United States Steel: A Corporation with a Soul

CHAPTER XVII

Chapter 175,823 wordsPublic domain

THE WAR AND AFTER

Never did year dawn so black for American industry as did 1915. The financial world, stunned by Germany’s unexpected attempt at world conquest, could see only the immense economic waste that war is. That the conflict in Europe could have a stimulating effect on American industry seemed unthinkable at that dark period, and industry as a whole seemed shaken to its foundations. Steel, the barometer of trade, naturally reflected this situation sharply.

At the close of 1914, as we have seen, operations of the Corporation’s subsidiaries reached the lowest point on record and the new year brought with it no sign of early betterment. Hence it was natural that all except the most confirmed optimists faced the future with doubt if not with dread.

This situation reflected itself plainly in the big company’s profits, which that January fell to $1,687,150. This proved to be the low point, however, a slight revivification of business beginning to make itself felt the following month, and being even more pronounced in March, when operations reached 60 per cent. capacity. But even then conditions were far from being satisfactory, earnings for the last month of the quarter aggregating only $7,132,081, and for the three months, $12,457,809.

But, difficult as it was to realize it at the time, the war was destined to bring to American business the biggest boom it had ever experienced. As the struggle developed the Allied powers had brought home to them sharply their great shortage of war materials. Germany, preparing years before for the struggle, had at the start an immense preponderance of guns, shells, automobiles, airplanes, and other articles, and there was no hope of crushing the Kaiser’s hordes unless and until the Entente could meet its foe on equal terms measured in material.

It had become a war of machines, a war largely of steel. And the Allies’ production of steel and machines could not be brought up to the point necessary to make victory certain. There was no country but America to turn to for the needed supplies.

Wire was the first product which felt the stimulus of the new demand. Before the beginning of 1915 both sides had settled down to the slow warfare of the trenches, and for the protection of these hundreds of thousands of miles of barbed wire were necessary. England, although until the beginning of the twentieth century the principal steel-manufacturing country in the world, had never devoted much of her capacity to wire products, and even before the war had been in the custom of importing a large part of her need of this commodity from the United States. And in their extremity both England and France looked across the Atlantic for more and more of this particular product, and the wire mills of the Steel Corporation and other producers here began to increase output and to show improving earnings.

Then came the demand for shrapnel bars, steel for explosive shells, guns, automobiles, trucks, and almost every article used in modern warfare. Russia, attempting to move immense armies with inadequate railroad transportation facilities, began to ask for locomotives and steel cars in large numbers, as well as steel rails to run them on, and the export steel trade of this country grew to unprecedented proportions.

Before the middle of the year the Corporation was operating on 90 per cent. capacity and was sending abroad one third of all the steel it produced. In the best pre-war year foreign shipments had amounted to only 18 per cent. of the output of the big company’s plants.

With the revival of the steel and Allied industries caused by the war demand domestic trade began to pick up, industry generally revived, and a spirit of optimism replaced the gloom that had been casting its shadow over the business world. As the trade balance of the United States for the first time in history reached and passed the billion-dollar mark it became plain that the war, great evil as it was, was making America rich. A boom was on.

How marked was the trade revival in 1915 is indicated by a comparison of the Corporation’s earnings for the four quarters of the year: First quarter, $12,457,809; second, $27,950,055; third, $38,710,644; fourth, $51,277,504.

Keener and keener grew the war demand as the months rolled on. The Allies, calling more and yet more on their man power to fill up the gaps in the fighting line, found it increasingly difficult to meet the ever-growing need for war materials and leaned more and more heavily on our manufacturers. The price of steel, under the enormous buying power from abroad and the increased demand at home, advanced rapidly, nor did this advance let up until the latter part of 1917, when, the United States having at length united her fortunes with England, France, and the other countries defending civilization, prices were fixed by agreement with the Government.

Germany’s submarine warfare tended still further to aggravate the world’s shortage of steel. The enormous tonnage of vessels sunk by the undersea raiders necessitated replacement by new ships, and in the summer of 1917 purchases of ship plate became so heavy that this particular product sold in some instances at twelve cents a pound or more, compared to an average price of around one and a quarter cents before the war.

United States Steel’s management, however, notwithstanding its desire to show large profits to stockholders, could not, consistently with the price policy it had followed for many years, countenance these extravagant prices. Its quotations at no time were as high as 50 per cent. of these levels. It steadfastly set its face against taking advantage of the world’s need to exact the highest prices the market could bear. Nevertheless, it showed enormous profits and paid large dividends to stockholders during the period.

One branch of the steel industry that was immensely stimulated by the war was by-product coke production. In this particular field Germany had led the world for years, although it was not until the war started that the other nations realized her secret object in fostering the development of these by-products and had brought home to them the cost of their neglect in this respect.

Coke by-products, benzol, toluol, xylol, etc., form the bases of practically all modern explosives. They also form the bases for modern dyes. And Germany for years had studiously cultivated the color markets of the world, and encouraged her manufacturers and scientists to increase production of these bases and to refine processes until she had practically eliminated competition in dyes.

Other countries, lacking in militarism as well as in foresight, did nothing to assist the development of this industry. They failed to see that in eliminating competition in dyes in peace time Germany left her intended victims without the means of making explosives in wartime. She could well afford, her intentions being what they were, to sell the world dyes even at a loss, believing as she did that the result was to give her a death grip on the throats of all possible enemies.

Fortunately, Germany was not able to achieve complete success. And it was the United States Steel Corporation that, more than any other single factor in this country, stood in her way.

Many years before the war, the Corporation’s management, realizing the value of saving the by-products of coal, had itself started to develop this field, and it was therefore a comparatively simple thing for it to make necessary additions to by-product plants to turn out the benzol, toluol, and other products which go into high explosives. Within a comparatively short time after the conflict started the Corporation was producing these materials at the rate of 10,000,000 gallons a year, and by the time the war closed it had increased its capacity to around 40,000,000 gallons.

Hand in hand with the development of this branch of the steel industry the American dye industry grew. In this respect, at least, Germany benefited the world. But, it might be stated parenthetically, our dye industry is not yet strong enough to stand of itself against the German competition that will most certainly be renewed. It is to be hoped that the Government of the United States will never forget the lesson learned in the war, and will lend American dye manufacturers encouragement at least sufficient to make it certain that no possible future attack will find us unready in the matter of explosive production.

The years 1916 and 1917 were by far the most profitable ever enjoyed by the Steel Corporation. In the final quarter of 1916 net earnings reached the unprecedented figure of $105,917,438 while earnings for the year were $333,574,177.

And that earnings for 1917 did not exceed those of the previous year was due only to the imposition in that year of excess profits taxes. In 1917 the Corporation, after deducting over $233,000,000 from earnings to cover these taxes, showed a balance of $295,292,180. In other words, its earnings before taxes were close to $530,000,000.

On April 6, 1917, the United States became a participant in the struggle which had now come to be called the “World War.” And shortly after this occurred American steel manufacturers were called upon to sacrifice to patriotism part of their profits and to sell steel to the Government, its Allies, and the public at prices considerably lower than those which would otherwise have been obtainable in the open market.

J. Leonard Replogle was appointed Director of Steel Supplies, and he, in conjunction with the War Industries Board appointed by the President to regulate and coördinate for war purposes the supply of industrial products generally, met with the steel manufacturers early in September of that year and agreed on a scale of prices for steel which, in the case of some products at least, were less than half those quoted in the open market.

It is a matter of gratification that our steel manufacturers, nearly all of them, responded freely and patriotically to the Government’s request. And of them all there was none that showed more willingness to assist Mr. Replogle in his difficult task of fixing a fair scale of steel prices than United States Steel. As a matter of fact, the prices eventually agreed on were not very far away from those being charged by the big company, which had for many months been consistently below the market established by its competitors.

Throughout 1918 this scale of prices was maintained with no important change. On several occasions increases or adjustments were requested by various manufacturers, but never by the Steel Corporation. And there is ground for the belief that it was the assistance of this company that enabled the representatives of the Government to resist the pressure sometimes brought to bear to secure an adjustment upward. In any event, the profits of all producers during the period in which prices were fixed proved clearly that no such increases were necessary to permit the manufacturers substantial profits.

In fact, all steel companies enjoyed large earnings in 1918. United States Steel showed net profits for the year, after an appropriation for taxes of $274,277,835, of $199,350,680.

The immense war profits piled up by the big company in the three years, 1916 to 1918, permitted more liberal distribution to shareholders, and for some time extra dividends were paid, making total disbursements 8¾ per cent. in 1916, 18 per cent. in 1917, and 14 per cent. in 1918. Throughout the whole period, however, the regular rate of dividends did not change from 5 per cent. which it still is.

In 1918 the Steel Corporation’s sales grew to the largest volume on record, $1,288,029,255 or, including inter-company sales, $1,692,572,000.

During the war boom the rights of the worker had not been forgotten. Early in 1916, as soon as the improvement in industry became evident, a wage advance of 10 per cent. was put into effect. Since the beginning of the war, and up to the date of writing, wages of common labor have been advanced as follows:

CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE AS DATE OF INCREASE PERCENTAGE OF COMPARED WITH INCREASE 1915 WAGE

Feb. 1, 1916 10 10 May 1, 1916 13.6 25 Dec. 15, 1916 10 37.5 May 1, 1917 9 50 Oct. 1, 1917 10 65 April 16, 1918 15 90 Aug. 1, 1918 10.5 110 Oct. 1, 1918[C] 10 131 Feb. 1, 1920 10 153

[C] This figure based on ten-hour day. At this time basic day was changed to eight hours and time and a half paid for overtime.

With the signing of armistice on November 11, 1918, new problems were presented to American industry generally and the steel trade was not exempt. Not even the most far-sighted could tell with any assurance what would be the effect of the letting up in war demand. It was realized that capacity had been greatly increased to meet war needs for steel and it was questioned whether a normal peace demand would be sufficient to keep the mills employed. Moreover, the trade, recognizing that a readjustment from a war to a peace basis was inevitable, asked when it would occur and how long it would last.

In view of these uncertainties many steel manufacturers felt that Governmental regulation of prices should be continued temporarily, and at a meeting in Washington with the War Industries Board and the Director of Steel Supplies, Judge Gary representing the trade, offered to submit a new scale of prices to replace those in effect during the war. The Government’s representatives, however, took the viewpoint that it would be better to let prices be regulated only by the law of supply and demand, and left the manufacturers free to sell steel at whatever levels they could obtain.

Nevertheless, the trade put into effect the suggested new scale and this continued to operate for about four months. This scale averaged about $7.00 a ton lower than the prices obtaining under Government control.

But peace was to bring yet another reduction in prices. About the beginning of March, 1919, President Wilson, taking the stand that deflation of prices generally was necessary before business could return to normal, and that this deflation could be regulated and made orderly if the Government assisted, appointed an Industrial Board at the head of which was George N. Peek, to bring about the desired results. The steel manufacturers were called upon first to coöperate with this Board, and they responded readily. On March 20th a new scale of prices, about $5.00 a ton below the levels existing in the first part of the year, and about $12.00 a ton below the War Industries Board prices, was agreed to.

But the settlement of steel prices was the only thing ever accomplished by the Board. The President’s plans for regulated deflation came to naught.

Prior to their conferences with Mr. Peek the steel men had been given to understand that if a price scale satisfactory to both sides could be reached the Railroad Administration, then operating all the country’s transportation systems, would place necessary orders for steel, and this understanding accounted in large part for their readiness to meet the Government representatives halfway.

The railroads, it was generally recognized, needed steel badly for rails, cars, locomotives, and other equipment. For years their purchases had been entirely inadequate to meet the growing needs of the country’s commerce, and their potential demand was therefore very large. In the then period of uncertainty it was felt that the purchasing of these railroad supplies would steady business and stimulate other demands, acting as a safety valve against a possible depression.

But the Railroad Administration declined to honor the promise, expressed or implied, of the Government. Director-General Walker D. Hines claimed that the prices agreed on for rails were unreasonably high and the three-cornered dispute that followed between Mr. Hines, Mr. Peek, and the railmakers resulted in the dissolution of the Industrial Board and the withdrawing by the Government from any attempt to regulate the price of steel or other commodities. Followed a period of general business uncertainty, a let-up in buying activities felt keenly by the steel mills. The responsibility for this situation must be placed largely at the door of the Railroad Administration. The roads, with the possible exception of the farmers, are the largest consumers of steel and of many other products in the country. Prosperity was hardly possible in steel trade without railroad buying, that is, under normal conditions. There was no question that the railroads were exceedingly short of supplies and the practically unanimous opinion was that if they began to place orders covering their requirements it would have a stimulating effect on business generally and would dissolve the doubt and hesitation that hung over the financial world during the period of transition from war to peace.

But the Railroad Administration declined to make any move. One of its highest officials informed the writer, who pointed out to him the importance of some definite action to help restore business balance, that he did not consider it the Railroad Administration’s duty to in any way “hold the bag” for business.

Ostensibly, the Railroad Director based his refusal to place orders for rails and other material required by the roads on the ground that prices were too high. There is little question that he and his associates believed that, by holding off, the steel companies would be forced to reduce prices further to induce railroad buying. The result must have been a severe disappointment, for when the roads did begin to buy, they had to pay, for a substantial part of the tonnage purchased, prices $10.00 a ton or more higher than those agreed on by the Industrial Board, though the Steel Corporation has consistently maintained the Industrial Board prices.

As a matter of fact, the end of the war found the whole world starving for steel. For five years steel needed for a million uses of commerce had been diverted to the terrible business of war. And it did not take long for this dammed-up demand to begin to make itself felt. By the early part of October pulses of business were again beating firmly, and by the beginning of 1920 a peace boom had taken the place of the war boom that ended at the close of 1918.

For the year 1919 the Corporation, despite the brief depression the steel trade went through, reported earnings of $143,589,062 (after deducting interest and obligations of subsidiary companies), and a balance available for dividends of $76,794,582. Earnings on the common stock were $51,574,905, or the equivalent of $10.20 per share.

In the early part of 1920 the steel trade enjoyed a boom that approached that experienced during the war. The world was filling its most pressing requirements of material of which it had been starved while the products of industry were going into munitions and other war needs. Steel prices ascended to the highest levels attained since 1917, although the Corporation maintained the lower levels fixed by the Industrial Board in March, 1919. The closing months of the year, however, witnessed a sharp depression, and at the close of the period the so-called independent companies were operating at a very low rate of capacity with practically no forward orders. The Corporation, because of its price policy earlier in the year, went into 1921 with its order books filled and with operations at fully 90 per cent. of capacity.

Earnings of the Corporation for 1920 were $177,126,126 and the net for the junior stock was equivalent to $16.70 a share. Production of steel ingots was approximately 19,278,000 tons and of finished steel 14,233,000 tons.

The events of the closing months of 1920 completely vindicated the judgment of Judge Gary and his associates, both on the matter of prices and in their preparation for the inevitable reaction of the earlier boom period. During the previous three years the Corporation had been steadily creating a reserve for anticipated inventory losses, this reserve amounting to $90,000,000 at the end of 1919. Thus, when the reaction did arrive the Corporation was not faced with the necessity, as others were, of scaling down inventories with consequent losses of earnings.

Within the past few weeks the independents, who for a year or more had been quoting prices greatly in excess of those charged by the big company, reduced their prices to an average several dollars a ton below the Corporation’s, with an accompanying, and substantial, cut in wages (20% to 30%). The Corporation at the time this is written (February 18, 1921) is “still doing business at the old stand” both as regards prices and wages and is thus safeguarding the interests of both its customers and its employees.

We have now followed the Corporation’s fortunes through practically twenty years, seeing it grow stronger and more firmly established both as a manufacturing entity and financially, as well as with the public and particularly with the investor, from year to year. What of the future?

There are, of course, uncertainties at present, and there will be from time to time as the years go by. The history of business has been one of prosperity and depression periodically, and the Corporation is not exempt from the effect of these. But its immense accumulated financial strength, its huge working capital, the good will it has erected among consumers, employees, and the public generally, combined with the fact that it has come scatheless and with increased honor through a bitter attack by the Government, give ample justification for the belief that it will grow and expand along healthy lines and to the increasing financial benefit of stockholders as the years roll on. The Corporation, in the past, has proven itself strong enough to weather business depressions and it is now many times as strong financially and in every other respect as it has ever been.

Conditions in the steel trade are not encouraging for the immediate future. The industry is apparently going through the period of deflation from a war to a peace basis just as are other industries all over the world, but while the immediate future is somewhat cloudy, the outlook for steel, if one looks ahead several years, is unquestionably bright. The world shortage of the metal caused by the war was by no means filled during the period of activity that lasted from October, 1919, to September, 1920. There is every reason to believe that the world still needs steel in immense quantities for the myriad uses in which the metal is employed, not only for future expansion but for replacement which should have occurred during the war years. As soon as the economic and financial difficulties from which the world is now suffering have been overcome--and the signs on the sky are that these clouds are already being dissipated--a great demand for steel can be prognosticated.

And United States Steel with its twenty-two million odd tons of capacity, its great resources, its good will, and its wonderful organization, will undoubtedly share generously in this anticipated trade revival. For it and for its stockholders the future holds a bright and glowing promise.

Perhaps no better conclusion for this volume can be found than the remark recently made to the writer by one of the leading independent steel makers. He said:

“United States Steel is a remarkable organization. Nothing like it exists or ever existed. It is in a class by itself.”

APPENDIX

COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION

Table showing percentage of total steel and iron output of the United States produced by the U. S. Steel Corporation in the years 1901, 1911, 1913, and 1919. Figures for 1901 and 1911 are from the exhibit in the dissolution suit and for 1913 and 1919 from the reports of the American Iron & Steel Institute.

1901 1911 1913 1919 Iron ore from Lake Superior Ranges 61.6 54.3 50.46 45.94 Total iron ore 45.1 45.8 46.37 42.05 Total blast furnace products 43.2 45.4 45.47 43.97 Steel ingots and castings 65.7 53.9 53.21 49.61 Steel rails 59.8 56.1 55.51 61.96 Heavy structural shapes 62.2 47.0 54.03 43.77 Plates and sheets 64.6 45.7 49.13 44.30 Wire rods 77.6 64.7 58.44 55.42 Total finished products 50.1 45.7 47.81 44.60 Wire nails 65.8 51.4 44.55 51.86 Tin and terne plates 73.0 60.7 58.64 48.44

Summary of earnings and distribution thereof since organization:

Net profits from April 1, 1901 to December 31, 1919 $1,732,070,796 Deductions; special reserves, etc. 32,227,566 Balance of profits 1,699,843,230 Preferred dividends paid (131¼ per cent.) 496,391,722 Common dividends paid (89½ per cent.) 454,908,882 Total dividends paid 951,300,604 Surplus profits 748,542,626 Appropriations for capital expenditures, etc. 280,494,424 Balance of profits carried to surplus account 468,048,202

Summary of undivided surplus:

Surplus or working capital provided at organization $ 25,000,000 Balance of surplus accumulated to Dec., 1919 468,048,202 Total undivided surplus 493,048,202 Appropriated surplus 280,494,424 Total appropriated and undivided surplus 773,542,626

Table of number of common stockholders as shown by the Corporation’s books each quarter since organization in 1901. These figures indicate how the Corporation’s junior stock has been widely distributed and how it has grown in favor with investors in recent years particularly.

YEAR 4TH QTR. 3D QTR. 2D QTR. 1ST QTR.

1920 95,776 90,952 87,229 83,583 1919 73,318 73,456 74,071 78,018 1918 72,779 65,862 63,507 61,044 1917 51,689 44,789 43,482 42,564 1916 37,720 40,430 41,156 41,910 1915 45,767 51,169 55,907 56,825 1914 52,785 50,195 47,695 47,221 1913 46,460 44,398 41,324 38,679 1912 34,213 34,645 35,106 36,555 1911 35,011 31,472 29,853 29,235 1910 28,850 28,910 24,435 22,033 1909 18,615 16,861 17,342 21,522 1908 21,093 24,804 27,439 29,563 1907 28,435 20,513 18,539 15,975 1906 14,723 14,879 [D]---- 17,525 1905 20,075 [D]---- [D]---- 24,531 1904 33,395 35,706 [D]---- 36,980 1903 37,237 34,997 28,987 26,830 1902 24,636 21,321 19,640 17,723 1901 15,887 13,318 ---- ----

[D] No figures available.

PRODUCTION (GROSS TONS)

================================================================= | 1902 | 1903 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+ Ore mined | 16,063,179 | 15,363,355 | Coal mined--not for making coke | 709,367 | 1,120,733 | Limestone | 1,313,120 | 1,268,930 | Coke | 9,521,567 | 8,658,391 | Pig Iron, Spiegel and Ferro-Manganese | 7,975,530 | 7,279,241 | Bessemer Steel | 6,759,210 | 6,191,660 | Open-hearth Steel | 2,984,708 | 2,976,300 | Finished Steel | 8,197,232 | 7,635,690 | Cement (bbls.) | 486,357 | 644,286 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+

================================================================= | 1904 | 1905 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+ Ore mined | 10,503,087 | 18,486,556 | Coal mined--not for making coke | 1,998,000 | 2,204,950 | Limestone | 1,393,149 | 1,967,355 | Coke | 8,652,293 | 12,242,909 | Pig Iron, Spiegel and Ferro-Manganese | 7,369,421 | 10,172,148 | Bessemer Steel | 5,427,979 | 7,379,188 | Open-hearth Steel | 2,978,399 | 4,616,015 | Finished Steel | 6,792,780 | 9,226,386 | Cement (bbls.) | 539,951 | 1,735,343 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+

=============================================================== | 1906 | 1907 --------------------------------------+------------+----------- Ore mined | 20,645,148 | 22,403,801 Coal mined--not for making coke | 1,912,444 | 3,550,510 Limestone | 2,227,436 | 2,957,163 Coke | 13,295,075 | 12,373,938 Pig Iron, Spiegel and Ferro-Manganese | 11,058,526 | 10,631,620 Bessemer Steel | 8,072,655 | 7,556,460 Open-hearth Steel | 5,438,494 | 5,543,088 Finished Steel | 10,578,433 | 10,376,742 Cement (bbls.) | 2,076,000 | 2,129,700 --------------------------------------+------------+-----------

================================================================= | 1908 | 1909 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+ Ore mined | 16,662,715 | 23,431,047 | Coal mined--not for coke making | 3,008,810 | 3,089,021 | Limestone | 2,186,007 | 3,496,071 | Coke Manufactured--Beehive | 7,591,062 | 11,896,211 | Coke Manufactured--By-product | 578,869 | 1,693,901 | Pig Iron, Spiegel, etc. | 6,934,408 | 11,618,350 | Bessemer Steel | 4,055,275 | 5,846,300 | Open-hearth Steel | 3,783,438 | 7,508,889 | Finished Steel | 6,206,932 | 9,859,660 | Cement (bbls.) | 4,535,300 | 5,786,000 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+

================================================================= | 1910 | 1911 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+ Ore mined | 25,245,816 | 19,933,631 | Coal mined--not for coke making | 4,850,111 | 5,290,671 | Limestone | 5,005,087 | 4,835,703 | Coke Manufactured--Beehive | 11,641,105 | 9,491,206 | Coke Manufactured--By-product | 2,008,473 | 2,629,006 | Pig Iron, Spiegel, etc. | 11,831,398 | 10,744,897 | Bessemer Steel | 5,796,223 | 5,055,696 | Open-hearth Steel | 8,383,146 | 7,697,674 | Finished Steel | 10,733,995 | 9,476,248 | Cement (bbls.) | 7,001,500 | 7,737,500 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+

================================================================= | 1912 | 1913 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+ Ore mined | 26,428,449 | 28,738,451 | Coal mined--not for coke making | 5,905,153 | 6,705,381 | Limestone | 6,124,541 | 6,338,509 | Coke Manufactured--Beehive | 11,544,840 | 11,062,138 | Coke Manufactured--By-product | 5,164,547 | 5,601,342 | Pig Iron, Spiegel, etc. | 14,186,164 | 14,080,730 | Bessemer Steel | 6,643,147 | 6,131,809 | Open-hearth Steel | 10,258,076 | 10,524,552 | Finished Steel | 12,506,619 | 12,374,838 | Cement (bbls.) | 10,114,500 | 11,197,000 | --------------------------------------+------------+------------+

=========================================================== | 1915 | 1916 | --------------------------------+------------+------------+ Ore mined | 23,669,676 | 33,355,169 | Coal mined--not for making coke | 5,828,278 | 6,162,430 | Limestone | 5,795,925 | 7,023,474 | Coke--Beehive | 9,701,692 | 12,479,160 | Coke--By-product | 4,799,126 | 6,422,802 | Pig iron, Spiegel, etc. | 13,641,508 | 17,607,637 | Bessemer Steel | 5,584,198 | 7,273,766 | Open-hearth Steel | 10,792,294 | 13,636,823 | Finished steel | 11,762,639 | 15,460,792 | Cement (bbls.) | 7,648,658 | 10,425,600 | --------------------------------+------------+------------+

====================================================================== | 1917 | 1918 | 1919 --------------------------------+------------+------------+----------- Ore mined | 31,781,769 | 28,332,939 | 25,423,093 Coal mined--not for making coke | 6,942,298 | 6,354,980 | 5,937,487 Limestone | 6,494,917 | 5,141,365 | 5,835,289 Coke--Beehive | 11,177,247 | 9,962,403 | 5,933,056 Coke--By-product | 6,284,428 | 7,795,233 | 9,530,593 Pig iron, Spiegel, etc. | 15,652,928 | 15,940,954 | 13,637,504 Bessemer Steel | 6,405,390 | 5,630,246 | 4,788,242 Open-hearth Steel | 13,879,671 | 13,953,247 | 12,412,131 Finished steel | 14,942,911 | 13,849,483 | 11,997,935 Cement (bbls.) | 10,917,000 | 7,287,000 | 9,112,000 --------------------------------+------------+------------+-----------

INCOME AND DISBURSEMENTS

========================================================= | | | | | | | | | NET INCOME | NET FOR | PFD. | | | STOCK | DIVIDEND | --------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ 1901 (9 mos.) | $84,779,298 | $61,395,203 | $26,752,894 | 1902 | 133,308,764 | 90,306,524 | 35,720,177 | 1903 | 109,171,152 | 55,416,653 | 30,404,173 | 1904 | 73,176,522 | 30,267,529 | 25,219,677 | 1905 | 119,787,658 | 68,585,492 | 25,219,677 | 1906 | 156,624,273 | 98,128,587 | 25,219,677 | 1907 | 160,964,674 | 104,565,564 | 25,219,677 | 1908 | 91,847,710 | 45,728,714 | 25,219,677 | 1909 | 131,491,414 | 79,073,695 | 25,219,677 | 1910 | 141,054,755 | 87,407,186 | 25,219,677 | 1911 | 104,305,466 | 55,300,296 | 25,219,677 | 1912 | 108,174,673 | 54,240,049 | 25,219,677 | 1913 | 137,181,345 | 81,216,985 | 25,219,677 | 1914 | 71,663,615 | 23,496,768 | 25,219,677 | 1915 | 130,396,012 | 75,833,833 | 25,219,677 | 1916 | 333,674,177 | 271,531,730 | 25,219,677 | 1917 | 295,292,180 | 224,219,565 | 25,219,677 | 1918 | 199,350,680 | 137,532,377 | 25,219,677 | 1919 | 143,589,062 | 76,794,582 | 25,219,677 | 1920[G] | 177,174,126 | 110,136,105 | 25,219,677 | --------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+

================================================================ | COMMON DIVIDEND | | +------+-------------+ | | RATE | AMOUNT | APPRORPRI- | SURPLUS | % | | ATIONS | --------------+------+-------------+------------+--------------- 1901 (9 mos.) | 3 | $15,227,812 | ---- | $19,414,497 1902 | 4 | 20,332,690 | ---- | 34,253,657 1903 | 2½ | 12,707,563 | ---- | 12,304,917 1904 | -- | ---- | ---- | 5,047,852 1905 | -- | ---- | 26,300,000 | 17,065,815 1906 | 2 | 10,166,050 | 50,000,000 | 12,742,860 1907 | 2 | 10,166,050 | 54,000,000 | 15,179,837 1908 | 2 | 10,166,050 | ---- | 10,342,987 1909 | 4 | 20,332,100 | 18,200,000 | 15,321,918 1910 | 5 | 25,415,125 | 26,000,000 | 10,772,384 1911 | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 4,665,495 1912 | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 3,605,247 1913 | 5 | 25,415,125 | 15,000,000 | 15,582,184 1914 | 3 | 15,249,075 | ---- | 16,971,984[E] 1915 | 1¼ | 6,353,781 | ---- | 44,260,374 1916 | 8¾ | 44,476,469 | ---- | 201,835,585 1917 | 18 | 91,949,450 | 55,000,000 | 52,505,438 1918 | 14 | 71,162,350 | ---- | 28,935,350[F] 1919 | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 26,159,780 1920[G] | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 59,501,303 --------------+------+-------------+------------+---------------

[E] Deficit.

[F] After deducting $12,215,000 special allowance for amortization of war plants.

[G] Figures subject to adjustment.

THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N. Y.

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

Most of the photographs were printed back-to-back, but in this eBook, they appear on the pages given in the List of Illustrations.

Some footnote anchors in tables were moved to the other side of the cell.

Devices that cannot display characters used in this eBook may substitute question marks or hollow squares.

Pages 310-311: Each of the three “Production (Gross Tons)” tables (1902-1907, 1908-1914, and 1915-1919) was printed as a single wide table, but have been split here to meet width restrictions.

Page 312: Table of “Income and Disbursements” was printed as a single table with eight columns, but has been split here to meet width restrictions.