Part 85

Captain LAWRENCE. He would either be facing the crowd or facing the street, depending on the necessity at that time. He was given no specific instructions except that he was not told specifically that he would face the crowd on the traffic assignments, but he was told that he was to watch the crowd, so I wouldn't say that the man--that all of the men on the route were specifically instructed to face the crowd. I gave them no such instructions.

Mr. GRIFFIN. As you drove down the route preceding the motorcade, did you observe just exactly what these men were doing?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; most of the men were watching the oncoming traffic and keeping it moving. They were keeping this oncoming traffic moving. Some of the men were trying to push the crowd back, especially in the downtown area. There were many of them facing the crowds there and trying to push the crowds back, and this was, I imagine, about a mile ahead of the motorcade.

Mr. GRIFFIN. As a practical matter--stationing as you did two men at each intersection generally--could two men have effectively prevented anyone who was bent upon attacking the President, could they have effectively prevented him from rushing out and doing something?

Captain LAWRENCE. If they saw them in time, but two men, in as large a crowd as that--these men had all they could handle, with as large a crowd as we had turn out for that motorcade. It was a full-time job keeping the crowd back, and this was what the officers were trying to do.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Have you given any thought, or do you have any suggestions as to how a police department the size of the Dallas Police Department could have stationed more men along the route so that they could have effectively--not only kept the crowd back but could have been effectively on the lookout for people who might want to rush out and do something?

Captain LAWRENCE. Well, looking back on it, I would say, with the manpower that we had for this particular job and the crowd that turned out, that without the use of precautions, these men would have a very difficult time keeping a crowd back like that. This crowd was an enthusiastic crowd, as you know, as you probably have heard many times, and it was a bigger crowd than I expected.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Is it practical for a city the size of Dallas to use barricades or ropes along the motorcade, the length of the one that the President traveled?

Captain LAWRENCE. Well, with the length of this motorcade, I don't believe that we could have on this short a notice, and this is my opinion. We would have to go to another source to get sufficient barricades to handle it, because I don't think we have that many barricades--I don't think that many barricades would be available for a motorcade as long as this one.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Does the police department maintain barricades?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; the barricades are obtained from the public works department. We have been able to request barricades to barricade off streets at certain events on holidays and parks. We have asked for barricades and we have always received barricades.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you give any specific instructions to your men with respect to watching windows?

Captain LAWRENCE. No.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you give any specific instructions to the people who were stationed along Elm and Houston at the intersection of Elm and Houston, the man at Houston in particular, did you direct any particular attention to those men who were stationed there?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; I did not make the individual assignments, but as I said, the only thing I did was make these remarks as to these particular assignments in stating that they would be made by these officers, and, of course, there were some assignments made in this area and there were also some assignments made to the overpass.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Was there anything that would be in the general orders or the general background and training of the police officers who were stationed along this route which would make the individual police officer believe that it was his responsibility to watch the windows of buildings?

Captain LAWRENCE. I don't recall any specific instructions of that kind ever being given on an assignment of this type, because--again--as I said, with the manpower that was assigned and the crowd they had to control, that the officer had all he could take care of in maintaining crowd control of the people on the streets and watching the crowd there.

I am talking about the men that were assigned for these specific assignments here. I assume that some instructions have been given to some members of the CID, the criminal investigation division, and to the men from the special service bureau, and the men specifically assigned to security duties instead of traffic duties. It would be my assumption that this was a part of the assignments given.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Would the duties of the men at the intersections be so burdensome prior to the time that the motorcade actually arrived that they couldn't keep their eyes on the windows and other places such as that? In other words, did they have anything to do of substance until shortly before the motorcade arrived?

Captain LAWRENCE. They had everything they could do to take care of the crowds when I came through there before the President's motorcade--keeping the crowds back, in fact, when I was listening on channel 2 I heard Inspector Sawyer asking for more help for men downtown to try to keep the crowds back so the motorcade could get through there.

Mr. GRIFFIN. When an officer is at an intersection for the purpose of crowd control, do his problems begin as soon as the crowd begins to form, regardless of how long it is before the President is going to arrive, or does the problem only become a substantial one when he realizes the President is 5 minutes away?

Captain LAWRENCE. I think when he first goes on assignment, that's when he's prepared to handle the crowd.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, is there a danger that the crowd is going to move out into the street at any point as soon as it gets large enough where the people start to push and shove?

Captain LAWRENCE. This did happen in the downtown area and this was substantially before the President's car actually arrived. This is why, I believe, and I am assuming, because I was ahead of this motorcade, but I heard Chief Curry ask these motorcycle officers that were way up ahead to drop back, and some of them that were alongside and to the rear of the President, to pull up alongside his car, and Chief Curry had some of these motorcycle officers that were supposed to be about a couple of blocks ahead of this motorcade, he asked them to drop back. He asked the lead motorcycles that were supposed to be a half block ahead of the escort--he asked them to drop back.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, is it fair to say that without specific instructions, that an officer would not watch the windows of buildings? He would not do it as a result of routine orders that prevail in the police department and his general training.

Captain LAWRENCE. I would say in a case like this that an officer should do this and this should be part of his responsibility on the job, but I also have to say he was not given any specific instructions to do that as far as buildings were concerned, but I'm talking about the men assigned to this traffic assignment.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Are there any other specific instructions besides watching the windows of buildings that, as a result of your experience on November 22, you think should be given to police officers who have traffic assignments?

Captain LAWRENCE. As a result of what happened on November 22, I believe that where a Head of State, the President of the United States, comes to Dallas and is in a motorcade or a parade, that the streets should be barricaded or roped off and that officers--more officers than were stationed be stationed along the route to control the crowd. I mean, of course, this is looking back--as I told you before--there were more people along the route--in fact, I was surprised--they had even stopped their cars all along Stemmons Freeway.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Of course, we are trying to benefit from hindsight, when I asked you if in looking back you could make some suggestions for the future.

Captain LAWRENCE. That's right.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Could a police force the size of the Dallas police force have found more officers to man the route?

Captain LAWRENCE. With a route as long as this, I doubt that they could have, because some of these officers were given second and third assignments and this motorcade route, as long as it was, was in my opinion--this was too long of a motorcade route to give the proper security, and our department wasn't big enough to handle an event--of course, this is hindsight again--and an event like this with a route as long as this to cover all of the cross streets, because we certainly didn't cover all of the cross streets along the route except the downtown area. We covered some of the main ones and there were other streets that were not covered and the people themselves block the streets for the motorcade.

Mr. GRIFFIN. You have with you here a list of the assignments you made on November 22?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; I do.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Could you give that to us so we can mark it for identification?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes, sir; would you mind me explaining a couple of them?

Mr. GRIFFIN. No; not at all, if you think it is necessary.

Captain LAWRENCE. There were some changes made.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I am going to mark this as Capt. W. P. Lawrence Deposition, July 24, 1964, Exhibit No. 2. Do you want to indicate what clarification you would make in the assignments that are shown on Exhibit No. 2?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; on the morning of November 22, the streets were still wet and it was raining that morning and I talked to Asst. Chief Batchelor about some of the motorcade assignments and he agreed with me that no car, no motorcycle officer, should pass the President's car, so we reassigned some officers indicated by asterisks on this detail to cover the Stemmons Freeway traffic lanes to the rear of the escort to prevent any vehicles from passing the presidental party, and that's shown on the detail. Also, as I say--you can see the asterisks here beside these officers and they were changed. Also, I felt that because of the curvature of Stemmons Freeway and these people coming over a crest and around a curve--that they would be on top of these motorcycle officers and would not have warning enough. I discussed placing a couple of the three-wheel motorcycle officers up further on Stemmons Expressway, which would be back farther south, so that when they saw from the top of Stemmons Expressway this motorcade approaching, they could start stopping the traffic before it came around the curve and down the hill because of the speed. For this reason, two officers were stationed--their assignment was changed and they were placed--they were stationed up on Stemmons Freeway for the purpose of starting to stop this traffic themselves.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Is there anything else on there that you think should be clarified?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; on the evening--I'm going back a day, but on the evening of November 21, I was handed a list of additional men from the Third Patrol Platoon to work traffic assignments. Here is the list--you can have this list.

Mr. GRIFFIN. All right.

Captain LAWRENCE. This necessitated me making some changes so that the three-wheel motorcycle officers could be taken off of corner assignments and placed on patrol assignments in the downtown area, and those assignments, or some of those patrol assignments are shown on the last page of this.

Mr. GRIFFIN. All right.

Captain LAWRENCE. The changes you can see were made in ink. There was one particular assignment, on page 3, that we had eliminated because we understood that the Highland Park Police would cover Lemmon and Loma Alto and then when these additional men were given to us, two officers were placed back on this assignment.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I have marked the additional list of 19 men, which list you received on November 22, as Capt. P. W. Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Exhibit No. 3. Let me ask you some specific questions about it--about the men who were stationed in the area of Dealey Plaza. Did you question any of these men after the President was shot to determine whether or not they had seen anyone in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository Building?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; however, when I questioned the men--the men had already been--one man that I questioned had already been questioned by Mr. Sorrels and this would be Officer J. E. Murphy and two other men that I questioned were Officers J. W. Foster and J. C. White. I questioned J. W. Foster regarding the men that were alongside him on the overpass, on the triple underpass where the President was to go.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Sergeant Harkness?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; I didn't question Sergeant Harkness.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Officer King--W. K. King?

Captain LAWRENCE. No.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Officer J. B. Allen?

Captain LAWRENCE. No.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Officer W. H. Denham?

Captain LAWRENCE. No.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Or Officer W. E. Barnett?

Captain LAWRENCE. No.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Officer J. M. Smith?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; I did not.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Officer E. L. Smith?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; I did not.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Do you know of anyone in the police department who questioned those men after the assassination to determine whether or not they had been observing the windows of the Texas School Book Depository Building and had seen anybody in those buildings?

Captain LAWRENCE. I know that all of these men have been questioned and that they were calling all of these men to be questioned and that this investigation was being handled by the Secret Service, and this is one reason why I did not question these men.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Have you received any information that any of these men did see anybody at the windows of the Texas School Book Depository Building, particularly on the sixth floor?

Captain LAWRENCE. I have never received any information from any of these men that they saw anybody up there.

Mr. GRIFFIN. You have answered that you did not conduct an investigation of these men and that you thought the Secret Service did; let me ask the further question--has the police department conducted an investigation of these men who were at the intersections of Main and Houston and Elm and Houston?

Captain LAWRENCE. To my knowledge, they were--there was an investigation requested.

Mr. GRIFFIN. By the police department?

Captain LAWRENCE. By the police department--that reports were requested from these men, by the supervisory officers, but--and by the inspectors and the deputy chiefs--but I was not given any such assignment.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Let me turn to the movement of Lee Harvey Oswald and ask you when did you first receive instructions as to the moving of Lee Harvey Oswald to the county jail?

Captain LAWRENCE. I received no original instructions on the movement of Lee Harvey Oswald. I was scheduled to be off on Saturday and Sunday. These were my days off. On Saturday at approximately 10 a.m., I came down in civilian clothes and I observed a large crowd of people around the county courthouse and I had knowledge from what I had heard on television and I had seen on television and heard on the radio that charges had already been filed against Lee Harvey Oswald, so it was my assumption that he would be transferred to the county jail, but I had no knowledge of it; and seeing this large crowd gathering down at this part of town, I immediately called the traffic office and started trying to contact Sergeant Harkness and finally got him down there and told him to get some other traffic officers down there and I remained down at this location until approximately 6:30 p.m. when Captain Thompson came on duty. While down there and during the afternoon, I noticed there was a large crowd gathered and there seemed to be a need for barricades or ropes or something to keep these people behind these ropes and across the street from the county jail, and I called Chief Batchelor's office, and Officer Art Hammett answered the phone and I told Art Hammett there was a large crowd down there, and this was early in the afternoon--I would say about 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon on Saturday--and there was a large crowd there and I believe that ropes or barricades were necessary to keep these people out of the streets and across the street at Dealey Plaza, and Hammett said he would try to get in touch with Chief Batchelor and let me know.

On Saturday afternoon I got a call on the radio, and, of course, it was a three-wheel motorcycle with the radio going, and Officer Hammett asked me and I am assuming he was in the dispatcher's office at the time, and he asked me if the ropes that I requested were to block off the street for motor vehicle traffic and I told him it was not, and he said, "Well, permission is granted." Then, we borrowed some rope from the sheriff's office and we roped off this block across the street from the county jail. We also got some barricades from Elm and Houston where a--where part of the street had been blocked off there anyway, and we blocked off the sidewalks on the county jail side--at Houston and Elm Street, and Main Street, and the only persons we allowed in this area were television, radio, and news media people.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you take any further precautions on Sunday?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes. By the way, when Captain Thompson came on, I contacted him by radio and asked him to meet me down there and he relieved me and our solo motorcycle detail was placed down there in the evening. When I got home I called Chief Lunday at home and I told him--that's when I heard that the transfer was supposed to be made the following morning, that there would be a need for some more men down there and that I would be down there and I would get as many men as I could on the location. So on Sunday morning I arrived down there and I'm going to guess at the time as approximately 8 a.m. I first went by the office and I picked up some police reserves in my car and took about four of them down there with me, and then I had some motorcycle officers that were not already stationed--upstairs on the third floor--and I had them meet me down there too. It was still roped off and the crowds started gathering and I personally instructed Sergeant Steigel to go down there and Sergeant Bellah, and most of the men down there, I personally instructed them that when Oswald was brought in down there, that they were not to look at Oswald, that they were to face the crowd and they were not to worry about anything but keeping their eyes on that crowd, because I estimated there were approximately 500 people down there at that time, and these officers were specifically instructed on that. And when Chief Lunday showed up at approximately--sometime between 9:30 and 10, he showed up--he arrived in civilian clothes--he saw that there was a large crowd there too and we were concerned about the security of Oswald, and I expressed this opinion to Chief Lunday and Lieutenant Southard also. There with me at the time too was Captain Solomon, who also showed up down there. The only time that I knew that anything had happened was when Sheriff Bill Decker came out of his office and came by the cameras there where the vehicle was supposed to enter the county jail entrance there, and he waved for me to come over to him. I was across the street at that time and he told me that Oswald had been shot in the basement of the city hall. So, after this was confirmed, we then sent some more men to Parkland Hospital to seal it off.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you have anything to do with the stationing of men along the route that it was expected that Oswald was to follow?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; I didn't.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you ever receive any specific instructions from any of your superiors on stationing your men around Dealey Plaza or the county jail or did the precautions that you took--were they undertaken on your own initiative?

Captain LAWRENCE. I would say that I notified Chief Lunday of the situation down there and then he told me to go ahead and station these men there.

Mr. GRIFFIN. But there never was any independent effort made by your superior officers to contact you prior to the move and say, "Captain Lawrence, we are going to move Oswald at such and such a time, or in such and such a way, and take such and such precautions"?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; I believe though that Chief Lunday was in communication with headquarters because he went immediately after he talked to Lieutenant Southard and I and saw this crowd too, he immediately went inside the sheriff's office and it is my assumption that he had communication with them because he came out a little later and told me about the plans--how Oswald was to be brought down and that he would not be brought down in the armored truck, but that the armored truck would come Elm Street and would make a left turn off of Elm, and when it did, this car with the detectives in it would come first and the car with Oswald would turn into the ramp there at the county jail and they would lower the gates immediately. At that time Chief Lunday was in charge down there.

Mr. GRIFFIN. How long were you informed of this plan to bring Oswald in a police car; how long before you actually knew Oswald was shot did you learn about that plan?

Captain LAWRENCE. I would say approximately 10 minutes--I'm just guessing--I know it was just shortly after that that I heard he was shot.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Were you ever informed that the armored car had arrived at the police station?

Captain LAWRENCE. No; I had no knowledge of an armored car until Chief Lunday told me about it and at the same time he was telling me about it, a sergeant arrived down there from the radio patrol and was giving Chief Lunday some information to the same effect, that the armored car was going to be used as a decoy.

Mr. GRIFFIN. But maybe I didn't make my question clear--was any information ever passed on to the people at the county jail that the decoy car had arrived in the city basement?

Captain LAWRENCE. Not to my knowledge. I was outside all the time.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I think we have pretty well covered everything here. I'm going to ask you if you will sign Exhibit No. 1 and also Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3.

Captain LAWRENCE. This man did not show up and he was given some other assignment.

Mr. GRIFFIN. That is the No. 3 man there on that list?

Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; he was given some other assignment.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Let me mark one more paper here--this is a copy of a letter that you wrote.

Captain LAWRENCE. That's a copy of a letter that I wrote that you probably have in the file there.

Mr. GRIFFIN. This is a letter you wrote to Chief Curry on July 15 detailing what you did on November 22, and I am going to mark it Capt. P. W. Lawrence Deposition, July 24, 1964, Exhibit No. 4, and I will ask you if you will sign that up at the top also. Do you have anything else, captain, you would like to add?

Captain LAWRENCE. Oh, I guess this probably has been mentioned to you before--there are some people that were down there--Captain Solomon and I discussed the fact that we were rather shocked at the crowd that was down there when they announced that Oswald--when they heard that Oswald had been shot--about them cheering, but this was an actual fact, and I thought it was a terrible thing myself, it broke me up too, this killing of the President, but as I said, this was a real shock that these people cheered like this. This just showed the attitude of some of them that were down there. I can't think of anything else.