Part 9

_Id._... A. Dumas fils speaks of “les femmes, ces éternelles mineures des religions et des codes;” and of “les arguments à l’aide desquels l’Eglise veut mettre les femmes de son côté”; and shows as the effect that “Il y a des femmes honnêtes, esclaves du devoir, pieuses. Leur religion leur a enseigné le sacrifice. Non seulement elles ne se plaignent pas des épreuves à traverser mais elles les appellent pour mériter encore plus la récompense promise, et elles les bénissent quand elles viennent. Tout arrive, pour elles, par la volonté de Dieu, et tout est comme il doit être dans cette vallée des larmes, chemin de l’éternité bienheureuse.... D’ailleurs elles ne lisent ni les journaux, ni les livres où il est question de ces choses-là; cette lecture leur est interdite. Si, par hasard, elles avaient connaissance de pareilles idées, ... elles en rougiraient, elles en souffriraient pour leur sexe, et elles prieraient pour celles qui se laissent aller à propager de si dangereuses erreurs et à donner de si déplorables exemples.... Mais, pas plus que le bonheur, la ruse, l’ignorance, la misère et la servitude, la foi aveugle, l’extase, et l’immobilité volontaire de l’esprit ne sont des arguments sans réplique.”—(“Les Femmes qui Tuent,” &c., pp. 10, 91, 103.)

The evil which Dumas points out is common to all religions, of whatever race or make; the hall-mark of every creed, from Confucianism to Comtism, has been the subjection of woman, under the affectation of advocating her highest interests. The pious compound has usually been altered to meet the growing intellectual requirements of common-sense and justice and humanity, and hence the precepts of religion as to feminine conduct have by no means always lain in such lines as the multitude in our modern Western civilisation still enjoins on women. No more than the whole and universal attitude of religion, ancient or modern, as regards woman, is exposed or expressed in the following recapitulation of present or historic facts:—“It is not the chastity of women, as we understand it, but her subjection, that Japanese morality requires. The woman is a thing possessed, and her immorality consists simply in disposing freely of herself.

“As regards prostitution, Brahmanic India is scarcely more scrupulous than Japan, and there again we find religious prostitution practised in the temples, analogous to that which in ancient Greece was practised at Cyprus, Corinth, Miletus, Tenedos, Lesbos, Abydos, &c. (Lecky, ‘History of European Morals,’ Vol. I., p. 103). According to the legend, the Buddha himself, Sakyamouni, when visiting the famous Indian town of Vasali, was received there by the great mistress of the courtesans. (Mrs. Spier, ‘Life in Ancient India,’ p. 28).”—Letourneau (“The Evolution of Marriage,” Chap. X.).

The enforcement, or commendation, or acceptance of the practice of prostitution, with its profanation of the dignity and individuality of woman, and its utter carelessness and disregard for either her physical or intellectual well-being, is indubitable evidence of the man-made (_i.e._, male) origin of such a scheme of religion or ethics or economics. For, as Mrs. Eliza W. Farnham truly remarks:—“If a doubt yet remains on the mind of any reader that I have stated truly the part of the masculine as cause in this terrible phenomenon, let it be considered how man has always introduced prostitution in every country that he has visited, and every island of the sea. Does anyone believe, for example, that if the voyages of discovery and trade had been made by women instead of men, to the islands of the Pacific, this scourge would have been left as the testimony of their visit, so that, in a few generations, the populations native there would have fallen a literal sacrifice to their sensuality, as they are actually falling to man’s at this day? There is no comment needed on the illustration, I am sure. The common sense of every reader will furnish the best comment and answer the question correctly.”—(“Woman and Her Era,” Vol. II., p. 299.)

_Id._... Lastly, but most convincingly, as to the wilful and intentional degradation and subjugation of woman by the teaching and rites of religion, let it be noted that, among the Jews, the very fact of being a woman is made a disgrace; and woman, the mother of the human race, is insulted accordingly. In the morning synagogue service of prayer, directly after unitedly blessing “Adonai,” for bestowing on the barn-door fowl the power to distinguish between night and day, and for not having created the worshippers present heathens or slaves, each member of the male portion of the congregation thanks the same Adonai “that Thou hast not fashioned me as a woman,” while each member of the segregated female portion of the company is instructed to submissively give thanks “that Thou hast fashioned me after Thine own pleasure.” The male thanks for not being heathens seem, under the circumstances, conspicuously premature.—(See “Ohel Jakob,” _i.e._, “Jacob’s Temple,” the “Daily Prayer of the Israelites,” Fraenkel’s ed., Berlin.)

That the spirit of this Mosaic or Hebrew sexual teaching, with its incongruous assertions and inferences, has communicated itself deeply to Christianity, may be observed from such passages as 1 Tim. ii. 13, 14; 1 Cor. vii., 9; Eph. v. 24; Col. iii. 18; 1 Pet. iii. 1, 5; and many others.

_Id._... Buckle quotes from “Fergusson on the Epistles,” 1656, p. 242:—“The great and main duty which a wife, as a wife, ought to learn, and so learn as to practice it, is to be subject to her own husband.” (See also Note XVII., 8.) And Buckle further cites, from “Fox’s Journal,” “After the middle of the seventeenth century the Quakers set up ‘women’s’ meetings, to the disgust of many, and (query, because) in the teeth of St. Paul’s opinion.”—(“Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works,” Vol. I., pp. 375, 384.)

_Id._... As already said, the “sanctimonious” claim of “woman’s duty” runs through all religions. Here, for instance, is what is reported in a leader of the _Manchester Guardian_ of August 15th, 1892:—

“In this country no one would place suicide in the ranks of the virtues. Here it is a crime, but in China under certain circumstances it is regarded as an act of heroism and devotion worthy of sympathy and of national recognition. Thus the Governor of Shansi forwarded to the Emperor of China a memorial setting forth the virtues as daughter and wife of a lady in that province. She was of good family, both her father and grandfather having been officials in the district. At the age of ten she showed her love for her mother in a peculiarly Chinese fashion. One of the Celestial beliefs is that medicine acquires efficacy by having mingled with it some human flesh, and the little girl cut some from her own body to be used for the purpose of curing an illness which threatened her mother’s life. In 1890 she was married to an ‘expectant magistrate,’ whose expectations were realised by his appointment last autumn to a judicial post. What she had, as a good daughter, done for her mother, she, as a good wife, did also for her husband, who fell ill; but her remedy was inefficacious, and he died. She was now in a position which, according to the Chinese code of ethics, has no responsibilities for a woman. Without parents, husband, or children to demand her affectionate care, she decided to commit suicide, and apparently not only communicated her intentions to those around her, but had their sympathy and support in her decision. We are told that, “only waiting till she had completed the arrangements for her husband’s interment, she swallowed gold and powder of lead. She handed her _trousseau_ to her relations to defray her funeral expenses, and made presents to the younger members of the family and the servants, after which, draped in her state robes, she sat waiting her end. The poison began to work, and soon all was over.” The story of a distracted wife seeking refuge in death from the sorrows of widowhood might doubtless be told of any country in Europe, but the sequel is possible only in China. The Governor of Shansi, struck with the courage of the lady in what he evidently regards as a very proper though somewhat unusual exhibition of conjugal affection, asks in his memorial that the virtuous life and death of the lady may be duly commemorated. The prayer of the memorial has been granted by the Emperor and a memorial arch is to be erected in honour of the suicide.”

8.—“... _this reasoned day_ ...”

See Note XVII., 8.

XXXVI.

1.—“_By cant condoned_ ...”

“Much has been said by Guizot on the influence of women in developing European civilisation. It is at least certain that several of the fathers did everything they could to diminish that influence. Tertullian bitterly complains of the insolence of women who venture to teach and to baptise. He allows that in case of necessity baptism may be administered by a layman, but never by a woman. Again, among the other crimes of the heretics he particularly enumerates the insolence of their women, who ventured to teach, to dispute, &c., &c. In ‘De Cult. Faem,’ lib. I. Cap. I., he says: ‘Let women remember that they are of the sex of Eve, who ruined mankind, and let them therefore repair this ignominy by living rather in dust than in splendour.’”—Buckle (“Common-Place Book,” Note 1870).

_Id._—“... _man fashioned woman’s ‘sphere_.’”

“We deny the right of any portion of the species to decide for another portion, or any individual for another individual, what is, and what is not, ‘their proper sphere.’ The proper sphere for all human beings is the largest and highest which they are able to attain to. What this is, cannot be ascertained without complete liberty of choice.”—Mrs. Harriet Mill (“Enfranchisement of Women,” _Westminster Review_, July 1851).

6.—“... _civil law_ ...”

For example of this let us look at the law of our own country in even recent times. Blackstone says:—“The husband (by the old law) might give his wife moderate correction.... But this power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds, and the husband was prohibited from using any violence to his wife, _aliter quam ad virum ex causa regiminis et castigationis uxoris suæ licite et rationabiliter pertinet_ (_i.e._, otherwise than to a man for the ruling and punishment of his wife, lawfully and reasonably pertains). The civil law gave the husband the same or a larger authority over his wife, allowing him for some misdemeanours, _flagellis et fustibus acriter verberare uxorem_ (_i.e._, to severely beat his wife with whips and cudgels), for others, only _modicam castigationem adhibere_ (to administer a moderate chastisement). But with us, in the politer reign of Charles the Second, this power of correction began to be doubted, and a wife may now (_circ._ 1750) have security of peace against her husband; or in return, a husband against his wife. Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old common law,” (query, were the women fond of it?) “still claim and exert their ancient privilege: and the courts of law will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty in case of any gross misbehaviour.” (“Commentaries,” Edward Christian’s Ed., Book I., Chap. XV.)

Such was undoubtedly the generally accepted and not infrequently acted upon assumption; and it is certain that the Courts of Law would, in the event of a wife absenting herself from her husband, order her return to his custody; and would, and did imprison her in default of her compliance. And this state of things continued until—as Mrs. Wolstenholme Elmy records in her history of the celebrated “Clitheroe case”—

“At length, in the year 1891, and, as in the case of the negro Somerset, upon the return to a writ of _habeas corpus_, there have been found judges bold enough and just enough to set aside the ancient saws and maxims, resting mainly upon _obiter dicta_ and loose phrases of previous judges used in reference to hypothetical cases never actually before the Courts, and to declare plainly and straightly that the personal slavery of the wife is no part of the law of England. The actual words of the Lord Chancellor in dealing with the return to the writ are, as reported by the _Times_, March 20th, 1891, as follows:—

“After stating the circumstances of the marriage, the decree, and the refusal of the wife to cohabit, it states: ‘I therefore took my wife, and have since detained her in my house, using no more force or restraint than necessary to take her and keep her.’ That is the return which seeks to justify an admitted imprisonment of this lady. I do not know that I am able to express in sufficiently precise language the difference between ‘confinement’ and ‘imprisonment,’ but if there is any distinction, I can only say that upon these facts I should find an imprisonment, and looking at the return it is put as a broad proposition that the right of the husband, where there has been a wilful absenting of herself by the wife from her husband’s house—that it is his right to seize possession of his wife by force, and detain her in his house until she renders him conjugal rights. That is the proposition of law involved in the return, and I am not prepared to assent to it. The Legislature has expressly deprived the Matrimonial Court of the power of imprisoning the wife for refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and the result of such a system of law, if the husband had the power, would be that whereas the Court had no power to hand the wife over into her husband’s hands, but only to punish her for contempt by imprisonment under the control of the Court, and without any circumstances of injury or insult, and even that power was taken away, the husband might himself of his own motion seize and imprison her until she consented to the restitution of conjugal rights. That is the proposition I am called upon to establish by holding this return to be good. _I am of opinion that no such right or power exists in law. I am of opinion that no such right ever did exist in our law._ Whatever authorities may be quoted for any such proposition, it has always been subject to this condition: that where she has a complaint of, or is apprehensive of, ill-usage, the Court will never interfere to compel her to return to her husband’s custody. Now this brings me to the particular circumstances of this transaction. I am prepared to say that no English subject has a right to imprison another English subject (who is _sui juris_, and entitled to a judgment of his or her own) without any lawful authority, but if there were any qualification of that proposition I should be of opinion that on the facts of this case it would afford an ample justification to any Court for refusing to allow the husband in this case to retain the custody of his wife.

“On these and other grounds the Lord Chancellor declared that the return of the writ was bad, and ordered that the lady be restored to her liberty, the other judges concurring.”—(“The Decision in the Clitheroe Case and its Consequences,” pp. 3, 4.)

Lord Esher was one of the two other Judges, both concurring, who formed the Court of Appeal which granted the writ, and a few days subsequently he gave from his place in the House of Lords the following further statement of his judgment and views:—

“As I was a party to the judgment, which seems to have been more misunderstood than any judgment I recollect, I, perhaps, may be excused from making an observation. It was urged before the Court of Appeal that by the law of England a husband may beat his wife with a stick if she refuses to obey him, and that if a wife refused her husband conjugal rights, whatever that phrase may mean, which I have never been able to make out, he may imprison her until she restores him conjugal rights, or satisfies him that she will. All that the Court of Appeal decided was that a husband cannot by the law of England, if the wife objects, lawfully do either of those things. Those intelligent people who have declared that the judgment is wrong must be prepared to maintain the converse—namely, that if a wife disobeys her husband he may lawfully beat her; and if she refuses him a restitution of conjugal rights he may imprison her, it was urged, in the cellar, or in the cupboard, or, if the house is large, in the house, by locking her in it and blocking the windows. I thought, and still think, that the law does not allow these things....”—(The _Times_, 17th April, 1891.)

Mrs. Wolstenholme Elmy further tells us that:—

“To Lord Selborne the married women of this country owe a further debt of gratitude for his introduction in 1884 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of that session, which put an end to the punishment by imprisonment of the husband or wife who refused to obey the decree of the Court for restitution of conjugal rights. The arguments of Mr. Lankester and Mr. Finlay in the Clitheroe case, based upon this abolition of the power of the Court to imprison for disobedience, are known to everyone. It would be destructive not only to personal freedom, but a gross infraction of justice and common-sense, were a husband to be permitted to exercise on his own behalf and at his own pleasure a prerogative of punishment which had been withdrawn from the Court.

“That this power of imprisonment was not a mere _brutum fulmen_, but a terrible reality in former days, may be learned from a Suffolk case, early in the present century. A wife in contempt of court, a lady of good family in Suffolk, was imprisoned in Ipswich goal for disobeying a decree requiring her to render conjugal rights to her husband. At the end of a year and ten months she became in want of the common necessaries of life, and was reduced to the gaol allowance of bread and water; she suffered from rheumatism and other maladies, which were aggravated by the miseries of her imprisonment; and after many years of such suffering died in prison—for she never went back to her husband.”—(“The Decision in the Clitheroe Case and its Consequences,” p. 9.)

But while the law has thus been needfully amended in England, a further evil effect has meantime supervened in our dependency of India; for this faculty of imprisonment by the Courts for non-compliance with their order in the event specified, which has been abolished in England, seems to be still existent and appealed to in our Indian Courts. (See Note XXII., 2.) The strange thing is that the suit for the restitution of conjugal rights is not a matter of native law, but an inadvertent and apparently entirely unintentional introduction from our English system; the very judges who administer the Indian Law being at a loss to account for its appearance in their practice. One authority, in seeking the solution of the problem, declares that—“Mr. —— ‘could not find any enactment directly establishing suits for the restitution of conjugal rights, and believed there were none; but that they had been recognised in a Stamp Act, and again in the Limitation of Suits Act passed in 1871.’ The material point is that Indian lawgivers have not consciously given this remedy to those who did not possess it before; but that it has slipped into our law without design. Mr. —— thinks ‘That this class of suits was known in the old Supreme Courts, in the Presidency towns, and as between Europeans; and it was not an improper subject of legislation as regards Stamp Duty or Limitation by Time: but being spoken of without qualification was held by the High Courts to be available for all classes of the Indian communities.’ If this theory be true, it accounts in an easy way for a change effected without any intention of the Rulers at all. It is worth enquiry into under this aspect.” Yes, enquiry and rectification hand in hand!

_Id._—“... _and part divine_.”

The fact has been that male lawgivers, in whatever land, have generally asserted for their code of feminine ethics or conduct a divine origin, and have announced the punishment for breach thereof as a divine injunction. In very few instances, indeed, was there any attempt to decree an equal punishment to the male who was partner with the female in a mutual breach of this morality, and very frequently no punishment of the male attached at all; and even in the few cases where such a punishment was nominally threatened, the man’s share in the offence was most generally connived at, and passed unpunished. This double code of morality has a flagrant exemplification in the English Law of Divorce, by which, while a man can procure a Decree of Divorce on the simple ground of the adultery of his wife, a woman cannot obtain a like decree for her husband’s adultery unless that offence be accompanied by such treatment of herself as the Court will recognise as “cruelty,” or with “desertion.” The double scheme of sexual morality, so revoltingly tolerated, in so far as man is concerned, by “society” in the present day is too patent to need further words here. And the repulsive cant is still that, while the man is allowed to go free, the punishment of the woman is due and commendable as in accordance with “divine law.” (See Note XIV., 3.)

XXXVII.

3, 4.—“... _lowest boor is lordly ‘baron’ styled, And highest bride as common ‘feme’ reviled_.”

“... husband and wife; or, as most of our elder law books call them, ‘baron’ and ‘feme.’”—(Blackstone’s “Commentaries,” Bk. I. Chap. 15.)

But the context of the words “baron” and “feme” involved something more than a mere _façon de parler_ of the law books. Edward Christian says, in Note 23 to the Chapter in “Blackstone” above quoted:—“Husband and wife, in the language of the law, are styled _baron_ and _feme_; the word baron, or lord, attributes to the husband not a very courteous superiority. But we might be inclined to think this merely an unmeaning technical phrase, if we did not recollect, that if the baron kills his feme it is the same as if he had killed a stranger or any other person; but if the feme kills her baron it is regarded by the laws as a much more atrocious crime, as she not only breaks through the restraints of humanity and conjugal affection, but throws off all subjection to the authority of her husband. And, therefore, the law denominates her crime a species of treason, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she had killed the king. And for every species of treason (though in petit treason the punishment of men was only to be drawn and hanged), till the 30 Geo. III., Chap. 48, the sentence of woman was to be drawn and burnt alive.”

And Mr. Courtney Kenny says, on the same point, that the English Law of Marriage in the twelfth century had “clothed the humblest husband with more than the authority of a feudal lord, and merged his wife’s legal existence altogether in his own.”—(“History of the Law of Married Women’s Property,” p. 8.)

And he exemplifies the position of the “feme” as being accurately depicted in the words of Petruchio:—

“I will be master of what is mine own, She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house, My household stuff, my field, my barn, My horse, my ox, my ass, my anything.” —(“The Taming of the Shrew,” Act III., scene 2.)

The picture of the past masculine proprietorship and “bullyism” is scarcely overdrawn. Ere a distant day Englishmen will shudder in reflecting on the male creatures who were their progenitors.

5, 6.—“_The tardier fear that grants the clown a share In his own governance, denies it her._”