CHAPTER V.

GRADUAL DECLINE OF RIOTOUS DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE ABOLITIONISTS.--CHANGES OCCUR IN THE DOCTRINES AND METHODS OF THE AMERICAN ANTISLAVERY SOCIETY.--JUDGE JAY RESIGNS HIS MEMBERSHIP, WHILE CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF EMANCIPATION.

The effort to suppress the antislavery movement by force, which was carried on by Northern people at the instigation of the South, continued through the years 1837 and 1838. The incidents which attracted the most attention were the murder of Lovejoy at Alton and the burning of Pennsylvania Hall in Philadelphia by a mob. By assassination and arson a considerable portion of the American people sought to destroy the right to free speech and free assemblage guaranteed by the American Constitution and cherished hitherto as a birthright. The right of free discussion, wrote Alexander H. Everett at the time, "is not only endangered, but for the present, at least, is actually lost." "The newspapers of every day," he continued, "bring to our view the account of some new case in which a printing-press has been seized and thrown into the river; a public meeting broken up; a citizen tarred and feathered, scourged--too often, I add with horror, put to a violent death by a lawless mob for no other cause or crime than the free discussion of the subject of slavery." The impunity with which these crimes were committed, the connivance or leniency of the authorities whose sworn duty it was to uphold the laws, made this time a critical one for the security of American liberties. In pursuing their lawful course undaunted through this "reign of terror," when so large a portion of their fellow-countrymen seemed to have forgotten the obligations of citizens to established law, the abolitionists not only maintained the existence of their cause, but they preserved those rights which Americans value above all others. That free speech continued to exist in the United States was duo to their indomitable courage. Such a state of affairs could not endure long. Lawless feeling exhausted itself in fruitless violence. Antislavery societies increased in numbers and membership. Comparative order and toleration gradually displaced the disgraceful passions which had placed the liberties of the country in hazard.

As opposition diminished and their path became easier, abolitionists began to differ among themselves as to the best means to attain their ends and as to the fundamental principles of their cause. In New York State a tendency was developed, under the leadership of Gerrit Smith, to adopt political methods. In Boston moral agitation remained the accepted means. But here novel theories on other subjects were being adopted by leading antislavery people and thus associated in the public mind with antislavery itself. Garrison adopted and recommended in the _Liberator_ his no-government and non-resistance doctrines. He put forth new and not generally accepted views regarding the observance of Sunday. He took pains to declare that he adopted these theories in his private capacity, and not as an abolitionist. But he had many followers who did not discriminate so carefully. The public mind became confused and began to associate abolitionism with a variety of novel and unpopular opinions. The cause was thus obstructed and divisions occurred among those who laboured for the emancipation of the negro. Up to this time women had not taken part in public meetings, and to many persons the idea of their doing so was repugnant. The admission of women to membership and office in the same societies as men was determined in Boston in 1838, after a struggle and amidst much objection.

"I have observed," wrote Jay in a private letter in 1838, "frequent attempts to use abolition as a pack-horse to carry forth into the world some favourite notion having no legitimate connection with the antislavery cause; and have witnessed the dissensions caused in our ranks by such inconsiderate and dishonest assumptions. Thus I have known an official document, under the signature of a secretary of a State society, pass a high eulogium on a particular form of Church government; and I have seen an editorial article in an official antislavery periodical recommending a decoction of dried currants as a substitute for the fermented juice of the grape in the observance of the Lord's Supper! All such perversions of antislavery influence appear to me to be dishonest in their character, and dangerous in their consequences to the continuance and efficiency of our organization. No one is more strenuous than myself for the right of opinion and discussion; but common justice and fairness require that we should not make others responsible for our peculiar opinions, nor seek to propagate them by means entrusted to us for very different purposes.

"The practice of passing numerous resolutions at our antislavery meetings strikes me as a growing and pernicious evil. Too many seem to think that all our objects are to be effected by resolutions; and amid the vast multitude that are proposed and adopted with little reflection, it is not surprising, yet deeply to be deplored, that some are false _in fact_, more false in sentiment, and very many coarse and vulgar in expression. Falsehood is not the less immoral for being employed in a good cause, and it is very unwise to impair the charms of Truth by arraying her in vulgar attire. It is to be wished that our meetings may in future be less prodigal of their resolutions, and more circumspect as to the matter and language."

Judge Jay looked with dismay upon the novel doctrines on other subjects which were becoming associated with antislavery in the public mind. He deplored the loss of strength which must result from a departure from the singleness of purpose announced in the declaration of principles at the founding of the American Antislavery Society. And there were differences of opinion arising on the fundamental principles of the cause which troubled him still more. As has been shown in these pages, he had joined the American Antislavery Society only after a deliberate examination of its constitution and the conviction that its principles were in strict accordance with the Constitution of the United States. He was as strong an advocate of emancipation as lived, but to him the Constitution was the supreme law under which all benefits could be and must be obtained. Efforts to seek the abolition of slavery by arguments or conduct in violation of the Constitution seemed to him wicked in themselves and fatal to the cause. Such efforts he had now to combat.

At the sixth anniversary of the Massachusetts Antislavery Society, held in January, 1838, the business committee, composed of Messrs. Garrison, Phelps, May, and Fairbanks, reported the following resolution:

"_Resolved_, That in order to bring our coloured friends within the brotherhood of this nation, we will encourage them in petitioning to Congress, in their own names, for the redress of their grievances, and, if not successful, then we will lend them our aid in bringing their cause before the court of the United States to ascertain if a man can be held in bondage agreeably to the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of our country."

Judge Jay wrote a letter to Mr. Ellis Gray Loring, March 5th, asking for more definite information as to the true intent of the society in passing the resolution.

"Who are the _coloured friends_ alluded to?" he asked. "Obviously _slaves_, because if Congress does not redress their grievances, then the society is to lead them into the court of the United States to ascertain whether a man can be held in _bondage_.

"What grievances are the slaves, under the encouragement of the society, to petition Congress to redress? Obviously those they suffer as slaves, because if Congress does not redress them, redress is to be sought in the court, by demanding if a man can be held in _bondage_, that is, as a slave.

"What slaves are intended by the resolution? No qualification or limitation whatever is expressed or implied. The Society, no doubt, recognizes the slaves of Georgia as its coloured friends as well as the slaves of the District of Columbia. The resolution is the tenth of a series of resolutions reported by the committee, and in none of them is any mention made of the District of Columbia, and, moreover, the question to be decided by the court is not whether an inhabitant of the District can be held as a slave, but whether a man can be held in bondage agreeably to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of our country, and the tribunal to decide this question is not the court of the District but the court of the United States.

"Members of Congress take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. If, therefore, the society believe the Constitution does not authorize Congress to redress the grievances of its coloured friends, it has pledged itself to encourage those friends to petition Congress to commit perjury. Hence it appears to me that the true meaning of this resolution, expressed in plain language, is, '_Resolved_, That in our opinion Congress possesses the constitutional power to abolish slavery throughout the United States, and that we will encourage the slaves to petition Congress for an act of emancipation, and should no such an act be passed we will aid them in suing for their freedom in the Supreme Court of the United States.'

"It is to be regretted that the society did not announce the means they intend to employ to encourage the slaves to send petitions to Congress. The pledge has been solemnly given. Is it to be redeemed by sending among them secret or avowed agents? It is singular also that if the society believes the 'court of the United States' can give liberty to the slaves, it should not make an _immediate_ application for its beneficent interposition, but should resolve to postpone such application not only until it has succeeded in prompting them to petition Congress for a redress of their grievances, but also until a sufficient time has elapsed to learn the result of this moral experiment. Permit me now, sir, to call your attention to the past professions of some of the gentlemen who reported this resolution, and of the society which adopted it.

"On the 4th December, 1833, Messrs. Phelps, Garrison, and May, as members of the Philadelphia Convention, signed the following declaration: 'We fully and unanimously recognize the sovereignty of _each State to legislate exclusively_ on the subject of slavery which is tolerated within its limits. We concede that Congress has no _right to interfere_ with any slave State in relation to the momentous subject.'

"Mr. Garrison afterwards, in an editorial article in the _Liberator_, thus expresses himself: 'Abolitionists as clearly understand and as sacredly regard the constitutional powers of Congress as do their traducers, and they know, and have again and again asserted, that Congress has _no more rightful authority to sit in judgment upon Southern slavery than it has to legislate for the abolition of slavery in the French colonies_.'

"On the 17th of August, 1835, at a meeting of the Massachusetts Antislavery Society, duly held in Boston, an address to the public was adopted, professing to set forth the _true principles and objects_ of the society; and to give this statement a stronger claim to the confidence of the community it was authenticated by the signatures of _thirty-one_ of the principal officers and members of the society, including _your own_ and those of three of the committee who reported the late resolution, viz., Messrs. Garrison, May, and Fairbanks. The opinion of the society at that time on the power of Congress was in that document thus explicitly stated: 'We fully acknowledge that no change in the slave laws of the Southern States can be made unless by the Southern Legislatures. Neither Congress nor the Legislatures of the free States have authority _to change the condition_ of a single slave in the slave States.' Yet the society now stands prepared to encourage the slaves to petition Congress for a redress of their grievances! And now, sir, the object of this letter is to ascertain whether the resolution I have quoted does in truth represent the present opinion held by your society on the power of Congress, or whether the resolution was intended to be confined to slaves in the District of Columbia and the territory of Florida.

"It cannot be necessary to dwell on the vast importance of an explicit declaration by your board on this subject. Independent of the deep concern I feel in the harmony, integrity, and consistency of the abolition party, I have a personal interest in the inquiry I now make of you. An _enlarged_ edition of my book is ready for the press, but the late resolution of your society compels me to suspend its publication. I had treated the charge that abolitionists desired Congress to interfere with slavery in the States as calumnious, and in refutation of it had appealed to their solemn disclaimers. I need not say, sir, that until the late resolution is satisfactorily explained, or its doctrine disavowed by your society, I cannot in my new edition deny the charge, but must as an honest man substitute for my confident assertions and triumphant appeals most painful and humiliating confessions. Permit me to suggest that it is highly desirable that your board should act explicitly on this subject before the meeting of the American Antislavery Society, that, if possible, no inquiries or investigation may then arise to mar the harmony of the meeting and retard the progress of abolition.

"I flatter myself, sir, that your sentiments on the constitutional question remain the same as when you signed the address of 1835, and that you comprehend and appreciate the motives which have prompted this letter. I shall await your answer with extreme anxiety."

On receipt of this letter Mr. Loring communicated with a number of the members of the board of managers and endeavoured to hold a meeting of the board for the purpose of rescinding or repudiating the resolution; but it was not until the 14th that he succeeded in getting a quorum together. After Mr. Loring had read Judge Jay's letter to the board, they promptly passed the following resolution:

"_Resolved_, That as said resolution was submitted to the meeting just at its close, when but few delegates were present, and was adopted without deliberation or discussion, this board recommend its reconsideration at the next quarterly meeting of the society.

_"Resolved_, As the sense of this board, that Congress has no power to abolish slavery in the several States of this Union."

In a letter dated the 15th of March, enclosing a copy of the above resolution, Mr. Loring said: "I can hear of but one or two persons here who believe in the power of Congress over slavery in the States, viz., the Misses Grimké, Mr. Alanson St. Clair, and perhaps Mr. May and Mrs. Chapman. Several, however, and those influential persons (Mr. Garrison among them), think slavery unconstitutional, and believe it would be so pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States if the point should ever be made. In this opinion I can by no means agree."

The "unfortunate resolution," he continued, was offered by a "silly officious person" at a moment of much haste and confusion just as the meeting was breaking up, and had been approved without proper consideration by the committee whose duty it was to revise all resolutions. "It seems, however, to have been understood by those who voted for it as applying only to free coloured persons whose rights might be infringed by Southern laws or to slaves in the District of Columbia; and the pledge given to try the question of slavery in the United States Courts seems to have arisen from the notion that the question of the accordance of slavery with the Constitution might be incidentally raised and determined even in a case in which the party whose rights are to be vindicated is free."

In conclusion Mr. Loring said that this question would assume an important aspect at the future meetings of the Antislavery Society, and earnestly hoped wise and honest counsel would prevail. He thought it would be sufficient ground for dissolving the Union were the United States Supreme Court to assume power over slavery in the several States. "The honesty and common sense of the nation," he wrote, "would revolt against such a doctrine and against those who should maintain it."

In his reply, dated the 29th of March, Judge Jay congratulated Mr. Loring on the service he had rendered the cause of abolition by procuring the passage of the resolutions from the board of managers. "In the fulness of our zeal," he wrote, "we are all liable occasionally to stray beyond the line of propriety, and it evinces more devotion to duty to acknowledge and correct errors than to avoid committing them."

At the fifth annual meeting of the American Antislavery Society, held at the Broadway Tabernacle on the 2d of May, 1838, Alvan Stewart of Utica, N. Y., offered a resolution, vigorously supported by himself and others, to the following effect:

"That the clause of the second article of the constitution of this society be struck out which admits 'that each State in which slavery exists has, by the Constitution of the United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its abolition in said State.'"

This motion was equivalent to a declaration on the part of the society that Congress had the right, under the Constitution, to abolish slavery. Judge Jay had previously declared that Stewart's doctrine was false, untenable, and hurtful to the cause. The arguments by which it was supported he considered absurd. For two days of continued debate he exposed its fallacy and danger and was rewarded by the defeat of the resolution. But such attempts to change the original articles of belief upon which the society was founded gave him great uneasiness for the future. His feelings upon this subject were shown in a letter to the secretary of the Young Men's Antislavery Society who had invited him to preside at its convention:

"On uniting with the American Antislavery Society some years since I remarked, with the letter requesting that my name might be enrolled among its members, that I had attentively considered its constitution, and expressed my conviction that in joining the society I was acting consistently with my obligations as a Christian and a citizen. The great moral principles advanced in the constitution perfectly accorded, in my opinion, with the precepts of the Gospel, and the measures proposed, by which those principles were to be carried into practice, equally accorded with the obligations of the oath I had taken to support the Constitution of the United States. I embarked in the antislavery cause with a firm determination to support the principles and measures avowed by the society at the hazard of obloquy, persecution, and, if necessary, even life itself; and never in advocating the cause to sacrifice truth and principle to expediency. How far I have acted up to this determination others must judge. I am not myself conscious of having departed from it.

"The constitution of the society contains an express admission that 'each State in which slavery exists has, by the Constitution of the United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its abolition;' and the object of the society in regard to slavery in the States is declared to be to effect its abolition by 'arguments addressed to the understandings and consciences of our fellow-citizens.' Notwithstanding these explicit declarations we were accused of aiming to effect our object by inducing Congress to invade the rights of the States by abolishing slavery within their limits; and it was justly argued that such an attempt was unconstitutional, and would, if successful, lead to civil war and a severance of the Union. So gross and unfounded were the calumnies circulated against us, that it was deemed expedient by the executive committee of the society, of which I was one, to publish an address to the public, pledging our individual characters and responsibility as to the real objects and principles entertained by our association. This address bore my signature among others, and contained, as nearly as I can recollect, the following passage: 'We hold that Congress has no more right to abolish slavery in the States in which it exists than it has to abolish slavery in the French West India Islands; consequently we desire no national legislation on the subject.' We were justified in giving this pledge by the declaration of the convention which formed the society, by the constitution of the society itself, by the constitutions of the several State societies, and by the uniform language of antislavery publications. Few persons have been more conversant with the writings of abolitionists than myself; yet I can truly aver that until the appearance of Mr. Stewart's extraordinary argument I was not aware that there was a man or woman belonging to an antislavery society who entertained a different opinion. This gentleman, holding the responsible station of chairman of the executive committee of the State society, avowing in its constitution the inability of Congress to abolish slavery in the States, published an article in the official paper of the society, asserting the constitutional power of Congress immediately to emancipate every slave in the United States, declaring that abolitionists had 'but one thing to do'--which was to petition Congress to exercise this power; thus repudiating the moral means they had prescribed for themselves, viz., 'arguments addressed to the understandings and consciences of our fellow-citizens'; and virtually recommending the employment of _force_, the power of the general government as the sole agent in effecting the abolition of slavery.

"I had supposed that sentiments so utterly at variance with the solemn asseverations of abolitionists, so repugnant to the constitutional pledges of their societies, would have excited universal indignation; but I was mistaken. After the publication of these sentiments, Mr. Stewart was selected as one of the orators of the American Society at their ensuing anniversary. At the annual meeting in May last he moved to purge from the constitution the concession I have quoted, thus giving the society the constitutional right of discharging what he had proclaimed the sole duty of abolitionists, that of petitioning Congress to abolish slavery in the States; and in supporting his motion he ridiculed the idea of effecting our object by addresses to the understanding and consciences of slaveholders. On taking the question a majority of the society was in favour of expunging; and the admission respecting the power of Congress still stands in the constitution only because it required a vote of two thirds to cancel it. Mr. Stewart was afterwards elected a manager of the society. A State society since organized has by a formal vote refused to insert the usual admission into its constitution, and another previously organized has since stricken it from its constitution.

"From this state of facts it is apparent that the pledges given to the public in our constitution, and in the address of the executive committee to which I have referred, that abolitionists admitted that Congress had no right to interfere with slavery in the States, that hence arguments were the only means they intended to use for its abolition, have been flagrantly falsified. So far as I was concerned, and unquestionably many more, the pledge was given in good faith, and however others may belie it, I mean honestly to abide by it. In my opinion, Congress has no more right to pass a general emancipation law than to direct how Broadway shall be paved; and without intending to impeach the motives of others, I must take the liberty to say that I would regard such a law as a most wicked and detestable act of usurpation--an act that would inevitably and properly sever the Union and necessarily result in bloodshed and national calamity.

"It seems to me, moreover, inconsistent with Christian sincerity and plain dealing for our societies to profess in their constitution a belief in great and important principles, and to promise to regulate their measures in accordance with those principles, and at the same time to retain in communion with them and elevate to office men who openly repudiate and ridicule those principles and avow a wish to introduce a course of action utterly repugnant.

"On discovering from the proceedings of last May that the American Society and its auxiliaries no longer considered their avowed principles binding on their members, but that they might be treated with insult and ridicule without incurring a loss of either confidence or office, and that in the bosom of the society opinions were entertained utterly at variance with public and solemn professions, and in their practical consequences hostile to the welfare of the country and inconsistent with the oath I had taken to support the Constitution of the United States, I deemed it my duty no longer to share in the responsibilities of their measures. I have not since taken part in the meeting of any antislavery society, and the recklessness with which the pledge given by myself and other officers of the society has been falsified, warns me to be cautious how I again become identified with the promises and declarations of these associations. These considerations induce me very respectfully to decline your kind invitation.

"My attachment to the cause of abolition, and to the principles avowed in the constitution of the American Society, was never stronger than at this moment; and I shall ever regard it a duty and a privilege to labour for the abolition of slavery in every manner consistent with propriety and my moral and political obligations.

"Although my confidence in the integrity and singleness of purpose of antislavery societies is weakened, I have not the most distant wish to interrupt their harmony or impede their usefulness. I have thus, sir, frankly but with much pain stated my sentiments. These sentiments I have no desire to conceal or to obtrude upon others; and you are at liberty to suppress this letter or make any use of it you may think proper."

The annual meeting of the Connecticut Antislavery Society was held at New Haven in May, 1840, commencing on the 20th. The society considered this meeting to be of vital importance to the prosperity of the cause in that State on account of the Legislature being in session there at that time, many of the members of which were expected to attend.

In April Judge Jay received an invitation from the Committee of Arrangements to deliver an address on the "Action of the Federal Government in Behalf of Slavery," on which subject the Committee felt convinced that Judge Jay could "give the society as well as our legislators some valuable information."

Other engagements compelled Judge Jay to decline the invitation. In his letter to the Committee of Arrangements informing them of his inability to comply with their request, Judge Jay assured them that the interest he had theretofore professed to feel in the antislavery cause had suffered no diminution; and his conviction of the truth of the great principles set forth in the constitution of the American Society had, if possible, grown stronger from continued reflection and observation; but as to the singleness of purpose and the efficiency and integrity of the present antislavery organization his opinion had undergone a change.

"In joining the organization," he wrote, "I had good cause to believe that I would not be called upon to co-operate with men who condemned any of its avowed principles, or with men who would seek to render it an instrument for promoting other objects than the abolition of slavery.

"One of the principles laid down in the constitution of the American Society, and a most important one as limiting its operations, is that by the Constitution of the United States Congress has no right to legislate for the abolition of slavery in the several States in which it exists. Yet a gentleman was in 1838 chosen by the society one of its officers after having both in print and in the presence of the society denied this doctrine and contended that it was the duty of abolitionists to petition Congress to pass a law for the immediate emancipation of all the slaves in the United States. The expulsion of this gentleman from the society was in my opinion required by the respect it owed itself, and by the good faith it owed both to the public and to its members. The course pursued was an emphatic declaration on the part of the society that its professed principles, however useful they might be in conciliating public confidence and in acquiring funds, were by no means binding on its members. Having sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and regarding the proposed mode of emancipation a most palpable violation of it, and seeing that the avowed principles of the society were in fact no security for its conformity to them in its conduct, I then determined never again to take a part in its meetings or in those of its auxiliaries. Subsequent events have given me no cause to regret this determination.

"One of the great objects for which the American Society was avowedly formed was to effect the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia and of the American slave-trade by Congressional legislation. Yet men belonging to the society, and even some of its officers, are now publicly maintaining that all compulsory laws are sinful, and of course that it would be a usurpation of the divine prerogative for Congress to suppress by penal law the abomination of slavery in the capital of the republic, and the nefarious traffic in human flesh of which the capital is the great depot. I cannot as an abolitionist act with those who reprobate all enactments, not merely for the abolition of slavery where it exists, but even for preventing its re-establishment on soil from which it has been extirpated; and also for protecting the poor coloured man, his wife, and children from the merciless kidnapper.

"Certainly the founders of the society did not intend to effect by it any alteration in the social relations of the sexes; and not the most distant hint of such a design can be found in the Constitution; yet it is in vain to deny that an attempt is now making to render antislavery societies instrumental in advancing certain theories respecting the rights of women.

"The American Society was intended as a central organization by which the contributions and efforts of abolitionists were to be concentrated and directed; and for some years it discharged its functions with wonderful zeal, energy, and success. But at last the managers of certain local societies imagined that the vitality of the extremities of the system would be quickened by arresting the pulsations of the heart; and accordingly measures were adopted, and with perfect success, to paralyze the parent institution.

"For a while abolitionists exhibited a pattern of Christian and disinterested benevolence in behalf of the oppressed which commanded the secret admiration even of their enemies, and conciliated the favour of the good. Latterly a strong desire has been evinced to change the antislavery enterprise from a religious into a political one, and a scramble for the loaves and fishes has already commenced.

"Unwilling to take a part in the bitter feuds which now divide abolitionists, and not choosing to assume any responsibility for principles and measures I cannot approve, I deem it most consistent with my obligations as a Christian and a citizen to absent myself from an arena in which I can do no good and in which I can no longer appear without being engaged in unprofitable conflict. But most cheerfully will I again enlist in a new antislavery organization (if any such can be devised) that will offer a fair promise of avoiding the errors which have destroyed the efficiency and moral character of the present.

"I beg you to be assured that in the preceding remarks I have had no particular reference to the Connecticut Society, not being aware that it is open to censure.

"I have no desire either to conceal or to obtrude my opinions respecting the existing state of the antislavery enterprise, but I deemed it due to myself to state frankly and without reserve the considerations which induce me to pursue a course apparently at variance with my former public vindication of the American Antislavery Society."

Among abolitionists there was a great diversity of opinion as to whether women should be admitted to membership in antislavery societies and permitted to hold office and generally to enjoy the same privileges as men. This question was the cause of much feeling and was destined to create an unfortunate division in the antislavery ranks.

The subject was first voted upon in the New England Society, where, in 1838, it was resolved to permit all persons, whether men or women, who agreed with them on the subject of slavery to participate in the meetings as members. An attempt having been made in vain to rescind this vote, a protest was drawn up by Amos R. Phelps, Charles T. Torrey, and five others, disclaiming all responsibility for it, and denouncing the action of the society as injurious to the cause of the slave by connecting with it an entirely foreign subject and by establishing a dangerous precedent.

At the sixth annual meeting of the American Antislavery Society, held in New York, May 7, 1839, it was voted, 180 ayes to 140 nays, "that the roll of the convention be made up by placing upon it the names of all persons, male or female, who are delegated from any auxiliary society, or members of this society."

The seventh annual meeting of the American Society was fixed for the 12th of May, 1840. It was generally realized that on this occasion a definitive settlement of the woman question would be made. The board of managers of the Massachusetts Society made strenuous efforts to insure a large attendance of members sharing their views. A large steamboat was chartered which conveyed Garrison and his party to New York, and it was soon manifest that they had mustered a majority sufficient to carry their point.

Arthur Tappan, the president of the society, anticipating "a recurrence of the scenes witnessed last year, and resolved not to be found contending with his abolition brethren," did not attend the meeting, and Francis Jackson presided in his place. Among the persons nominated by the chairman as a business committee was Miss Abby Kelley. After a long and exciting debate Miss Kelley was elected by a vote of 557 to 451. Immediately after the result was announced, Lewis Tappan, Charles W. Denison, and Amos Phelps, members of the business committee, asked to be excused from serving upon it.

After the meeting had adjourned those members who had voted against the admission of women met and organized a new society under the name of the "American and Foreign Antislavery Society." Arthur Tappan was chosen president, James G. Birney and Henry B. Stanton, secretaries, and Lewis Tappan, treasurer. The Executive Committee was composed of Gerrit Smith, Judge Jay, John G. Whittier, Joshua Leavitt, and other leading abolitionists.

On June 1st Judge Jay wrote a note to Mr. J. C. Jackson, the recording secretary of the American Antislavery Society, asking that his name be stricken from the roll as a member. In stating his reasons for resigning, he said that the proceedings at the late meeting of the society had convinced him that the institution was being used, by those who had recently acquired control of it, as an instrument for advancing the doctrine of the equality of the sexes in all the relations of life. "Married women without their husbands," he said, "were associated with men in the Executive Committee--a committee to which is confided the management of the society, and whose meetings have hitherto been, and will probably continue to be, both frequent and private."

The principle thus officially avowed by the society Judge Jay declared had not the remotest connection with the true objects for which the society was formed, nor was it sanctioned by the constitution. "However grievous some women may find the yoke imposed upon them by the opinions usually entertained on the subject," he continued, "that is not the yoke which abolitionists associated to break." The claims now set up by the society in regard to "the rights of women" appeared to him necessarily to involve their participation in the sacred ministry, their exercise of the elective franchise, and their entire independence in the conjugal relation. Irrespective of the soundness of these claims, it did not appear by what right the society called upon its members to support them. Judge Jay contended that "any association for the professed purpose of abolishing negro slavery may with as much propriety prescribe the form of baptism and the Lord's Supper as it may insist that women are authorized to administer these ordinances." Fully convinced that the society as thus managed was exerting an influence not only very injurious to the antislavery cause, but contrary to domestic order and happiness and inconsistent with the precepts of the Gospel, Judge Jay deemed it his duty to sever his connection with it.

In our time, when the admission of women to participation in nearly every form of activity is universally accepted, it may seem extraordinary that the American Antislavery Society should have divided upon such an issue. But what is now a familiar custom was then a strange doctrine, the consequences of which were unknown and were dreaded by conservative people. The abolitionists whose votes admitted women to equal rights with men contended that women were among the most useful and influential workers for the cause and that they should have a corresponding position in the councils of the party. It was denied that active participation in the meetings of the societies was inappropriate to their sex. On the other hand, it was believed by many persons earnestly and usefully engaged in the cause of emancipation that the antislavery society should pursue its end unimpeded and undisturbed by outside issues. The emancipation of woman might be a highly desirable reform, but it should be sought separately from the emancipation of the negro. An individual should be allowed to labour for the slave without being forced to support untried theories regarding woman's rights and the sinfulness of human government.

At this period Judge Jay was especially active with his pen. In 1839 was published his "View of the Action of the Federal Government in Behalf of Slavery." This work was the first effective exposure of the manner in which the United States Government had been used for many years by pro-slavery statesmen to carry out their own ends. Judge Jay showed the shameful position in which the National Government had been placed before the nations of the world when the President and his diplomatic representatives were forced by the Slave Power to demand the return of fugitive slaves and compensation for their loss when shipwreck had allowed them to attain liberty on a foreign shore; when the armies of the United States were sent to Florida at enormous expense to capture alleged runaway private property; when the power of the Government was strained to prevent abolition in Cuba and to introduce slavery into Texas. The efforts to suppress the right of petition and freedom of debate in Congress were thoroughly described. An account, humiliating to every American, was given of the condition of the national capital itself, converted by the fostering protection of the United States Government into the chief slave-market of the Union.

Judge Jay's next publication was entitled, "On the Condition of Free People of Colour in the United States." He showed that they were denied the right to the franchise, to liberty of locomotion, to the lowest employment in the public service; that their education was impeded almost to prohibition and that even their industry was hampered by cruel restrictions. Worst of all, they might at any time be seized and sold into slavery without recourse to law. In 1840 appeared his pamphlet on "The Violation by the House of Representatives of the Right of Petition." These writings had a wide circulation among persons not reached by the ordinary antislavery literature, and their influence was highly beneficial.

Although the woman question was the ostensible cause of the schism of 1840, there were several other differences which tended quite as much to divide the abolition camp. While the Garrison party continued to depend solely upon moral agitation and opposed all political effort, a numerous and powerful body in the antislavery ranks began to look to the ballot-box as the instrument of reform. In 1840, under the leadership of Gerrit Smith, Alvan Stewart, Myron Holley, Elizur Wright, Joshua Leavitt, and William Goodell, a convention at Albany organized the Liberty party by the nomination of James G. Birney, of Kentucky, for President, and of Thomas Earle, of Pennsylvania, for Vice-President. Out of a total of about two and a half million votes cast at this election, the candidates of the Liberty party received a little over seven thousand. W. H. Harrison, the whig candidate, defeated his democratic opponent, Martin Van Buren. Although the abolition vote was not large, it gave the party great encouragement, and an address was issued congratulating the friends of the slave that a new power to overthrow slavery had been found in "the terse literature of the ballot-box."

Judge Jay's attitude towards the formation of the Liberty party appears in a correspondence which took place between him and Gerrit Smith in July, 1840. "I suppose you have come, as well as myself," wrote Smith, "to the conclusion that whilst American slavery exists our national political parties will be essentially and irrevocably pro-slavery parties, and that abolitionists cannot, therefore, vote consistently for the candidates of such parties. If you have come to this conclusion, you of course admit that we are under the necessity of designating our own candidates for law-makers and that the object of the Freeman's State Convention to be held in Syracuse the first Wednesday in August is proper. Now, when we come together in that convention there is one thing which, next to the blessing of Heaven, we shall need far more than any other. I mean your consent that we shall put you in nomination for governor. Will you enable me to insure the convention of that consent? If you will, you will in so doing render a very great service to our holy cause--a service which I see not how we can well dispense with. If there be anything selfish in your heart, we have, of course, nothing to address to it. We do not expect to elect you, and we are well aware that your nomination would expose you to pro-slavery ridicule and hatred. If you give your consent to the nomination, we know that such consent must proceed from your disinterested and self-sacrificing love for the antislavery cause. Do, my dear sir, give us your name; we can rally about it those who will be dead to the power of any other name."

To this strong appeal Jay gave the following reply:

"I was last evening favoured with your letter of the 20th inst. asking me to consent to be the abolition candidate for governor at the ensuing election. The request implies a confidence in the strength and sincerity of my attachment for the abolition cause that demands my acknowledgments. I cannot now embrace the opportunity afforded by your letter of entering at large into the question of a distinct abolition party; but justice to myself and respect for you induce me to mention some general principles which I think applicable to the present case.

"An abolition political party supposes a union for the election of rulers without regard to the sentiments of the associates or their candidates on any other subject than that of slavery. Of course the party and the rulers elected by them may have the most opposite and irreconcilable opinions on every topic but one of local and national interest; yet it is supposed such discordant materials will form one homogeneous mass. Abolitionists give but little promise of such wonderful unity in the future. I doubt the practicability of forming such a party; and I moreover question whether such a party would be consistent with our obligations as citizens. It is evident that this party could effect its professed object, the abolition of slavery, only in a course of years, and in the meantime it is _to neglect and disregard every other interest_. The party as such can have no opinion and exert no influence either in elections or elsewhere in relation to the trade, the finances, internal improvements, foreign affairs, or the military power of the nation, and no inquiry is to be allowed into the opinions of candidates on these most important topics.

"I fear the very attempt to form such a party will prove injurious to the antislavery cause. It excites dissensions among ourselves. On this point I will not enlarge. It will present in its results a false and disheartening estimate of the number of abolitionists; because as many antislavery men will refuse to support the abolition candidates, the canvass will represent us as far less numerous than we really are. Moreover, the abolitionists who are thus called out of the political parties can of course exercise no more influence in them. We are depriving the parties of the little salt that keeps them from utter putrefaction. Had the whig abolitionists in the last Legislature been nominated by an abolitionist party they would not have been elected and we should not now have the glorious and blessed jury law.

"I have never approved under present circumstances of any further organized interference by abolitionists with elections than the official questioning of candidates. Under that system every abolitionist might exert a powerful influence merely by withholding his vote, without giving his suffrage for one to whom he was politically opposed. The experiment failed, but by whose fault? Seward and Bradish, Marcy and Tracy, dealt frankly with us. Yet abolitionists made but little difference between the friends and foes. Had Bradish had 20,000 votes more than Seward the conversion of our politicians to abolition would have been general and instantaneous, and slavery would have received an irremediable wound. And can we believe that if abolitionists would not then refrain from voting for the party, they will now consent to vote against it?

"I am very far from thinking that it can never be right and proper to set up abolition candidates without regard to party preferences. Had the question of emancipation been almost equally poised in the British Parliament it would have been patriotic to turn the scale by a temporary abandonment of the contested objects and the election of antislavery members. And so also I can readily conceive of circumstances in which it may be the duty of the abolitionists of a particular State or district to suspend for a time their labours for the slave in order to unite with the friends of temperance to carry some great point. But taking into consideration the existing circumstances of the antislavery cause, I am not clear that the formation of an abolition political party, disregarding all the other interests of the country, is consistent with either duty or policy, and of course it becomes me to decline the request with which you have honoured me. May God enlighten and direct us, and when we cannot think alike may He give us the graces of meekness and charity."