ‛οι δε κατα μεν τι απορητικον, κατα δε τι δογματικον. Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; Πλατων πολυφωνος ων, ουχ ‛ως τινες οιονται πολυδοξος. _Exposuisti_: Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_. _Zenone_: see Introd. p. 5.

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NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.