Part 23

“I have stated but a few of the points upon which the greatest stress is laid by the colonists who have emigrated. To state every point would go too much into detail; but these will be sufficient to show why the people are discontented.

“The inhabitants asked for a vagrant law, but that was refused. They asked for power to punish their insubordinate apprentices, but this was also refused. Many of them prayed to be relieved from taxes for the first year after the war, but this was not acceded to. Their waggons, oxen, and horses were used for the purposes of the war, but they received no satisfactory remuneration. Several other things are also stated, too many to be mentioned here.

“I hope your Excellency will be convinced of the truth of what I have here said, and I do not doubt that if it had been in your power, our country would now be in a prosperous state; but, as it is, our country is ruined, for we see that everything taken by you from the enemy has been restored to them, which will more encourage them.

“To make the country yet more unfortunate, we see with astonishment a governor who could do much good by the existing laws, and we see other persons, such as missionaries and other prejudiced writers, who are believed, whilst what this governor writes is not attended to.

[Sidenote: Political Attitude of Uys.]

“We address memorials to the governor and to parliament, but we find no change. Now we see the mischievous effects to the inhabitants, and we are thus obliged to quit the colony. It is not our fault that we leave our native land; we have begged and prayed for a change, and none is made. We therefore emigrate, but we shall, notwithstanding, not yet separate ourselves from our respected governor, who endeavoured to do us good; and whenever we can be of any assistance, we shall not fail to afford it.

“If I can be of any use to your Excellency, or any report of mine be of service to a governor whom I so much esteem, I shall spare no trouble; and I remain, etc.

RIGHT “P. L. UYS, Commandant.”

The political position, or the attitude assumed by Pieter Uys and his party towards the emigrants who had preceded them, was one of independence. As well he thought might he assert authority over Mr. Retief as Mr. Retief over him. The time had not yet come for framing a constitution, which should be deferred until the tide of emigration had slackened, when it could be done with the consent of the whole body of the people, and not merely of a small section of them. Accordingly on the 14th of August 1837 a series of resolutions were drawn up and signed, placing their attitude clearly before their countrymen. These resolutions literally translated were as follows:

RIGHT “Caledon River, 14th August 1837.

“Resolutions adopted by us, the undersigned travellers and exiles from the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, now on our journey between the Orange and Vet rivers. We make known to our countrymen in advance with what object and intention we have undertaken our journey, and that our unanimous wish is:

“1. To select the country called the Bay of Port Natal as our seaport.

[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]

“2. To inspect the extent of country joining the same inland, as far as we shall deem necessary.

“3. That we have placed ourselves under certain chiefs as field commandants, as protecting leaders over us, to investigate and redress all grievances that may take place on our journey.

“4. We place our dependence on the Allwise Ruler of heaven and earth, and are resolved to adhere to the sure foundation of our reformed Christian religion, entertaining the hope that when we have reached the place of our destination we shall live a better and safer life.

“5. As regards the establishment and execution of legal authority as exercised by some of our countrymen, we must unanimously declare that we entirely disapprove thereof; and we shall only regulate ourselves in the wilderness by the old burgher regulations and duties, and all differences which may arise shall be adjusted in accordance with those burgher regulations.

“6. We have come to the final determination not to submit to any laws that may have been established by a few individuals, and which we conceive have a tendency to reduce us from a state of banishment to a state of slavery.

“7. When we shall have attained our object and have arrived at the place of our destination, we trust to see the whole of our countrymen assembled together, then by the public voice to proceed to the election and appointment of our chief rulers and the framing of proper laws, and in general to consider what is useful both for the country and the people.

“8. The judicial appointments and laws as now established will not be noticed by us in the slightest degree, but are considered as of no value.

“9. We trust that every burgher will participate in these sentiments, in order to be placed in the situation of a free citizen.

“10. We purpose to establish our settlement on the same principles of liberty as those adopted by the United States of America, carrying into effect, as far as practicable, our burgher laws. Every person agreeing herewith will therefore attach his signature for the information of those who are still in doubt on the subject.

“P. L. UYS, J. J. UYS, J. P. MOOLMAN, H. J. POTGIETER, J. LANDMAN, And 165 others.”

[Sidenote: Action of Pieter Retief.]

At this time Mr. Retief was preparing to send an expedition against Moselekatse, to follow up the blow struck at Mosega in January 1837 by the commandos under Gerrit Maritz and Hendrik Potgieter. The Matabele had provoked hostilities by the robbery and massacre of a hunting party under Fieldcornet Stephanus Petrus Erasmus, of the Kraai river,[103] and of many emigrant families belonging to the party of Potgieter who had imprudently ventured across the Vaal. But this expedition was not carried out, Mr. Retief’s partisans assigning as a reason that they believed the Griquas under Adam Kok and Andries Waterboer would attack the camps while so many of the men were away, but the real cause probably being the dissensions between the emigrants themselves.

In October 1837 Mr. Retief, having found a pass in the Drakensbergen, with some of his followers went down into Natal, and Messrs. Potgieter and Uys determined to carry out the plan of attacking the Matabele again. Uys had no personal interest in the matter, for he had resolved to settle in Natal, but his sympathy with his countrymen led him to assist them against the barbarians who had done them so much injury. On the 19th of this month he concluded an agreement of friendship with Moroko, chief of the principal section of the Barolong at Thaba Ntshu, and immediately afterwards the two commandos set out from the camps on the border of the Caledon and at Winburg. One of the most important campaigns yet entered upon in South Africa between Europeans and Bantu had commenced.

[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]

An account of this campaign has been given in my _History of South Africa_, and Dr. J. C. Voigt has entered even more fully into the details of the nine days’ struggle on the Marikwa than I did.[104] The result of this expedition was the flight of the whole Matabele tribe to the country north of the Limpopo, the opening of the territory now comprised in the Transvaal Province and the Orange Free State to European settlers, and the relief of the remnants of the Betshuana tribes from the misery in which they had been existing. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the victory on the Marikwa in November 1837 to civilisation and the happiness of both white and black people in South Africa. And yet Pieter Lavras Uys, one of the leaders of the little band of brave men who risked their lives against terrible odds and won it, is well nigh forgotten in the land he served so well.

On the 21st of July 1837 Mr. Retief had written to Sir Benjamin D’Urban a letter of which the following is a translation:

“The undersigned Pieter Retief, as conductor-in-chief of the united encampments, most humbly sheweth,

“That we as subjects of the British government during our distressed circumstances submitted our grievances to his Majesty the King; but as all our endeavours proved fruitless, we have ultimately found ourselves compelled to quit the land of our birth in order that we might not become guilty of opposition or rebellion against our government.

[Sidenote: Letter of Pieter Retief.]

“That this abandonment of our native country has occasioned us enormous and incalculable losses, but that notwithstanding this we on our side will not show any enmity towards the British nation.

“That consequently all trade and commerce between us and the British merchants will on our part be free and uninterrupted, as with all other nations, with this understanding that we desire to be considered as a free and independent people.

“That we have learnt with grief that almost all the native tribes by whom we are now surrounded have been instigated to attack us; but although we feel ourselves fully able to resist all our enemies, we would however beg of your Excellency to prevent, as far as lies in your power, such hostilities, so that we may not be compelled to spill human blood, which has already been the case with Moselekatse.

“That we will prove to the world by our conduct that it never has been our intention unlawfully to molest any nation or people; but that on the contrary we have no greater satisfaction than in the general peace and amity of all mankind.

“That, finally, we confidently trust that the British government will allow us to receive the amount of all the just claims and demands which we still have within the colony. I have &c.

RIGHT “P. RETIEF.”

This letter seems to have taken a long time to reach the governor. On the 25th of October 1837 he wrote the following note upon it:

“A little time must be suffered to elapse before any answer be sent to this, and this of necessity, because there are three contending chiefs: Retief, Maritz (_sic_, it should be Potgieter), and Uys; and although Retief has now the greatest influence, yet it does not extend over the whole of the emigrants, nor is there any positive certainty that it will continue. Before the government condescends to treat with them at all, it must at least be certain that it treats with an acknowledged and undivided authority; this matter must lay by, therefore, for a while, which also may afford time for an answer to the dispatch of July last, in which the question is asked of his Majesty’s government ‘What are the relations to be in future kept between the emigrants and the colonial government?’ And in the meanwhile the emigrants are moving far out of contact with the Colony, to the eastward, so that there can arise in the interim no collision between them and the colonial authorities or inhabitants.--B. D’URBAN.”

[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]

Of Pieter Retief’s negotiations with the Zulu chief Dingan, of the removal to Natal of the whole of the party that adhered to him, and of the terrible massacres of the emigrants by the Zulus, nothing needs to be stated here.[105] These events are fully recorded in my _History of South Africa_ and in Mr. G. S. Preller’s _Piet Retief: Lewenskets van die Grote Voortrekker_, (6de druk), a demi octavo volume of one hundred and ninety-four pages, published at Pretoria in 1909.

[Sidenote: Visit of Pieter Uys to Natal.]

It was the intention of Mr. Potgieter to settle on the highlands of the interior and to endeavour to open communication with the outer world if possible through the Portuguese harbour of Delagoa Bay. Mr. Uys, on the other hand, had from the first resolved to make homes for himself and his party in the neighbourhood of Port Natal. But he was not in a hurry to move over the mountains, especially as the pasture around his temporary camp was good, and the cattle, large and small, would be the better of a long rest after their journey from Oliphants Hoek. With a few companions on horseback, however, he rode over to inspect the country again, and on the 15th of December 1837 arrived in the first of the camps under Retief and Maritz on the Bushman’s river in Natal.

There the question of the form and personnel of the government was the topic of discussion again, and it became evident to Mr. Uys that he and his adherents would be in a minority in Natal. He therefore stated that after his party had arrived and settled on farms he would be prepared to abide by the decision of a majority of the whole community, but he could not be induced to sign a document pledging fidelity to Mr. Retief as governor and commandant-general, which was pressed upon him. After a short visit he returned to his camp on the highlands, and was there when the heartrending tidings reached him of the treacherous massacre of Mr. Retief and his companions at Dingan’s kraal on the 6th of February 1838 and of the even more atrocious massacre of men, women, and children alike, near the present village of Weenen on the 17th of the same month.

All political differences disappeared at once on receipt of this sad intelligence, and as soon as possible Uys and his men were on their way to the assistance of their sorely afflicted countrymen and women who were still alive in Natal. So quickly was the commando got together and so rapidly did it ride that it arrived at the camp on the 1st of March 1838. Potgieter also assembled his men as speedily as he could, and went down into Natal with the same intention.

[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]

The condition of things there was wretched. The survivors of the massacre were huddled together in lagers, each under a commandant, but all close together to ensure their safety, and recognising Mr. Maritz as commandant-general and president of the council of war. Every day they were expecting another attack from Dingan’s army. Constant watch had therefore to be kept, and the men did not venture to move about unarmed, while the women were confined to the precincts of the lagers.

The accession of strength derived from the commandos of Uys and Potgieter made it unnecessary to act solely on the defensive any longer. Offensive operations were decided upon, not only with a view of punishing the Zulus, but of proving to them that the arms and tactics of Europeans were so superior that a prolonged conflict would be averted, and peace based upon the white man’s supremacy be secured. But the emigrants had still much to learn. The heavy firelocks that they carried were indeed more formidable weapons than the Zulu stabbing spears, but were far short of being as efficient as modern rifles. To load them it was necessary to pour a certain quantity of powder from a horn into the barrel, to insert a wad and beat it down with a ramrod, then to put in the slugs or a ball and wad down again, and finally to put priming in the pan and adjust the flint and lock. All this took time, even with the most expert and practised man, and while the gun was being loaded its owner was practically unarmed. The difference between a modern military rifle and a gun used by a South African farmer in 1838 is vastly greater in point of efficiency in conflict than that between such a gun and a Zulu stabbing spear.

Then as to military tactics. The farmer considered himself superior, simply because he was a civilised man. He was accustomed to circumvent game, and used the same methods in war that he used in the chase. But he had yet to learn that many a Zulu induna as well as the wily chief of the mountain, who was even then gathering strength at Thaba Bosigo, was greatly his superior in military skill. The almost naked black man, whose general knowledge was so defective that he might be regarded as intellectually little superior to a child, in all that relates to tactics and strategy was in advance of the ordinary untrained European.

[Sidenote: Arrangements to punish Dingan.]

It was arranged that Uys and Potgieter with all the men they could muster should advance towards Dingan’s residence from the camp on the Bushman’s river, and that the English chiefs with their warriors should cross the Tugela much nearer its mouth and press on towards the same point. It was hoped in this way to divide Dingan’s forces, and it was certain that the black army of Natal, as the English chiefs called their followers, would fight desperately, as their existence depended upon victory over the Zulus. Several hundreds of them were armed with muskets, which their chiefs had imported and paid for with ivory, and their leaders were brave and capable men. But this really formidable force was drawn into an ambush by the strategy of the Zulu commander who was sent to oppose it, and after such a battle as is only fought by men who know that they must conquer or die, it was almost annihilated.[106]

As neither Potgieter nor Uys would serve under Maritz, who may have been wanting in tact and was certainly charged with being overbearing in his manner, though no man could have been more devoted to the public welfare than he, it was resolved that he should remain to protect the camps in case of attack, and that they should lead their respective adherents in separate commandos, but acting in concert with each other, to attack Dingan in his principal kraal Umkungunklovu. The two commandos, when finally mustered, numbered three hundred and forty-seven men, exclusive of a few coloured attendants. Their commissariat and spare ammunition was taken with them on pack horses.

[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]

Neither of the leaders had a full conception of the hazardous nature of their expedition. A much smaller force than that under their command could have marched anywhere in the Xosa or Tembu country, and by keeping on open plains or ridges have been perfectly safe. They had served in the Kaffir war, and knew this. Then their decisive defeat of the Matabele had inspired them with the belief that they were invincible. They did not reflect that perhaps the field of operations against Dingan might not be so favourable to them as that against Moselekatse had been, and so they rode on in unbounded confidence. For five days they saw hardly any people, as the inhabitants had removed by order of Dingan to places of greater safety.

On the 11th of April 1838 they were close to the spot where eight months and five days later in the same year the battle was fought that gave to the stream from which they drank the name Blood River and to the date of the memorable engagement the name Dingan’s Day. Here for the first time since they left the camp they saw what appeared to them to be a small Zulu army. They drew hastily into battle order, and then dashed forward to charge, Potgieter with his men on one wing of the enemy, and Uys with his on the centre. The Zulus did not wait to meet the shock, but fled as fast as they could, and the farmers pursued them. Uys and his followers were too eager in the chase to act with proper caution, and did not observe that they were riding into a defile between two parallel chains of hills until a great Zulu army, that had been lying there concealed, suddenly showed itself on each side and in front of them. Its horns were even closing in behind before they realised that they were in an ambuscade and in the utmost danger.[107]

[Sidenote: Death of Pieter Uys.]

There was no possibility now of carrying out the tactics they had adopted against the Matabele: of firing a volley, riding back and reloading their guns, and then charging again. There were no better horsemen in the world than these farmers, for they had been accustomed from early youth to ride and to hunt the game which then abounded in the country they came from. But the din caused by the Zulus striking their shields with their short spear shafts was so great that the horses became almost unmanageable, and for an instant it seemed as if all was lost. Then realising that there was one chance left, they directed all their fire upon the horns of the Zulu army, that had closed in, shot down hundreds, and dashed through the opening thus made.

Commandant Uys was wounded by a spear thrust, but as he fell from his horse he called out to his followers to leave him and fight their way out, for he must die. All except ten of them escaped by the road that had been opened, but the pack horses, baggage, and spare ammunition had to be left behind. Of the ten who died there, one was Commandant Pieter Lavras Uys. Another was his gallant son Dirk Cornelis Uys, a boy only fifteen years of age, who could have escaped, but seeing his father on the ground and a Zulu raising a spear to stab him, he turned to assist his parent, and fell by his side. The others who lost their lives were David, Jacobus, and Jan Malan, Louis, Pieter, and Theunis Nel, Joseph Kruger, and Frans Labuschagne. Potgieter’s division retreated in time, on finding that it was being drawn into broken ground, and got safely away. The expedition then, being unable to keep the field owing to the loss of all the stores of the division under Uys, fell back to the camp on the Bushman’s river, and Potgieter and his men shortly afterwards returned to Winburg.

[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]

The aged father of Pieter Uys survived him only three months. He went down into Natal with the other members of the party, and in July died there. Mr. Maritz too, broken in health by anxiety and trouble, died on the 23rd of September of the same year. Thus of the most prominent leaders of the emigration, all had passed away in this short time except Mr. Potgieter, who lived until 1853.

SYNOPTICAL INDEX.

SKETCH I.

Alfonso, son of the Burgundian Count Henrique: assumes the title of king of Portugal, 7; which in A.D. 1143 is confirmed by Pope Innocent II, ib.; in 1147 he obtains possession of Santarem and Lisbon, and extends the boundary of Portugal southward to the Tagus, ib.

Africa: is almost entirely unexplored by Europeans in the early years of the fifteenth century, 4

Alani, the: in the fifth century of our era invade the Iberian peninsula, but most of them are afterwards driven by the Visigoths into Africa, 6

Alexandria: before A.D. 1500 is the chief market in which Europeans obtain Indian products, 3

Alexandrian libraries: destruction of, 11

Algarves, emirate of the: in 1250 is conquered by the Christians, and in 1263 is annexed to Portugal, which thus acquires its present dimensions, 8

America: is entirely unknown to Europeans in the early years of the fifteenth century, 4

Arabs, the: before A.D. 1500 know more than Europeans of the geography of Africa, 11; in the eighth century of our era conquer the whole of the Iberian peninsula except the territory held by the Basques, 6; their rule at first is mild, ib.; in the eleventh century of our era the caliphate is broken into fragments, ib.; when a struggle with the Christian population commences which lasts for centuries, ib.; gradually a number of little independent Christian states come into existence, 7; among which in A.D. 1095 is a county that afterwards expands into the kingdom of Portugal, ib.

Arnold’s _History of Rome_: reference to, 4

[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]