Part 2

The Yazoo Pass project, which sought to turn the right flank of Vicksburg by sending an expedition through the Delta waterways to the bluffs north of the city, was for a time the most promising of the bayou attempts. By exploding a mine in the Yazoo Pass, 325 river miles north of Vicksburg, access from the Mississippi into the rivers of the Delta was secured. With paddle wheels reversed against the roaring current which surged through the crevasse, and suffering extensive damage in collisions with trees and floating debris, the gunboats and transports carrying a division of infantry began the hazardous journey. Almost a month was required to reach the calmer waters of the Coldwater River.

Notified of the threat, Pemberton dispatched Maj. Gen. W. W. Loring's Division to halt the Union advance. Fort Pemberton, overlooking the Yalabusha River 90 miles north of Vicksburg, was quickly constructed of earth and cotton bales. The land surrounding the fort was completely flooded, permitting approach by water only. On March 11, the Union gunboats began an artillery bombardment and were promptly greeted by a heavy return fire as "Old Blizzards" Loring gained his nickname by pacing the parapet and urging his gunners to, "Give them blizzards, boys! Give them blizzards!" Grant had planned to send 30,000 men through the Yazoo Pass; but Loring's gunners blasted back every attempt to pass the fort, forcing the fleet to withdraw. The Yazoo Pass expedition was one of the great flanking attempts of the war--the route from Milliken's Bend to the rear of Vicksburg through the pass was over 700 miles, yet it was only 30 miles direct from Milliken's Bend to Vicksburg.

THE STEELE'S BAYOU EXPEDITION.

The last and most extraordinary of Grant's unsuccessful attempts to reach Vicksburg was the Steele's Bayou expedition through 200 miles of narrow, twisting bayous north of Vicksburg. Like the Yazoo Pass operation, it was an effort to turn the city's right flank. This shorter route had been originally scouted in order to send aid to the Yazoo Pass expedition when that column seemed in great danger of being cut off and captured. Further exploration suggested the route to the bluffs by way of Steele's Bayou might prove the best of all possible approaches to Vicksburg, and Porter himself commanded the squadron of 11 vessels which entered Steele's Bayou from the Yazoo River on March 16.

The route was heavily obstructed by natural hazards, but Porter, warned by apprehensive officers who feared that superstructures would be carried away in crashing through the closely overhung waterways, answered with the declaration, "All I need is an engine, guns, and a hull to float them." Progress was slow through winding streams barely wide enough to admit passage of the gunboats. This time alert Confederates, aided by treacherous obstructions in the mouth of the Rolling Fork, nearly succeeded in shutting up and capturing the entire fleet by felling huge trees across the bayou to block Porter's retreat.

Sherman, following behind the fleet with infantry, received word of Porter's danger, and an eerie night march ensued. By the flaring light of candles held in the muzzles of their rifles, the Federal soldiers splashed through the canebrake hip deep in water and arrived in time to drive off the Confederates who had moved in behind the Union fleet. Three days were required to back the fleet to safety on the Mississippi, which was reached late in March. Grant had now tested all possible approaches to Vicksburg as he attempted to swing wide around its flanks to the north and south. Every effort had failed. In April, the Union Army was no closer to Vicksburg than it had been in December. The Southern bastion on the Mississippi had successfully withstood Union land and naval attacks for almost a year.

_The Vicksburg Campaign: Grant Moves Against Vicksburg--and Succeeds_

In the eyes of many in the North, Grant's Army had floundered in the swamps for months with nothing to show for it except a steadily mounting death list from disease. Criticism of the Union commander mounted. "I don't know what to make of Grant, he's such a quiet little fellow," said Lincoln, thinking of the more flamboyant leaders who had led his Eastern armies, "The only way I know he's around is by the way he makes things _git_." Lincoln had grown increasingly fond of Grant, whose army, while ineffective, had never been inactive. Now he declared to Grant's critics, "I think we'll try him a little longer."

Although Grant had made every effort to navigate the bayous and reach Vicksburg, he was later to record that little hope had been entertained that success would greet these ventures. While waiting for the dry season which would permit land operations, however, he had determined to exhaust every possibility and to retain the fighting edge of his army by keeping it constantly on the move. As April arrived and the roads began to emerge from the slowly receding waters, Grant prepared to execute the movement which he had believed from the first to be the logical approach against Vicksburg--marching down the west bank of the Mississippi through Louisiana, crossing the river south of the city, and laying siege to it from the rear.

PORTER RUNS THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES.

Grant's Vicksburg campaign officially began on March 29, 1863, when he ordered McClernand's Corps to open a road for the army from Milliken's Bend to the river below the city. Considerable work had been done previously when it was contemplated that a canal from Duckport to the river below Vicksburg might offer passage to the fleet. Falling waters had finally defeated this plan and, during April, McClernand's engineers labored to bridge streams, corduroy roads, and build flatboats to cross areas still covered by flood waters. During that month also, elements of the Army of the Tennessee accomplished the 70-mile march and assembled at a small hamlet appropriately named, Hard Times, in view of Grant's unpleasant bayou experiences. Here they were across the river from the Confederate stronghold of Grand Gulf, 25 miles below Vicksburg.

To ferry the Union Army across the Mississippi, it was necessary for Porter's fleet, in anchorage north of Vicksburg, to run the batteries and rendezvous with Grant below. While naval craft singly and in groups had, on occasion, passed these batteries successfully before, it was still a formidable undertaking for which careful preparation was required. As protection against shellfire, each vessel had its port side, which would face the Vicksburg guns in passage, piled high with bales of cotton, hay, and grain. Coal barges were lashed alongside as an additional defense.

Shortly before midnight, April 16, Confederate pickets in skiffs at the bend of the river above Vicksburg saw the muffled fleet bearing down upon them and quickly gave the alarm. Tar barrels along the bank were ignited and buildings in the small village of De Soto across the river were set afire. The blinding light of a great flare helped illuminate the river and outline the fleet for the Confederate gunners. Tier upon tier of the river batteries thundered down on the Union vessels. In return, these boats delivered their broadsides into the city as they passed so close that the clatter of bricks from falling buildings could be heard on board.

Through this "magnificent, but terrible" spectacle--one of the most fearful pageants of the war--steamed the fleet in single file. "Their heavy shot walked right through us," related Porter. Every one of the 12 boats was hit repeatedly. Many went out of control and revolved slowly with the current. Despite the furious bombardment, only one craft was sunk; within a few days damages were repaired and the fleet joined the army at the village of Hard Times. Because of the difficulty of supplying the army by wagon train over the wretched road from Milliken's Bend, 6 transports and 12 barges loaded with supplies ran the batteries a few nights later with the loss of 1 transport and 6 barges.

THE RIVER CROSSING.

Grant's plan was to make an assault landing at Grand Gulf, a fortified road junction on the bluffs at the mouth of the Big Black River. On April 29, the Union gunboats pounded the Grand Gulf fortifications for 6 hours, seeking to neutralize the defenses and clear the landing for 10,000 Federal infantry aboard transports just beyond range of the Confederate cannon. The naval attack failed to reduce the Confederate works, and that night Grant marched southward along the Louisiana shore to a landing opposite Bruinsburg. There he was met by the fleet which then slipped downstream under cover of darkness. By noon of the following day, April 30, Grant was across the Mississippi, experiencing

a degree of relief scarcely ever equaled since.... I was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships, and exposures, from the month of December previous to this time, that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.

Grant's landing was unopposed, partly because of two diversionary movements and partly because of Pemberton's decision to hold his army close to Vicksburg and fight a defensive campaign. Both diversions were completely successful. On April 17, the day after Porter's running of the batteries had indicated Grant's strategy of striking from the south, Col. B. H. Grierson with 1,000 cavalrymen moved out from southwestern Tennessee on one of the celebrated cavalry raids of the war. They rode entirely through the State of Mississippi behind Pemberton's army to a junction with Union forces at Baton Rouge, La. In 16 days Grierson covered 600 miles, interfering with Confederate telegraph and railroad communications and forcing Pemberton to detach a division of infantry to protect his supply and communication lines. Sherman, whose corps had not yet made the march from Milliken's Bend, made an elaborate feint above Vicksburg. Loading his men aboard every available gunboat, transport, and tug, he landed at Haynes' Bluff, north of Vicksburg, leading Pemberton to expect the real attack from that direction. Both moves helped screen Grant's true objective.

The events immediately following Grant's landing revealed a basic difference in tactical concepts between Pemberton, commanding the Army of Vicksburg, and Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, his superior, who was in charge of Confederate operations in the West. Johnston believed that to defeat Grant it would be necessary for Pemberton to unite his whole force in order to smash the Union Army, preferably before Grant could consolidate his position on the east bank. Accordingly, he wired Pemberton on May 2 "If Grant's army crosses, unite all your troops to beat him; success will give you back what was abandoned to win it."

It was Pemberton's concept that holding Vicksburg was vital to the Confederacy and that he must primarily protect the city and its approaches. To have marched his army to meet Grant "would have stripped Vicksburg and its essential flank defenses of their garrisons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager hands of the enemy." This inability of Pemberton and Johnston to reach agreement upon the tactics that might thwart Grant's invasion seriously affected subsequent Confederate operations and prevented effective cooperation between the two commanders in the Vicksburg campaign.

THE BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.

McClernand's Corps, immediately upon debarking on April 30, headed for the bluffs 3 miles inland. By nightfall the Federal soldiers had reached the high ground and pushed on toward Port Gibson, 30 miles south of Vicksburg. From this point, roads led to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, and Jackson. Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen moved his Grand Gulf command toward Port Gibson to intercept the threat, and, at daylight on May 1, leading elements of the Union advance clashed with Bowen's troops, barring the two roads which led to Port Gibson.

The battle of Port Gibson was a series of furious day-long engagements over thickly wooded ridges cut by deep, precipitous gullies and covered with dense undergrowth. While greatly outnumbering Bowen, McClernand was prevented by the rugged terrain from bringing his whole force into action. Slowly forced backward, Bowen conducted an orderly retreat through the town, which he evacuated. The holding action had cost Bowen 800 casualties from his command of 8,000; Union losses were about the same from a force at hand of about 23,000. Pemberton determined not to contest Grand Gulf lest he risk being cut off from Vicksburg and withdrew across the Big Black River. Thus he permitted Grant to occupy Grand Gulf and gave him a strong foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi.

THE STRATEGY OF THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

Grant's overall strategy, up to the capture of Grand Gulf, had been first to secure a base on the river below Vicksburg and then to cooperate with Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks in capturing Port Hudson. After this he planned to move the combined force against Vicksburg. Port Hudson, a strong point on the Mississippi near Baton Rouge, was garrisoned by Confederate troops after Farragut's withdrawal the previous summer. At Grand Gulf, Grant learned that Bank's investment of Port Hudson would be delayed for some time. To follow his original plan would force postponement of the Vicksburg campaign for at least a month, giving Pemberton invaluable time to organize his defense and receive reinforcements. From this delay the Union Army could expect the addition of no more than 12,000 men. Grant now came to one of the most remarkable decisions of his military career.

Information had been received that a new Confederate force was being raised at Jackson, 45 miles east of Vicksburg. Against the advice of his senior officers, and contrary to orders from Washington, Grant resolved to cut himself off from his base of supply on the river, march quickly in between the two Confederate forces, and defeat each separately before they could join against him. Meanwhile, he would subsist his army from the land through which he marched. The plan was well conceived, for in marching to the northeast toward Edwards Station, on the railroad midway between Jackson and Vicksburg, Grant's vulnerable left flank would be protected by the Big Black River. Moreover, his real objective--Vicksburg or Jackson--would not be revealed immediately and could be changed to meet events. Upon reaching the railroad, he could also sever Pemberton's communications with Jackson and the East. It was Grant's belief that, although the Confederate forces would be greater than his own, this advantage would be offset by their wide dispersal and by the speed and design of his march.

But this calculated risk was accompanied by grave dangers, of which Grant's lieutenants were acutely aware. It meant placing the Union Army deep in alien country behind the Confederate Army where the line of retreat could be broken and where the alternative to victory would not only be defeat but complete destruction. The situation was summed up in Sherman's protest, recorded by Grant, "that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to maneuver a year--or a long time--to get me."

The action into which Pemberton was drawn by the Union threat indicated the keenness of Grant's planning. The Confederate general believed that the farther Grant campaigned from the river the weaker his position would become and the more exposed his rear and flanks. Accordingly, Pemberton elected to remain on the defensive, keeping his army as a protective shield between Vicksburg and the Union Army and awaiting an opportunity to strike a decisive blow--a policy which permitted Grant to march inland unopposed.

With the arrival of Sherman's Corps from Milliken's Bend, Grant's preparations were complete and, on May 7, the Union Army marched out from Grand Gulf to the northeast. His widely separated columns moved out on a broad front concealing their objective. When assembled, Grant's Army numbered about 45,000 during the campaign. To oppose him, Pemberton had available about 50,000 troops, but these were scattered widely to protect important points. On the day of Grant's departure from Grand Gulf, Pemberton's defensive position was further complicated by orders from President Jefferson Davis that both Vicksburg and Port Hudson must be held at all cost. The Union Army, however, was already between Vicksburg and Port Hudson and would soon be between Vicksburg and Jackson.

In comparison with campaigns in the more thickly populated Eastern Theater, where a more extensive system of roads and railroads was utilized to provide the tremendous quantities of food and supplies necessary to sustain an army, the campaign of Grant's Western veterans ("reg'lar great big hellsnorters, same breed as ourselves," said a charitable "Johnny Reb") was a new type of warfare. The Union supply train largely consisted of a curious collection of stylish carriages, buggies, and lumbering farm wagons stacked high with ammunition boxes and drawn by whatever mules or horses could be found. (Grant began his Wilderness campaign in Virginia the following year requiring over 56,000 horses and mules for his 5,000 wagons and ambulances, artillery caissons, and cavalry.) Lacking transportation, food supplies were carried in the soldier's knapsack. Beef, poultry, and pork "requisitioned" from barn and smokehouse enabled the army which had cut loose from its base to live for 3 weeks on 5 days' rations.

A noted historian described this campaign: "The campaign was based on speed--speed, and light rations foraged off the country, and no baggage, nothing at the front but men and guns and ammunition, and no rear; no slackening of effort, no respite for the enemy until Vicksburg itself was invested and fell."

THE BATTLES OF RAYMOND AND JACKSON.

When it became likely that Grant might strike the railroad in the vicinity of Edwards Station, Pemberton moved from Vicksburg toward that point with his main force, leaving a strong reserve in this city. At the same time he ordered the units collecting at Jackson to hit Grant's flank and rear if the opportunity presented itself. Maj. Gen. John A. Logan's Division, in advance of McPherson's Union Corps, reached the vicinity of Raymond, a crossroads village 15 miles from Jackson on May 12, and was there engaged by a Confederate brigade under Brig. Gen. John Gregg. A sharp clash lasting several hours followed, Gregg's outmanned infantry being driven back toward Jackson. Each side lost about 500 men during the engagement. Confederate resistance at Raymond indicated to Grant that Jackson might be held more strongly than had been anticipated, and rumors reached the Union Commander that strong reinforcements under Johnston were expected there. Grant then determined to make sure of Jackson and, on May 13, wheeled his entire army toward the east.

Johnston arrived by rail in Jackson, on the night of the Raymond engagement, in order to take field command of all troops defending Vicksburg, and was notified that Grant's Army was between Pemberton's forces and those in Jackson. About 12,000 troops were at Jackson, against which the entire Union Army was reported to be moving. Johnston telegraphed Richmond, "I am too late."

In a pouring rain, Sherman and McPherson approached Jackson on the morning of May 14. Johnston posted the brigades of General Gregg and Brig. Gen. W. H. T. Walker on the approaches to the city with instructions to hold just long enough for valuable stores to be removed from Jackson northward to Canton where he hoped to combine forces with Pemberton. Delaying their attack until the rain (which would spoil their powder) slackened, the Union infantry charged the Confederate entrenchments, driving the defenders before them and capturing the city along with 35 guns and much equipment. Having intercepted a dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton ordering a junction of all Confederate troops, Grant put his men on the road toward Edwards Station at daylight the following morning. His plan was to drive a wedge between the Confederate forces before Johnston, circling to the north, could effect a junction with Pemberton. Sherman remained in Jackson to destroy the railroad yards and stores.

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL.

Events preceding the battle of Champion's Hill emphasized the opposing tactical views held by the two Confederate commanders. Pemberton believed the retention of Vicksburg so imperative that no move which might endanger the city should be considered. It was Johnston's view that Admiral Porter's successful passage of the batteries and Grant's approach from the rear had already doomed the city, and that it was consequently valuable only for the military supplies and troops which it contained. Johnston believed that the South's only chance to prevent loss of the Mississippi was for Pemberton and himself to join forces and fight the great battle which might smash and destroy Grant's Army.

On the morning of May 14, Pemberton, at Edwards Station, received the dispatch from Johnston (a copy of which Grant had already intercepted) informing him of the position of Union troops at Clinton, between the two Confederate forces, and ordering him "if practicable, come up on his [Grant's] rear at once." Pemberton considered the order "suicidal." Convinced that Johnston's recent arrival on the field and separation from the main body did not give him sufficient information to survey the situation accurately, Pemberton called a council of war and placed the order before his commanders. Although a majority of his council favored obedience to Johnston's order, Pemberton was unwilling to endorse a movement which might endanger Vicksburg. It was decided to move instead against Grant's supposed communications which were believed essential to the Union Army's existence away from the river.