CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

"_And you, good Yeomen, Whose limbs were made in England, show us here The mettle of your pasture; let us swear That you are worth your breeding._"

SHAKESPEARE.--KING HENRY THE FIFTH.

[Sidenote: Oct. 1917.]

Our infantry withdrew from the line for a rest on the 12th October. The artillery, however, merely changed the scene of their labours, and about ten days later marched straight up from their former positions into action in the neighbourhood of Wancourt, to cover the 51st Division; the trench mortar batteries in the meantime were temporarily distributed between the 3rd and the 16th Divisions.

On the 29th we had the misfortune to lose a valuable officer in Lieut. H. Sutherland, signalling officer of the 312th Brigade, who was killed very soon after his brigade had joined the 51st Division.

My own headquarters had meanwhile moved to Haplincourt, and on the 30th October I learned from the G.O.C.R.A. of the 4th Corps that a big attack was to be made in the direction of Cambrai within about three weeks, in which the 62nd Division was to play a leading part. It was, in fact, to attack and capture the village of Havrincourt, a position of enormous strength protected by an elaborate system of trenches and barbed wire entanglements, and forming one of the strongest portions of the formidable Hindenburg line.

[Sidenote: Nov. 1917.]

The method of attack was to be an entirely new departure. There was to be no artillery preparation; in other words, not one gun beyond the normal was to be fired until the moment of assault, or what is technically known as "Zero." Then the barrage was to begin, and the infantry were to assault preceded by tanks. In addition to my own brigades, I was to have under my command for the operation the 77th, 93rd, and 16th Brigades, i.e. twenty batteries in all.

A period of intense activity now commenced. A tremendous lot of work had to be done, and there were at first very few men to do it. A party of about 100 men, taken from the 3rd and 16th Brigades R.H.A., was placed at my disposal, and I entrusted the superintendence of the work to Major C. A. Eeles, who tackled it with the greatest energy. Positions were selected for the five brigades at ranges of from 2000 to 2500 yards from the enemy's front line, chiefly along the Hubert road on the northern edge of the Havrincourt Wood, and, as it was absolutely essential that the work should be done without the Boche suspecting it, and the whole country was visible from his lines, the task was a very difficult one. The first thing to do was to screen off the proposed positions from view. That part of the wood through which the Hubert road ran had been cut down by the Huns when they retreated through it in April; a lot of scrub had grown up in the clearing during the summer, and with this a screen of twigs and branches was erected in one night, for a distance of two miles along the edge of the road on the enemy's side. When morning broke on the 4th November the road itself was invisible from the German trenches, and yet the screen that hid it mingled so well with the surrounding scrub that the enemy never noticed any change. For the next fortnight the work of preparation went on night and day, and so careful were the precautions taken by the working parties, that the enemy never had the slightest suspicion that anything unusual was going on. On this occasion the weather helped us, as the days were usually misty, and yet not a drop of rain fell all the time.

The preliminaries consisted in making positions for 20 batteries, digging ammunition recesses and telephone pits, construction of shelters for the detachments, the preparation of gun platforms and trail beds, and the collection at the gun pits of tremendous dumps of ammunition (700 rounds per 18-pounder gun and 450 rounds per howitzer). For the conveyance of the latter about three miles of light railway had to be laid down. Then O.P.'s and brigade headquarters were selected and prepared, and camouflage was collected and placed over all work as it was carried out, and also arranged ready for putting on the guns as they were required to move into their positions in action.

Lieut. E. W. Davis was wounded on the 9th November.

Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Foot, D.S.O., A.A. and Q.M.G. of the Division, left us about this time on appointment to a corps. He had always been most helpful to the gunners, and we were very sorry to lose him. His place was taken, after an interval of a few weeks, by Lieut.-Colonel Harold Lea, D.S.O., with whom the Divisional Artillery always preserved the same happy relations.

The artillery concentration began on the night of the 12th/13th November, when the 310th and 312th Brigades arrived in the neighbourhood of Beaulencourt; they concentrated next day at Barastre, where their wagon lines were to be during the battle. In this advance to the battle area the most elaborate precautions were taken to keep the enemy's suspicions from being awakened. All troops marched by night, and remained hidden during the day time in the various big woods, which are dotted about in this part of the country. I well remember walking over to the Corps Headquarters at Villers au Flos on the evening of the 14th; it was a pitch dark night, and I found it almost impossible to make my way along the road, which was covered along its whole length by an unbroken column of heavy guns being drawn by caterpillars--the heavy artillery concentrating for the battle. And yet next morning that same road presented its usual empty and tranquil appearance to such hostile planes as might happen to fly overhead.

On the 18th, Divisional headquarters moved to Neuville. The 312th Brigade moved into their gun positions on the night of the 17th/18th, and all the rest of my command on the night of the 18th/19th, i.e. the 310th, 77th, 93rd, and 153rd Brigades.

Lieut.-Colonel Lough, commanding 312th Brigade, left on the 17th, invalided home, and his successor, Lieut.-Col. A. G. Eden, joined us on the 19th.

The night of the 19th was a very anxious one, and will long be remembered by all who took part in the battle. It was impossible to tell whether the enemy had any suspicions of what was in store for him; he might even know all about it, and this was the more possible, as he had made a raid two nights before the battle and had captured one or two of our men. There was a chance that he might have wormed some information out of them, for an uneducated man may often give away valuable information quite innocently, out of pure ignorance or indiscretion. If he _did_ know, the enemy might have wrecked the attack before it began, by bombarding the long line of guns, which had the most definite orders on no account to fire a round till 6.20 a.m. when the attack was to be launched. As it happened, the Boche showed great uneasiness, and fired very heavily during the night, though fortunately not on any vital places. We listened to the firing in great suspense, and watched the flashes of the shell bursting apparently very near our line of guns; but we could get no information, for no telephones were allowed until the moment of attack, lest indiscreet things might be said, and tapped by the enemy's listening apparatus.

At 5.45 a.m. there was a particularly furious burst of firing, which died down at a few minutes past six, and was succeeded by a dead silence, during which one could fancy one heard the anxious beating of fifty thousand hearts. Did the Boche know; had he some infernal surprise for us? We stood in a little group outside the hut which served for our headquarters, and fixed our eyes on the long grey line of wood along the edge of which the guns lay waiting. The moment arrived. A tremendous thunder clap broke the silence; the whole sky grew red, and the air sighed with shell. The battle had begun according to our plans, and success was certain.

Preceded by the tanks, our infantry swept forward in an irresistible wave, and pressing close up behind the barrage, overcame all obstacles, capturing system after system of strongly fortified posts, and following the tanks through a jungle of barbed wire which the Boche might well have believed to be absolutely impenetrable. By about noon they had taken all their objectives. Havrincourt, Graincourt, Anneux, and the Cambrai road, from the factory north-west of Graincourt to the canal, were in our hands, together with several hundreds of prisoners, a 4.2-inch howitzer battery, and many machine guns and mortars. The Division had made the record advance of the war, 7000 yards in one day. The following message was received in the evening:

"Army Commander sends special congratulations to all ranks of the 62nd Division on their very fine achievements to-day."

As this was the greatest battle in which the Division had yet been engaged, I shall here give in full the official account of the artillery action, as it was made out at the time by Capt. Lindsell, my Brigade Major.

_20th November._ From zero (6.20 a.m.) until the capture of the brown line the artillery action was in the nature of a set piece, the barrage being fired according to timetable as detailed. No modifications were found necessary.

_10.30 a.m._ The first artillery advance was ordered, 77th Brigade being directed to send forward one battery to the area north-east of Havrincourt Wood in support of the 185th Infantry Brigade.

_10.40 a.m._ Eight prisoners were captured by the advanced reconnoitring party of C/310.

_10.50 a.m._ The 5th Brigade R.H.A., having passed under the orders of the C.R.A. 62nd Division, was ordered to advance battery by battery to the east of Havrincourt, to support the advance of the 186th Infantry Brigade on Graincourt.

_11.40 a.m._ The 77th Brigade was ordered to advance complete to the south-west of Havrincourt to cover the line Graincourt--Factory on Bapaume-Cambrai road.

_12 noon._ The 310th Brigade was ordered to advance battery by battery to the east of Havrincourt to support, with 5th Brigade R.H.A., the further advance of the 186th Infantry Brigade.

_2 p.m._ The Divisional Artillery situation was as follows:

5th Brigade R.H.A. East of Havrincourt, moving into action. 310th Brigade R.F.A. In column of route moving forward. 77th " " Two batteries in action south-west of Havrincourt, and two moving into action in the same area. } Still in original positions, 93rd 93rd " " } and 153rd awaiting orders 153rd " " } from 36th Division, to whose 312th " " } command they had now passed.

_2 p.m._ It was ascertained that the 51st Division (on our right) had not captured Flesquières. As this position exposed the right of the attack of the 62nd Division, the 310th Brigade were ordered back to their former positions; this order did not, however, take effect, as on receipt of later information they were allowed to continue their former movement.

_2.30 p.m._ The 77th Brigade was in action complete S.W. of Havrincourt.

_4.10 p.m._ The 5th Brigade R.H.A. and 310th Brigade R.F.A., in action east of Havrincourt, were grouped under Colonel West, R.H.A., to cover the line gained by the 186th Infantry Brigade in the vicinity of Graincourt. The 77th Brigade was ordered to cover the part in the direction of Flesquières. The 312th Brigade, still in its original position, was ordered to be prepared to cover the brown line as a defensive measure in case of necessity.

_6.50 p.m._ Orders were issued for the 62nd Division to continue the advance on Bourlon on the 21st, and for a further advance of all artillery brigades in support of this attack. Owing to the state of the ground it was found impossible to get the guns forward during the night. Brigades therefore advanced as early as possible on the 21st to positions S.W. of Graincourt, with the exception of the 5th Brigade R.H.A., which remained N.E. of Havrincourt. The four brigades, as their batteries were able to get into action, were placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 186th Infantry Brigade for his attack on Bourlon Wood. Owing to bad going and damaged roads the difficulties of getting guns forward proved very considerable, but all brigades were in position by the afternoon of the 21st, with communication established with the Infantry Brigade headquarters in Graincourt.

_21st November._ Bourlon Wood and village were attacked, under a barrage fired by the 5th R.H.A. and 310th Brigades. The attack was held up by machine gun fire from the Marquion trench. During the remainder of the day the artillery forward moves were continued, and a fresh attack on the Marquion line was organised for the 22nd.

_22nd November._ The 62nd Division again attacked under a barrage provided by all four artillery brigades. The attack succeeded in gaining a hold astride the Marquion line, south of Bourlon Wood.

The 40th Division then relieved the 62nd, the artillery, however, remaining in action under the former division.

* * * * *

The following Divisional Order was issued on the 24th November:

"SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY.

"The Divisional Commander has the honour to announce that both the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander have expressed their high appreciation of the achievements of the 62nd Division in the battle.

"The Divisional Commander had the most implicit confidence that the Division would acquit itself with honour. To have advanced 7000 yards on the first day, taken all objectives, held them against counter attacks, and handed over all gains intact to the relieving division, is a feat of arms of which any division may be justly proud.

"The number of prisoners taken by the division is not far short of 2000. Thirty-seven guns have been captured, which include two 8-inch howitzers, one complete 4.2-inch battery, one complete battery of 5.9-inch, and the remainder guns of various calibres, many of which were brought into action against the enemy.

"The number of machine guns, granatenwerfer, etc., etc., which have fallen into our possession is so considerable that it has not been possible yet to make an accurate tally of them.

"The advance of the artillery to Graincourt, and the accuracy of the barrage, is worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Regiment.

"To G Battalion, the Tanks, all ranks of the Division expresses their admiration of the skill, bravery, and the splendid self-sacrifice which made success possible.

"The discipline, valour, and steadiness of all ranks has been beyond praise.

"It is with great and legitimate pride that I have the honour to sign my name as Commander of the 62nd West Riding Division.

"WALTER BRAITHWAITE, Major-General."

On the 23rd, 24th and 25th November attacks were continued by the 40th Division against Bourlon Wood, which ended in the gaining of a firm footing in its southern outskirts. I received a letter from the G.O.C. 40th Division expressing his thanks "for the excellent and untiring support which the 62nd Divisional Artillery gave to the infantry under his command" on these days.

On Sunday the 25th the 62nd Division was ordered back into the line, much to our surprise, in relief of the 40th Division, which had suffered heavily in its severe three days' fight. Our orders were to capture Bourlon Wood, and we had the support of the following artillery in addition to our own: 5th Brigade R.H.A., 77th, 178th, and 181st Brigade R.F.A., and the 87th Heavy Artillery group.

Divisional headquarters moved forward into the Park of Havrincourt Chateau.

The attack was made at 6.20 a.m. on the 27th under a rolling barrage, and resulted in the capture of almost the whole of Bourlon Wood, the highest piece of ground for miles round. Our losses were very heavy, but the success was a most important one, and in the battle our tired Division met and shattered a division of Prussian Guards which had to be withdrawn from the line after only 24 hours in action.

Lieut. E. E. C. Lintern was wounded on the 25th, and for gallant services on the 21st and 22nd, Major E. W. F. Jephson won a bar to his Military Cross, and Lieut. N. Hess was awarded the Military Cross. The same honour was gained by Lieut. J. B. Boden and Lieut. P. C. Furlong for the following acts:

"On the 23rd November, Lieut. Boden, finding a disabled enemy field gun in a forward position, fitted the breech mechanism of another gun to it, and brought it into action in the open. He fired about 60 rounds with excellent effect, though under heavy fire, and in full view of the enemy."

"On the 25th November, when one of his guns blew up while his battery was in action, Lieut. Furlong collected the detachment who were suffering from shell shock, got them under cover, and steadied the detachments at the other guns, under heavy shell fire."

On the night of the 28th our infantry was relieved by the 47th Division. On this day and on the 29th there was a great increase of activity on the part of the enemy's artillery, and it became evident that he had been strongly reinforced.

At 8.45 a.m. on the 30th the enemy launched a very formidable counter attack, pouring his infantry forward in great masses and with the most desperate determination, supported by a tremendous artillery fire of high explosive and gas shell. As the hostile infantry appeared over the crest of the hill, to the west of Bourlon Wood, they were engaged with direct fire by our field artillery, which swept through and raked the advancing masses again and again, inflicting the most appalling losses upon them. The most desperate fighting went on all day, and at one time my two most forward batteries, A/312 and D/312, were within a few hundred yards of the Boche infantry. Batteries have seldom been given such excellent targets of massed infantry in the open as offered themselves that day to nearly all my batteries, and full advantage was taken of the opportunity. At 4 p.m., when darkness came on, the enemy had made no progress against our corps front, the most determined attacks of four German divisions, with three others in support, having been utterly crushed by the unconquerable resistance of the three British Divisions in the line. To quote from the official account issued by the General Staff:

"At the end of this day of high courage and glorious achievement, except for a few advanced positions, some of which were afterwards regained, our line had been maintained intact. The men who had come triumphantly through this mighty contest felt, and rightly felt, that they had won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against them in his full strength, and had been defeated with losses at which even the victors stood aghast."

Against the corps on our right the Boche had been more successful, and the position on its extreme right was at one time full of peril. Here the enemy penetrated our lines and captured Gonnelieu and Gouzancourt, though he was driven out of the latter village by the Guards that same night. The back areas were very heavily bombarded all through the day, and the D.A.C. in Metz suffered a good many casualties.

Lieut. C. B. Innes was wounded during this day's fighting; Lieut. E. T. Williams was awarded the Military Cross, while Lieut. J. B. Boden added a bar to the decoration which he had earned only eight days before:

"During a strong enemy attack the battery was in action during the whole of the day. For over seven hours the battery was heavily shelled, and during the whole of this period Lieut. Boden was among the guns, occasionally working a gun himself, and setting a magnificent example to the men of his detachment. Finally he was put _hors de combat_ through a shell dropping close by him and stunning him. His cool determination and devotion to duty were magnificent."

"On the battery being heavily shelled, and fired on by machine guns from the flank, orders were received to withdraw. Lieut. Williams remained behind with two guns, the wheels of which had been damaged, but succeeded in getting both of them clear of the position, thereby setting a splendid example of gallantry and fearlessness to the men."

Thirty-three Military Medals were also awarded (v. Appendix).

I handed over artillery command on the evening of the 30th, and rejoined Divisional Headquarters at Haplincourt, to find that all our three infantry brigades had again been thrown into the line in support of three different divisions. I heard to my great sorrow that Brig.-General Bradford, V.C., who had joined the 62nd only about three weeks before, had been killed. He was a man of extraordinary gallantry and great personal charm, and a born soldier and leader of men.

I copy here an extract from a captured document, signed by the Commander of the German army on our front, which was rather flattering to our pride as gunners:

"It is worthy of remark that our enemy's guns have a much smaller zone of dispersion than our own. They also appear to have better and more accurate data for shooting from the map than we have. This seems to be proved from the fact that in weather that excludes all possibility of observation, and under conditions very different from those prevailing during previous shoots, he obtains hits on small targets with great accuracy."

[Sidenote: Dec. 1917.]

Divisional Headquarters left the area of the Cambrai battle on the 4th December, together with the infantry of the Division, and after several moves the Artillery Headquarters finally settled down for a time at Bethoncourt, near Tincques, on the 19th. The guns, as usual, remained in action, supporting different divisions in the arduous work of adjusting the new trench line. Bourlon Wood was given up together with some more of the captured ground, but Havrincourt was retained, and the net result to us was considerably on the credit side.

Capt. E. F. Johnson was killed on the 9th December only about a week after joining the Division. On the 13th Lieut. L. Gane was awarded the Military Cross when in action at Doignies:

"When an enemy shell hit one of the gun pits which contained a large number of charges, Lieut. Gane ordered all the men away, and himself went into the pit. Satisfied that immediate action would save the shell dump and prevent the fire from spreading, he had a party to extinguish the flames, which was successfully accomplished. By his prompt action and coolness he saved the shells and guns from being blown up."

I received the following letter dated the 11th December from the G.O.C. R.A. of the 47th Division:

"To-morrow I shall be parting with your brigades and D.A.C., and I take the opportunity of thanking you most heartily for all the work they have done since you handed them over to me.

"Our infantry have been greatly pleased with the support your gallant fellows have given them, not only on November 30th, but ever since, and I am only sorry that they have had to put up with so much discomfort, but the conditions have made it impossible to do much for them. Colonel Sherlock has been a tower of strength.

"E. N. WHITLEY, Brig.-General R.A."

At last, after another fortnight of hard fighting and great discomfort, the artillery was withdrawn, and arrived in the rest area behind Arras on the 29th December. In spite of the severity of the weather, all ranks greatly enjoyed the rest which they had so well earned, although it could only be called a rest in the sense that they were out of danger and in a condition of comparative comfort. Much work of course had to be done in cleaning up and generally refitting, and in preparing to take up the new positions just north of Arras, which were now to be our special charge.

[Sidenote: Jan. 1918.]

On the 7th January my Brigade-Major, Capt. W. G. Lindsell, D.S.O., M.C., left the Division to take up the appointment of Staff Officer R.A. of the 8th Corps. He was greatly regretted throughout the Division, by none more sincerely than by myself. To an unlimited capacity for work, and a meticulously accurate knowledge of staff duties, he added a tact and charm of manner which made him many friends in the Divisional Artillery, and helped to ensure that all orders, however unpleasant, were carried out cheerfully and without question in full confidence that nothing which bore the Brigade-Major's signature would ever be unreasonable or unnecessary.

Major F. FitzGibbon, D.S.O., was appointed Brigade-Major in Lindsell's place, and I may say at once that he proved a most worthy successor.

In the New Year's gazette Capt. Lindsell, M.C., and Major Arnold Forster both received the D.S.O., and Major R. C. Foot the Military Cross. All these honours had been thoroughly well earned, but it was a great disappointment to me that more officers could not receive decorations. The allotment of honours allowed for regimental officers was always so small that each gazette left this feeling of disappointment behind it, and many an officer remained undecorated at the end of the war who had earned such distinction over and over again. Major Arnold Forster, I may here mention, was the only battery commander to hold that position in the Division throughout the war; one or two others ran him close as far as service in France was concerned, but he commanded a battery--and commanded it with conspicuous success--from May, 1916, till the breaking up of the Division in Germany, and had the satisfaction therefore of fighting the battery which he had himself trained.