Chapter 26
"Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German Government was invited by the Governments of France and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to put an end to the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I said that so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a Sea Power like England. Posterity will one day read the exact terms of the telegram--now in the archives of Windsor Castle--in which I informed the Sovereign of England of the answer I had returned to the Powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their adversity.
"Nor was that all. Just at the time of your Black Week, in the December of 1899, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction, and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. Nay, I did more. I bade one of my officers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants in South Africa on both sides, and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With the figures before me, I worked out what I considered to be the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then I dispatched it to England, and that document, likewise, is among the State papers at Windsor Castle, awaiting the serenely impartial verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coincidence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts, and carried by him into successful operation. Was that, I repeat, the act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say!
"But, you will say, what of the German navy? Surely that is a menace to England! Against whom but England are my squadrons being prepared? If England is not in the minds of those Germans who are bent on creating a powerful fleet, why is Germany asked to consent to such new and heavy burdens of taxation? My answer is clear. Germany is a young and growing Empire. She has a world-wide commerce, which is rapidly expanding, and to which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have a powerful fleet to protect that commerce, and her manifold interests in even the most distant seas. She expects those interests to go on growing, and she must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Germany looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared for any eventualities in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take place in the Pacific in the days to come--days not so distant as some believe, but days, at any rate, for which all European Powers with Far Eastern interests ought steadily to prepare? Look at the accomplished rise of Japan; think of the possible national awakening of China; and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only those Powers which have great navies will be listened to with respect when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved; and if for that reason only Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak together on the same side in the great debates of the future."
Such was the purport of the Emperor's conversation. He spoke with all that earnestness which marks his manner when speaking on deeply pondered subjects. I would ask my fellow-countrymen who value the cause of peace to weigh what I have written, and to revise, if necessary, their estimate of the Kaiser and his friendship for England by his Majesty's own words. If they had enjoyed the privilege, which was mine, of hearing them spoken, they would doubt no longer either his Majesty's firm desire to live on the best of terms with England or his growing impatience at the persistent mistrust with which his offer of friendship is too often received.
There are more indiscretions than one in the interview, but the most important and most dangerous was the Emperor's statement that at the time of the Boer War the Governments of France and Russia invited the German Government to join with them "not only to save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust." Such a revelation coming from the Emperor ought, one would suppose, to have caused serious trouble between Great Britain and her Entente friends. That it did not is at once testimony to the cynicism of Governments and the reality and strength of the Entente engagement. In private life, if a fourth person confidentially told one of the three partners in a firm that the other two partners had invited him to join them in humiliating him to the dust, there would have been a pretty brisk, not to say acrimonious correspondence between the proposed victim and his partners. Governments, it appears, look on things differently, and so far as the public knows, England simply took no notice of the Emperor's communication. Possibly, however, the Emperor had put the matter too strongly and an explanation of some kind was forthcoming. If so, it must be looked for among the secret archives of the Foreign Office. It was at once suggested that the Emperor made the revelation expressly to weaken, if not destroy, the Entente. One can conceive Bismarck doing such a thing; but it is more in keeping with the Emperor's character, and with the indiscreet character of the entire interview, to suppose it to be a proof of deplorable candour and sincerity.
The excitement in Germany caused by the publication of the interview soon took the shape of a determination on the part of the Chancellor and the Federal Council, for once fully identifying themselves with the feelings of Parliament, Press, and people, that "something must be done," and it was decided that the Chancellor should go to Potsdam, see the Emperor, and try to obtain from him a promise to be more cautious in his utterances on political topics for the future. The Chancellor went accordingly, being seen off from the railway terminus in Berlin by a large crowd of people, among whom were many journalists. To Dr. Paul Goldmann, who wished him God-speed, he could only reply that he hoped all would be for the best. He looked pale and grave, as well he might, since he was about to stake his own position as well as convey a mandate of national reproach.
What passed at Potsdam between the Emperor and his Chancellor has not transpired. Naturally there are various accounts of it, one of them representing the Emperor as flying into a passion and for long refusing to give the required guarantees; but as yet none of them has been authenticated. It should not be difficult to imagine the mental attitudes of the two men on the occasion, and especially not difficult to imagine the sensations of the Emperor, a Prussian King, on being impeached by a people--his people--for whom, his feeling would be, he had done so much, and in whose best interests he felt convinced he had acted; but whatever occurred, it ended in the Emperor bowing before the storm and giving the assurances required.
The Chancellor's countenance and expressions on his return to Berlin showed that his mission had been successful, and there was great satisfaction in the capital and country. The text of these assurances, which was published in the _Official Gazette_ the same evening, was as follows:
"His Majesty, while unaffected by public criticism which he regards as exaggerated, considers his most honourable imperial task to consist in securing the stability of the policy of the Empire while adhering to the principle of constitutional responsibility. The Kaiser accordingly endorses the statements of the Imperial Chancellor in Parliament, and assures Prince von Bülow of his continued confidence."
After returning to Berlin, Prince Bülow gave in the Reichstag his impatiently awaited account of the result of his mission, and made what defence he could of his imperial master's action in allowing the famous interview to be published. Before giving the speech, which was delivered on November 10, 1908, it will be as well to quote the five interpellations introduced in Parliament on the subject, as showing the unanimity of feeling that existed in all parts of the House:--
1. By Deputy Bassermann (leader of the National Liberals):
"Is the Chancellor prepared to take constitutional responsibility for the publication of a series of utterances of his Majesty the Kaiser in the _Daily Telegraph_ and the facts communicated therein?"
2. By Deputy Dr. Ablass (Progressive Party):
"Through the publication of utterances of the German Kaiser in the _Daily Telegraph_, and through the communication of the real facts in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ caused by the Chancellor, matters have become known which demonstrate serious short-comings in the treatment of foreign affairs, and are calculated to influence unfavourably the relations of the German Empire to other Powers. What does the Chancellor propose to do to devise a remedy and to give full effect to the responsibility attributed to him by the Constitution of the German Empire?"
3. By Deputy Albrecht (Socialist):
"What is the Chancellor prepared to do to prevent such occurrences as have become known through the _Daily Telegraph's_ communications regarding acts and utterances of the German Kaiser?"
4. By Deputy von Norman (Conservative Party):
"Is the Chancellor prepared to submit further information regarding the circumstances which led to the publication of utterances of his Majesty the Kaiser in the English Press?"
5. By Prince von Hatzfeldt and Freiherr von Gamp (Imperial Party--Conservative):
"Is the Chancellor willing to take precautions that such occurrences as that brought to light by the publication in the _Daily Telegraph_ shall not recur?"
In reply to the interpellations Prince von Bülow said:--
"Gentlemen, I shall not apply myself to every point which has just been raised by previous speakers. I have to consider the effect of my words abroad, and will not add to the great harm already caused by the publication in the _Daily Telegraph_ (hear, hear, on the Left and Socialists).
"In reply to the interpellations submitted, I have to declare as follows:--
"His Majesty the Kaiser has at different times, and to different private English personalities, made private utterances which, linked together, have been published in the _Daily Telegraph_. I must suppose that not all details of the utterances have been correctly reproduced (hear, hear, on the Right). One I know is not correct: that is the story about the plan of campaign (hear, hear, on the right). The plan in question was not a field campaign worked out in detail, but a purely academic (laughter among the Socialists)--Gentlemen, we are engaged in a serious discussion. The matters on which I speak are of an earnest kind and of great political importance--be good enough to listen to me quietly: I will be as brief as possible. I repeat therefore: the matter is not concerned with a field campaign worked out in detail, but with certain purely academic thoughts--I believe they were expressly described as 'aphorisms'--about the conduct of war in general, which the Kaiser communicated in his interchange of correspondence with the late Queen Victoria. They are theoretical observations of no practical moment for the course of operations and the issue of the war. The chief of the General Staff, General von Moltke, and his predecessor, General Count Schlieffen, have declared that the General Staff reported to the Kaiser on the Boer War as on every war, great or small, which has occurred on the earth during the last ten years. Both, however, have given assurances that our General Staff never examined a field plan of campaign, or anything similar, prepared by the Kaiser in view of the Boer War, or forwarded such to England (hear, hear, on the Right and Centre). But I must also defend our policy against the reproach of being ambiguous _vis-à-vis_ the Boers. We had--the documents show it--given timely warning to the Transvaal Government. We called its attention to the fact that in case of a war with England it would stand alone. We put it to her directly, and through the friendly Dutch Government in May, 1899, peacefully to come to an understanding with England, since there could be no doubt as to the result of a war.
"In the question of intervention the colours in the article of the _Daily Telegraph_ are too thickly laid on. The thing itself had long been known (hear, hear). It was some time previously the subject of controversy between the _National Review_ and the _Deutsche Revue_. There can be no talk of a 'revelation.' It was said that the imperial communication to the Queen of England, that Germany had not paid any attention to a suggestion for mediation or intervention, is a breach of the rules of diplomatic intercourse. Gentlemen, I will not recall indiscretions to memory, for they are frequent in the diplomatic history of all nations and at all times ('Quite right,' on the Right). The safest policy is perhaps that which need fear no indiscretion ('Quite right,' on the Left). To pass judgment in particular cases as to whether or not a breach of confidence has occurred, one must know more of the closely connected circumstances than appears in the article of the _Daily Telegraph_. The communication might be justified if it were attempted in one quarter or another to misrepresent our refusal or to throw suspicion on our attitude; circumstances may have previously happened which make allusion to the subject in a confidential correspondence at least intelligible. Gentlemen, I said before that many of the expressions used in the _Daily Telegraph_ article are too strong. That is true, in the first place, of the passage where the Kaiser is represented as having said that the majority of the German people are inimically disposed towards England. Between Germany and England misunderstandings have occurred, serious, regrettable misunderstandings. But I am conscious of being at one with this entire honourable House in the view that the German people desire peaceful and friendly relations with England on the basis of mutual esteem (loud and general applause)--and I take note that the speakers of all parties have spoken to-day in the same sense ('Quite right'). The colours are also too thickly laid on in the place where reference is made to our interests in the Pacific Ocean. It has been construed in a sense hostile to Japan. Wrongly: we have never in the Far East thought of anything but this--to acquire and maintain for Germany a share of the commerce of Eastern Asia in view of the great economic future of this region. We are not thinking of maritime adventure there: aggressive tendencies have as little to say to our naval construction in the Pacific as in Europe. Moreover, his Majesty the Kaiser entirely agrees with the responsible director of foreign policy in the complete recognition of the high political importance which the Japanese people have achieved by their political strength and military ability. German policy does not regard it as its task to detract from the enjoyment and development of what Japan has acquired.
"Gentlemen, I am, generally speaking, under the impression that if the material facts--completely, in their proper shape--were individually known, the sensation would be no great one; in this instance, too, the whole is more than all the parts taken together. But above all, gentlemen, one must not, while considering the material things, quite forget the psychology, the tendency. For two decades our Kaiser has striven, often under very difficult circumstances, to bring about friendly relations between Germany and England. This honest endeavour has had to contend with obstacles which would have discouraged many. The passionate partisanship of our people for the Boers was humanly intelligible; feeling for the weaker certainly appeals to the sympathy. But this partisanship has led to unjustified, and often unmeasured, attacks on England, and similarly unjust and hateful attacks have been made against Germany from the side of the English. Our aims were misconstrued, and hostile plans against England were foisted on us which we had never thought of. The Kaiser, rightly convinced that this state of things was a calamity for both countries and a danger for the civilized world, kept undeviatingly on the course he had adopted. The Kaiser is particularly wronged by any doubt as to the purity of his intentions, his ideal way of thinking, and his deep love of country.
"Gentlemen, let us avoid anything that looks like exaggerated seeking for foreign favour, anything that looks like uncertainty or obsequiousness. But I understand that the Kaiser, precisely because he was anxious to work zealously and honestly for good relationship with England, felt embittered at being ever the object of attacks casting suspicion on his best motives. Has one not gone so far as to attribute to his interest in the German fleet secret views against vital English interests--views which are far from him. And so in private conversation with English friends he sought to bring the proof, by pointing to his conduct, that in England he was misunderstood and wrongly judged.
"Gentlemen, the perception that the publication of these conversations in England has not had the effect the Kaiser wished, and in our own country has caused profound agitation and painful regret, will--this firm conviction I have acquired during these anxious days--lead the Kaiser for the future, in private conversation also, to maintain the reserve that is equally indispensable in the interest of a uniform policy and for the authority of the Crown ('Bravo!' on the Right).
"If it were not so, I could not, nor could my successor, bear the responsibility ('Bravo!' on the Right and National Liberals).
"For the fault which occurred in dealing with the manuscript I accept, as I have caused to be said in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, entire responsibility. It also goes against my personal feelings that officials who have done their duty all their lives should be stamped as transgressors because, in a single case, they relied too much on the fact that I usually read and finally decide everything myself.
"With Herr von Heydebrand I regret that in the mechanism of the Foreign Office, which for eleven years has worked smoothly under me, a defect should on one occasion occur. I will answer for it that such a thing does not happen again, and that with this object, without respect to persons, though also without injustice, what is needful will be done ('Bravo!').
"When the article in the _Daily Telegraph_ appeared, its fateful effect could not for a moment be doubtful to me, and I handed in my resignation. This decision was unavoidable, and was not difficult to come to. The most serious and most difficult decision which I ever took in my political life was, in obedience to the Kaiser's wish, to remain in office. I brought myself to this decision only because I saw in it a command of my political duty, precisely in the time of trouble, to continue to serve his Majesty the Kaiser and the country (repeated 'Bravo!'). How long that will be possible for me, I cannot say.
"Let me say one thing more: at a moment when the fact that in the world much is once again changing requires serious attention to be given to the entire situation, wherever it is matter of concern to maintain our position abroad, and without pushing ourselves forward with quiet constancy to make good our interests--at such a moment we ought not to show ourselves small-spirited in foreign eyes, nor make out of a misfortune a catastrophe. I will refrain from all criticism of the exaggerations we have lived through during these last days. The harm is--as calm reflection will show--not so great that it cannot with circumspection be made good. Certainly no one should forget the warning which the events of these days has given us ('Bravo!')--but there is no reason to lose our heads and awake in our opponents the hope that the Empire, inwardly or outwardly, is maimed.
"It is for the chosen representatives of the nation to exhibit the prudence which the time demands. I do not say it for myself, I say it for the country: the support required for this is no favour, it is a duty which this honourable House will not evade (loud applause on the Right, hisses from the Socialists)."
Prince Bülow's speech requires but little comment--its importance for Germany is the fact that it brought to a head the country's feeling, that if the Emperor's unlimited and unrestrained idea of his heaven-sent mission as sole arbiter of the nation's destinies was not checked, disaster must ensue. The speech itself is rather an apology and an explanation than a defence, and in this spirit it was accepted in Germany. It is fair to say that the Emperor has faithfully kept the engagement made through Prince Bülow with his people so far, and unless human nature is incurable there seems no reason why he should not keep it to the end of the reign. More than four years have passed since the incidents narrated occurred. The storm has blown over, the sea of popular indignation has gone down, and at present no cloud is visible on the horizon.