Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)
Chapter 12
THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally a war between two different principles--that of _raison d'état_, and that of the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appeared in our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when the Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice of a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet the demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of law and sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now appears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of which claims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europe in order to secure the 'safety' of its own state, while the other stands for the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants to which it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand in the way of _salus populi_; the other regards the maintenance of such covenants as a grave and inevitable obligation.
Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national historian, and whose lectures on _Politik_ have become a gospel, the Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard what they regard as the national German state.[179] 'The state', says Treitschke, 'is the highest thing in the external society of man: above it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.' There is here no room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_; for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the exclusive state--_der geschlossene Staat_--and in another sense than that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign articles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economy such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentially power: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as 'the public might for defence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual is self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and self-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might, and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the _colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture.
Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive. The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the glory of war.
_Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international 'law' so called must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_ obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future over against other states.' International treaties are no absolute limitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for such time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge set over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last resort subject to its own decision--in other words, to its own repudiation.[180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, that the maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies the violation of an international obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is ridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other states to start by taking the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his master were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students. There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law. 'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (_Recht_): none can say that one nation has a better conception than another.' 'No self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right' to any international rule: 'by so doing it would renounce its own highest ideals.' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words and foreign wares will reject international law as something 'foreign'. Again, Bernhardi makes play with the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_; and this, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may no longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality.'[181]
But it is the glorification of war--war aggressive as well as war defensive--which is the most striking result of the doctrine of the all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index to Treitschke's _Politik_, under the word War, one reads the following headings--'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God'; 'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is politics _par excellence_'. Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and these are to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it is politics _par excellence_, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sick nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war comes to make us realize that we are members one of another. 'Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes before the great thought of the state.' War alone makes us realize the social organism to which we belong: 'it is political idealism which demands war.' And again, 'what a perversion of morality it were, if one struck out of humanity heroism'(_Heldentum_)--as if _Heldentum_ could not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'
Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealization of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' in order to preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state to preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, individualism will triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of the world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy'. War, war--the 'strong medicine', the teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable biological law, the force that spreads the finest culture--war is the law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive-- primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserve all its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip away by emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself colonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must find them by conquest from other powers.[182] Treitschke already cried the watchwords--'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' Treitschke already designated England as the object of German attack, and began to instil in Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth of Germany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intact for German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be a World-power or perish. And besides, England was a 'sick' state--a sham, an hypocrisy.[183]
The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moral veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right of conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that in such cases 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a 'biologically just decision'! And he expresses wonder and surprise at those who think that 'the weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right. The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer--the talk of war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the 'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as invalidating supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk of power as 'the vehicle of the highest culture'. Treitschke, a stern Protestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but the doctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute force disguised as _Heldentum_, and of vicious cunning disguised as political morality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is a doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to maintain its state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against faith and charity and humanity and religion', and which will stride ruthlessly to war when 'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culture goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, 'lest in this state, which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state should remain.' Mommsen's warning has come true in August, 1914. By their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of _Heldentum_ are Louvain smoking in ashes to the sky.
It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, because it is not only the philosophy of a professor like Treitschke, but also that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only so, but it is the philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chancellor himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is true) to justify Germany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium. Let us only remember, in justice to a great people, that it is not really the doctrine of Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will tell us that Germany is 'just merely an extended Prussia'). And let us remember, in extenuation of Prussia, that she has suffered from two things--geographical pressure springing from her mid-European situation, and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest perpetuated by her Hohenzollern rulers since the days of the Great Elector, and especially since Frederic the Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has made Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing space, to secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure, Frederic the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquest irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has been easier for England, an island state in the West exempt from pressure, to think in other terms: it has been possible for Russia, secure in the East, to think, and to think nobly (as the present Tsar has done), of international obligation. Nor is it an accident that sees England and Russia united in the common cause of Europe to-day--that sees both championing the cause of small nations, one in the East, the other in the West.[185]
But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; and we fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is the public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great and small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightiness of the state--to the doctrine that all means are justified which are, or seem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a European society, or at least a European comity of nations, within which all states stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by which all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the state and posture of gladiators' in their relations one with another; we stand for the reign of law.
Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its own internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are a people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is no new thing in our history that we should fight for that cause. When England and Revolutionary France went to war in 1793, the cause, on the side of England, was a legal cause. We fought for the public law of Europe, as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did not fight in 1870, because neither France nor Germany had infringed the public law of Europe by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were ready to fight if they did. A fine cartoon in _Punch_, of August, 1870, shows armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and shield, with the words--'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't trouble you, dear friend. But if they do----' To-day they have; and England has drawn her sword. How could she have done otherwise, with those traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood--traditions as real and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to Anglo-Saxon England; traditions which are the fundamental basis of Anglo-Saxon public life all the world over? America once fought and beat England, in long-forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground of law--that law-abidingness which is as deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts to-day as it is in any Britisher--is a bond of sympathy between the two in this great struggle of the nations.
To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, they feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for 'world-empire', with its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life and death struggle with France and Russia. We too, they feel, are Machiavellians; but we have put on what Machiavelli called 'the mantle of superstition', the pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It is true that we are fighting for our own interest. But what is our interest? We are fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme interest. The new German political theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. The old--the very old--English political theory is, 'The Right is our interest'. It is true that we have everything to gain by defending the cause of international law. Should that prevent us from defending that cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in the defence?
This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a public law of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. She stands for her own preservation, which is menaced when public law is broken, and the 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled.
(Treitschke's _Politik_, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years 1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General Bernhardi's book, _Deutschland und der nächste Krieg_, was published in 1911, and has been translated into English under the title _Germany and the Next War_. See also J.A. Cramb, _England and Germany_, 1914.)
Notes:
[Footnote 179: The unity of the German state is in no small measure a matter of artificial Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke was the great advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic origin, and immediately of Saxon birth.]
[Footnote 180: We are reminded of the famous sentence in _The Prince_:--_Dove non è giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine_.]
[Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states.' It would seem to follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germany is helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The suggestion that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not adopted by the German Government before the war, nor by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech to the Reichstag on the Belgian question (see _supra_, p. 91).]
[Footnote 182: It was significant that Germany, while offering to England at the end of July a guarantee of the integrity of the soil of France, would not offer any guarantee of the integrity of French colonies (_supra_, p. 82).]
[Footnote 183: Nothing has here been said, though much might be said, of the distortion of history and ethnology by German nationalism, or Pan-Germanism. It is well known that the Pan-Germans regard England as Teutonic, and destined to be gathered into the German fold. In these last few weeks we have been reproached as a people for being traitors to our 'Teutonic' blood. Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty; but as a matter of fact our mixed blood has many other strains than the Teutonic. On the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profit consult a book by Paul Vergnet, _La France en danger_ (Oct. 1913).]
[Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche it should be said that in his later years he revolted against the Prussian military system.]
[Footnote 185: German professors have recently reproached England for being allied with 'Muscovite barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whose sovereign convened the first Peace Conference? Have not England and Russia striven together in peace (as they now strive together in war) for a great common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fasten on Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that has happened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantage refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff, _Russia: the Psychology of a Nation_ (Oxford, 1914).]
EPILOGUE
In conclusion something must be said of the process by which our understanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913, became the solid alliance which now, on sea and land alike, confronts the German forces. England gave France no positive engagements until the eleventh hour; it may be argued that England gave them far too late, and that the war might never have occurred if England had been less obstinately and judicially pacific. But the English case for the delay is clear. We hesitated to throw in our lot with France, because France would not stand neutral while Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from the incalculable entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied ourselves with a power which was so committed. Why, we were asking ourselves, should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans?
We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might contemplate this policy. She could not define beforehand the limits which she would observe in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, as we now know, that a war with Russia meant, to German statesmen, only a pretext for a new attack on France, even more deadly in intention than that of 1870. France could not do without the help of Russia. How then could she afford to forfeit Russia's friendship by declaring, at Germany's command, that she would do nothing to help Russia?
This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last days before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well disposed, could not help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and for France these were the critical weeks, the weeks upon which her own fate must depend. She appealed urgently to England for support.
But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it could make no definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had been foreshadowed in earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had made it abundantly clear that there could be no prospect of common action unless France were exposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no certainty of such action even in that case. But France had staked everything upon the justice of her cause. She had felt that her pacific intentions were clear to all the world; and that England could not, with any self-respect, refuse assistance. The French mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, to convince the British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleet had been left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England no less than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was the disappointment with which France received the English answer of July 31st.
But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If our answers to France were guarded, our answers to the German overtures of July 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting the battle of France with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went still further, by undertaking to defend the French coasts and shipping, if the German fleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea. To justify our position of reserve from July 31st to August 4th we may quote what Mr. Asquith said the other day (September 4th):--
'No one who has not been in that position can realize the strength, the energy, and the persistence with which we laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest, straining almost to breaking-point our most cherished friendships and obligations.'
Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never any prospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it should not succeed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It is easy to be wise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet government and we have Parliamentary government. Before an English minister can act, in a matter of national importance, no matter how positive his own convictions may be, he must convince his colleagues, and they must feel certain of convincing a democracy which is essentially pacific, cautious, slow to move. Nothing short of the German attack on Belgium would have convinced the ordinary Englishman that German statesmanship had degenerated into piracy. That proof was given us on August 4th; and on that day we sent our ultimatum to Berlin.
To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to back with the French for their national existence and our own. Our own, because England's existence depends not only on her sea-power, but upon the maintenance of European state-law. The military spirit which we have described above (Chap. VI) tramples upon the rights of nations because it sees a foe in every equal; because it regards the prosperity of a neighbour as a national misfortune; because it holds that national greatness is only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbing other nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and who possibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning: _Tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet_.
Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue would find her still convinced that she has taken the only course compatible with honour and with public law. Military anarchism shall be destroyed if England, France, and Russia can destroy it. On this object England and France have staked their last ship and their last soldier. But, it may be asked, what state-system do we hope to establish, if and when we are successful in this great crusade?
What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, is, first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and whatever else can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This is the indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The next essential is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never experience such another invasion as we have seen in August, 1914; without a France which is prosperous, secure, and independent, European civilization would be irreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, as essential as the other two, is the conservation of those other nations which can only exist on sufferance so long as _Realpolitik_ is practised with impunity.
To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their friend, and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in her history she has made war upon a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the 'Balance of Power' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be too great. In these struggles she assisted the small Powers, less from altruism than because their interest was her own. She supported Holland against Philip II of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she supported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, to the best of her power, Switzerland and Piedmont.
We do not argue--it would be absurd to argue--that England has always been free from reproach in her dealings with the smaller states. Holland may well remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century and the English Navigation Laws. But Holland should also remember that, in the seventeenth century, England was not yet a great Power; Holland and England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent alliances have healed, over a policy which England has long since renounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great wrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark knows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England. Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no assistance in 1864. That mistake--for it was a mistake of weakness, not deliberate treachery--has brought its own nemesis. We are still paying for that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson. The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as Denmark may react on such a state as England.
England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become less prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm of naval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help she can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she could not tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires to found. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the political system for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. That system England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it is adopted.
English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with English interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended struggling nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece and Italy for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill of England to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, is largely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature. They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity. They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization which links together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and more durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. In this fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we have forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunate position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in the same direction.
APPENDIX I
GERMANY'S REASONS
FOR
WAR WITH RUSSIA
How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby made the European War.
WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.
Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin.
Foreign Office, Berlin, August 1914.
On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.
The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servias policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborly relations.
In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.
It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.
Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our allys estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.
We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia but have not participated in her preparations.
Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.
The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.
As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced.
From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2.]
From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign powers.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.]
Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan.
In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.]
The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]
The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in the evening.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]
The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:
"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.
"But mobilization means war.
"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."
[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]
On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the German military attaché his word of honor that no order to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché then pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.
In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.
On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison.
In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most emphatic steps.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]
On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.
France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]
Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an understanding between these two powers.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.]
We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.
In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.
Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]
On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.
On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows:
"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,--a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.
"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.
"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia".
On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army:
"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.
"As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.
"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves."
In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sasonow. Count Szápáry was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]
Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.
During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.
Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]
During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser, and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.
On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser:
"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.
"Your cordially devoted
"Nicolas."
This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:
"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."
Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]
After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.
The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.
The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.
The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.
Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:
"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply."
To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:
"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.
Thus Russia began the war against us.
Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.]
The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.
On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.
THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.
THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA.
Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.
"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government:
"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistence which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.
"The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Servia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.
"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled language of the press, the glorification of the originators of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.
"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such sufferance.
"_It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped, from Servian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier officials._
"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.
"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.
"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:
"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.
"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31st, 1909.
"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will hence-forward proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort."
"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the Army.
"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows:
"1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latters territorial integrity;
"2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form;
"3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
"4. to remove from military service and the administration in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government;
"5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;
"6. to commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the examinations;
"7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have been compromised through the result of the investigation;
"8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica, who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier;
"9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th;
"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this note."
ENCLOSURE.
The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following results:
1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.
2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.
3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Servian Army in Kragujevac.
4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider--(outside Belgrade).
5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.
THE SERVIAN ANSWER.
Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914. (With Austria's commentaries in italics.)
The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly and neighborly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.
The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been renewed protests against the great neighborly monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in the declaration and actions of the responsible representatives of the state at that time, and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of March 31st 1909; furthermore that since that time neither the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government has made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text book, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of the Balcan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderate policy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she has brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved.
_The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing that since the declaration of March 31st 1909, there has been no attempt on the part of the Servian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina._
_With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy._
_Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia._
The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the state. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to solve the greater number thereof, in favor of the progress of both countries.
_The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the expressions of the press and the activity of Servian associations possess a private character and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control of the state. This is also provided for by the Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to the monarchy._
The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions that citizens of Servia had participated in the preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to cooperate in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready in order to prove its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it would receive information.
_This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has done nothing in this direction._
According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to position and rank, every Servian citizen, for whose participation in the crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July to publish the following enunciation:
"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which should be directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e. the entirety of such activities as aim towards the separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable consequences of these criminal machinations."
_The Austrian demand reads_:
"_The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary_...."
_The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Servian Government reserves itself the supterfuge for later occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor recognized the same as hostile to the monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the present one_.
The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I. and R. Government certain Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declaration of March 31st, 1909.
The Government ... identical with the demanded text.
_The formula as demanded by Austria reads_:
"_The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries ... have participated_...."
_Also with this formula and the further addition "according to the declaration of the I. and R. Government", the Servian Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future_.
The Royal Government binds itself further:
1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the monarchy is to be must severely punished, as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.
It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible according to the clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution.
_Austria had demanded_:
_1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy._
_We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take care that such attacks of the press would cease in the future._
_Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means towards this end, viz.:_
_a) A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to the monarchy can be individually punished, a matter, which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the desired success._
_b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permit confiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of the Government to enforce it and that has not been promised us._
_These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the event of the notpassing of these laws by the Skuptschina everything would remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of the Government._
2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against Austria-Hungary.
_The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of Servia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we have asked besides:_
"_To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and in another form._"
_In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana._
3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs.
_Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Servia while it must know that the text books introduced in the Servian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies._
_Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition desired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction"--a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools_.
4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged.
_By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point_.
5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the cooperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every cooperation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations.
_The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties_.
6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.
_The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable_:
_1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the outrage_.
_2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations ("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête judiciaire")._
_3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation._
_If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great number) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible_.
7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which the note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, wherefor a warrant has been issued against him.
The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo.
_This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade_.
8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe the existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.
It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.
9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were made and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected therefor.
_The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfill the demand._
10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put into execution.
The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at the Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on March 31st 1909.
_The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time._
EXHIBIT I.
The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on Juli 23rd 1914.
The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes for their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt must disappear that the center of action of the efforts for the separation of the south slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and of the Army.
The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to press its demands with the Servian government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it.
I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the sense indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and therewith give special emphasis to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences.
I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the course of your interview.
EXHIBIT 2.
The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914.
You will make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited:
In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance of members of the Servian government and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.
The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian government and the energetic intercession of the powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable.
The reply of the Servian government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian government than to press its demands, if need be through military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great power.
Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and a task of Russia's to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield.
The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favor toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realize that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers desire to localize, there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence.
The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavors which aim at the localization of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.
Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our command. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.
EXHIBIT 3.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 24th 1914.
Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Chargé d'affaires in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstance, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charge d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to Sasonow.
EXHIBIT 4.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 24th 1914.
I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties concerned.
EXHIBIT 5.
The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of July 26th 1914.
The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonow this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.
EXHIBIT 6.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor on July 25th 1914.
Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp to the Czar).
The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria are being made.
EXHIBIT 7.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor on July 26th 1914.
The military attaché requests the following message to be sent to the general staff:
I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.
EXHIBIT 8.
Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July 27th 1914.
Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.
(Note that the official translator means _Kriegszustand_.)
EXHIBIT 9.
Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July 27th 1914.
Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued manoeuvres.
EXHIBIT 10.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent. July 26th 1914.
Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilization.[186] If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.
[Footnote 186: The German text inserts _auch gegen uns_, i.e. also against us.]
EXHIBIT 10a.
Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. July 26th 1914.
After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.
EXHIBIT 10b.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.
After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial dis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.
EXHIBIT 11.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.
Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Secretary of War:
Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honor that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even against Austria as very menacing.
EXHIBIT 12.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 27th, 1914.
We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.
EXHIBIT 13.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 25th, 1914.
The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers.
EXHIBIT 14.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.
We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.
EXHIBIT 15.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.
We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna.
EXHIBIT 16.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28th, 1914.
Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.
EXHIBIT 17.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914.
News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.
EXHIBIT 18.
Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the Kaiser on July 30th, 1914.
Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization against Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not desert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilized.
EXHIBIT 19.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July 31st, 1914.
We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.
EXHIBIT 20.
I. His Majesty to the Czar.
July 28th, 10.45 p.m.
I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The inscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort, still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder, shall suffer their deserved punishment.
On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.
Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin
signed: Wilhelm.
EXHIBIT 21.
II. The Czar to His Majesty.
Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.
I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.
signed: Nicolas.
EXHIBIT 22.
III. His Majesty to the Czar.
July 29th, 6.30 p.m.
I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot--as I told You in my first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious war". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.
According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.
signed: Wilhelm.
EXHIBIT 23.
IV. His Majesty to the Czar.
July 30th, 1 a.m.
My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.
signed: Wilhelm.
EXHIBIT 23a.
V. The Czar to His Majesty.
Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.
I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.
Nicolas.
EXHIBIT 24.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.
In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication.
EXHIBIT 25.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.
Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We have therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.
EXHIBIT 26.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.
If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement:
"Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avail été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.
"A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la securité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemande, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:
"Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie."
Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time.
Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.
EXHIBIT 27.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August 1st 1.05 p. m.
Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.
APPENDIX II
EXTRACTS FROM
SIR EDWARD GREY'S
CORRESPONDENCE
RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN
CRISIS
_For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August 1914_
No. 13.
_Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25._
(Translation.)
M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:
"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.
"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.
"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.
"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."
No. 17.
_Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July_ 25.)
(Telegraphic.) _St. Petersburgh, July_ 25, 1914.
I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.
If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.
On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present _status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.
I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.
No. 18.
_Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 25.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July 25, 1914._
Your telegram of the 24th July acted on.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.
Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.
Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.
No. 41.
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.
I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.
I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.
No. 43.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 27, 1914.
Your telegram of 26th July.
Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.
In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.
Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.
No. 56.
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.
The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
No. 62.
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July 28_, 1914.
I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,[187] which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.
In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.
[Footnote 187: "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.]
No. 85.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 29.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 29, 1914.
I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.
His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.
In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.
Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.
No. 87.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.
M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.
He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 89.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation--which I hoped would continue--into thinking that we should stand aside.
He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?
I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.
The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 98.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 30.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 30, 1914.
Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.
He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave--a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday--Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.
His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.
He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.
No. 101.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, July_ 30, 1914.
Your telegram of 29th July.[188]
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.
Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_ improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.
[Footnote 188: See No. 85.]
Enclosure 1 in No. 105.
_Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon_.
My dear Ambassador, _Foreign Office, November 22_, 1912.
From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.
Yours, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 119.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 31, 1914.
M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, it we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.
I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.
M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.
I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.
M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.
I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.
M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.
I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 122.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 31, 1914.
Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.
I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.
It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.
I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.
In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.
No. 123.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[189] of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.
He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.
I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to Public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.
The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
[Footnote 189: See No. 122.]
No. 133.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:--
"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.
"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."
(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)
No. 134.
_Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Paris, August_ 1, 1914.
President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.
No. 148.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 2, 1914.
After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:--
"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.
"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."
I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.
M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow--in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.
No. 153.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 4, 1914.
The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:--
"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.
We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.
His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.
APPENDIX III
Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government.
(Cd. 7445.)
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey_.
Sir, _London, August_ 8, 1914.
In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.
During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.
I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.
After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.[190]
[Footnote 190: This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.]
APPENDIX IV
THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO
SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN _dossier_ OF THE CRIME
The following document is contained in the German Version of the German White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our knowledge of the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be reprinted, as it is omitted altogether in the official version in English of the German White Book. The authorship of the document is uncertain. It has the appearance of an extract from a German newspaper.
Aus dem österreich-ungarischen Material.
Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der österreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an die auswärtigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts erwähnte Dossier wird heute veröffentlicht.
In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die südlichen Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurückgreist. Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln und an Intensität wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der Unnerionskrise ihren Höhepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen hervor. Während einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegen die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich--von anderen Propagandamitteln abgesehen--Ussoziationen, die diese Kämpfe vorbereiteten, unter denen die Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionären Komitee hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader Auswärtigen Amte völlig abhängige Organisation unter Leitung von Staatsmännern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und dem ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und Milan Pribicevic gehören zu diesen Gründern. Dieser Berein hatte sich die Bildung und Ausrüstung von Freischaren für den bevorstehenden Krieg gegen die öfterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In einer dem Memoire angefügten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens veröffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Tätigfelt und Ziele dieses Vereins ausführlich dargelegt werden. Es heißt darin, daß zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren nahen und ferneren Brüdern jenseits der Grenze und unseren übrigen Freunden in der Welt gehören.
_Oesterreich ist als erster und größter Feind bezeichnet_. Wie die Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt, predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das Schlußkapitel enthält einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln für den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die Annexion vorangezeigt hat.
Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbrana angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Tätigkeit der Narodna Odbrana, die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zur Ausbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic und von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmäßig inspiziert wurden. Weiter wurden die Komitatschis im _Schießen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnbrücken_ usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen Erklärung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber nicht nur nicht erfüllt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire führt als Beispiel die Art und Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentäter als serbischer Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blätter wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt.
Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gründung wurde die Narodna Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der _Schützenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, und verschiedene andere Vereine angehörten_.
Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die füörperliche Entwickelung der Bevölkerung Serbiens sowie deren materielle Kräftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass es eine unerlässliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten grössten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu führen, und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen unterjochter Brüder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und Reden ähnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswärtige Tätigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei denen offen Mitglieder für die erwähnte serbische Vereinigung geworben wurden, besteht. Gegenwärtig ist noch die Untersuchung darüber im Zuge, dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmänner und Missionäre wurde die Aufwiegelung in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie unter bedenklichen Umständen verleitet. In den Schulen der Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der gewünschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militärisch auch insofern vorbereitet, als serbische Emissäre im Falle des Ausbruchs der Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstörung von Transportmitteln usw., der Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in einer besonderen Beilage belegt.
Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Tätigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den Attentaten gegen den Königlichen Kommissär in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem missglückten Attentat Schäfers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es verbreitet sich hierauf über den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, über die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wie sich die Attentäter mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors Tankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwassën lieferte, wie auch die Rolle eines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als Zögling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte. Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darüber lässt, dass dies ein wohl voerberiteter und für die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war.
Eine Beilage enthält einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in Serajewo über die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic und Papovic geständig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem flüchtigen Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm zu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist geständig, die Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole ausgeführt zu haben. Beide Täter gaben zu, bei der Verübung der Tat die Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage enthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter über Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmässig hergestellt wurden, für millitärische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft über den Transport der drei Attentäter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, dass ein Angehöriger der Monarchie einige Tage vor dem Attentat dem österreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur Verübung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog während dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gründen verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein. Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt hätten. Da diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprüft sind, kann über deren Stichhaltigkeit vorläufig noch kein Urteil gefällt werden. In der Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, während das vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Südungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenröte der serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu befreienden Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw. stehen.
APPENDIX V
Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.
(Cd. 7596)
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_.
_London, September_ 1, 1914.
Sir,
The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.
The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.
So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official "Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.
On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.
The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.
His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.
The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szápáry with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szápáry had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.
Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.
Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."
M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.
The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.
The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.
On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.
On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.
After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument...
[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
[Footnote 192: See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
APPENDIX VI
EXTRACTS FROM
THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
_Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques_:
_Négociations ayant précédé la guerre_
_10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Août 1914_
PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI
This important collection of documents, which has only reached us since the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp. 66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of any proposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the willingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and Russia, to continue discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis took Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts when friction began with Russia. (_Infra_, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)
The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened to mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. This threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking all precautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's desire, the only course open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable.' (_Infra_, No. 58.) The reader will also notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the German army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn; and that the German Government explained that the publication had been premature and accidental. (_Infra_, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening in her attitude to Russia.
It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declared war on Russia. (_Infra_, No. 79.)
In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methods employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of the Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.
RECUEIL
DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.
Négociations ayant précédé la guerre.
10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Août 1914.
Petrograde, Imprimerie de l'Etat. 1914.
No. 1.
Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_).
Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, à 6 heures du soir, an Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un délai de 48 heures pour l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajouté verbalement que pour le cas où la note ne serait pas acceptée intégralement dans un délai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la Légation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en tournée électorale ont été rappelés et sont attendus à Belgrade demain Vendredi à 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a communiqué le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et déclare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de l'Autriche.
(Signé) Strandtman.
No. 2.
Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._
Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
Texte de la note qui a été transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:...
(_For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22_ (supra _in Appendix I._))
Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note'.[193]
(Signé) Strandtman.
[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3 (_supra_, Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book.]
No. 3.
Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Pétersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le 11/24 Juillet 1914 à 10 heures du matin.
Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est trouvé dans la nécessité de remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois courant, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:
(Suit le texte de la note).
Voir document No. 2.
No. 4.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé d'affaires en Autriche-Hongrie.
_(Télégramme)._
St.-Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit....
(This communication is printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 13); see p. 177 _supra_ for the text in English.)
Communiqué à Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 5.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie et en France.
_(Télégramme)._
St.-Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Me réfère à mon télégramme à Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous espérons que le Gouvernement auprès duquel. Vous êtes accrédité partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d'urgence à son Représentant à Vienne de se prononcer dans le même sens.
Communiqué à Belgrade.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 6.
Télégramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent de Serbie à Sa Majesté l'Empereur.
Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie dès les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a déclaré qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir une enquête sur son territoire si la complicité de certains de ses sujets était prouvée au cours du procès instruit par les autorités Austro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignité comme Etat indépendant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du gouvernement dans l'officiel et un ordre du souverain à l'armée, où nous réprimerions l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant à nous mêmes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées perfides.--On nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les nôtres à l'instruction et pour surveiller l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la note. Nous avons reçu un délai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Légation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prêts à accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat indépendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acception nous sera conseillée par Votre Majesté; toutes les personnes dont la participation à l'attentat sera démontrée seront sévèrement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient être exécutées sans des changements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donné un délai trop court. Nous pouvons être attaqués après l'expiration du délai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontière. Il nous est impossible de nous défendre et nous supplions Votre Majesté de nous donner Son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance précieuse de Votre Majesté qui s'est manifestée tant de fois à notre égard nous fait espérer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son généreux coeur slave.
En ces moments difficiles l'interprète les sentiments du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Majesté de vouloir bien s'intéresser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.
(Signé) Alexandre.
No. 7.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._
Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Tous les journaux du matin, même ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent l'impossibilité pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posées, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton énergique adopté par l'Autriche. L'officieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulièrement agressif; il qualifie de superflus les recours éventuels de la Serbie à St. Pétersbourg, à Paris, à Athènes et à Bucarest, et termine en disant que le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la situation dans la péninsule Balcanique va enfin s'éclaircir.
(Signé) Bronewsky.
No. 8.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
La copie de la note officiellement remise à Belgrade a été communiquée par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche an Gouvernement Français. Plus tard l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visité le Ministre et lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait obligée de recourir à une pression et, en cas de besoin, à des mesures militaires; la communication se terminait par la remarque qu'à l'avis de l'Allemagne cette question devrait être résolue directement entre l'Autriche et la Serbie et qu'il était de l'intérêt des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire en l'abandonnant aux Parties intéressées. Le Gérant du Département Politique, qui assistait à l'entretien, demanda à l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait considérer l'action autrichienne comme un ultimatum--en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas où la Serbie ne se soumettrait pas entièrement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilités étaient inévitables? L'ambassadeur évita une réponse directe en alléguant l'absence d'instructions.
(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
No. 9.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Pachitch est rentré à Belgrade. Il a l'intention de donner dans le délai fixé, c'est à dire demain Samedi à 6 heures du soir, une réponse à l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. On adressera aujourd'hui même aux Puissances la prière de défendre l'indépendance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est inévitable--nous ferons la guerre.
(Signé) Strandtman.
No. 10.
Communiqué du Gouvernement Impérial.
St.-Pétersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Les derniers événements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum à la Serbie préoccupent le Gouvernement Impérial an plus haut degré. Le Gouvernement suit attentivement l'évolution du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifférente.
No. 11.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Le comte Berchtold se trouve à Ischl. Vu l'impossibilité d'y arriver à temps, je lui ai télégraphié notre proposition de prolonger le délai de l'ultimatum et l'ai répétée verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la communiquer à temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, mais a ajouté qu'il pouvait prédire avec assurance un refus catégorique.
(Signé) Koudachew.
No. 12.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Suite à mon télégramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la réponse négative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois à notre proposition de prolonger le délai de la note.
(Signé) Koudachew.
No. 13.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Reçu avec retard le 14--27 Juillet 1914.
Je transmets la réponse que le Président du Conseil des Ministres Serbe a remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois à Belgrade aujourd'hui avant l'expiration du délai de l'ultimatum....
(The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, pp. 23-32 (supra, Appendix I.).)
No. 14.
Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 11/24 Juillet. Ai communiqué son contenu an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais l'a également prié de conseiller à Vienne la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum; il a communiqué cette démarche télégraphiquement à Vienne, il va en faire autant pour notre démarche, mais il craint qu'à la suite de l'absence de Berchtold parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses télégrammes ne restent sans résultats; il a, en outre, des doutes sur l'opportunité pour l'Autriche de céder an dernier moment et il se demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai répondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait céder sans porter atteinte à son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus précises. Même lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir à Vienne pour éviter la possibilité de conséquences redoutables, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères répondait chaque fois négativement.
(Signé) Bronewsky.
No. 15.
Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Ai reçu le télégramme du 11/24 Juillet concernant la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le Représentant de France à Vienne a été muni d'instructions conformes.
(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
No. 16.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Reçu télégramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a prescrit à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'appuyer notre démarche concernant la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en même temps que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche était venu le voir et avait expliqué qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer à la note autrichienne le caractère d'un ultimatum; il faudrait la considérer comme une démarche qui, en cas d'absence de réponse ou en cas de réponse insuffisante au terme fixé, aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le départ immédiat de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer cependant le commencement immédiat des hostilités.--Grey a ajouté qu'à la suite de cette explication il a indiqué à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne que dans le cas où il serait trop tard pour soulever la question de la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arrêt des hostilités pourrait peut-être servir de base à la discussion.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 17.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres.
_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nous comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du côté de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l'équilibre européen, en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passé et qui serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 18.
Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle répandue par quelques journaux d'après laquelle la démarche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation de l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait été remise et n'a exercé aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est à tort qu'on attribue à l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.
L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de l'Autriche les revendications à son avis légitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.
Avant tout elle désire comme elle l'a déjà déclaré dès le commencement du différend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localisé.
No. 19.
Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)_ Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Me réfère à mon télégramme du 11/24 Juillet.
Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publié, sous une forme pas entièrement exacte, les déclarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent à cette démarche le caractère d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, très impressionné par ces divulgations, a visité aujourd'hui le Gérant du Département Politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caractère de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a déclaré que l'Autriche avait présenté sa note à la Serbie sans entente précise avec Berlin, mais que cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche et que certainement 'la flèche une fois partie' (ce sont là ses propres paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs d'alliée.
(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
No. 20.
L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a déclaré que le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas été informé du texte de la note autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entièrement la démarche autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demandé en même temps si l'Angleterre pouvait consentir à agir à St. Pétersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a répondu que cela était complètement impossible. Le Ministre a ajouté que tant que les complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les intérêts Anglais n'étaient engagés qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait prévoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la Russie et que dès ce moment on se trouverait en présence d'une situation à laquelle seraient intéressées toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se réservait pour ce cas une complète liberté d'action.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 21.
Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Malgré le caractère extrêmement conciliant de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, à 6-1/2 du soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas reçu an délai fixé une réponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la Légation. La Scoupchtina est convoquée à Nich pour le 14/27 Juillet. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la même ville.
(Signé) Strandtman.
No. 22.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Grey a dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'à son avis la mobilisation autrichienne devait entraîner la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre générale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en présence des mobilisations autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immédiate et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan nécessitait avant tout l'agrément de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas mobiliser. En conséquence il a adressé tout d'abord à Berlin une question à ce sujet.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 23.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Italie.
_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
L'Italie pourrait jouer un rôle de tout premier ordre en faveur du maintien de la paix, en exerçant l'influence nécessaire sur l'Autriche et en adoptant une attitude nettement défavorable au conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait être localisé. Il est désirable que vous exprimiez la conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide à la Serbie.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 24.
Le Gérant du Consulat à Prague au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Prague, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
La mobilisation a été décrétée.
(Signé) Kazansky.
No. 25.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie.
_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Après avoir examiné avec lui les 10 demandes adressées à la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'à part la forme peu habile sous laquelle elles sont présentées, quelques-unes parmi elles sont absolument inexécutables, même dans le cas où le gouvernement Serbe déclarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1 et 2 ne pourraient être exécutés sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la Scoupchtina pourrait être difficilement obtenu; quant à l'exécution des points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des conséquences fort dangereuses et même faire naître le danger d'actes de terrorisme dirigés contre les membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrer dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me semble, qu'avec certains changements dans les détails, il ne serait pas difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues étaient confirmées par des preuves suffisantes.
Dans l'intérêt de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de Szápáry, est précieuse à l'Autriche au même degré qu'à toutes les Puissances, il serait nécessaire de mettre au plus tôt possible une fin à la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait très désirable que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fût autorisé d'entrer avec moi dans un échange de vues privé aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du 10/23 Juillet. Ce procédé permettrait peut-être de trouver une formule qui fût acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction à l'Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le sens de ce télégramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 26.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne.
_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet.
Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon télégramme à Vienne d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir, que de son côté il trouvera possible de conseiller à Vienne d'aller au-devant de notre proposition.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 27.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
Le Directeur du Département Politique m'informe, que lors de la communication qu'il a faite à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas caché son étonnement de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donné satisfaction à Giesl. L'attitude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du Département Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe.
(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
No. 28.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et lui a fait les déclarations suivantes:
«L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paix et espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg dans un sens modérateur». Le Ministre fit observer que l'Allemagne pourrait de son côté entreprendre des démarches analogues à Vienne, surtout en présence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la Serbie. L'Ambassadeur répondit que cela n'était pas possible, vu la résolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances--l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France--ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des démarches à St. Pétersbourg et à Vienne, puisque l'affaire se réduisait en somme à un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur allégua l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa d'adhérer à la proposition allemande.
(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
No. 29.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet 1914.
Le Directeur du Département Politique a déclaré qu'à son avis personnel, les démarches successives allemandes à Paris ont pour but d'intimider la France et d'amener son intervention à St. Pétersbourg.
(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
No. 30.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
Après la réception à Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l'armée autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composée, aux dires des journaux, en partie d'éléments autrichiens, se livra à une série de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure avancée de la soirée les manifestants se massèrent à plusieurs reprises devant le palais de l'Ambassade Impériale en poussant des cris hostiles à la Russie; la police était presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure.
(Signé) Bronewsky.
No. 31.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)_.
Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Ai reçu votre télégramme du 13-26 Juillet. Prie me télégraphier si, à Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne s'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la médiation des 4 Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à St. Pétersbourg que Vous étiez disposé à accepter cette combinaison, Grey a décidé de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite hier soir à Berlin, à Paris et à Rome.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 32.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en France et en Angleterre.
_(Télégramme)_.
St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 53.).)
No. 33.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie.
_(Télégramme)_.
St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Ai pris connaissance de la réponse transmise par le Gouvernement Serbe au Baron Giesl. Elle dépasse toutes nos prévisions par sa modération et son désir de donner la plus complète satisfaction à l'Autriche. Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient être encore les demandes de l'Autriche, à moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un prétexte pour une guerre avec la Serbie.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 34.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)_.
Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a conféré aujourd'hui de nouveau longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du Département Politique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insisté sur l'exclusion de toute possibilité d'une médiation ou d'une conférence.
(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
No. 35.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Ai conféré avec le Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, en présence de Berthelot, immédiatement après mon retour à Paris. Tous les deux m'out confirmé les détails concernant les démarches de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a communiqués dans ses télégrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirmé par écrit sa déclaration d'hier, savoir: 1) l'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas à l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son unique but est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. 2) Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. 3) L'Allemagne et la France, complètement solidaires dans l'ardent désir de ne pas rompre la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens modérateur. Le Baron de Schoen a spécialement souligné l'expression de la solidarité entre l'Allemagne et la France. D'après la conviction du Ministre de la Justice, les démarches susdites de l'Allemagne out pour but évident de désunir la Russie et la France, d'entraîner le Gouvernement Français dans la voie des représentations à St. Pétersbourg et de compromettre ainsi notre allié à nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la responsabilité non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant tous ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 36.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Il ressort de vos télégrammes du 13/26 Juillet que vous ne connaissiez pas encore la réponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le télégramme par lequel cette nouvelle m'a été communiquée de Belgrade a été également en route pendant 20 heures. Le télégramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Français expédié avant-hier, au triple tarif, à onze heures du matin, et contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre démarche, n'est parvenu à sa destination qu'à 6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce télégramme n'ait été retenu intentionnellement par le télégraphe autrichien.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 37.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a communiqué au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères que la réponse de la Serbie a été jugée insuffisante à Vienne et que demain, mardi, l'Autriche procéderait à des 'actions énergiques' don't le but serait de forcer la Serbie de lui donner les garanties nécessaires. Le Ministre ayant demandé en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur répondit qu'il n'avait pas de renseignements exacts à ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage da la frontière serbe, d'un ultimatum et même d'une déclaration de guerre.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 38.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
J'ai prié le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'appuyer à Vienne votre proposition tendant à autoriser Szápáry d'élaborer, par la voie d'un échange de vues privé avec Vous, une rédaction des demandes austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a répondu qu'il était an courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis de Pourtalès que, puisque Szápáry avait commencé cette conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il télégraphiera dans ce sens à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Vienne. Je l'ai prié de conseiller d'une façon plus pressante à Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller à l'Autriche de céder.
(Signé) Bronewsky.
No. 39.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, ce dernier avait reçu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tenté de lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative à une action en faveur de la paix, action qui serait exercée simultanément à St.-Pétersbourg et à Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France. Cambon a proposé que ces Puissances donnent à Vienne un conseil dans les termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle». En adoptant cette formule voilée on éviterait de mentionner la nécessité de s'abstenir d'une invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a opposé à cette proposition un refus catégorique, et cela malgré les instances de l'Ambassadeur qui a fait valoir, comme un bon côte de la proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances grâce auquel on évitait l'opposition de l'Alliance à l'Entente, ce dont s'était si souvent plaint Jagow lui-même.
(Signé) Bronewsky.
No. 40.
Télégramme de Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur à Son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant à Moi dans un moment particulièrement difficile ne s'est pas trompée sur les sentiments qui M'animent à Son égard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.
Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée par la situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces à aplanir les présentes difficultés. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien pour arriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignité de la Serbie.
Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgré Notre plus sincère désir, Nous ne réussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut être assurée qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se désintéressera du sort de la Serbie.
(Signé) Nicolas.
No. 41.
L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Vienne, le 14/17 juillet 1914.[194]
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères est absent. Pendant un entretien prolongé, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout à fait amicaux, attiré son attention sur l'impression défavorable qu'a produite en Russie la présentation par l'Autriche à la Serbie de demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque état indépendant, bien que petit. J'ai ajouté que ce procédé, qui pourrait amener des complications les moins désirables, a provoqué en Russie une profonde surprise et une réprobation générale. Il faut supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence des assurances du Représentant Allemand à Vienne, lequel pendant toute cette crise a joué un rôle d'instigateur, a compté sur la probabilité de la localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilité de porter à cette dernière impunément un coup grave. La déclaration du Gouvernement Impérial concernant l'impossibilité pour la Russie de rester indifférente en présence d'un tel procédé a provoqué ici une grande impression.
(Signé) Schébéko.
[Footnote 194: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.]
No. 42.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Londres, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.[195]
Grey vient de répondre à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui était venu le questionner sur la possibilité d'une action à St.-Pétersbourg, que cette action devrait se produire à Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin serait le mieux qualifié pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer en même temps que la réponse serbe à la note autrichienne dépassait par sa modération et son esprit de conciliation tout ce à quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a ajouté qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseillé à Belgrade de donner une réponse modérée et qu'il pensait que la réponse serbe pouvait servir de base à une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question.
Dans ces conditions, a continué Grey, si l'Autriche malgré cette réponse commençait les hostilités, elle prouverait son intention d'anéantir la Serbie. La question placée sur ce terrain produirait une situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient impliquées toutes les Puissances.
Grey a enfin déclaré que le Gouvernement Anglais était bien sincèrement disposé à collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agirait de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire l'Angleterre se réservait une pleine liberté d'action.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
[Footnote 195: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.]
No. 43.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.
(_Télégramme_). St.-Pétersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 54.).)
No. 44.
Le Consul général à Fiume au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Fiume, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
L'état de siège a été proclamé en Slavonie, en Croatie et à Fiume et en même temps les réservistes de toutes les catégories ont été mobilisés.
(Signé) Salviati.
No. 45.
L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (I)).)
No. 46.
Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publié le texte de la note responsive serbe qui lui avait été communiqué. Jusqu'à ce moment cette note n'a paru in extenso dans aucun des journaux locaux, qui selon toute évidence ne veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de l'effet calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs allemands.
(Signé) Bronewsky.
No. 47.
L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914.
Le décret sur la mobilisation générale a été signé.
(Signé) Schébéko.
No. 48.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres.[196]
_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914.
En présence des hostilités entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est nécessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action médiatrice et que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit immédiatement suspendue. Autrement la médiation ne servira que de prétexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donnera entre temps à l'Autriche la possibilité d'écraser complètement la Serbie et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans.
Communiqué à Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.
(Signé) Sazonow.
[Footnote 196: An English (abbreviated) version of this telegram is given in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 70 (2)).]
No. 49.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne.
_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet, 1914.
(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (2)).)
No. 50.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre et en France.
_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (3)).)
No. 51.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
Sur ma question s'il avait une réponse de Vienne relativement à Votre proposition de pourparlers privés à St.-Pétersbourg, le Secrétaire d'Etat a répondu négativement.
Il déclare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout ouvertement. Parlant à Cambon, il a même ajouté qu'en cas d'une pression trop évidente l'Autriche se hâterait de mettre l'Allemagne en présence d'un fait accompli.
Le Secrétaire d'Etat dit qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui un télégramme de Pourtalès d'où il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous êtes disposé à trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai répliqué que probablement Vous avez été dès le commencement en faveur d'un compromis, bien entendu à la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pour l'Autriche, mais également pour nous. Il m'a dit ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commencé à mobiliser sur la frontière autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour l'Autriche la possibilité de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de préparatifs sur notre frontière. J'ai répondu que, d'après les renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait également sur notre frontière et que par conséquent nous devions prendre des mesures analogues. J'ai ajouté que les mesures que nous avons peut-être prises de notre côté n'étaient nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne.
(Signé) Bronewsky.
No. 52.
Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, an nom de son Gouvernement, a déclaré à Pachiteh que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralité.
(Signé) Strandtman.
No. 53.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
A l'occasion de l'arrivée du Président de la République Français le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères avait préparé un court exposé de la situation politique actuelle, à pen près dans les termes suivants: L'Autriche, craignant la décomposition intérieure, s'est emparée du prétexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des garanties qui pourront revêtir la forme de l'occupation des communications militaires serbes ou même du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix dépend de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit être «localisée» entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est à dire de la punition de la politique précédente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'avenir. De ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action modératrice à Pétersbourg. Ce sophisme a été réfuté à Paris comme à Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a en vain tâché d'entraîner la France à une action solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les mêmes tentatives out été faites à Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a été répondu que l'action devrait être exercée à Vienne, car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son refus de discuter les rares réserves de la Serbie, et la déclaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre générale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent exercer une action modératrice sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus grande modération, surtout en conseillant à la Serbie d'accepter ce qui était possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui l'Allemagne paraît renoncer à l'idée d'une action sur la Russie seule et incline vers une action médiatrice à Pétersbourg et à Vienne, mais en même temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tâchent de faire traîner l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose à la Conférence sans indiquer aucune autre manière d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mène des pourparlers manifestement dilatoires à Pétersbourg. En même temps elle prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolérées, ses prétentions augmenteront proportionnellement. Il est très désirable que la Russie prête tout son appui an projet de médiation que présentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche, sous prétexte de «garantie», pourra, en fait, changer le status territorial de l'Europe orientale.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 54.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 10/29 Juillet 1914.
Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 15/28 Juillet à Grey. Il a déclaré aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient échoué, et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Pétersbourg que la Russie mobilisait contre l'Autriche à la suite de la mobilisation de cette dernière. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est déclaré en faveur de la médiation, mais qu'il rencontre des difficultés quant à la forme. Grey a insisté pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquât la forme laquelle à l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur médiation pour éviter la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre la médiation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas où l'Allemagne consentirait à se ranger du côté de la paix.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 55.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entière résolution du Gouvernement Français d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette résolution est soutenue par les cercles les plus étendus et par les partis, y compris les radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui présenter une déclaration exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques du groupe. Dès son arrivée à Paris, Viviani a télégraphié d'urgence à Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Pétersbourg et Vienne il était nécessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelât le plus tôt possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition concernant la médiation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a reçu aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouvelé l'assurance des tendances pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Allemagne désirait la paix elle devrait se hâter d'adhérer à la proposition de médiation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a répondu que les mots «conférence» ou «arbitrage» effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a répliqué qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre forme de médiation. D'après l'avis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succès des négociations entre les Puissances il serait nécessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander à la Serbie. Viviani a répondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en enquérir auprès de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive serbe pourrait servir de base à la discussion; il a ajouté que la France désirait sincèrement la paix, mais qu'elle était en même temps résolue d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses alliés et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette résolution rencontrait la plus vive approbation du pays.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 56.
Télégramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie à sa Majesté l'Empereur.
Profondément touché par le télégramme que Votre Majesté a bien voulu M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur. Je prie Votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la cordiale sympathie, dont Votre Majesté est animée envers Mon pays, nous est particulièrement précieuse et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est assuré étant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de Votre Majesté. Ces moments pénibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la protection de Votre Majesté seront conservés pieusement dans l'âme de tous les Serbes.
(Signé) Alexandre,
No. 57.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
J'ai communiqué à Pachitch le texte du télégramme responsif de Sa Majesté l'Empereur an Prince Alexandre. Pachitch après l'avoir lu, se signa et dit: «Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clément»! Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'émotion qui l'avait gagné. L'héritier est attendu à Nich dans la nuit.
(Signé) Strandtman.
No. 58.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en France.
_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 10/29 Juillet 1914.
Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communiqué la résolution prise par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses préparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commencé ces derniers qu'à la suite de la mobilisation à laquelle avait déjà procédé l'Autriche et vu l'absence évidente chez cette dernière du désir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie.
Puisque nous ne pouvons pas accéder au désir de l'Allemagne, il ne nous reste que d'accélérer nos propres armements et de compter avec l'inévitabilité probable de la guerre.--Veuillez en avertir le Gouvernement Français et lui exprimer en même temps notre sincère reconnaissance pour la déclaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entièrement sur l'appui de notre alliée de France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette déclaration nous est particulièrement précieuse. Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 59.
Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Nich, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
Le Prince-Régent a publié hier un manifeste signé par tous les Ministres à l'occasion de la déclaration de la guerre par l'Autriche à la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: «Défendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le Régent lut en son nom le discours du trône, an début duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation démontrait l'importance des évènements actuels. Suit l'exposé des faits des derniers jours--l'ultimatum autrichien, la réponse serbe, les efforts du gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui était compatible avec la dignité de l'Etat pour éviter la guerre et enfin l'agression armée du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux côtés de laquelle se tient le Monténégro. En passant à l'examen de l'attitude des Puissances en présence du conflit, le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est animée la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa Majesté l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et de la Russie un «jivio» formidable et fébrile secouait la salle des séances. Les marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent aussi relevées séparément et provoquèrent des «jivio» d'approbation de la part des députés. Le discours du trône se termine par la déclaration d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par l'expression du voeu que toutes les mesures soient prises pour faciliter la tâche du Gouvernement.
(Signé) Strandtman.
No. 60.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, et en Italie.
_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a demandé si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que l'Autriche pourrait donner--de ne pas porter atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de Serbie--et indiquer à quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir à suspendre nos armements; je lui ai dicté, pour être transmise d'urgence à Berlin, la déclaration suivante: «Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires.»
Veuillez télégraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouvernement Allemand en présence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre désir de faire le possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons pas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'à faire gagner du temps à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche pour leurs préparatifs militaires.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 61.
L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
J'apprends que le décret de mobilisation de l'armée et de la flotte allemandes vient d'être promulgué.
(Signé) Swerbéew.
No. 62.
L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me téléphoner pour me communiquer que la nouvelle lancée tout à l'heure de la mobilisation de l'armée et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets des journaux étaient imprimés d'avance en prévision de toutes éventualités, et mis en vente à l'heure de l'après-midi, mais que maintenant ils sont confisqués,
(Signé) Swerbéew.
No. 63.
L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 16-29 Juillet et ai transmis le texte de Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que je viens de voir; il m'a dit qu'il avait reçu un télégramme identique de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg et m'a déclaré ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche.
(Signé) Swerbéew.
No. 64.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 16 et 17 Juillet à Grey lequel considère la situation comme très sérieuse, mais désire continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer à Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que l'Autriche ne pût profiter de ces atermoiements pour écraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous vous trouviez s'était apparemment modifiée. A cette époque nos rapports avec l'Allemagne n'étaient pas compromis. Après la déclaration de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg concernant la mobilisation allemande, ces rapports avaient changé et sa demande avait reçu de Votre part la seule réponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne était revenu auprès de Vous et s'était enquis de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formulées dans des circonstances tout-à-fait spéciales. J'ai en même temps de nouveau insisté auprès de Grey sur la nécessité de prendre en considération la situation nouvelle créée par la faute de l'Allemagne à la suite de l'action de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a répondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait compte de ces arguments.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 65.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé à Grey pour quelle raison l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a répondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractère agressif, mais que la situation était telle que chaque Puissance devait se préparer.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 66.
L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
Malgré la mobilisation générale je continue à échanger des vues avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez l'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de visées de conquête à l'égard de la Serbie, mais tous insistent également sur la nécessité pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'an bout l'action commencée et de donner à la Serbie une leçon sérieuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir.
(Signé) Schébéko.
No. 67.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.[197]
_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
Me réfère à mon télégramme du 17/30 Juillet. D'ordre de son gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le désir du Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule que j'ai proposée hier à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai répondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous je vous transmets la formule modifiée en conséquence.
'Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe à assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance,--la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.'
(Signé) Sazonow.
[Footnote 197: The second paragraph is printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_ No. 132).]
No. 68.
L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me dire que nos pourparlers, qui étaient déjà difficiles à la suite de la mobilisation contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en présence des graves mesures militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y relatives sont, d'après lui, reçues ici de tous les côtés et devront provoquer inévitablement des mesures analogues de la part de l'Allemagne. A cela j'ai répondu que, d'après des renseignements sûrs dont je disposais et qui étaient confirmés par tous nos compatriotes arrivant à Berlin, la prise contre nous des mesures susdites se poursuivait également en Allemagne avec grande activité. Malgré cela, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les officiers de leurs congés et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres.
(Signé) Swerbéew.
No. 69.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.
_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre à Grey l'expression de ma plus sincère reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a usé pendant les pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grâce à quoi l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'est pas encore perdu.
Je l'ai aussi prié de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que ce n'était qu'à Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques chances d'un succès quelconque, en facilitant à l'Autriche la nécessité d'un compromis.
Communiqué à l'Ambassadeur en France.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 70.
Télégramme secret aux Représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur à l'étranger.
(_Télégramme_). Le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a déclaré, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est-à-dire à midi, Samedi, nous ne commencions pas la démobilisation, non seulement à l'égard de l'Allemagne, mais aussi à l'égard de l'Autriche, le Gouvernement Allemand serait forcé de donner l'ordre de mobilisation. A ma question si c'était la guerre, l'Ambassadeur a répondu par la négative, mais en ajoutant que nous étions fort près d'elle.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 71.
L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Londres, 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
Grey m'a dit qu'il a télégraphié à Berlin qu'à son avis la dernière formule acceptée par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base de négociations qui présente le plus de chances pour une solution pacifique du conflict. Il a exprimé en même temps l'espoir qu'aucune grande Puissance ne commencerait les hostilités avant l'examen de cette formule.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 72.
L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
(_Télégramme_). Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a posé aux Gouvernements Français et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralité de la Belgique.
La France a répondu dans I'affirmative, tandis que le Gouvernement Allemand a déclaré ne pouvoir répondre à cette question catégoriquement.
(Signé) Benckendorff.
No. 73.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visité hier Viviani et lui a déclare que l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais était prête à discuter avec les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le Gouvernement Français est très préoccupé par les préparatifs militaires extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontière française, car il est convaincu que sous le voile du «Kriegszustand» se produit une véritable mobilisation.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 74.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
A la réception ici du télégramme de l'Ambassadeur de France à St.-Petersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faite l'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la résolution de l'Allemagne de décréter aujourd'hui la mobilisation générale, le Président de la République a signé le décret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procède à l'affichage des listes d'appel des réservistes. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite à Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvelle communication, en alléguant l'impossibilité de déchiffrer les télégrammes qu'il a reçus. Viviani l'a informé de la signature du décret de mobilisation en réponse à la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait part de son étonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eût pris une telle mesure à un moment où se poursuivait encore un échange de vues amical entre la Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajouté que la mobilisation ne préjugeait pas nécessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pourrait rester à Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est resté à Vienne et celui d'Autriche à St.-Pétersbourg.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 75.
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
Je tiens du Président que pendant les dernières journées l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a assuré avec force le Président du Conseil des Ministres et lui même, que l'Autriche nous aurait déclaré être prête à respecter non seulement l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur cette déclaration. J'ai opposé un démenti catégorique à cela.
(Signé) Iswolsky.
No. 76.
Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg le 19 Juillet 1914 à 7 h. 10 du soir.
Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre à[198]) cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude [198]) que son action était dirigée contre I'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:
Sa Majesté l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire, relevant le défi se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.
St.-Pétersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
(Signé) F. Pourtalès.
[Footnote 198: Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparées d'avance et que par erreur elles out été insérées toutes les deux dans la note.]
No. 77.
Communiqué du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères concernant les événements des derniers jours.
Le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914.
Un exposé défigurant les événements des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse étrangère, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères croit de son devoir de publier l'aperçu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvisé.
Le 10/23 Juillet a.c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade présenta an Ministre Président Serbe une note où le Gouvernement Serbe était accusé d'avoir favorisé le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti à l'assassinat de l'héritier du trône austro-hongrois. En conséquence l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le contrôle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une série de mesures tendant à la découverte du complot, à la punition des sujets serbes y ayant participé et à la prévention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le sol du Royaume. Un délai de 48 heures fut fixé au Gouvernement Serbe pour la réponse à la susdite note.
Le Gouvernement Impérial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Pétersbourg avait communiqué le texte de la note 17 heures après sa remise à Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles étaient inexécutables quant an fond, tandis que d'autres étaient présentées sous une forme incompatible avec la dignité d'un Etat indépendant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie contenue dans ces demandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa prépondérance dans les Balcans démontrée par ces mêmes exigences, le Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale à l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait désirable de soumettre à un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir à une discussion de la note. L'action modératrice des autres Puissances à Vienne ne fut non plus couronnée de succès.
Malgré que la Serbie eût reprouvé le crime et se fût montrée prête à donner satisfaction à l'Autriche dans une mesure qui dépassa les prévisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade jugea la réponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette ville.
Reconnaissant le caractère exagéré des demandes présentées par l'Autriche, la Russie avait déclaré encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de rester indifférente, sans se refuser toutefois à employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fût acceptable pour l'Autriche et ménageât son amour-propre de grande puissance. En même temps la Russie établit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie comme Etat indépendant. Malheureusement tous les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement Impérial dans cette direction restèrent sans effet. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, après s'être dérobé à toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, procéda à la mobilisation, déclara officiellement la guerre à la Serbie, et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombardée. Le manifeste qui a accompagné la déclaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir préparé et exécuté le crime de Seraïewo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de droit commun lancée contre tout un peuple et tout un État attira à la Serbie par son inanité évidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la société européenne.
A la suite de cette manière d'agir du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, malgré la déclaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait rester indifférente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial jugea nécessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle décision s'imposait parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement Serbe et les premières démarches de la Russie cinq jours s'étaient écoulés, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la mobilisation de la moitié de l'armée austro-hongroise avait été décrétée.
Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie; il lui fut en même temps expliqué qu'elles n'étaient que la conséquence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne. En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial déclara que la Russie était prête à continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de négociations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soit en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conférence des quatre Grandes Puissances non intéressées directement, voire l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie.
Cependant cette tentative de la Russie échoua également. L'Autriche-Hongrie déclina un échange de vues ultérieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se déroba à la participation à la Conférence des Puissances projetée.
Néanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la paix. Répondant à la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, à quelles conditions nous consentirions encore à suspendre nos armements, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères déclara que ces conditions seraient la reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serbe avait revêtu le caractère d'une question européenne, et la déclaration de cette même Puissance qu'elle consentait à ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.
La proposition de la Russie fut jugée par l'Allemagne inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanément on reçut à St.-Pétersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation générale par l'Autriche-Hongrie.
En même temps les hostilités continuaient sur le territoire Serbe et Belgrade fut bombardée derechef.
L'insuccès de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'élargir les mesures de précaution militaires.
Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adressé une question à ce sujet, il lui fut répondu que la Russie était forcée de commencer ses armements pour se prémunir contre toutes éventualités.
Tout en prenant cette mesure de précaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et déclara être prête à accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posées par nous.
Malgré cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Allemand, le 18/31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la demande d'avoir à suspendre ses mesures militaires à midi du 19 Juillet/ 1 Août, en menaçant, dans le cas contraire, de procéder à une mobilisation générale.
Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Août, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, an nom de son Gouvernement, la déclaration de guerre.
No. 78.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de S. M. I'Empereur à l'étranger.
(_Télégramme_). St.-Pétersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914.
Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce dès à présent de rejeter sur nous la responsabilité de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a été provoquée par l'énorme responsabilité que nous aurions assumée, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution à un moment où l'Autriche, se bornant à des pourparlers d'un caractère dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procédait à une mobilisation générale.
Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'était engagé vis-à-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole à n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Après une telle garantie et après toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre déclaration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignité et l'indépendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en étant complètement incompatible avec notre propre dignité, aurait certainement ébranlé l'équilibre Européen assurant l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne. Ce caractère Européen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important que le prétexte qui l'a créé. Par sa décision de nous déclarer la guerre à un moment où se poursuivaient les négociations entre les Puissances, l'Allemagne a assumé une lourde responsabilité.
(Signé) Sazonow.
No. 79.
Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Pétersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le 24 Juillet à 6 h. du soir.
D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie ce qui suit:
«Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec ladite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie à partir du présent moment.
"(Signé) Szápáry. St.-Pétersbourg. 6 Août/24 Juillet 1914."