Part 2

In October the Argonne front suddenly became as calm as it had previously been active. The Germans were content with a defensive policy. The struggle for the saps was renewed, trenches were blown up by mines and the mine craters were disputed by short bombing engagements.

In 1916, during the battle of Verdun, the Argonne was especially the scene of artillery duels and of mine warfare on the plateau of Bolante, at Hill 285 and at Vauquois.

--1916--

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

During 1915, Germany was particularly on the defensive, in Artois (May-June) and in Champagne (September-October). Her successes in Serbia and Russia had not brought the final victory which could only be won on the Western front.

Germany feared an allied offensive and was anxious over the continual increase of their forces in men and material. To forestall this offensive would cause it to miscarry and keep the initiative in her own hands.

The Germans wanted too, to make an impression on the world at large which began to have doubts about her ultimate victory. Finally they were influenced by political considerations at home. The rationing of the population had lowered the general morale, and the prestige of the Crown Prince had slumped heavily on account of his failure in Argonne. A grand victory was necessary to strengthen the German morale, to appease dissension and to rehabilitate the prestige of the Imperial family. The German High Command chose Verdun. Was this choice of ground as paradoxical as it has been said?

"_Verdun in all the war is the hinge of the door which swings open sometimes on France, sometimes on Germany_". (L. GILLET.)

To capture Verdun was to threaten the whole French right wing, to gain an important stake, a stronghold fronting the rich basin of Briey, and to get the benefit of a great moral effect.

The Verdun salient lent itself to converging enemy attacks and concentrated fire. On the right bank the defenders of Verdun would be fighting with their backs to the Meuse. The neighbourhood of Verdun with its valleys and woods, facilitated the moving of troops and the concentration of artillery screened from view.

The enemy too had fourteen railways at his disposal and Metz close at hand from which to bring up troops and supplies.

On the French side, there was only one broad gauge railway connecting Verdun, via Saint-Menehould, with the rest of France. This railway, too, was always liable to be cut off by shell-fire. (_See illustration opposite_).

=Geographical Sketch.=

The table-lands of Verdun where the battle was to be fought are the last of the series of heights which form the top of the basin in which Paris lies. The Meuse which often overflows in winter divides them from North to South.

The terrace of the table-lands of the right bank, for some ten kilometres in width, separates the valley of the Meuse from the marshy plain of the Woëvre.

Numerous streams flow at a depth of more than a hundred metres for a very short distance, thus hollowing out deep ravines which give to the hills of the Meuse a contour "jagged, cut in festoons, as though it was hand-modelled in a clay substance". The summit line, where not indented, contains the highest points (388 m.), keys to the battle field.

"_All this country with its partitions and compartments seemed built like a natural fortress. The sheltered ways and ravines provided covered approaches and first-rate artillery positions. Every wood and copse could be converted into a redoubt._

"_If the branching off of the valleys and their innumerable ramifications added to the dangers of movement or manoeuvre or facilitated surprise attacks, the ridges, on the other hand, made marvellous observation posts. On all sides were the very slopes, banks and flank protection which engineers could desire._" (L. GILLET: _La Bataille de Verdun_).

=German plans for a decisive attack.=

Following the lesson of the offensives in Artois (May 1915) and Champagne (September 1915), the German commander intended to put into practice the French offensive methods but to add, by means of artillery fire, an unparalleled ferocity. To concentrate masses of artillery, to cut by shell fire the only broad-gauge railway that connected Verdun with France (_see plan p. 18_), to flatten out the French defences, to isolate the occupants by barrages of heavy shells, then to rush headlong on the town and crush the last resistance, at the same time sending forward overwhelming masses of troops, without regard to losses: such was the plan which the Germans carried out on February 21st, 1916.

=Character of the battle of Verdun=

The battle of Verdun was a battle of annihilation, mutual annihilation. The method was to concentrate the fire of all the guns, not over a line but on a zone, and not only on the position to be captured but also as far as possible in rear on everything that could support the position. The simile that best expresses it is no longer that of a battering ram striking against a wall, but that of a rammer falling perpendicularly and hammering an encircled zone. The encircled zone was the part where the old territorials who were screening from observation a road behind the lines, ran almost as great a danger as men in other battles did in an attacking wave. Here, while the shells continued to fall, no fatigue party of men or munitions could go three hundred metres without being wiped out entirely. Here the wounded in deep-dug aid-posts went mad from lack of air. Here often a mug of water meant life or death to a man. This encircled zone was bounded by a narrow stretch of ground which the opposing artilleries tried to spare because the infantry were fighting there hand to hand, with bombs, machine guns, and flame-throwers; every square yard of ground being hotly disputed.

"In front of Verdun, one day, the O. C. of a new force asks the officer of the chasseurs whom he has just relieved: "Where does our line run here?--I'll show you. There where you will find on the ground my dead chasseurs, lying side by side, that is where our line runs".

"In front of Verdun, one day, a battalion commander being completely cut off sends twenty runners one after another, to the Colonel's headquarters. These runners are bound to follow a certain track to go and another to return. Not one comes back and on the next day he finds the bodies of all twenty, ten lying on the path there and ten on the path back.

"In front of Verdun, one day, at nightfall, a battalion commander goes up towards the front line to see his men and cheer them on. The front line is a string of shell holes and in these holes, one by one, the men are crouched. He leans over one of these pits of darkness, for the night was pitch black, and in a low voice so that the enemy may not hear asks: "How goes it?". There is no movement but a voice replies in muffled tones as though telling a secret: "All well, Colonel, they shall not pass". He goes on his way continuing his rounds "How goes it?" and from each dark shell-hole rises the same secret whisper.

"Where was that? At Mort-Homme or Froideterre? At Haudromont farm or Chapelle Sainte-Fine? It makes no difference! It was "in front of Verdun, one day" any day you like in this battle, in which so many days were alike, and these innumerable stories, so magnificent that no poet could have had the genius to invent one of them, these stories--each one so immortal--are all as alike in their essentials as were the countless actions in this "battle of annihilation" (JOSEPH BÉDIER: _L'Effort français_).

THE IMPORTANT PHASES OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

_The central attack (February 21st-25th) endangered the position of Verdun but the arrival of the first French reinforcements saved the place._

_The enemy widened his attacking front, but his effort to outflank the position was a failure._

_The defence was reorganised, road and rail taking their part in the battle. The enemy's attempts at attrition on the spot were a failure._

_On July 1st the allied offensive was launched on the Somme._

_As soon as this new engagement allowed him, the French Commander intended to turn the enemy's failure before Verdun into defeat._

_Three operations were prepared with the greatest skill and most energetically carried out, by which the enemy were driven out of the positions they had captured. These were the three victories of October 24th 1916 (Douaumont-Vaux), December 15th 1916 (Louvemont-Bezonvaux) and finally August 20th, 1917 (Samogneux-Mort-Homme, Hill 304)._

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

(_February-August 1916_).

1. =The central attack.=

=On February 21st 1916=, at 7.15 a.m., the enemy opened fire on the two banks of the Meuse, over a front of 40 kilometres. Simultaneously Verdun was systematically bombarded, the last residents being evacuated by the military authority at midday on the 25th.

For nine hours, all the enemy guns and trench mortars kept up a running fire without intermission. In all the woods adjoining the front it was a regular fire-work display. A feature of this overwhelming bombardment was the enormous proportion of heavy calibre shells, 150's and 210's coming over like hailstones.

Under this deluge of projectiles all trenches were levelled, the woods became a twisted mass of trunks and branches, and villages collapsed and were blotted out.

The infantry attack was launched at 4.15 p.m. just before dusk, from the Haumont-Ornes wood.

Three army corps, the 7th, 18th and 3rd advanced. They thought that they had only to march, with their rifles slung, over ground like a ploughed field.

The 51st (Boulengé) and 72nd Divisions (Bapst) of the 30th Corps (Chrétien) sustained the first shock and for three days covered the arrival of French reinforcements.

A heroic combat followed the most formidable artillery preparation hitherto known. The chasseurs of Colonel Driant resisted the attack, inch by inch, in the wood of Caures. By nightfall the advance of the enemy was insignificant compared with their losses. They succeeded, however, in capturing the wood of Haumont.

=On the 22nd=, with snow falling, the bombardment was resumed with, if possible, greater intensity. Colonel Driant in the wood of Caures was outflanked on both sides and died fighting, after first evacuating his chasseurs to Beaumont.

Meanwhile the sectors of Woëvre and the left bank of the Meuse were subjected to violent bombardment.

The fighting =on the 23rd= was even more furious. Brabant fell into the hands of the enemy after a fierce resistance by the 351st Infantry Regiment, which clung desperately to the ruins of Samogneux until nightfall. Further east the battle raged fiercely. The French counter-attacked unsuccessfully at Caures Wood and were attacked at Herbebois. The 51st Infantry Division, fell back, making the enemy pay dearly for his progress towards Fosses Wood. In the evening, the front extended along the Samogneux-Beaumont-Ornes line. Samogneux was captured by the enemy during the night. The situation was very critical.

=On the 24th=, the enemy brought up fresh storm troops and, although harassed by the French artillery on the left bank of the Meuse, they succeeded in taking Hill 344 to the East of Samogneux, Fosses Wood and the village of Ornes. But on the same day French reinforcements arrived, namely the 37th Infantry Division of the 7th Corps, the 31st and 306th Brigades of the 20th Corps under General Balfourier who provisionally took charge from the Meuse to the Woëvre. At the same time also General Pétain took over the command of the army of Verdun from General de Castelnau.

=On the 25th=, the 37th Infantry Division, with orders to defend Talou Hill and Louvemont village, resisted for a long time against incredibly furious attacks, but on their right the enemy succeeded in capturing Vauche Wood and, advancing towards Douaumont, carried the fort by surprise (_see page 88_). However, their efforts to take the village failed before the heroic tenacity of the 31st Brigade, while the 94th Infantry Division, covered itself with glory. The enemy advance from this side had the effect of compelling the 31st Infantry Division to abandon Talou Hill.

During this time, in Woëvre, the front which was a dangerous salient and only very lightly held, was withdrawn to the foot of the Meuse Hills. This falling back was carefully cloaked and under cover of a rearguard action a new front was organised.

Taking over the command on the night of the 25th, General Pétain at once divided the battle-line into four sectors, officered as follows: General Bazelaire, on the left bank, from Avocourt to the river; General Guillaumat, from the Meuse to Douaumont; General Balfourier, from this point to the Woëvre; General Duchesne, on the Meuse Heights.

There were no trenches, but he ordered that the forts should at least be connected by a continuous line of entrenchments to be made while the battle was at its height and which the "poilus", in their disdain for the shovel and pick, called the "Panic Line". The entire 59th Division was told off to build the earthworks on the second and third lines. Thirteen battalions kept in repair the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, via Souilly (the =Sacred Way=), which became the main artery for re-victualling the place in men and munitions, and along which 1,700 motor lorries passed each way daily. Lastly, General Pétain managed to imbue all ranks with his energy and faith, and the enemy's drive was stopped.

Indeed, during =the day of the 26th=, the 39th Division (Nourisson), which had relieved the 37th, repulsed all attacks on Poivre Hill, while the 31st Brigade continued to hold Douaumont until relieved in the evening by the 2nd Division (Guignabaudet).

On the following days the fighting continued about and in the streets of Douaumont, which the enemy finally captured on March 4th. The Germans now began to show signs of weakening. Their effort on the right bank had failed. Checked at Douaumont, they were taken in the rear by the French positions on the left bank, and were obliged to modify their plans. From that time they operated simultaneously or successively on both banks.

2.--=The battle on the flanks= (_March-April 1916_).

The German offensive was unable on the right bank of the Meuse to yield the expected results. The enemy intended to combine operations on both banks.

=On March 6th=, two German divisions attacked from Bethincourt to Forges, where the French front was held by the 67th Division (Aimé) and succeeded in taking Forges and Regnéville, but were checked by the positions on Oie Hill.

Continuing their advance, =on the 7th=, they succeeded in capturing these positions, as well as Corbeaux Wood. The village of Cumières was the scene of terrible fighting, but remained in the hands of the French, while further to the west the enemy's attacks broke down at Mort-Homme (_See page 112_).

=On March 8th=, while on the left bank French troops retook Corbeaux, on the right bank the Germans brought into line units of five army corps and began a general attack, which failed with very heavy losses, their only gain being the capture of part of Vaux village.

=On the 9th=, they succeeded in getting a footing on the slopes of Mort-Homme, but at the other end of the battle-line their attack on Vaux Fort failed. Their radiograms announcing the capture of the fort were untrue (_See page 68_).

=On the 10th=, Corbeaux Wood was taken by the Germans and the French withdrew to the line Bethincourt-Mort-Homme, south of the Corbeaux and Cumières Woods. The battle continued in the village and in front of Vaux Fort, strongly held by the French. The enemy temporarily ceased his massed attacks. In reality his offensive had failed.

=On March 10th=, Joffre was able to say to the soldiers of Verdun:

_"For three weeks you have withstood the most formidable attack which the enemy has yet made. Germany counted on the success of this effort, which she believed would prove irresistible, and for which she used her best troops and most powerful artillery. She hoped by the capture of Verdun to strengthen the courage of her Allies and convince neutrals of German superiority. But she reckoned without you! The eyes of the country are on you. You belong to those of whom it will be said: "They barred the road to Verdun!"_

=From March 11th to April 9th= the aspect of the battle changed. Wide front attacks gave place to local actions, short, violent and limited in scope. On March 14th the enemy captured, from the 75th Brigade, Hill 265 forming the Western portion of Mort-Homme, but they failed to take the Eastern portion. On the 20th, Avocourt and Malancourt Woods fell into the hands of the Bavarians, and after a fierce struggle the village of Malancourt was lost, and then Bethincourt on April 8th. On the right bank, after powerful attacks near Vaux, the enemy reached Caillette Wood and the Vaux-Fleury railway, only to be driven back by the 5th Division (Mangin).

A furious attack was made along both banks by the Germans at noon =on April 9th=; on the left bank, five divisions were engaged, failing everywhere except at the Mort-Homme, where, despite the heroic resistance of the 42nd Division (Deville), they gained a footing on the N. E. slopes; on the right bank, Poivre Hill was attacked but remained in French hands.

On the following day in his order of the day, General Pétain promulgated his famous message "_Courage ... we shall beat them!_" (_Reproduction page 30_).

=On April 30th=, General Nivelle superseded in supreme command of the Verdun forces General Pétain who had been appointed to the command of the central army group.

"_April 9th was a glorious day for our armies_", General Pétain declared in his order of the day dated the 10th, "_the furious attacks of the soldiers of the Crown Prince broke down everywhere. The infantry, artillery, sappers and aviators of the 2nd Army vied with one another in valour._

"_Honour to all._

"_No doubt the Germans will attack again. Let all work and watch, that yesterday's success be continued._

"_Courage! We shall beat them!_"

Ch. Pétain

3. =The battle of attrition= (_May-August 1916_).

In May the enemy attacked on the left bank of the Meuse with an assault upon Mort-Homme. Then, widening their attacking front in a Westerly direction, they turned upon Hill 304, a strong key position and valuable observation post. The French lost this Hill =on May 23rd= but retook it the following day. A further month's bitter fighting only gained for the enemy the crest of Mort-Homme and the north slopes of Hill 304.

=On May 22nd=, with the object of clearing the left bank of the Meuse where the enemy were pressing, the 5th Division (Mangin) attacked on the right bank, in the direction of Douaumont. The central attack alone was successful, the enemy holding their ground inside the fort; their numerous reserves, among them the 1st Bavarian Corps, succeeded in dislodging the attackers =on May 24th= (_See page 90_).

Even though Douaumont remained in the enemy's hands, this attack was successful in freeing the left bank by drawing upon the German reserves. The struggle continued without respite or quarter. The Germans, alarmed by the preparations for the Franco-British offensive on the Somme, wished to be finished with Verdun. They, therefore, launched attack after attack but every time they were met by the irresistible will of the French.

The enemy, who in April had captured the village of Vaux, next furiously attacked the fort, and though =on June 2nd= they occupied the superstructure, it took them five days to subdue the garrison (_See page 71_).

At the same time they advanced from Douaumont towards Froideterre. =On June 9th=, Thiaumont Farm was captured, but the redoubt still held out. On the left bank, the enemy resumed their attacks. =On May 31st=, they outflanked Mort-Homme by the Meuse valley and reached Chattancourt station, but were driven back by a counter attack as far as Cumières. Even if they captured the summit of Hill 304, they could not conquer the South slopes, and they were still far from the fortified barrier of Bois Bourrus.

On the right bank, on the other hand, by holding Douaumont and Vaux the enemy were at hand to break through the barrier of Souville and had within view the basin of Verdun. Here it was that the enemy were going to work for the supreme decision.