Part 21

The amendment further provided that Congress should never have the power to abolish slavery in the states where it existed, nor in the District of Columbia without the consent of Maryland and Virginia. The slave trade in the District of Columbia and the foreign slave trade were forever prohibited, as was also the custom of bringing slaves into the District of Columbia for the purpose of their sale or distribution to other parts of the country. Congress should provide for the payment to the owner for any fugitive slave whose return was prevented by mobs or intimidation, after his arrest; and the elective franchise and the right to hold office were not to be accorded persons of the African race.[382]

While no final action had been taken upon this report, with the accompanying amendment, by the Convention at the time of Virginia's secession, yet the votes taken in the Committee of the Whole on the various paragraphs of the report indicated that had not Virginia's secession been precipitated, the report would have been adopted by the body in substantially the form in which it came from the Committee on Federal Relations.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND COERCION

What would have been the attitude of the other states to the amendment to the constitution so proposed, must, of course, be a matter of conjecture, but the adoption by Congress, though controlled by the Republican Party, of the joint resolution providing for an amendment which should forever prohibit Congress from interfering with slavery in the states where it existed, and the enactment of the statute organizing the territories of Dakota, Colorado and Nevada without prohibition as to slavery, would seem to indicate that the principal provisions of the amendment proposed by Virginia would have met the approval of the requisite number of the states.

FORT SUMTER AND ITS OCCUPATION

As above indicated, the crucial point, with the group holding the balance of power in the Convention, was the position of the Federal Government upon the question of coercing the Cotton States. The employment of force to compel three millions of people to submit to a government not of their own choice, was at war with the Declaration of Independence and repugnant to thousands of the American people North as well as South. That the Federal Government would have been sustained in a bald invasion of the Southern States, may well be questioned. The situation, however, was not quite so embarrassing for the Government. Many of these states had formally ceded to the Union jurisdiction over parcels of land within their respective limits, upon which had been erected forts, post offices or custom houses. These constituted coigns of vantage, where the rights of the Federal Government were of a dignity higher, or at least more manifest, to the popular mind, than those rights which obtained over the whole area of the states or their citizens. Thus in the great drama of diplomacy and play for position which preceded the Civil War, the rights of the nation and of the states in these forts and buildings became matters of imminent moment. When South Carolina seceded, Fort Moultrie was occupied by Federal soldiers. She appointed commissioners to negotiate with the authorities at Washington for the withdrawal of the troops, and the settlement of all questions with respect to the fort and other like properties in the state. Later these troops were transferred by the Federal authorities to Fort Sumter. Upon the organization of the Southern Confederacy, commissioners from it were substituted for those appointed by South Carolina. President Lincoln refused to recognize the Southern Confederacy, or to treat with its representatives. Negotiations, however, semi-official in character, were instituted, and upon the reports which went out from these conferences men gauged the chances of peace or war. If Fort Sumter were evacuated, the prospects of peace would be enhanced. If the Federal Government should decide to hold the fort, and provision and strengthen its garrison, then war would be imminent. Upon these contingencies, stocks rose and fell, and the friends of peace took hope or lost heart.

Footnote 376:

_History of United States_, Rhodes, Vol. III, p. 462.

Footnote 377:

_The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, Wilson, Vol. III, p. 138.

Footnote 378:

Colonel Baldwin's Interview with Mr. Lincoln, Dabney. _Southern Historical Papers_, Vol. 1, p. 449.

Footnote 379:

_Life of Matthew F. Maury_, Corbin, p. 186.

Footnote 380:

_History of United States_, Rhodes, Vol. III, p. 345.

Footnote 381:

_Journal of the Committee of the Whole_, Virginia Convention, 1861, pp. 31-43.

Footnote 382:

See Report of the Committee on Federal Relations, with accompanying exhibits in the Appendix of the _Journal of the Virginia Convention_, 1861.

XL

THE CONTEST IN THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION FOR AND AGAINST SECESSION (Concluded)

On the 8th of April, the Virginia Convention adopted the following resolution:

"WHEREAS, in the opinion of this Convention the uncertainty which prevails in the public mind as to the policy which the Federal Executive intends to pursue towards the seceded states is extremely injurious to the industrial and commercial interests of the country, tends to keep up an excitement which is unfavorable to the adjustment of pending difficulties, and threatens a disturbance of the public peace; therefore,

"RESOLVED, That a committee of three delegates be appointed by this Convention to wait upon the President of the United States and present to him this Preamble and Resolution, and respectfully ask him to communicate to this Convention the policy which the Federal Executive intends to pursue in regard to the Confederate States."[383]

William Ballard Preston, Alexander H. H. Stuart and George W. Randolph were unanimously elected members of the committee thus created.

That this action of the Virginia Convention was not hypercritical, that grave doubts actually existed as to the position of the Federal Government, is a fact of contemporary history. Writing from Washington, March 16, 1861, to Ex-President Buchanan, Edwin M. Stanton said:

"Every day affords proof of the absence of any settled policy or harmonious concert of action in the Administration. Seward, Bates and Cameron form one wing; Chase, Welles, Blair, the opposite wing; Smith is on both sides and Lincoln sometimes on one, sometimes on the other. There has been agreement in nothing."[384]

W. H. Russell, the well-known correspondent of the _London Times_, notes in his diary under date of March 23d: "The Government (of the United States) appears to be helplessly drifting with the current of events, having neither bow nor stern, neither keel nor deck, neither rudder, compass, sails nor steam."[385]

On the 1st of April, Secretary Seward presented to the President his now famous memorandum, "Some thoughts for the President's consideration," the opening paragraph of which recited: "First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy either foreign or domestic."[386]

On the 15th of April, the Committee of the Virginia Convention appointed to wait on the President submitted its report. It recited that because of violent and protracted storms they had not reached Washington until the 12th; that agreeable to the wishes of the President they appeared before him on the 13th and presented the resolution; and that the President thereupon read to them a paper which embodied his response to the Convention.

LINCOLN'S REPLY TO CONVENTION

In his reply, Mr. Lincoln stated that having, in his inaugural address, defined his intended policy, it was with deep regret and some mortification that he now learned that there was great and injurious uncertainty as to what that policy was; he commended a careful consideration of the document as the best expression he could give of his purpose. Continuing, he said:

"As I then and therein said, I now repeat, 'The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what is necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere.'"

THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR TROOPS

Continuing, the President said:

"But if, as now appears to be true, in pursuance of a purpose to drive the United States authority from these places an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess if I can like places which had been seized before the Government was devolved upon me.

"And, in any event, I shall to the extent of my ability repel force by force.

"In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted as reported, I shall perhaps cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the states which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the Government justifies and possibly demands it."[387]

What effect this reply of the President would have had upon the Virginia Convention it is impossible to say, for on the day of its presentation to that body came the news of his proclamation calling for an army of seventy-five thousand men.

The proclamation recited that the laws of the United States were opposed and their execution obstructed in the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, "by combinations" too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.

The militia thus called for was apportioned among the several states (except the seven forming the Southern Confederacy) and their governors were requested to furnish forthwith their respective quotas. Despite the somewhat ambiguous character of this proclamation, men everywhere believed that the attempt was now to be made to re-establish by force of arms the supremacy of the National Government over the states of the Southern Confederacy, and that to every commonwealth was presented the solemn alternative of bearing a part for or against this movement.

THE CONFLICT AT FORT SUMTER

President Lincoln justified the immediate issuance of his proclamation because of what he termed the unprovoked attack on Fort Sumter and the wanton insult thus offered the honor and dignity of the nation. On the other hand, it was insisted that his action in breaking off the negotiations, having for their object the peaceful adjustment of all questions relating to Fort Sumter, his notice to the Governor of South Carolina that its garrison would be provisioned, and the arrival off the harbor of Charleston of the Relief Squadron charged with that mission, not only precipitated the conflict, but justified the inauguration by the Southern Confederacy of what would have been, under other circumstances, offensive measures. Had the authorities of the Confederacy been more thoughtful of their interests than their rights, or taken counsel of their caution rather than of their courage, they might have permitted the naval expedition to provision Fort Sumter and reinforce its garrison with men and munitions of war. Such, however, was not the temper and fibre of that people. They met what they deemed a second invasion of their country just as they did four months before, when they fired upon the "Star of the West" in the first attempt to relieve the Fort.

Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, in his work _The War Between the States_, presents the position of his Government with respect to the matter as follows:

"I maintain that it (the war) was inaugurated and begun though no blow had been struck, when the hostile fleet, styled the 'Relief Squadron,' with eleven ships carrying two hundred and eighty-five guns and two thousand four hundred men, was sent out from New York and Norfolk, with orders from the authorities at Washington to reinforce Fort Sumter, peaceably, if permitted, but forcibly, if they resist."

VIRGINIA'S SECESSION PRECIPITATED

The action of the Virginia Convention was quick and decisive. On the 17th of April, an ordinance was adopted providing for Virginia's secession from the Union and submitting this action of the Convention to the people for ratification or rejection at a special election to be held on the 23d of May. In the Convention the tentative ordinance was passed by a vote of eighty-eight ayes to fifty-five noes (nine not voting), and before the people a month later it was confirmed by a vote of 128,884 against 32,134. Mr. Rhodes records that, in the concluding hours of the Convention, strong men spoke for or against secession, with sorrowful hearts and in voices trembling with emotion.[388]

This action of the Convention was the logical and inevitable result of the President's proclamation. There had never been any doubt as to Virginia's position. With all her loyalty to the Union, she had repeatedly declared in the most authoritative manner, her opposition to the coercion of the Cotton States and her determination to resist such a policy.

To the requisition upon Virginia for her quota of troops Governor Letcher made reply to the Secretary of War:

"I have only to say that the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States and the requisition made upon me for such an object—an object in my judgment not within the purview of the constitution or the act of 1795, will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war; and having done so we will meet you in a spirit as determined as the Administration has exhibited toward the South."[389]

The Governors of Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee and North Carolina returned like answers to the requisitions of the Federal authorities for troops.

Mr. Henderson, the English writer, in his work from which we have heretofore quoted, says with reference to Virginia's position:

"So far Virginia had given no overt sign of sympathy with the revolution. But she was now called upon to furnish her quota of regiments for the Federal Army. To have acceded to the demands would have been to abjure the most cherished principles of her political existence.... Neutrality was impossible. She was bound to furnish her tale of troops and thus belie her principles; or secede at once and reject, with a clean conscience, the President's mandate. If the morality of secession may be questioned, if South Carolina acted with undue haste and without sufficient provocation, if certain of the Southern politicians desired emancipation for themselves, that they might continue to enslave others, it can hardly be denied that the action of Virginia was not only fully justified, but beyond suspicion...."[390]

Footnote 383:

_Journal of Virginia Convention_, 1861, p. 143.

Footnote 384:

_Life of James Buchanan_, Curtis, Vol. II, p. 534.

Footnote 385:

_My Diary, North and South_, Russell, Vol. I, p. 37.

Footnote 386:

_Speeches, Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln_, N. & H., Vol. II, p. 29.

Footnote 387:

_Journal of Virginia Convention_, 1861, Document No. XVII.

Footnote 388:

_History of United States_, Rhodes, Vol. III, p. 386.

Footnote 389:

_American Conflict_, Greeley, Vol. I, p. 459.

Footnote 390:

_Stonewall Jackson_, Henderson, Vol. I, p. 122.

XLI

THE ATTEMPTED REINFORCEMENT OF FORT SUMTER AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

The relative responsibility for the collision at Fort Sumter we are not concerned to consider except in so far as it may have affected the action of Virginia in withdrawing from the Union. The charge is often heard, that, despite Virginia's professed love for the Union, and her efforts to maintain the peace, she made haste to unite her fortunes with the Southern Confederacy because of this assault by its soldiers upon Fort Sumter. It would seem a most illogical conclusion to all her unquestioned efforts if she were thus led to espouse the cause of the Confederacy and to gird herself for battle by reason of the happening of the very event she had striven so earnestly to avert. It was not the assault upon Fort Sumter, however momentous in its potency, which impelled Virginia, but the proclamation of President Lincoln which followed. The proclamation was the proximate cause of her secession, though her action was stimulated by the previous course of the Federal authorities with respect to the Fort. The people of Virginia regarded the policy of the Administration as characterized by a disregard for the peace of the country, a play for position ill-befitting a great nation at such a solemn crisis. Much has been written in defense of that policy. In support of Virginia's arraignment, the sentiments of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet ministers may be quoted. Three weeks previous to the issuance of the orders for the relief of Fort Sumter, five of its seven members recorded their opposition and the considerations of prudence and patriotism which impelled them to their position.

On the 15th of March, 1861, President Lincoln submitted the following request in writing to each member of his Cabinet:

"_My dear Sir_:

"Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it? Please give me your opinion in writing on this question.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN."[391]

VIEWS OF CABINET

Secretary Seward, in the course of an extended reply, wrote:

"If it were possible to peaceably provision Fort Sumter, of course, I should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of the case are known to be that the attempt must be made with the employment of military and marine force which would provoke combat and probably initiate a civil war which the Government of the United States would be committed to maintain, through all changes, to some definite conclusion."...

Continuing, Mr. Seward said:

"Suppose the expedition successful, we have then a garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six months. What is it to do then? Is it to make war by opening its batteries to demolish the defenses of the Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot, what is the advantage we shall have gained? If it can, how will it serve to check or prevent disunion? In either case, it seems to me, that we will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act, without an adequate object, after which reunion will be hopeless, at least under this Administration or in any other way than by a popular disavowal both of the war and of the Administration which unnecessarily commenced it. Fraternity is the element of union; war the very element of disunion." ...

In conclusion, he said: "If this counsel seems to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I console myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham gave to his country under circumstances not widely different."[392]

Secretary Cameron wrote he would advise such action if he "did not believe the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a bloody and protracted conflict."[393]

Secretary Welles wrote:

"By sending or attempting to send provisions into Fort Sumter, will not war be precipitated? It may be impossible to escape it under any course of policy that may be pursued, but I am not prepared to advise a course that would provoke hostilities.... I do not, therefore, under all the circumstances, think it wise to provision Fort Sumter."[394]

Secretary Smith wrote:

"The commencement of civil war would be a calamity greatly to be deplored and should be avoided if the just authority of the Government may be maintained without it. If such a conflict should become inevitable, it is much better that it should commence by the resistance of the authorities or the people of South Carolina to the legal action of the Government in enforcing the laws of the United States....

"If a conflict should be provoked by the attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter, a divided sentiment in the North would paralyze the arm of the Government, while the treason in the Southern States would be openly encouraged in the North.... I, therefore, respectfully answer the inquiry of the President by saying that in my opinion it would not be wise, under all the circumstances, to attempt to provision Fort Sumter."[395]

Attorney General Bates wrote:

"I am unwilling, under all the circumstances, at this moment, to do any act which may have the semblance before the world of beginning a civil war, the terrible consequence of which would, I think, find no parallel in modern times.... For these reasons, I am willing to evacuate Fort Sumter, rather than be an active party in the beginning of civil war.... Upon the whole I do not think it wise now to attempt to provision Fort Sumter."[396]

Postmaster General Blair and Secretary Chase united in the opinion that it would be wise to make the effort to provision Fort Sumter.

Mr. Blair wrote:

"I believe that Fort Sumter may be provisioned and relieved by Captain Fox with but little risk; and General Scott's opinion that, with its war complement, there is no force in South Carolina which can take it, renders it almost certain that it will not then be attempted. This would completely demoralize the rebellion.... No expense nor care should therefore be spared to achieve this success."[397]

Secretary Chase wrote:

"A correct solution must depend, in my judgment, on the degree of possibility, on the combination of reinforcement with provisioning and on the probable effects of the measure on the relations of the disaffected states to the National Government.

"I shall assume what the statements of the distinguished officers consulted seem to warrant, that the possibility of success amounts to a reasonable degree of probability; and also that the attempt to provision is to include an attempt to reinforce; for it seems to be generally agreed that the provisioning without reinforcements notwithstanding hostile resistance, will accomplish no substantially beneficial purpose.

"The probable political effects of the measure allow room for much fair difference of opinion, and I have not reached my own conclusion without much difficulty."

The Secretary then proceded to declare, that, if such a step would produce civil war, he could not advise in its favor, but that, in his opinion, such a result was highly improbable, especially if accompanied by a proclamation from the President reiterating the sentiments of his inaugural address. "I, therefore," concluded Mr. Chase, "return an affirmative answer to the question submitted to me."[398]

It will be seen, from the foregoing extracts, that five of the seven members of the Cabinet concurred in the opinion that no attempt should be made to provision or reinforce Fort Sumter, and that such an attempt would in all probability precipitate civil war. As Mr. Seward expressed it: "We will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act without an adequate object"; or in the language of Secretary Welles, "By sending or attempting to send provisions into Fort Sumter, will not war be precipitated?... I am not prepared to advise a course that would provoke hostilities."

If such were the opinions of leading members of President Lincoln's Cabinet, expressed in confidential communications to their chief, as to the character of the proposed action, can it be deemed unreasonable that the people of Virginia held similar views?