CHAPTER XII

Korean Reflection

_Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean War: Ground, Air, Helicopter--FMF and Readiness Posture--Problems Peculiar to the Korean War--Korean Lessons_

_Marine Corps Role and Contribution to the Korean War: Ground_[691]

[691] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter _Rpt of SecDef_; _PacFlt EvalRpts_, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), vs. I and II, hereafter _USMC Board Rpt_, held in James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va; A Summary of the General Officers’ Conference, HQMC, 19–21 Aug 53, hereafter _Generals’ Summary_, at Breckinridge Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of USMC Action in Korean War; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I, II, III, IV, _passim_; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Robert D. Heinl, Jr., _Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962_ (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_; Release “1st Marine Division ‘The Old Breed’” from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release “Outline of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in Korea,” HistBr, G-3 Div, HRS Folder; _CheVron_, MCRD, San Diego, Calif., V. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, “From Camp Pendleton to Inchon--18 Years Later, LtGen E. A. Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in Korea,” Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter _CheVron_.

Ground operations of the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War can be divided into six periods. These are the Pusan Perimeter defense (August-September 1950), Inchon-Seoul assault (September-October 1950), the Chosin Reservoir campaign (October-December 1950), East-Central Korea (January 1951-March 1952), West Korea (March 1952-July 1953), and the post-armistice period (July 1953-February 1955).

Marine Corps traditional concepts of readiness and fast, effective deployment were never better illustrated than in the hectic weeks following 25 June 1950. The NKPA invasion of South Korea came at a time when U.S. military forces were in the final stages of a cutback to peacetime size. Ships and planes were being “mothballed”; personnel of all the Armed Services were being reduced in number to the lowest possible effective manpower levels.

From the peak of its six-division, five-wing wartime strength of 475,600 in 1944–1945, the Marine Corps at the outbreak of the Korean emergency had only two skeletal divisions and two air wings. There were but 74,279 Marines on active duty, 97 percent of the Marine Corps authorized strength. Although a ceiling of 100,000 had been established for the Corps by law, it was a period of tight purse strings for all defense components. Fiscal austerity in the post-World War II period had whittled Corps numbers from 85,000 in FY 1947 to what was projected at 67,000 by the end of FY 1950.

This critically reduced strength found the normal Marine triangular infantry organization cut back to two companies per battalion, two battalions per regiment, and two regiments per division. The 1st Marine Division, at Camp Pendleton, and 2d Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune, were structured along the regular peacetime T/O of 10,232 USMC/USN vice the wartime minimum T/O of 22,355. No Marine units of any size were located in the Far East.

Despite its lean numbers in late June 1950, the Marine Corps once again would be in the forefront of American military response to the Communist aggression 6,000 miles across the Pacific. As hard-pressed South Korean forces and understrength U.S. occupation troops from Japan attempted to halt the Communist invaders, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, on 2 July, requested the JCS to send immediately a Marine RCT with supporting air to the Far East. On 7 July, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was formed at Camp Pendleton from units of the 1st Division. Major components of the brigade--a balanced force of ground, service, and aviation elements--were the 5th Marines and MAG-33. Five days later, the 6,534-man brigade had mounted out from San Diego to answer the CinCFE plea for Marines to help turn the Communist tide engulfing Korea.

The brigade buttressed the faltering UNC defense in the Pusan Perimeter. Employed as a mobile reserve it helped prevent three enemy breakthroughs--at Chinju and the two Naktong River battles. On 7 August, a month after its activation, the brigade launched an attack toward Chinju. The Marine brigade was the first unit sent from CONUS to see combat in what was then considered a short-term police action. Later, in leading the way to destruction of an enemy bridgehead at the Naktong, the Marine brigade gave the defending Eighth Army its first victory against the NKPA in the Korean conflict.

Even before the brigade had been dispatched to the Far East, as the Korean situation continued to deteriorate, MacArthur had requested the JCS to expand the brigade to a full war-strength division. Between 10–21 July MacArthur, now CinCUNC, had made three separate requests for a Marine division. This persistence was reinforced by his growing determination to conduct a tactical amphibious operation to the rear of the overextended NKPA lines and thereby seize the initiative from the enemy.

In the States, meanwhile, authorization was received to bring the badly understrength 1st and 2d Marine Divisions up to full 22,000-man war levels. By stripping posts and stations, reassignment and rerouting of units, and callup of additional reserve personnel, major elements of the 1st Marine Division were on their way to Korea by mid-August. Timing was critical in order to meet the projected D-Day target date of 15 September.

Pulled out of the Pusan line on 12 September, the brigade was absorbed by the newly arrived 1st Marine Division in preparation for the coming Inchon invasion. As the brigade commander, Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, USMC, later reminisced:

Although the 1st Provisional Brigade and the 1st MarDiv had never actually trained or worked together, they still combined and executed a successful landing. To me, this simply emphasized the fine training and techniques laid down for amphibious landings by the Marines.[692]

[692] _CheVron_, pp. 4–5.

Organized as a unit less than four months, the brigade left behind it a reputation for mobility, effectiveness, and rapid deployment in the face of national emergency. Although Marine air and ground forces had operated together since 1919 in Haiti, formation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade “marked the first time that the air and ground elements, task organized under a single commander, had engaged in combat.”[693]

[693] _Ibid._ Even though Marine air and ground forces had on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air support in the early days was considered a subsidiary rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not fully employed before the end of hostilities.

In the brilliant Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, Major General Oliver P. Smith’s 1st Division Marines led the X Corps attack in the first major counterstroke by United Nations forces on Communist-held territory. This maneuver was closely timed against enormous odds of personnel, logistics, and hydrography (tidal fluctuations of 31 feet) which made 15 September the only suitable assault date until mid-October. When outlined in earlier planning sessions by General MacArthur, the mammoth difficulties of the operation had been so unsettling that the designated Attack Force Commander for the landing, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, expressed the view that “the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible.”[694]

[694] Quoted in _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet.

Despite all the difficulties, the landing at Inchon and recapture of Seoul, the South Korean Capital, and its adjacent Kimpo airfield by the Marines was a stunning tactical blow by the UNC that broke the backbone of the North Korean People’s Army 1950 offensive. The 1st Marine Division, in its successfully executed amphibious landing, had offered UNC forces an opportunity to defeat the enemy decisively before a Siberian-like Korean winter set in. Accomplished under the most adverse weather and geographic conditions, the assault proved anew the decisive power of amphibious forces employed at a critical time and place. This capability and readiness of the Marine Corps had totally reversed the military situation, and a battered enemy was on the run. The subsequent routing of the NKPA divisions in the Inchon-Seoul campaign by X Corps and the Eighth U.S. Army forces would have led to an early UN victory had not the Chinese Communists intervened to support their Korean counterparts. The operation had validated Far East Commander General MacArthur’s early premise that:

... air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that nothing short of the intervention of U.S. ground forces could give any assurance of stopping the Communists and of later regaining the lost ground.[695]

[695] _Ibid._, p. 3.

The Inchon operation, moreover, had been planned in record time--approximately 20 days. This was one of the shortest periods ever allotted to a major amphibious assault, involving the planning, assembly of shipping, and mounting out of a combined force of 29,000 Marines and support personnel.

With the Inchon-Seoul operation ended, the 1st Marine Division (including the 7th Marines which had reached Inchon in time for the liberation of Seoul) reembarked on 12 October for deployment to the east coast of Korea. A new military operation was envisioned north of the 38th Parallel against Pyongyang, the North Korean Capital. As part of the drive, X Corps was to make an amphibious envelopment on the east coast, in the area of the enemy-held port of Wonsan. From here X Corps would advance westward toward Pyongyang, to link up with Eighth Army troops and trap NKPA forces withdrawing from the south.

While the Marines were en route to the objective, word was received that ROK troops had overrun Wonsan and were pushing north. The revised X Corps plan of operation called for a three-pronged attack towards the Yalu. The Marine division would advance on the left, the U.S. Army 7th Division in the center, and 1st ROK Division on the right flank. This drive to the north and subsequent action at the Chosin Reservoir would rank as one of the most rigorous campaigns in the entire history of the Marine Corps.

Fighting as part of EUSAK, by this time fanned out throughout North Korea, the 1st Marine Division did not meet the expected NKPA resistance. Instead, large-scale Chinese Communist Forces had entered the war. As X Corps swept north toward the Yalu River in November 1950, the Marines became the first United States troops to defeat the Chinese Communists in battle. At Sudong, after four days of savage fighting, the Marine RCT-7 so badly crippled major elements of the 124th CCF Division that it was never again committed as an organic unit.

When the Chinese forces struck in full force at the Chosin Reservoir, X Corps units were forced back. Elements of a nine-division assault force, the CCF 9th Army Group, which had been sent into Korea with the specific mission of annihilating the 1st Marine Division, began to attack. On 27 November, the Chinese directed a massive frontal assault against 5th and 7th Marines positions at Yudam-ni, west of the reservoir. Another CCF division, moving up from the south, cut the MSR held by the 1st Marines so that the division at Yudam-ni, west of the reservoir, was completely encircled by Communist forces. Many experts considered the 1st Marine Division as lost. Others thought the only way to save it was to airlift it out, leaving its equipment behind. Instead, the Marines seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through CCF units blocking a route to Hagaru. The division battled its way out in 20-degree-below-zero weather 78 miles over icy, winding mountain roads from the reservoir to the Hamhung-Hungnam area where, on 15 December, it redeployed to South Korea.

Integrated ground and air action enabled the 10,000 Marines and attached 4,000 Army-Royal Marine troops to break out of the entrapment and move south. During 13 tortuous days the Marines had withstood hostile strength representing elements of six to eight CCF divisions. The major result, from the military view, was that the Marine division properly evacuated its dead and wounded, brought out all operable equipment, and completed the retrograde movement with tactical integrity.

Not only had the Chinese (with a total of 60,000 men in assault or reserve) failed to accomplish their mission, destruction of the division, but the Marine defenders had dealt a savage blow to the enemy in return. POW debriefings later revealed that assault units of the CCF 9th Army Group had been rendered so militarily ineffective that nearly three months were required for its replacement, re-equipment, and reorganization.

Early in 1951, the 1st Marine Division was reassigned to IX Corps for Operation KILLER, a limited offensive ordered by the EUSAK Commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway. In Operation RIPPER, in March, the division led another IX Corps advance as it drove toward the 38th Parallel on the east-central front. When the Chinese struck back with their spring offensive on 22 April, the Marines were transferred to operational control of X Corps and counterattacked to restore the UNC defensive position in the far eastern sector. During May and June, the 1st Marine Division continued to punish the enemy in the Punchbowl area of eastern Korea, driving the CCF back to Yanggu and the Soyang River corridor.

Activity all along the UNC front came to an uncertain halt in July 1951 when Allied and Communist negotiators met at Kaesong for truce talks initiated by the enemy. In August the MLR flared into action again, and the Marine Division was engaged in new counterthrusts in the Punchbowl area. Fighting during the next three weeks involved the division in some of its hardest offensive operations in Korea. It also developed that this would be the last offensive for the Marines. In November 1951, as a result of the truce talks and possibility of ending hostilities, General Ridgway, now UNC Commander, ordered the Eighth Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the front.

The war of fire and movement had turned into one of positional warfare, a defensive posture by UN forces that would continue for the last 21 months of the three-year conflict. Throughout the winter of 1951–1952, the Marines conducted vigorous patrol activities in their sector of X Corps. Although it was a lackluster period of trench warfare for the average infantryman, major tactical innovations were being pioneered by the division with its use of the transport helicopter for logistical and resupply missions.

In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division was transferred from the eastern X Corps line 140 miles west to strengthen the far end of the Eighth Army MLR in the I Corps sector. The division was relocated in the path of the enemy’s invasion route to Seoul, where weak defenses in the Kimpo coastal area had threatened the security of the UNC front. Here the division’s four infantry regiments (including the 1st Korean Marine Corps RCT) held nearly 35 miles of front line in the critical Panmunjom-Munsan area. The demilitarized route for the United Nations negotiators led through the Marine lines. It was the most active sector of the UN front for the next 16 months. This key position guarded the best routes of advance from North Korea to Seoul and indicated the high regard in which General James A. Van Fleet, EUSAK commander, held the Marines.

West Korean terrain was rugged, hilly, and friendly to the CCF who had the advantage of high ground positions as well as considerably more manpower. Although cast in an unaccustomed defensive warfare role, rather than a true attack mission, the Marines repelled an almost continuous series of enemy probes. While truce talks went on at nearby Panmunjom, fighting as furious as at any time earlier in the war flared up intermittently as the CCF tried to gain additional terrain for bargaining purposes. During 1952–1953, the Marine division beat off determined CCF limited objective attacks on Bunker Hill, the Hook, Vegas, and Boulder City outposts up until--literally--the final day of the war, 27 July 1953.

In reviewing Marine actions during this period, the Secretary of the Navy commented:

Marines in Korea have established an enviable record of success in carrying out their assigned missions. The First Marine Division began its third year in Korea holding an active sector of the United Nations front guarding the enemy’s invasion route to Seoul. It was frequently subjected to fanatical Chinese attacks supported by intensive artillery fire. Some of the heaviest fighting during the year took place along the front held by this Division. Enemy attacks were well coordinated and numerically strong. Continued patrol activity to keep the enemy off balance frequently resulted in bitter hand-to-hand fighting with numerous casualties on both sides.[696]

[696] Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 185.

This type of prolonged static warfare gave little real satisfaction to Marines accustomed to waging a war of movement and a more tangible “mission accomplished.” The year of positional warfare in western Korea was costly, too. Total U.S. casualties in the Korean War numbered approximately 137,000 men killed, missing, or wounded. The Marine Corps toll was 30,544. Of this number, 4,262 were KIA, an additional 244 were listed as non-battle deaths, and 26,038 were wounded. During this last part of the war, Marine casualties (both ground and air) totaled 13,087, plus an additional 2,529 for the attached 1st KMC/RCT. Astonishingly, 1,586 Marines or 39.6 percent[697] of the infantry Marines killed in the entire war were victims of the “static,” outpost warfare in the west. Another 11,244 were listed WIA during this period--representing 43.9 percent of the total number of ground Marines wounded during the three years of conflict.

[697] See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only; air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952-July 1953 period cited above.

* * * * *

Conditions varied widely during the 1950–1952 and 1952–1953 periods of the war. The enemy’s improved capability in artillery during the latter period of positional warfare largely accounts for the high casualty rate at this time. It has been noted that:

Prior to February 1952, with a warfare of mobility prevailing, the enemy was inferior in artillery, the causative agent of most personnel losses. Afterwards, during the outpost warfare of western Korea, the front remained more or less static, and the Chinese Reds had as much artillery support as the Marines.[698]

[698] Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 6 (Jun 55), p. 16.

It might be valid to question the use of Marine Corps specialists in amphibious warfare in an Army-type conventional land war. The protracted land campaign that characterized the latter stages of the Korean conflict actually was waged for the majority of the war period--from September 1951 to July 1953, or nearly two years. In terms of economy of manpower it could be considered an inefficient, though not ineffective use of Marines. On the other hand, the history of warfare down through the ages makes it repeatedly clear that a nation fights the pitched battle against its opponent with the arsenal of weapons and personnel at hand.

As an Eighth U.S. Army component (attached variously to the X, IX, and I Corps), the 1st Marine Division (one of nearly 20 divisions representing U.S. Army, British Commonwealth, and ROK troops) performed its assigned mission--to repulse and punish the enemy. It contributed heavily to maintaining the integrity of the EUSAK front and was considered one of the two crack EUSAK divisions--the other being the Marines’ neighbor to the right, the British Commonwealth Division. With the attached KMCs, the 1st Marine Division, moreover, was also the biggest and strongest division in EUSAK.

Most importantly, fast deployment of the Marine division had made possible the brilliant tactical maneuver at Inchon. Many military experts, following World War II, had envisioned future conflicts only in terms of atomic warfare and massive strategic air assaults. Even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “had predicted publicly, hardly six months before, that the world would never again see a large-scale amphibious landing.”[699] In contradiction to new atomic-age tactics, however, the United Nations commander in September 1950 had turned the tide of the battle by his use of a conventional maneuver--envelopment by amphibious assault. The performance of the Marine Corps was thus responsible, in part, for changing post-Korean War military doctrine from total reliance on new tactics and weaponry to a more balanced concept that combined both sophisticated innovations and viable, established procedures.

[699] Statement by Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, as quoted by Gen G. C. Thomas, Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. and RAdm A. A. Ageton, _The Marine Officer’s Guide_ (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1956), p. 130.

Although unemployed in its primary amphibious role after late 1950, the 1st Marine Division had originally been positioned on the eastern front because of this capability. It was the UN commander’s desire to have EUSAK’s only amphibious trained and equipped division near the coast in the event that an amphibious maneuver was required for offensive or defensive purposes. Again, in the division’s 1952 move to the western coastal front in the Kimpo area, this fighting capability was a major consideration.

To a large extent, U.S. forces in Korea fought the early part of the Korean War with weapons from the preceding war--only five years removed. Three tactical innovations employed by the Marine Corps during the Korean War were highly successful and largely adopted by the other services. These were the thermal boot, individual body armor, and the helicopter. All were first combat tested in 1951.

Frostbite casualties during the first winter in Korea resulting from inadequate footwear made it necessary to provide combat troops with specially insulated footgear. The new thermal boot virtually eliminated frostbite for both Marine infantrymen and aviators. Armored utility jackets had been developed toward the end of World War II but were not actually battle tested. The Marine Corps had renewed the experimentation in 1947. First combat use of the plastic, light-weight body armor was made in July 1951 by Marines while fighting in the Punchbowl and Inje areas of X Corps. Improvements were made to the prototypes and by the following summer the Marine Corps, following a request made by the Army Quartermaster General, furnished some 4,000 vests to frontline Army troops. By 1953 the 1st Marine Division had received its authorized quota of 24,000 vests and new lower torso body armor had also been put into production.

Medical experts reported that the effectiveness of enemy low-velocity missile weapons striking a man wearing body armor was reduced from 30–80 percent. Chest and abdominal wounds decreased from 90–95 percent after issuance of the armored vests. Overall battle casualties were estimated to have been cut by 30 percent. By the time of the cease-fire, the protection offered by the Marine body armor had been extended to some 93,000 Marine and Army wearers. Hardly anywhere could the U.S. taxpayer or fighting man have found a better buy for the money: mass production had reduced the per unit cost of the Marine armored vest to just $37.50.

_Air_[700]

[700] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; _USMC Board Rpts_, vs. 1-11; _Generals’ Summary_; AnlRpt SecNav 1952–1953; _USMC Ops Korea_ vs. I-IV, _passim_; Monograph, _A Brief History of Marine Corps Aviation_, (HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960); Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The Acid Test,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 5 (May 57), pp. 22–27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the Armistice,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun 57), pp. 22–26; Brochure, Change of Command Ceremonies, 11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW folder, HRB ref. file.

On 3 August 1950, eight VMF-214 Corsairs led by squadron executive officer, Major Robert P. Keller, catapulted from the deck of the USS _Sicily_ to launch the first Marine air strikes in the Korean action. From then until 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 127,496 combat sorties in the Korean War, considerably in excess of the 80,000-odd sorties for all Marine aviation during World War II. Of this Korean number nearly a third, more than 39,500, represented the Marine Corps close air support specialty, even though 1st MAW pilots were heavily engaged in other assignments from Fifth Air Force. These included interdiction, general support, air defense patrols, air rescue operations, photo and armed reconnaissance, and related tasks to insure Allied air superiority.

With the outbreak of Korean hostilities, Stateside Marine air units were alerted for combat duty by 5 July. At Major General Field Harris’ 1st MAW headquarters, El Toro, MAG-33 elements were quickly readied for deployment to Japanese bases and thence to Korea. Commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, MAG-33 comprised Headquarters and Service Squadron 33, fighter squadrons VMF-214 and -323, an echelon of nightfighters from VMF(N)-513, two radar units (Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 and Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2), plus the observation squadron, VMO-6. Forward elements were quickly on their way, arriving in Japan on 19 July, while the rear echelon reached the Korean Theater on 31 July. Twenty R5Ds from Marine Transport Squadrons 152 and 352 were already providing logistical support for Pacific lift operations.

After practicing some last minute carrier landing approaches, the fighter pilots got into combat almost at once. Following -214 into the war, VMF-323 started operations on 6 August, flying from USS _Badoeng Strait_ in support of the Pusan ground defenders. When the brigade mounted out on 7 August on its drive to Chinju, the two MAG-33 carrier squadrons were there with their 5-inch HVARs, napalm, 100- to 500-pound bombs, and 20mm cannon. VMF(N)-513 began its regularly-scheduled night tours over the Korean perimeter that same date, lashing at enemy supply and transportation centers in the Sachon-Chinju area of southern Korea. VMO-6 had already started evacuating casualties from the Pusan area three days earlier.

Many Army ground commanders witnessed the Marine system of close air support for the first time during the Pusan fighting. After the second Naktong battle, when air strikes had silenced enemy guns and 300 troops near Obong-ni, the commander of the 23rd Regiment to the right of the brigade wrote General Ridgway in Washington:

Infantry and artillery is a good team, but only by adding adequate and efficient air support can we succeed without devastating losses ... The Marines on our left were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it like artillery. It was, ‘Hey, Joe, this is Smitty, knock the left of that ridge in from Item Company.’ They had it _day and night_.[701]

[701] Quoted in Andrew Geer, _The New Breed--The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), pp. 94–95, quoted with permission of the publisher.

And while Marine, Army, and Navy staffs were completing plans for the forthcoming Inchon assault, MAG-33’s little aerial Photo Unit (part of Headquarters Squadron) took a series of reconnaissance photographs of the landing beaches in preparation for the closely coordinated maneuver.

During Inchon-Seoul operations, MAG-33 was joined by three MAG-12 fighter squadrons: VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542. After the capture of Kimpo airfield, 212’s “Devilcats” and 542’s nightfighters transferred from Itami to Kimpo. Flying out of 2d MAW headquarters, Cherry Point, N.C., on 18 August, the Devilcats had climaxed a hurried dash halfway around the world to get into action. The squadron flew its first combat mission from Kimpo a month after its departure from the East Coast. While the MAG-12 land-based squadrons and the carrier pilots functioned as the division’s flying artillery, MGCIS-1 set up a radar warning system and MTACS-2 established a Tactical Air Direction Center to direct all aircraft in the X Corps zone of action.

With the conclusion of the Inchon operation on 8 October, VMF-312 and VMF(N)-542 remained at Kimpo. Other Marine squadrons (VMF-212, VMF(N)-513, VMO-6, HqSq-12, and carrier-based VMF-323) shifted to the Korean east coast in readiness for the Wonsan landing and subsequent deployment north of the Marine infantry regiments. Wing elements began arriving at the port city’s airfield on 13 October. Division Marines, meanwhile, on board ship in the Wonsan harbor while more than 3,000 expertly laid Communist mines were being removed, did not land until 26 October. For the men who fought the vertical war in Korea, it was “one of the rare times in the air-ground association, the 1st MAW had landed ahead of the 1st Marine Division. The aviators didn’t miss putting up a big sign-board “_Welcome, 1st Division!_”[702]

[702] LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea,” Part I, _Marine Corps Gazette_, May 1957, p. 45.

As 30 CCF divisions slammed into UNC forces all across the fighting front in late November to change the nature of ground operations (and the future of the war), so did the onset of the first Korean winter test 1st MAW aerial skills and ingenuity. Low hanging ceilings, icing conditions, and three-inch snows on the carrier decks were common operating hazards. For the shore-based pilots, the bad weather often caused changed flight plans as they were forced to land at alternate fields or on Navy carriers. Nonetheless, Marine RD4s flew up to the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, at Hagaru, to air-drop ammunition and supplies and evacuate casualties from the entrapment. Logistical support to this tiny frozen makeshift air strip was also provided by Air Force C-47s and C-119s. Later on, during the first step of the grinding movement south, Air Force pilots paradropped a sectionalized steel bridge vitally needed at Koto-ri to replace a destroyed span over a chasm.

Beginning with the load-out for Wonsan in early October, the 1st MAW was placed under operational control of the Seoul-based Fifth Air Force.[703] Echelons of FAF air command and control initially slowed operational orders anywhere from 4 to 36 hours. Simplified interservice communications and command liaison between 1st MAW and FAF helped improve the situation. With a verbal agreement, on 1 December, for CG, 1st MAW to receive full control over X Corps area aircraft, problems eased substantially. To a large degree the close coordination of Marine aviation and ground forces during the Chosin campaign was due to the use of flexible, simplified, and fast battle-tested Marine Corps-Navy CAS techniques and to having increased the number of pilot FACs from one to two per battalion.

[703] Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Except for the formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board Rpt, v. I, p. IV-B-9, 14.

The Marine movement south from Hagaru was protected by one of the greatest concentrations of aircraft during the entire war. Twenty-four CAS aircraft covered the breakout column, while attack planes assaulted enemy forces in adjacent ridge approaches. Marine planes on station at Yonpo (south of the Hamhung-Hungnam axis) and carrier-based VMF-323 flew some 130 sorties daily. Another 100 attack sorties were flown daily by Navy carrier-based planes, while FAF flew interdiction missions beyond the bombline. Marine Panther jets of VMF-311, operating with the Air Force from the Pusan area, got into the action at Yonpo. It was also at this time that an airborne TADC (tactical air direction center) was first improvised when the radio jeeps moving south with the column had communication failures. For six days, a VMR-152 R5D transport orbited 2,000 to 4,000 feet above the Marine units to control air support between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni as a flying radio nerve center.

From late November to early December, as the division battled its way from Chosin to Hamhung, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft evacuated more than 5,000 Marine, Army, and ROK casualties. And during the most critical period, the little OY spotter planes and HO3S-1 helicopters from VMO-6 provided the only physical contact between units separated by enemy action. Marine tactical squadrons in these three early major offensives of the war, from 3 August to 14 December, flew 7,822 sorties, 5,305 of them CAS for the battered UNC ground units.

From 1951–1953, 1st MAW pilots and planes came under direct control of FAF. They alternated between principal missions of interdiction raids to harass and destroy Communist supply lines north of the battlefront, general support sorties outside the bombline, and CAS flights to support infantry forces threatened by enemy penetration. Typical of FAF focus on massive aerial assaults were the following assignments that Marine flyers participated in:

In January 1951 (prior to Operation KILLER), the 1st MAW undertook a series of interdiction raids against the Communist supply net located in the Korean waist between the 38th and 39th Parallels, to disrupt the CCF transport-truck system.

On 9 May 1951, 75 1st MAW Corsairs and Panther jets were part of the 300-plane raid staged by FAF against Communist airfields at Sinuiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu.

Operation STRANGLE, a major Fifth Air Force all-out interdiction effort to cripple the enemy supply life line, was undertaken 20 May. When the Chinese Communist spring offensive broke shortly thereafter, MAG-12 Corsairs and -33 Panther jets delivered maximum support to the MLR regiments, the 1st and 7th Marines. When the truce talks began in Kaesong, in July 1951, 1st MAW planes and the radar searches of MACG-2 stood guard. Batteries of the Marine 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion, attached to the wing, were also alerted to keep under surveillance the approaches to key military ports.

New tactical developments pioneered by 1st MAW during the Korean War advanced the UNC air effort and added to the 1st MAW reputation for versatility. Several major steps forward were taken toward Marine aviation’s primary goal of providing real operational 24-hour CAS, regardless of foul weather conditions. The new MPQ-14 radar-controlled bombing equipment, developed between 1946 and 1950, was employed by MASRT-1, as a device to control night fighter sorties of a general support nature flown by day attack aircraft. By means of height-finding and directional radars, it enabled a pilot to leave his base, drop a bomb load on target, and return to home field without ever having seen the ground. It offered major practical improvement in blind bombing methods. MPQ was limited, however, in its use in sudden, moving battle situations because of some of its sophisticated, hand-built ABC components. A real tactical breakthrough in night CAS came in April 1953 when VMF(N)-513 and the VMO-6 spotter planes evolved the new searchlight beam control system which made possible 24-hour coverage for 1st Marine Division ground units.

In other innovations, it will be remembered that the Air Force in late 1952 had requested escort by VMF(N)-513’s new two-place jet-intruder F3D Skyknights on Air Force B-29 night bombing missions. During a four-month period from 1952–1953, the Marine night fighters downed one enemy plane or more a month while escorting the B-29s. Once the F3Ds began their night escort role, Air Force bomber losses became negligible.

A unique capability of the long-range, jet-intruder night-fighter was that the F3D carried a radar operator who replaced the ground controller, thereby extending air-defense radar range to the aircraft. It could thus operate independently and effectively at great distance from its base. Without GCI (ground control intercept) aid, VMF(N)-513 direct escort to bombers at night was so successful that the squadron’s planes were used as exclusive escort of the Bomber Command B-29s. In November 1952, the Marine squadron’s two night kills were the first ever recorded by airborne intercept radar-equipped jet fighters. At the end of the war, Skyknights and -513 pilots (flying F3Ds as well as the earlier F7Fs) had destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other Marine or Navy day or night fighter plane. Tactics employed by VMF(N)-513 were original in concept and required a high-level of training and individual pilot-AIO (airborne intercept operator) proficiency. It was noted that:

The enthusiasm with which this Marine aid to the Air Force has been received by FEAF Bomber Command indicates that VMF(N)-513 had successfully adapted its equipment and personnel to a mission usually associated with Air Force operations, making an important contribution to interservice cooperation, but even more important, to tactical progress in the night escort of bomber formations.[704]

[704] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-82.

An operation somewhat in reverse of the nightfighters was that of VMJ-1, the Marine photographic squadron, which had its own Air Force escort. Formerly the Wing Photo Unit, VMJ-1 was commissioned in February 1952 and flew a total of 5,025 combat flights. Under FAF operational control until late in the war, the squadron’s 550-mph F2H-2P twin-jet Banshees flew unarmed deep into enemy country--even as far as the MIG-guarded Yalu--photographing positions, airfields, power plants, and other targets. An escort plane flew cover while the photo ship took pictures. Photo missions to the Suiho Reservoir were rated so important that “24 Air Force F-86 jets flew an umbrella.”[705] Introduction of the squadron’s jet Banshee early in 1952 was a major step in improved aerial photography. The Banshee was the superior photographic aircraft in the combat theater, because of its new advanced-design view finder and operating range.

[705] “1st MAW in Korea,” _op. cit._, Part II, Jun 57, p. 23.

Coverage from VMJ-1’s gross wartime output of 793,012 feet of processed prints was equal to a continuous photographic strip six and half times around the earth at the equator. The Marine photo squadron contributed a third to the entire UN photo reconnaissance effort and at times flew as much as 50 percent of all FAF intelligence missions.

Throughout the war the four attack squadrons of MAG-12 (VMAs-212, -251, -121; and -332 at the end of the war) had dumped seemingly endless bomb loads on CCF installations, while MAG-33’s two jet-fighter squadrons (VMF-115 and -311) had provided the Marine exchange pilots who scoured the lower side of the Yalu with the Air Force F-86s on fighter sweeps.

During Korea the Marine CVE/CVL squadrons (VMAs-214, -233, -312, and -251) flew more than 25,000 sorties, experimenting with improved techniques for carrier landings. The carrier qualification program of Marine air units, a regular part of their training, also proved its value in combat. In the earliest days of the war, VMF-214 and -323[706] had operated from two CVEs based off the south coast of Korea, thereby providing close support to the brigade and other Eighth Army elements at a time when all shore-based aircraft were forced to operate from Japan.

[706] With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons were subsequently redesignated as attack units.

In other tactical refinements, the 1st MAW had employed an airborne tactical air control center in combat for the first time. In July 1952, when the static ground situation led to a build-up of enemy flak along the front lines that interfered with effective CAS delivery, the 11th Marines had instituted a flak suppression program in front of the division sector. Later that year, CG Eighth Army had ordered a similar program used by all other Eighth Army commands. By December, apparently because of lack of success with their own methods, EUSAK had adopted the system developed by the Marine artillery regiment. The antiaircraft program, together with a reduction in the number of runs per aircraft per mission,[707] had measurably decreased casualties for CAS missions conducted within artillery range. During 1952–1953 this loss rate for pilots and planes had dropped by a third, with no corresponding reduction in the sortie rate.

[707] In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction missions and two passes on CAS flights.

Stabilized warfare and enemy AA build-up had also led to an increasing use of enemy radars. Passive electronics countermeasures (ECM) were instituted by FAF. This program was enhanced in September 1952 by the commissioning of VMC-1 (Marine Composite Squadron 1), administratively assigned to MACG-2. The squadron possessed the only Fifth Air Force ECM capability to locate enemy radars and was the primary source of ECM intercept equipment in FAF squadrons for early warning and radar control monitoring. Throughout the duration of hostilities, VMC-1 remained the only Navy-Marine unit in the Korean theater with ECM as its prime function.

For its combat action, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was awarded two Korean Presidential Unit Citations and the Army Distinguished Unit Citation for the Wonsan operation. Wing pilots were responsible for downing 35 enemy planes, including the first night kill made by a United Nations aircraft. Participation of the 1st MAW in the war could also be measured in a different way. On the inevitable red side of the ledger: 258 air Marines had been killed (including 65 MIA and presumed dead) and 174 WIA. A total of 436 aircraft were also lost in combat or operational accidents.

From the command level, Korean operations marked the first time the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had functioned for an extended period as a component in a broad, unified command structure such as FAF. Despite the weak links initially inherent in such a situation, the command structure did work. Marine-Navy and Air Force-Army differing aerial doctrines and tactics of close tactical air support, however, were never fully reconciled. The Marine wing made a notable contribution in providing really effective close, speedy tactical support during the sudden fluid battle situation that erupted in mid-July 1953. Simplified Marine TACP control, request procedures, and fast radio net system enabled 1st MAW pilots to reach the target area quickly. During this final month of the war--and indicative of the enormous amount of coordination involved in the FAF administrative apparatus--1st MAW planes flew 1,500 CAS sorties for the 19 different EUSAK frontline divisions.

CG, 1st MAW noted in General Order No. 153 issued the last day of the war, that “the Wing’s association with the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh U.S. Fleet in combined operations had been a professionally broadening experience--teaching tolerance, teamwork, and flexibility of operations.”[708]

[708] MajGen V. E. Megee, GO 153, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoted in 1st MAW, Part II, _op. cit._, p. 26.

Besides the FAF interdiction work and support missions for frontline units, new 1st MAW tactics and equipment had diversified the wing’s skills and capabilities in its primary role of providing CAS for Marine ground units. Of new tactical air support developments in the Korean action none had a more revolutionary effect than those created by the helicopter--which dramatically reshaped battlefield logistics and pointed the way to a new era in Marine Corps air-ground teamwork.

_Helicopter_[709]

[709] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; _USMC Board Rpt_, v. I; Generals’ _Summary_; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I-IV, _passim_; Montross, _SkyCav_.

A promising newcomer on the Marine aviation scene was the helicopter, whose tactical employment in Korea was to far exceed all expectations. A few helicopters had been used experimentally in the European and Pacific theaters toward the end of World War II, too late to evaluate their performance. But it was the Marine Corps, beginning in 1947, that had pioneered the development of combat techniques utilizing the rotor-driven aircraft as a means of enhancing its capability for the amphibious assault. When the Korean incident erupted in June 1950, the Marine Corps was in a position to assign four HO3S-1 Sikorsky two-place helicopters and flight personnel from its Quantico test unit, HMX-1, together with fixed-wing planes and pilots to form the brigade observation squadron, VMO-6. These Marines had the distinction of being the first helicopter pilots of any U.S. service to be formed into a unit for overseas duty.

Further, the Marine Corps also had 31 months’ experience with the strange looking, pot-bellied, ungainly aircraft in diverse battlefield tasks. These included casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, wire-laying, liaison, and administrative missions. But promising test exercises at Quantico and Camp Lejeune were hardly enough. The real test would come at the front. There, the helicopter’s military value would reflect and “depend to a large extent on how well the Marine Corps had worked out combat doctrines and techniques where none had existed before.”[710]

[710] Montross, _SkyCav_, p. 108.

Landing with the brigade in August 1950, the choppers performed invaluable service from the earliest days of Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, and the Reservoir. During the most critical phase of the Chosin operation, the helicopters provided the only liaison between isolated commands. Wire-laying by air was first employed by VMO-6 during the second battle of the Naktong River, in September 1950. The ground had changed hands several times and control was uncertain. Using makeshift communication rigs, VMO-6 pilots unreeled telephone wire at a mile a minute. This method of putting telephone lines across Korean mountains became routine through the rest of the war, and Marine choppers strung miles of lines in rain and wind with the enemy blasting away at them. Wire was laid over terrain in a matter of hours where it would have taken men on foot weeks--if it could have been done.

Perhaps the greatest innovation of VMO-6, however, was its night casualty evacuation techniques first employed at Pusan. Darting in and out at treetop level around the Korean mountains, the light, easily maneuverable craft could land on a tiny patch of earth to evacuate injured men or bring in supplies. Once, during the early part of the war, when the aeronautical pioneer Igor Sikorsky was asked how his revolutionary vehicles were performing in combat, Mr. Sikorsky, bowing from the waist in his Old World manner, replied:

Thank you. Our things go very well in Korea. The helicopter has already saved the lives of several thousands of our boys in Korea and the score is still mounting.[711]

[711] _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 10 (Oct 55), p. 61 quoting Eugene E. Wilson, _Wings of the Dawn_ (Hartford, Conn.: Connecticut Printers, Inc., 1955).

With the advent of the helicopter, as little as 43 minutes elapsed between the time a Marine was hit and the time he was on board the USS _Repose_ or other hospital ships. Later on when the Marine transport copters arrived in Korea, HMR-161 pilots felt a new record had been set when only 30 minutes[712] intervened between the time a frontline Marine was hit and delivered to a hospital facility 17 miles from the zone of action. The _Consolation_ had been outfitted with a helicopter loading platform in July 1951, and eventually all hospital ships had such landing platforms. In Korea the flying ambulances could make the trip from rear area aid station to ship in five minutes and unload the wounded and clear the deck in 45 seconds flat.

[712] By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use when he commented, “I went aboard the _Samaritan_, where Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the casualties from the day and night before.” Capt Clifford P. Morehouse, _The Iwo Jima Campaign_, (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139.

Throughout the war nearly 10,000 wounded Marines were evacuated by helicopter; more than 1,000 such missions were carried out at night. Records indicate that VMO-6 flew out 7,067 casualties and that another 2,748 medical evacuations were made by HMR-161, for which the task ranked as a secondary mission. Although these humanitarian gains were important, major tactical innovations made by the helicopter were even more significant.

In the fall of 1951, HMR-161 successfully executed the first combat troop resupply mission in history. At this time while the division was deployed in the jagged razorback-ridge Punchbowl area, “a glimpse of future warfare was provided when Marine helicopter lifts on a company scale led to the lift of an entire battalion and its organic equipment.”[713] Arriving in Korea on 31 August, the squadron had a complement of 15 new 10-place HRS-1 transport vehicles, with cruising speed of 60–85 knots. Developed specifically to meet Marine Corps combat requirements, the HRS marked a new era in Marine airborne support to ground troops. Both VMO-6 and HMR-161 came under operational control of the division. (With 1st Division and Wing headquarters separated geographically by more than 200 miles, it was particularly expedient to have the two squadrons under division control.)

[713] HistBr outline, p. 4.

The first step toward using the rotor-blade aircraft in the mission most closely related to the USMC basic helicopter concept--that of transporting troops and supplies by vertical envelopment--was accomplished 13 September 1951. In Operation WINDMILL I, HRS choppers carried out the first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply operation in history. A lift of one day’s supplies was made to 2/1 in the Soyang River vicinity. A total of 28 flights were executed in overall time of 2½ hours (a total flight time of 14.1 hours) to transport 18,848 pounds of gear and 74 Marines a distance of seven miles.

HMR-161 first applied the Corps’ new concept of vertical envelopment on 21 September when, despite heavy fog, it transported 224 fully equipped Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the reserve area to the MLR. This was the first helicopter lift of a combat unit in history. Company-size troop lifts inevitably led to more complicated battalion-size transfers. In the 11 November Operation SWITCH, HMR-161 effected the relief of a frontline battalion, involving the lift of nearly 2,000 troops. Twelve of the 3½-ton aircraft made 262 flights in overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours flight time).

The tactical and logistical possibilities of the multi-purpose rotor craft attracted considerable attention. So impressed, in fact, were Eighth Army officers by the mobility and utility displayed by Marine helicopters that in November 1951 General Ridgway had asked the Army to provide four Army helicopter transport battalions, each with 280 helicopters. Korea, Ridgway said, had “conclusively demonstrated that the Army vitally needed helicopters,”[714] and he recommended that the typical field army of the future have 10 helicopter transportation battalions.

[714] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 533–534.

Ridgway was thereby renewing requests for helicopters made in the early days of the war by both the Army (through General MacArthur) and the Air Force (by General Barcus). But the UNC Commander’s enthusiasm, although understandable, turned out to be the undoing for substantial Army use of the rotary-blade aircraft in Korea. The scale of operations[715] envisioned by Ridgway unwittingly led to a “jurisdictional controversy”[716] about possible duplication of aerial functions not reconciled by the two services until a year later. Although both services had helicopters in limited use, “hostilities were in their last stages before either the Army or the Air Force began to receive the cargo helicopters which they had put on order in 1950 and 1951.”[717]

[715] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 184, comments: “In order to insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway] suggested that procurement be started on a scale that would permit manufacturers to expand production immediately.”

[716] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 534.

[717] _Ibid._

A successful three-day Army regimental supply exercise in May 1953 and a combat maneuver the following month in which the choppers formed an air bridge to a heavily attacked, isolated ROK unit caused General Taylor, then CG, EUSAK, to observe: “The cargo helicopter, employed in mass, can extend the tactical mobility of the Army far beyond its normal capability.” He strongly recommended that the Army make “ample provisions for the full exploitation of the helicopter in the future.”[718]

[718] _Ibid._, p. 535.

Pioneering developments by the Marine Corps had, of course, continued meanwhile. Logistical operations had grown increasingly complex and diversified. In Operation HAYLIFT II, 23–27 February 1953, Marine helicopters set an all time cargo-carrying record when they lifted 1,612,306 pounds of cargo to completely supply two JAMESTOWN regiments with daily requirements for the five-day period. This represented a total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the operation. The record day’s lift was 200 tons, whereas plans had called for lifting a maximum 130 tons per day. Experience gained during the operation indicated that similar tactical maneuvers in warmer weather would be even more successful when troop fuel oil requirements were reduced.

Other Marine innovations by HMR-161 included supplying ammunition from the rear area ASP to the MLR and redeployment of 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery personnel and guns from one firing area to another. And although VMO-6 executed most of the mercy missions, the transport squadron performed an unusual assignment in July 1952. Flood conditions throughout Korea brought an urgent request from the Army for use of HMR-161. On 30 July, the Marine squadron evacuated 1,172 Army troops from their positions in the Chunchon area where they had been trapped by the heavy rains.

With a new tactical exercise held nearly every month, HMR-161 operations that once had rated world-wide headlines were now practically routine. VTOL-style battalion troop lifts were no longer novel and regimental resupply operations were becoming almost standard practice. In both relocation of units and logistical support, combat helicopters had provided high mobility and reasonable speed. They had introduced a new infantry technique of “hit and run” tactics. The transport helicopter squadron had proved most effective when employed in major tactical movements and not when used piecemeal on minor missions. Marine Corps wartime use of the new aerial vehicle had clearly proven that helicopters had become a necessary and integral component of the modern-day balanced military force.

_FMF and Readiness Posture_[719]

[719] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav), 1951–1955; _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6. Chaps. 9, 10; _USMC Board Rpt_, vs. 1-11; _Generals’ Summary_; Brochure titled “Historical Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1941–1950 (Preliminary),” held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951_ (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.), hereafter Giusti, _Mobilization, MCR_; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, _The Marine Corps Reserve--A History, 1916–1966_ (Washington: Division of Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, “Men of Color,” issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, _Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957_ (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961).

The flexibility and readiness capability inherent in the Marine Corps FMF structure was a strong undergirding factor in its swift response to the Korean crisis. As noted, in June 1950 the Marine Corps had 74,279 officers and men on active duty. Its Fleet Marine Force, consisting of FMFPac and FMFLant, numbered 27,656. The 11,853 personnel of FMFPac included 7,779 men in General Smith’s 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton and 3,733 in General Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro. On the East Coast, FMFLant numbered 15,803 with approximately 8,973 Marines in the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and 5,297 air personnel attached to the 2d Wing at Cherry Point.

Outbreak of Korean hostilities thus presented the Marine Corps with the tasks of organizing and deploying for combat first a brigade and then a full war-strength reinforced division, each with supporting aviation elements. Despite the low strength to which FMFPac had shrunk due to stringent national defense economy measures, the heavy demands placed upon it were met. Both missions were accomplished quickly and effectively. In fact, “few achievements in the long history of the Marine Corps can equal what was achieved in the 11 weeks which elapsed between the outbreak of the Korean War and the amphibious assault of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon.”[720]

[720] Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac, 1941–1950, p. 49.

As early as 2 July, CinCFE MacArthur had requested that a Marine RCT-air unit be dispatched to the Far East. On 7 July the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated; on 12–14 July it embarked. With departure of the brigade, personnel shortages within the 1st Division and 1st Wing became acute. The division was reduced to 3,459, less than a RCT; and the wing to 2,300. Meanwhile, as the increasing demand had continued for a Marine Division deployed to Korea, it became equally apparent that if the Marine Corps were to fulfill this requirement of deploying a full-strength division to Korea,[721] its reservists would have to be called up to alleviate these shortages.

[721] With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv, even “had they been combined into a single unit, its numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one war-strength division.” Giusti, _Mobilization_, MCR, p. 9.

Manpower potential of the Marine Corps Reserve was 128,959, nearly twice that of the regular establishment. In June 1950, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (Ground) numbered 1,879 officers and 31,648 enlisted personnel being trained in 138 OMCR units of battalion size or less. Membership of the ground reserve was approximately 76 percent of its authorized strength. At the same time the Organized Reserve (Aviation) consisted of 30 fighter and 12 ground control intercept squadrons attached to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command organized at Glenview, Ill. in 1946. These MARTCOM squadrons numbered 1,588 officers and 4,753 enlisted, or approximately 95 percent of authorized strength. In addition to nearly 40,000 members of the OMCR, the Marine Volunteer (nondrill, nonpay status) Reserve carried approximately 90,000 on its rolls.

A warning notice went out on 19 July from the Commandant, General Cates, to District Directors that the OMCR would shortly be ordered to active duty; later that same day mobilization of the Reserve was authorized by President Truman, with Congressional sanction. On 20 July, the first 22 ground units, with nearly 5,000 men, were ordered to active duty on a schedule that took into account the unit’s state of readiness, proximity to its initial duty station, and facilities there for handling the personnel overload.

Less than a month after hostilities began in Korea, key infantry, artillery, and engineer units of the OMCR had been ordered to extended active duty. On 31 July, West Coast ground reserve units from Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and Phoenix were the first to report in to Camp Pendleton for augmentation into the 1st Marine Division. The following day their opposite numbers from the East Coast units arrived at Camp Lejeune. By 11 September, all of the organized ground units had reported for duty and the OMCR (Ground) had ceased to exist.

While the organized ground reserve was being mobilized, the first of the 42 MARTCOM fighter and intercept squadrons began arriving at El Toro. Personnel of six reserve VMF and three MGCI squadrons were ordered to duty on 23 July as replacements in the 1st MAW which had furnished units and men for the MAG-33 component of the brigade.

Commenting on the success with which the Marine Corps achieved this expansion, the Secretary of Defense was to note later:

The speed with which this mobilization was effected was an important factor in the rapid buildup of the First Marine Division, the first units of which sailed for the Far East in July 1950.[722]

[722] Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187.

As late as 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed MacArthur that a Marine division could not be sent before November or even December. Finally, on 25 July, the CinCUNC’s third request for the division was approved. It would, however, be a division minus one RCT, and the Joint Chiefs were “adamant in their decision that MacArthur must wait until autumn or even winter for his third RCT.”[723]

[723] _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 23.

The JCS also directed on 25 July that the Marine Corps build its division (less one RCT) to full war strength. The date of 10–15 August was set for its departure to the Far East. Among the many steps taken in the mobilization schedule, the JCS directed that the Camp Lejeune-based 2d Marine Division be expanded immediately to war strength.

Fleshing out personnel--against short-fuzed manpower and time factors--for the 1st Marine Division and Wing, due to embark in mid-August, a month after the brigade had left, was a round-the-clock operation for all hands. Between 25 July-5 August, the Marine Corps provided personnel for the expanded Division/Wing by:

transfer of FMFLant-selected, 2d Division/Wing air and ground units, of 6,800 men, to FMFPac;

transfer of 3,600 regular Marines from 105 posts and stations throughout the U.S.;

mobilization of 2,900 from early OMCR ground and air units; and utilization of two replacement drafts, number 900, intended for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

Expansion of the 1st Marine Division was in two phases, bringing the division (less one RCT) up to war strength and then organizing its third reinforced infantry regiment, the 7th Marines. With the cadre of 3,459 men in the division after the brigade left and the influx of regulars and reservists, the 1st Division embarked for Korea between 10 and 24 August. It had reached wartime strength (less one RCT) on 15 August, just 27 days after beginning its buildup from a peacetime T/O. As it had approached war strength, the Division CG, General Smith, was directed by CMC ltr of 4 August to activate a third RCT and prepare it for departure to Korea no later than 1 September.

While mounting out, the division transferred approximately 1,000 of its rear echelon to be used in the buildup of the 7th Marines. The 6th Marines of the 2d Division provided the base for building this new regiment. (Approximately 800 Marines of 3/6 were reassigned from Mediterranean duty and ordered to the Far East, via the Suez Canal, to join the 7th Marines upon its arrival there.) By drawing men from widely scattered sources, it was possible to activate the 7th Marines on 17 August. Departure of this regiment on 1 September was thus far in advance of the late fall or winter target date originally set by the JCS.

With all OMCR ground units called up and absorbed into the 1st and 2d Divisions, and air squadrons being mobilized on a slower schedule (due to less-urgent combat needs for air personnel in the early war stage), the Marine Corps dealt with its remaining body of reserve strength. Bulk orders went out beginning 15 August to the Volunteer Reserve, and by the end of the year 58,480 men and women in this category were on active duty. More than 80 percent of the volunteer reservists on Marine Corps rolls served during the Korean War.

Attesting to the impact of events in Korea is the fact that “following the epic withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Chosin Reservoir, the number of new enlistments into the active Volunteer Reserve jumped from 877 in December to 3,477 in January.”[724]

[724] Giusti, _op. cit._, p. 36.

Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September. A previous estimate had shown an expected 80 percent availability of ground reserve on M-Day; the actual mobilization figure was 90 percent. Of 33,528 OMCR ordered to active duty, a total of 30,183 (1,550 officers/28,633 enlisted) reported. Marine aviation also expanded rapidly. By January 1951, 32 organized reserve air units (20 of the 30 existing VMFs and all 12 MGCIs) had been activated and by October of that year all of the reserve squadrons had been called to active duty. Of the 6,341 organized air reservists, 5,240 received orders; 4,893, or 93.4 percent, reported in. In contrast to the ground reserve, air units had been recalled on a staggered or partial mobilization schedule, a matter which was later to receive Congressional attention (and ultimately to set a new trend) when the Nation’s entire Korean War mobilization procedures were reviewed and subsequently revised.

Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent. Between July 1950 and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and veterans, saw active duty with the Marine Corps.

Throughout the war the Marine Corps effected approximately 34 replacement drafts and another 31 rotation drafts. Ground Marines served an average tour of 13 months overseas (although actual time attached to the division was about 10½ months). The collapse of North Korean forces after the Inchon-Seoul operation and the unopposed landing at Wonsan had pointed to an early end of the Korean conflict. Massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, however, changed the prospect of a short war to a long one and made it necessary to implement a rotation and release policy. By March 1951, HQMC had worked out a preliminary phaseout program for reserve personnel (based on the various categories and length of service prior to recall) which was put into effect in June 1951.

During 1952 and up until July 1953, approximately 500 officers and 15,500 enlisted men joined the 1st Marine Division in Korea every six months. Individual monthly replacement drafts generally ranged from 1,900 to 2,500, depending on the combat situation and other personnel needs within the Marine Corps. Monthly rotation drafts of Marines assigned to the States or other duty stations from Korea were usually somewhat smaller than their corresponding incoming numbers. Ranks and MOS of replacement personnel to the end of the war, however, did not always meet the needs of the division. Specialty training conducted by the 1st Marine Division in Korea helped remedy most of the worst deficiencies.

During the latter half of 1952 and throughout 1953, tours for Marine pilots/combat air crews averaged 9 months, and for aviation ground officer/enlisted personnel, 12 months. Following a detailed HQMC study of the advantages of tactical unit as opposed to individual pilot rotation, a new squadron replacement policy was instituted. This procedure assured standard precombat training of all pilots[725] and development of a team spirit prior to the squadron’s arrival in the combat theater. Previously this had not been possible with the continuing turnover of 1st MAW personnel under the individual release system. Despite plans during 1952–1953 for replacement and rotation of squadrons as an entity, this did not come about until late in the war when carrier squadron VMA-312 was replaced by VMA-332 in June 1953. With the end of hostilities, tours were extended to approximately 14 months for both aviation and ground Marines.

[725] Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate recent precombat flying experience, had presented a serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job training for pilots in the VMO-6 fixed-wing section. As another measure to improve squadron operational proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a 100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953. This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units, with the exception of VMF(N)-513 pilots who were rotated after 60 missions.

Buildup of Marine Corps personnel during the Korean War from the June 1950 base of 74,279 is seen in the following strength figures:

June 1951 192,620 Marines on active duty June 1952 231,967 Marines on active duty June 1953 249,219 Marines on active duty

Altogether, an estimated 424,000 Marines served during the period of hostilities. The war also witnessed a sizable increase in the number of Negro Marines on active duty. This figure grew from 2 officers/1,965 enlisted in 1950 to 19 officers/14,468 enlisted by 1953. Marine officials commented on their fine combat performance, including that of many outstanding NCOs. In line with the changing climate of events and legislation,[726] the Korean War marked the first time that Negro personnel were fully integrated into the military services, in contrast to the segregated units before and during World War II.

[726] Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces continued to expand as a result of the President’s 1948 Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity. The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial integration of combat units, followed by similar programs for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun 1952), p. 21.

Peak strength of the Marine Corps during the Korean emergency occurred on 30 September 1953, when 261,343 were on duty. At the end of the war, 33,107 Marines (26,072 division, 7,035 wing) were stationed in Korea. The time of peak deployed strength in Korea during 1950–1953 appears to have been April 1953, when Marines of the 1st Division/Wing numbered 35,306.[727]

[727] For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW ComdDs, Apr 53 and _PacFlt Eval Rpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-54, Chap. 10, p. 10-29. Also, _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-33 and No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-26.

While the Korean War was still in progress, Congress passed new legislation to remedy certain shortcomings that had become apparent during the emergency, particularly the Nation’s recent experience with partial mobilization. These new laws affected the size of the FMF structure of the Marine Corps, its active-duty strength, and its reserve component.

Public Law 416, enacted 28 June 1952, represented several major advances for the Marine Corps. It authorized an increase of Marine Corps strength to a minimum of three combat divisions and three wings; raised the ceiling of regular active-duty personnel to 400,000 (except for normal expansion in a national emergency or war); and provided for the Commandant to sit as co-equal member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[728] on matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps. In reaffirming the role of Marine Corps in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, as well as land operations incident to naval campaigns, the law also cited the corollary Marine Corps mission of “performing such other duties as the President may direct.” Commenting on Public Law 416, the Commandant observed: “Our views are considered. Our interests are protected. The entire Marine Corps has benefited greatly by these gains.”[729] General Shepherd further noted that the new legislation “expresses clearly the intent that the Marine Corps shall be maintained as a ready fighting force prepared to move promptly in time of peace or war to areas of trouble. It recognizes that in the future there may be a series of continuing international crises--each short of all-out war, but each requiring our nation ... to move shock forces into action on the shortest of notice.”[730]

[728] Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at the JCS level by the SecNav or CNO.

[729] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 1.

[730] Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, _op. cit._, p. 70.

The two new laws affecting the future training and composition of the Marine Corps and other services were: (1) the Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMT&S), as amended, approved 19 June 1951; and (2) the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (Public Law 476), approved 9 July 1952. Basically, the two laws sought to establish a sounder mobilization base and were complementary in nature. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 implemented a new mobilization concept: either a partial or total callup of the Nation’s reserve forces. In the past, the M-Day target had been geared to a total war only. A limited war, resulting in a partial, Korean-type mobilization, had not been envisioned. The 1952 act thereby provided greater flexibility for dealing with both contingencies and also consolidated much of the existing legislation affecting reserve forces.

Members of the reserve were newly designated by different categories of M-Day priority: ready, standby, and retired reserve. These varying degrees of availability for callup reflected training status (OMCR/volunteer), length of prior service, and related factors (i.e., men with the least service were designated for first callup, or the “Ready” category.) Previously, they were all equally subject for recall in an emergency, regardless of prior service.

The 1952 act and its new provisions thereby distinguished between a future national emergency and an all-out war. Theoretically, at least, a national emergency could be proclaimed by the President, calling for a partial mobilization, as in Korea. A declaration of war by Congress, as in World War II, would call for total mobilization. Thus the Marine Corps Reserve was newly earmarked for either a partial or total mobilization.

Under UMT&S, a military service obligation of eight years was established for all young men under age 26 entering the armed forces (whether by enlistment, draft, appointment, or reserve) after 19 June 1951. The act also authorized drafting of male citizens for two-year active duty periods. This new system of eight-year obligors provided the post-Korean MCR with a stable body of personnel who had received their basic training but still had a reserve obligation.

Also as a result of the Korean mobilization, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve troop list was modified in order to provide a manpower pool for additional elements of the regular establishment. Supply, service, and security units were added to provide more of an FMF type of augmentation than that furnished by reserve units in the past. Reestablishment of the OMCR began in October 1951, when the first group of recalled reservists were released from Korean duty. Plans called for a larger reserve and more comprehensive training. Ground units were to be increased from 138 to approximately 255, with the air squadrons to number 42. The Volunteer Reserve was similarly to be strengthened by stricter requirements for participation.

Traditionally the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve, since 1916, had been defined as “providing trained personnel for integration into the Marine Corps in time of national emergency.” The strengthened MCR program as a result of Korea and the new laws led to a more serious reappraisal of its role. In looking to its post-Korea future, the Marine Corps planned a revitalized training program that would now “assist in extending the ‘force-in-readiness’ concept to the Marine Corps Reserve.”[731] More than ever before, the Marine Corps sought to make its reserve a mirror-image of the regular establishment.

[731] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 96.

_Problems Peculiar to the Korean War_[732]

[732] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; _USMC Board Rpt_ vs. I-II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin No. 5-53, “Lessons Learned,” dtd 10 Jun 53, hereafter _Lessons Learned 5-53_; _Generals’ Summary_; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_.

The undeclared war of Communist China against United Nations forces resulted in major changes in high-level policy and strategy that affected military tactics for the rest of the war. In an attempt to prevent escalation of Korean hostilities into an all-out nuclear war, the decision was made that U.N. forces, both ground and air, would not strike enemy bases in Chinese territory. After the beginning of truce negotiations in July 1951, the mission of Allied ground forces was changed from initiating offensive operations to one of maintaining an active defense of the MLR across Korea. The basic strategy became one of containment and prevention of any further enemy gains south of the 38th Parallel. It involved attempting to inflict maximum losses on the enemy while attempting to minimize those of the UNC. Militarily, these restrictions removed the possibility of winning a decisive victory. For the next two years, fighting seesawed back and forth across the parallel.

Static and defensive warfare thus characterized the greater part of the Korean War. During this period, the Marine division performed a land war mission similar to other Eighth Army components while Marine aviation squadrons flew under control of Fifth Air Force. Both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faced tactical restrictions that resulted from the strategic policies governing the overall role of EUSAK and FAF. Problem areas arose from the limited nature of this particular war. These involved not only the shift in the UNC strategy from an offensive posture to a defensive (“active defense”) concept, but also from the paralyzing effect of the protracted truce negotiations on battlefield tactics.

For nearly two years (16 months in West Korea and 5 months earlier while in IX Corps on the East-Central front), the Marine division assumed an unaccustomed defensive role. Such a sustained, basically non-win position was hardly morale-building to the average Marine unable to see personally any yardage gained, any progress made in his particular war. Not surprisingly, such a passive battle assignment did result in a temporary loss of amphibious skills on the part of both individual Marines and the division. End-of-war evaluations noted that “long and indecisive defensive situations such as existed in Korea do little to foster the offensive spirit so long traditional with the Marine Corps and certainly tend to detract from the immediate amphibious readiness required of a Marine Division.”[733]

[733] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-2.

Prior to its tour of duty as I Corps reserve in mid-1953, the 1st Marine Division had noted that it would “require intensive training and reequipping for a period of at least 60 days” upon release from active combat in order to “reach a desirable standard of amphibious readiness.”[734] Rigorous MARLEX and RCT exercises initiated in June 1952 after the division had moved to the western coastal sector off the Yellow Sea and expanded during its I Corps reserve period, were important steps in rectifying this skill attrition. This was, of course, in addition to the continuous training schedule in offensive and defensive warfare maintained by the division for the battalions and regiment periodically in regular reserve status.

[734] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the division’s ground readiness was rated as excellent; a conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated a 30-day training period would bring the division to complete amphibious readiness. _Generals’ Summary_, p. 53.

Outpost warfare in West Korea was characterized by overextended MLR frontage. The more than 60,000 yards held by the division while in the I Corps sector resulted in a thinly-held line which invited penetration and encirclement. “Normal” frontage for an infantry division in defense with two regiments on line was considered by U.S. Army doctrine to be 8–9,000 yards. Even with four MLR regiments (two Marine, 1st KMC/RCT, and KPR) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on line (the third Marine regiment in reserve with a counterattack mission), this was a very lengthy sector. It was further complicated by the Han River obstacle on the left flank and the Imjin River to the rear of the sector that separated Marine frontline troops from rear support and reserve units.

Infantry battalions thus occupied “extremely wide fronts, as a rule 3,500 to 5,000 yards,” while individual rifle companies were assigned anywhere from “1,200 to 1,700 yards of the MLR to occupy and defend.”[735] Prior to the battle of the Hook in October 1952, one of the major engagements on the western front, the 7th Marines at the far right end of the division sector had emplaced all three battalions on line, rather than the customary procedure of two on line and the third in reserve. There was little other choice, for the regimental sector exceeded 10,000 yards, “more properly the frontage for a division rather than a regiment.”[736]

[735] _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 19.

[736] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 107.

During a 100 percent watch, at least theoretically, a Marine could be spaced at intervals about every 10 to 15 yards along the MLR. A night 50 percent watch--with personnel of rifle platoons assigned to COPs, listening posts, combat patrols, repair of fortifications, and the KSC nightly supply trains--not infrequently spread personnel to a point where the MLR was dangerously thin, often with 50 yards between men.[737] Such an over-wide lineal deployment dissipated defensive strength and made mutually supporting fires difficult.

[737] Lessons Learned, _op. cit_.

Division artillery, too, was thinly positioned across the wide sector, making it difficult to execute counterbattery missions. This led to development of the innovative counter-counterbattery program (or “roving guns”) devised by the 11th Marines in May 1952 to deliberately mislead the CCF as to the strength and location of divisional artillery; the situation resulted as well in the reinforcement of the four Marine artillery battalions by heavier I Corps 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. The static situation in the prolonged land campaign also led to the growth of large, semi-permanent type camps which somewhat hampered traditional Marine mobility. Organizations had additional personnel and equipment above T/O and T/E because of the peculiar defense requirements of the sustained battle situation.

The lack of depth in the defense did not provide for receiving the shock of a determined enemy attack, particularly since the normal OPLR had been withdrawn to strengthen the overextended MLR in April 1952, shortly after the division’s arrival in West Korea. Ultimately, as we have seen, this main line of resistance concept was modified and rather than a long thin trenchline the Marine division employed a defense-in-depth concept using a series of strongpoints, as in Boulder City and the organization of the postwar main battle position. In contrast to the Marine situation (and that of most other divisions in the EUSAK line), the CCF confronting the 1st Marine Division beyond No-Man’s-Land deployed their forces in great depth, boasted unlimited manpower, and employed an elastic type of defense on mutually supporting key terrain features. The enemy had also developed an artillery capability that was numerically superior to ours. And they held high ground positions that overlooked virtually the entire Marine front.

As in World War II, Korean operations provided another instance in which various military services and components were coordinated by joint commands: EUSAK for the ground defense and FAF for air. These massive operational command structures accomplished the desired goals. On lower level echelons, however, some policies tended to be so restrictive that they precluded normal combat initiative and aggressiveness. The net result was thus to allow the enemy to maintain the tactical initiative while, in effect, hampering UNC counter-defense measures.

New directives issued by I Corps in late 1952, for example, changed the corps policy of large-scale raids for prisoners, previously encouraged in the spring of 1952, which affected infantry raids and patrol activities for the rest of the war. Plans for all raids, company size or larger, required both I Corps and EUSAK approval, and were to be submitted 10 days prior to planned execution. Complete patrol plans for even platoon-size operations had to be submitted at least 24 hours in advance. Although the reason for the new policy stemmed from a desire to minimize casualties during the prolonged stalemate, negative effects of such a lead-time factor were quickly apparent. Battalion or regimental commanders frequently were unable to capitalize on targets of opportunity that developed or changes in local conditions, such as weather or troop deployment, to gain maximum effectiveness from the operation.

Directives covering offensive maneuvers that could be taken on local initiative were so restrictive that “any independent action below the level of the Division Commander became practically nonexistent.”[738] Similarly, counterattack plans to retake previously considered major COPs were countermanded, on several occasions, by corps or army higher echelons shortly before jump-off time with the reason given that the action was not worth the cost of further UNC casualties or possible jeopardy to the fragile peace negotiations.

[738] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-84.

Allied offensive capability was further restricted by various EUSAK and I Corps orders issued during the protracted period of truce talks. Many directives had as their well-intentioned rationale the desire not to upset the precarious balance in UNC-Communist negotiations by providing the enemy further opportunities for exploitative propaganda victories. The actual record shows, however, that the Communists were never at a loss to conjure up and capitalize on fabricated “events” that suited their purpose--whether charging UNC aircraft had violated the Kaesong neutrality strip, that American fliers were engaging in germ warfare, or deliberately instigating POW camp disruptions and breakouts.

Neutrality restrictions[739] on supporting arms within the entire Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan-ni area further complicated the UNC tactical situation and hampered both offensive and defensive operations of the 1st Marine Division. This was particularly true of the center Marine regimental sector which was bisected by the Panmunjom corridor and the no-fire lines. The truce talk neutral zone restrictions prevented the Marines in this area from massing their artillery fires on a desirable scale and also, at times, interfered with proper CAS delivery forward of the MLR. The numerous and sometimes conflicting “no-fly, no-fire” restricting lines stemmed from original agreements made between UNC and Communist representatives in 1951. Subsequently, however, the prohibitions against firing any type of weapon in the area were modified from time to time and added to by FAF, EUSAK, and I Corps, “each time adding to the frustration of the local commanders.”[740]

[739] Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda shell leaflets.

[740] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, 9-78.

The double-standard effect of the neutrality restrictions became readily apparent, however. The CCF artfully used this area, by means of his tactics of “creeping” toward the Allied MLR, as a supply and reserve buildup location. The enemy emplaced artillery, assembled troops, and even used the neutral territory for equipment buildups, including tanks, in the Kaesong vicinity.[741] Thus the restrictive lines gave the enemy an opportunity to maneuver within an approximate 12 square-mile area, all within effective artillery range and outside of the Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, but UNC units were powerless to take any action.

[741] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-37.

Intelligence operations, during the latter stages of the war, were not considered optimum--for either the division or wing. While dug in on the western end of I Corps, the Marine information effort had been “seriously hampered by the lack of prisoners of war.”[742] Only 94 CCF had been captured by the division during the period, compared with more than 2,000 prisoners taken earlier on the East-Central front.[743] This deficiency was attributed to the “static defensive situation, the reluctance of the Chinese to surrender and the heavy volume of fire placed on our reconnaissance patrols.”[744]

[742] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39.

[743] Between December 1950-July 1953, the 1st Marine Division took 2,445 _NKPA/CCF_, with an additional 656 enemy seized by its attached 1st KMC/RCT, or a total of 3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G-1 Folder, Aug 53 (Box 4), “Personnel Periodic Rpt. No. 94,” dtd 15–31 Aug 53; _USMC Board Rpt_, v. I, p. II-B-46.

[744] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39.

In the air, photo reconnaissance results were not rated entirely satisfactory as a source of current information by either air or ground Marines. The command channels in effect designated the Air Force as responsible agent for control and coordination of all photo missions in Korea. Requests for photographic missions thus were relayed on to FAF and flown by its Reconnaissance Wing or the Marines’ own VMJ-1 squadron. The system produced relatively good vertical coverage with photos available in about 10 days. Special requests for immediate coverage on areas of local importance, however, customarily were either not flown or “delayed to the point where they were of no value”[745] because the tactical situation had been changed.

[745] _Ibid._

Delays were due to the shortage of photographic aircraft throughout FAF and the limited provision in T/Os for photo interpretation. Intelligence of air-strike targets (particularly post-strike) was consistently mediocre. Oblique photos of frontline positions took an average of three-four days to be processed and sometimes longer. As an expedient, aerial observers began to shoot their own vertical and oblique photos with hand-held cameras slung over the side of a VMO-6 plane.

Probably the most serious problem of all, from the Marine Corps point of view, was that during much of the Korean War Marine air-ground components, trained to work as a team, were to a large extent precluded from operating together. The separate missions of the wing and division reflected, on a smaller scale, the divergent UNC air and ground doctrine and tactics. After the early moving battles, Korean hostilities had settled down to a protracted land war in which ground and air tactical commands did not operate jointly and were never coordinated to deal a truly devastating blow to the enemy. Since the Korean War was a limited one most of the fighting was confined to the stabilized front across Korea. Both air and naval forces were viewed largely as supporting arms for the ground operation.

Due to political-military considerations, UNC tactical air power had been, in effect, handcuffed so that its use would not appear “overly aggressive” and threaten an enlargement of the Korean hostilities into a nuclear armageddon of World War III.[746] Since the earliest days of the war, a strict embargo had been placed on any bombing of Chinese rear supply areas or industrial complexes although it was obvious that much of the enemy’s logistical strength lay beyond the Manchurian border.

[746] Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the desire to employ “humanitarian” standards in the UNC war effort. Following WW II there had been wide criticism of the “moral wrong of massed air bombardment” as well as employment of the atomic bomb by the U. S. to hasten the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be directed against purely military targets. Futrell, _USAF Korea_, p. 41.

Air efforts were concentrated largely on nuisance or harassing raids within North Korea and close air support efforts of various types, rather than a systematic destruction of the enemy’s primary supply installation’s. Some ranking officers had informally interpreted official Washington policy as “Don’t employ airpower so that the enemy will get mad and won’t sign the armistice.”[747] Indeed, it was not until after the Communists had rejected what the UNC called its “final truce package,” in April 1952, that it was decided to exert greater pressure against the Communists. The list of approved aerial targets was then enlarged to include North Korean hydroelectric power facilities, previously exempted from air attack.

[747] _Ibid._, p. 402.

From late 1950 until early 1953, Marine air squadrons were assigned directly by FAF, with CG, 1st MAW, having virtually no tactical control over his own units. Marine Corps aerial doctrine traditionally employed close air support of ground operations as the primary role of its air arm. FEAF and FAF, however, in their interpretation of employment of tactical air power directed FAF maximum efforts toward interdiction missions, sometimes even to the expense of immediate CAS needs.[748] As Far East Air Forces stated late in 1951, “when required, close air support of United Nations Army forces may take precedence over other FEAF programs.”[749] Interdiction, general support, and close support missions were the normal order of priorities flown by _FEAF_-FAF.

[748] Comments Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 430–431: “Despite the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-_FAF_ in November 1951] placed on close support.” One of those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described the Marine division’s air support as unsatisfactory and stated his division had “taken unnecessary casualties because its air support had not been adequate or timely.” Average elapsed time between the division’s CAS requests and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had been filled within 30 minutes.

[749] _Ibid._, p. 432.

Operation STRANGLE, the 10-month, all-out, air interdiction campaign during 1951–1952 originally had as its objective the destruction of the North Korean road-rail network. The interdiction program had been defined at first as a move to “paralyze enemy transportation in the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel and the front lines.”[750] and later somewhat more conservatively as a measure to so “disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication ... that he will be unable to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces ... or to mount a sustained offensive himself.”[751]

[750] _Ibid._, p. 296.

[751] _Ibid._, pp. 435–436.

Despite more than 87,552 interdiction sorties flown during the period, CinCFE daily intelligence summaries showed that aerial harassment of the CCF had not hindered their defensive efforts. Instead, by the summer of 1952 the enemy had “actually doubled in troop strength, reinforced their artillery strength to equal that of the UN forces, developed a tremendous AA capability, and established the capability for launching a general offensive.”[752] With UNC air and sea superiority, the Chinese Communists had still succeeded in keeping their main supply route open. Rail track cuts were being repaired in as little as 36 hours. And the CCF was employing more fire power than ever: in May 1952, some 102,000 rounds fell against UNC positions compared to only 8,000 the previous July.

[752] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-58.

Even the retiring UNC Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, admitted before Congressional representatives in 1952 that the enemy had greater offensive potential than ever before, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, declared flatly: “The interdiction program was a failure ... It did _not_ interdict.”[753] USAF spokesmen felt it had attained its limited purpose but opined: “Seen abstractly, the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and preventive rather than offensive and positive.”[754] In early 1952, CG, FAF, General Everest, recognizing that his pilots “had been so long engaged in interdiction attacks that they were losing their skills in close support”[755] inaugurated a new system. Beginning in March all fighter-bomber squadrons were to be rotated on weekly close-support missions.

[753] Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_, p. 270.

[754] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 437–438.

[755] _Ibid._, p. 434.

Actually, the skies had begun to clear for Marine aviation operational difficulties by the latter half of 1952. A better understanding had developed between both high-level officials and the working day-to-day liaison operations at JOC CG, 1st MAW had “established his position so firmly he was able to guide establishment of the policies which governed his operations merely by expressing his desires to CG 5th AF.”[756] The battle for Bunker Hill in August 1952 had marked excellent cooperation between Eighth Army and FAF, with the 1st Marine Division receiving air priority for two days. In any event, matters were substantially improved from late 1951-early 1952 when, during a 12-month period, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv had plummeted to the incredibly low figure of 1,956[757] or 15.8 percent of the wing’s total 12,372 CAS sorties during FY 1952 (1Jul51–30Jun52).

[756] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-45.

[757] By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50 percent; for FY 1953, the _figure_ was 4,912 of total 14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. _Generals’ Summary_, Chart C, following p. 58.

Commenting on this unhappy period for both air and infantry Marines, Lieutenant General Richard C. Mangrum, USMC (Retired), who was CO, MAG-12 during part of the STRANGLE operations, said “for the rest of 1951 and well into 1952 the major effort of my Group and of MAG-33 was devoted to cutting the rail lines in North Korea. Without success, of course. Little by little we were able to increase the percentages of effort devoted to close support of the troops.”[758] And by the last six months of the war the bulk of all CAS missions received by the division were flown by 1st MAW aircraft, in contrast to earlier periods when a third or half of the division’s sorties were Marine-flown. As the last Korean War Wing CG noted, despite basic differences between Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy concept and tactics, ultimately “the commanders of the Fifth Air Force in actual daily practice decentralized control to a marked degree.”[759]

[758] Quoted in Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_, p. 647.

[759] MajGen V. E. Megee, “Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 17.

Throughout the war, however, a lack of standardized terms and differences in request procedures continued to exist. (This was resolved by using Marine control procedures when flying for the division, and Army-Air Force procedures when scrambled on flights for other divisions.) Whereas EUSAK-FAF considered strikes inside the bombline[760] as “close air support” and those outside it as “general support,” the Marine CAS concept was one of support in close proximity to frontlines (ranging from 50 to 500 yards out) that affects the fire and maneuver of those ground units. In the hands of Marine FACs, Marine planes employed on close support strikes had a definite influence on the MLR tactical situation.

[760] The bombline had been moved in to an average of 3–4,000 meters from the MLR in December 1952 to expose more targets to the “mass” strike treatment.

Then, too, the Marine system of maintaining aircraft “on air alert” resulted in CAS requests being filled in 5 to 15 minutes. Air support requests screened in the regular manner by Eighth Army and FAF at the JOC level resulted in a delivery of ordnance to the target in a minimum of 30 minutes and delays sometimes of nearly four hours.[761] During fluid situations, when the division required more than 40 sorties per day, the “on station” system proved more tactically effective than the FAF pre-planned “on call” procedure.

[761] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ Chap. 1, No. 6, p. 1-15.

Operational differences between the Marine-Navy and Army-Air Force type of CAS in a critical ground situation were never more apparent than in a major CCF last-ditch effort when the enemy slammed against ROK defenses in the Kumsong area. An end-of-war report noted:

CCF penetration of the II ROK Corps sector, in July, 1953, brought clearly into focus the ineffectiveness of the Air Force-Army close air support (CAS) system during periods of fluid operations. CCF eruption through the II ROK Corps MLR and deep into friendly territory eliminated, as effective or practical, the complete reliance by 5th AF on pre-planned CAS strikes (using aircraft from the ground-alert pool), against fleeting targets or targets of an immediate nature. These types of targets are considered normal during a fluid situation.

The inadequacy of communications for rapid transmission of air support requests in the CAS system employed in Korea, the impossibility of only four TACP’s per division (U.S. and ROK Army) to keep up with frontline battalion battle actions in order to control CAS strikes, and the over-centralization of control of CAS request approvals and CAS aircraft allocation were all clearly demonstrated during that period of fluid ground operations in July.[762]

[762] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-3.

Despite the accommodation reached during the Korean War, many of these fundamental differences in doctrine and employment of air support to ground troops in combat persisted until recent years.[763]

[763] For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems dealing with air-ground liaison and communications, use of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress, Rpt of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on Armed Services, Otis G. Pike, Chairman (House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington: GPO, 1966.

As military history has shown countless times in the past, wars are fought under the prevailing difficulties of the time. There never was a war waged under ideal conditions. A reflection on operational problems of the Korean period is predicated on the thought that a review of them--and the solutions effected where possible--may help avoid their repetition in a conflict of the future.

_Korean Lessons_[764]

[764] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; _Generals’ Summary_; _Lessons Learned 5-53_; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; 1st MAW PIR 127-53, dtd 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Ground Situation #1-53 (end-of-war analysis); 1st MAW PIR 169-53, dtd 18 Jun 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Air Situation 1-53, dtd 20 May 53 (end-of-war analysis); 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI: Comments on Tactics, Techniques, and Equipment, pp. 1–12; J. Lawton Collins, _War in Peacetime--The History and Lessons of Korea_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969); S. L. A. Marshall, _The Military History of the Korean War_ (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963); S. L. A. Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill--The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring 1953_ (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956), quoted with permission of the publisher; Ridgway, _Korean War_; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; Batterton, _Korea Notes_.

In the early phase of the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division deployment was in a moving battle situation similar to numerous engagements it had fought in the past 175 years. Most of the “lessons” learned from the enemy, the tactical situation itself, and the terrain in Korea are derived largely from the later outpost warfare stage when the Marines were employed in a stabilized and sustained defensive situation similar to that facing other Allied units across the entire Eighth Army front. Tactics of defense on a wide front, construction of permanent type field fortifications, and organization of the battle position in difficult terrain was a new experience to Marines. This period of limited objective attacks and battles of attrition highlighted the importance of small unit tactics and demonstrated some modified concepts regarding employment of supporting arms.

During the period of outpost warfare, the 1st Marine Division was never confronted by a general enemy offensive or combined infantry-armor-artillery-air assault. The nature of the conflict was one of limited objective attacks, with strong and sometimes sustained probes. Typically, these were two-battalion assaults against a platoon-size outpost.

Time after time, as UNC defending troops learned, the CCF characteristic pattern of attack was repetitive and almost predictable. After dark, heavy preparatory fires deluged an isolated advance outpost. Crude, but effective, improvised demolitions often reduced COP fortifications[765] so that the enemy could assail the position. Waves of attacking Chinese then overwhelmed the greatly outnumbered defenders. Almost invariably the initial attack made on the front of the position was a feint; the real attack would be made by troops that had enveloped the position and moved to the rear. Enemy ambush forces were also located to the rear of the outpost, between the COP and MLR, at normal reinforcement routes to prevent both a pullback by the defenders to the MLR and to stop reinforcements from reaching the outpost.

[765] If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely following under heavy preparatory fires, he could penetrate the position. At this close range, normal box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break up the attack. _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 10.

Effective defensive fire plans for the COPs covered all likely enemy approaches and assembly areas, as well as close-in boxing fires of the COP on all sides. Marine defense positions were sited for all-round defense, with special attention paid to covering the rear approaches at night. This tactic of rear envelopment also applied on a smaller scale to patrols. Invariably the CCF maneuvered to the flanks and rear of a friendly patrol in an attempt to encircle it. The CCF skillfully employed both the terrain and troops and regularly attacked from more than one direction.

Experience with Communist combat techniques forced UNC leaders to reevaluate their own night-fighting tactics. The Chinese had a marked superiority in night operations. Every major attack on Marine outposts during the last year of the war was made at night. When they were not directly assaulting a friendly site, the CCF advanced their own ground positions by digging and their well-known creeping tactics. This enabled them to establish an OP line within small arms and mortar range of Marine COPs and the MLR. The battle for Bunker Hill came about as a result of this enemy tactic. Organization in early 1952 of COP-2A, adjacent to the Panmunjom corridor, was in direct rebuttal to this same tactic. By such indirect methods, the Chinese were further able to extend their already favorable high ground positions which gave them observation over practically all of the Marine front line. Defensively the enemy used the cover of darkness equally well: mountain roads were aswarm with trucks and supply movements, which UNC night-fighters and bombers slowed with only moderate success.

Skilled, rapid construction of field fortifications and excellent camouflage discipline by the enemy were also object lessons. Entrances to tunnels and caves, as well as the bunkers themselves were so carefully disguised by fresh branches, weeds, logs, and other natural foliage that they were rarely visible either by air observer or aerial photographs. Active weapons positions were also effectively camouflaged. Often 60mm and 82mm mortars were housed in bunkers and fired through a narrow opening at the top. If moved out temporarily to an open slope, they were quickly returned to the bunker to avoid detection. The Chinese elaborate underground system of trenchworks and radial tunnels between forward and rear bunkers was sometimes as much as 35 yards long. Underground bunkers and tunnels often had 20 feet or more of protective dirt cover and offered security from anything except a direct aerial hit.

Destruction of the enemy’s trenches, bunkers, and cave network by medium and heavy artillery was only partially successful. Napalm was generally ineffective due to the lack of combustible materials in CCF ground defenses. The well-prepared, deeply dug fortifications were virtually impervious to anything less than air assaults with heavy ordnance (1,000-pound bombs and over) which were required to destroy CCF reverse slope positions.

A well dug-in secondary line was located four to eight miles to the rear of the Chinese MLR. Intelligence indicated that an attack to infiltrate CCF defenses would “require the penetration of a fortified area to a minimum depth of 10 miles.”[766] Some Korean War analysts maintained that behind their front line the Chinese had entrenched the ridges to an average depth of 14 miles and that the enemy “could have fallen back upon successive prepared positions for all that distance.”[767] Although the trench warfare period of the Korean War was often likened to World War I, the Chinese defensive works were estimated to have “ten times the depth of any belt of entrenchments in World War I.”[768] Some areas had even been engineered for defense against nuclear attack. Caves, tunnels, and particularly reverse slope positions also showed CCF skill in the selection and organization of terrain features.

[766] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-29.

[767] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, p. 24.

[768] _Ibid._, p. 116.

Both the nature of the ground fighting and weather in Korea quickly indicated that our bunker construction needed to be improved. Siting them lower into the ground, so that the outline of the bunkers would not make them such ready targets, and reinforcing them to withstand a 105mm direct hit were steps in this direction. Use of sandbags (of which there was a continuing shortage) for both bunkers and trenches proved to be almost as much a problem as a solution. Bunkers above ground shored up with sandbags frequently collapsed in times of heavy rains or Korean spring thawing conditions.

Outpost warfare also proved that the average bunker often became a deathtrap when used defensively. This was due to the enemy proclivity for sealing entrances with their satchel charges, as occurred in the Vegas Cities battle. It became evident that large living-fighting bunkers could easily turn into traps in which many men could become casualties simultaneously, and from which few could fight. Despite their exposed nature, fighting holes were often safer. Some Korean combat officers were of the opinion that rather than our six- to eight-man bunkers, smaller two-man fighting units would be obviously faster to build, more effective, and safer since they would present a smaller target.

A 1st Marine Division training bulletin issued near the end of the war stated categorically:

As a rule no bunker or cave should be large enough to accommodate more than four men. If the cave is bombardment proof, there is another greater danger that the men will fail to man their fighting positions quickly enough after the enemy fire lifts or ceases.[769]

[769] _Lessons Learned_, 5-53, p. 11.

UNC reconnaissance and security activities also showed need for improvement. Night raids, patrol operations, and ambushes were conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him off balance, and obtain intelligence. This type of mobile, small-unit action repeatedly indicated an urgent need for more basic training in night combat operations at the squad and platoon level. The frequent breakdown of communications in night fighting, whether it involved a small patrol or besieged outpost, was particularly critical. Some regimental commanders noted the failure to employ properly organic small arms in combat action during darkness before requesting heavier supporting fires. It was felt that the practice of calling for mortar or artillery fire to the exclusion of using small arms was a dangerous practice which was being overused and that “_even in the defense the spirit of the offensive must be maintained_.”[770] Meticulous planning was vital for effective fire plans, alternate avenues of approach, and evacuation. Detailed rehearsals of raids were essential.

[770] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.

Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience, Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively on “pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be silhouetted.”[771] Some commanders declared that such circumstances often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields--their own, as well as the enemy’s.

[771] Batterton, _Korea Notes_, p. 34.

In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953, enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity in intelligence activities.

The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans:

Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches, and at the same time heavily bombard our positions.

For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale attacks, they intensely bombard our positions.

An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack within a short period.[772]

[772] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army PIR No. 948.

As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of established procedures:

The same tactics and techniques should not be followed in every raid. The pattern should be altered to the extent that the tactics and techniques employed will not indicate the objective to the enemy. The time selected for raids should vary to permit the conduct of both daylight and night raids. Employment of supporting arms including the delivery of smoke must be varied to prevent indication of the objective.[773]

[773] _Lessons Learned 5-53_, p. 2.

Enemy ability to locate listening posts and take them under direct fire or mortar attack also dictated the need for frequent change in location.

Regarding the use of supporting arms, the Korean terrain itself dictated a need for modification of traditional practices of employing both direct and indirect fire weapons in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Standard Marine Corps use of both crew-served infantry weapons and artillery centered around the concept of interlocking and mutually reinforcing bands of fire. Neither the frontage nor terrain in Korea was what could be termed “normal.” Battalion frontages were often more than twice the accepted maximum. The terrain consisted of steep main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges leading off both sides. Such contours require twice as many machine guns for adequate defense against enemy attacks if employed in positions affording the usual interlocking grazing fire.

For both infantry weapons on the forward COPs and MLR, and supporting artillery batteries, the combination of “stretching unit fronts and unstretchable ranges”[774] of the weapons caused them to lose a considerable amount of their mutual support capability, as one artillery regimental commander commented about the experience of the 1st Marine Division in Korea. As a result, a compromise was often effected whereby machine guns were emplaced on the high ground of the ridge line, with their individual sectors of fire extended to 180 degrees. Although the guns were no longer mutually supporting, the numerous finger ridges could be better covered by fire to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on them prior to assault on the main ridge line.

[774] Col F. P. Henderson, “Amphibious Artillery of the Future,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 30.

As previously noted, the Marine division also modified its concept about occupying the military crest, rather than the topographical crest, of forward slopes.[775] In view of CCF tactics, forward slope positions offered the advantage of observation and superior fields of fire and assisted in bringing fire on the enemy in those areas and approaches masked from the view of reverse slope positions.

[775] See Chapter VI.

Under conditions of stabilized defensive lines in Korea, the great offensive power of Marine tanks was somewhat limited. They were used extensively as direct fire weapons and supplemented the artillery regiment by firing deep H&I (harassing and interdiction) missions. In West Korea, it proved expedient to have friendly tanks positioned in defiladed assembly areas where they were on call and ready to move into MLR firing slots on short notice. They often provided close fire support to Marine patrols and outpost defense actions, sometimes being called in for fire missions before the direct support artillery.

Since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire, they usually remained in firing positions on the MLR only long enough to complete their fire mission. Deployment of several M-46s in mutually supporting MLR positions, however, tended to reduce the volume of hostile fire. When operating forward of the MLR, it was important that the armored vehicles be protected by infantry from enemy tank-killer teams. Often the Marine artillery observer’s knowledge of the terrain and familiarity with objective targets upon which the tank could be effectively used was thus relayed to the tanker, particularly when such targets were themselves obscured to the tank gunner. In registering the target, however, the adjustment system used by the gunner differed from that of the artillery FOs. It was recommended that use of tank guns and lights be made part of the regular COP fire plan.

The Korean experience demonstrated in particular the need for better rehearsed tank-infantry patrols. It also showed the need for a reliable tank-mounted searchlight with a range up to 2,000 yards. Smoke and muzzle blast of the 90mm gun often reduced the effectiveness of the tank searchlight. When two tanks were employed as a team (one spotting targets and adjusting fire with the light, while the other zeroed in on the illuminated targets), the searchlight was markedly more effective.

Outpost warfare, which was predominantly night fighting, was thus characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery dueling, and sharp battles for contested terrain that would offer improved observation. In this stand-off period of positional warfare, ground defenses were developed to the point where “both sides were incomparably stronger than they had been in actual [moving] battle.”[776]

[776] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 72.

Lessons from Korea dealt not only with modified battle tactics, but involved an evaluation of enemy performance and capabilities, as well as certain strategic considerations which had so markedly affected the course of the war. UNC forces in Korea faced an adversary who had vast resources of manpower and, accordingly, was wholly indifferent to the cost of victory in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances Chinese commanders did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly unit.

Combat effectiveness of the CCF was evaluated as good to excellent. Chinese officers demonstrated good combat leadership. They were well schooled in both offensive and defensive military tactics. Some units had been trained for amphibious operations. During the long period of positional warfare, the CCF had built up their military capability (troops, artillery, AA guns) and resupplied their forward units. Maintaining a steady flow of supplies had been an earlier weakness of the CCF logistics system. During the last six months of the war Chinese stockpiles were adequate for 35 days of offensive operations; the enemy was capable of supporting a major offensive for a 17–24 day period.

By contrast, the North Korean soldier was considerably less effective. The larger number of NKPA prisoners taken and their greater desertion rate indicated poorer discipline and lower morale. NKPA units were rated from poor to good. After 1951, NKPA forces decreased in importance while the CCF assumed a greater role in the combat effort as well as in the truce negotiations.

Chinese weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign manufacture--Japanese, U.S., German, Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and Chinese design. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and had “proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.”[777]

[777] 1st MAW PIR 127-53, Encl (1), p. 1.

Individually and as units, the CCF exhibited the traditional Oriental characteristics of extreme patience, passivity, and determination. Some authorities went so far as to declare that the Chinese ability to:

... remain quiet for a long period and to patrol stealthily are the main reasons for the success of his engagements. The enemy’s successes which have resulted from his patience and stealth show that our troops need more training in the same technique.[778]

[778] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-41.

The enemy’s tenacious determination to hold key terrain, regardless of the costs of lives, was well known. Another evaluation concluded:

The Chinese [is] well and courageously led at the small unit level. He is thoroughly disciplined. He is an industrious digger. His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN superiority in the air, his inferior communications equipment and his hodgepodge of weapons and equipment.[779]

[779] _Ibid._, No. 5, p. 8-31.

Battlefront lightweightness and mobility, particularly in Korean winter operations, was another important object lesson from the enemy. Marine cold weather clothing, including thermal boot and body armor which had saved so many lives, was of excellent design and quality. Despite this, some authorities felt that during the Korean War the Marine was “placed at a disadvantage when he met the CCF soldier,”[780] because of bulky cold-weather clothing that hindered freedom of movement. The weight of some of the Marine infantryman’s weapons, such as the 16½ lb. BAR (plus magazines) and the 9½ lb. M-1 rifle, was felt to contribute further to this lack of mobility. In contrast, “the CCF soldier dressed in his quilted uniform and armed with a ‘burp’ [submachine] gun, moved freely and quietly over the roughest of terrain, thereby gaining a not inconsiderable advantage over his heavily burdened adversary.”[781]

[780] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-82.

[781] _Ibid._

This superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical surprise. Since CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often there was no preliminary warning until the CCF were virtually within grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed their presence from UN air reconnaissance.

One observer of the Korean scene, both in the early battles of 1950 and again in 1953, has compared the CCF development of military skills during this period, as follows:

In 1950, the Red Chinese were a crude lot, given more to pell-mell attacks and diehard stands than to deception and protection. But they stayed and they learned as they went along. When they entered the war, apart from their exceptional skill and persistence with the machine gun, they were not accurate users of hand weapons ... by 1953, few of the old signs remained. They had become as tenacious and as earth-seeking as ants, and in that lay a great part of their success. Two and one-half years of war in Korea were a bonanza for Communist China. On that training ground her armies became as skilled as any in the world in the techniques of hitting, evading and surviving.[782]

[782] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, pp. 20–21.

The most telling characteristic of the Chinese Communist soldier, who essentially was a guerrilla fighter, may thus be his ready capacity to learn from experience, particularly the fine art of deception.

As important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce table. Cease-fire talks dragged on interminably over a period of 2 years and 17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years of the truce talks, from July 1951-July 1953, an additional 56,000 Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. combat losses to more than 136,000.[783] (U.S. forces suffered some 80,000 casualties in the first year of the war.) And in the end, the final solution to the POW problem was substantially that first proposed by the UNC in April 1952.

[783] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, pp. 77, 78.

Commenting on the Communist strategem that opened the truce talks in July 1951, U.S. government officials observed at the time the negotiations began:

The suggestion was received with caution since the free people of the world have learned that Communist words and Communist intent seldom coincide. Regardless, our leaders initiated action for preliminary ceasefire talks with the hope that the Communists were acting in good faith.[784]

[784] Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.

Despite this early realistic appraisal of the enemy, the degree to which the Communists were to employ truce negotiations as simply an extension of the battlefield was not immediately evident.

A key factor is involved here. The proverbial Chinese quality of passivity and seemingly endless patience, both on the individual and national level, was fully utilized to their advantage. In contrast, the Western people, particularly Americans, are characteristically impatient to complete a task once it is started. As Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, who initially headed the UNC delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference, commented, “We are a people who like to get things _done_.... The Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience through the imposition of endless delays.”[785] The American attitude is to feel that a deadlocked issue should be resolved by mutual concessions, which puts the enemy on favorable ground in employing his delaying tactics. The Communist view is that by deliberately slowing the progress toward completion of the armistice the position of their opponent will gradually be undermined. Thus, Communists regard any concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Whereas Westerners often feel that to accept part of a negotiating proposal will encourage the Communists to respond in kind, such an action is apt to lead to an even more unyielding position on their part.

[785] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 39.

* * * * *

The armistice effort in Korea also taught the following lessons:

Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for [an] armistice. Increase it.

Armistice conferences should be brief ... to allow ... talks to become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This encourages your Communist opponents.

The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the area of conflict.

Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to make progress.[786]

[786] _Ibid._, pp. 166–173, _passim_.

Possibly no one had more first-hand experience in negotiating with the enemy in the Korean War than Colonel James C. Murray, the Marine Corps staff officer who was involved in the truce talks from 8 July 1951 to 27 July 1953. In these two years he served as liaison officer between the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in meetings. On three different occasions he negotiated the truce line which was to separate UNC and Communist forces. In July 1953, as Senior Liaison Officer, he was in charge of the UNC staff group that determined the final line of demarcation. He has noted that Communist rationalizations readily disregard whatever facts or logic which do not fit their purpose, no matter how inconsistent.

While customarily ignoring all restrictions of the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners, for example, when it was expedient to their interests the Communists would then argue for an incredibly narrow interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Declared Colonel Murray: “Having come to the conference table only because they were near defeat, the Communists were prepared from the very first to make the most of the negotiations to create ... a ‘climate of victory’.”[787] This accounts for their concern with even the smallest detail of “stage setting,” for maintaining “face,” and for practical advantages from negotiating conditions, such as the physical setting of the truce talk site.

[787] Col J. C. Murray, “Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice Negotiations,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep 55), p. 30.

* * * * *

As the Marine officer further observed:

A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the truce was the appearance of the Communist victory in Korea.... An armistice, no less than war, could be looked upon only as a means to an end ... to this end they negotiate patiently and skillfully ... temporary inconveniences must be borne for ... the attainment of long-range political objectives.[788]

[788] _Ibid._, p. 29.

Certainly, the close interaction between Communist military operations and truce negotiations, a key factor since 1951, was particularly apparent during April-July 1953 as the war drew to an end.

In addition to Communist China which had emerged stronger and with considerably more prestige from the war, the other Asian nation to have undergone marked military growth was the Republic of Korea. In June 1950, the ROK army had numbered approximately 98,000 inadequately trained troops, armed chiefly with hand-carried weapons such as rifles and carbines, ill-prepared to hold back a determined enemy attack. The ROK army was little more than a constabulary force organized by KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) for internal police duty. Only 65,000 men had actually received unit combat training. ROK armed forces during the three years of the war had increased six-fold and by July 1953 totaled nearly 600,000 men.

Training and equipment had steadily improved the ROK battle efficiency which, in the 1950–1951 period, had been handicapped by lack of heavy tanks, mortars, artillery, antitank mines and shells, and other heavy weapons. By the spring of 1951 the ROK army was being transformed into an effective fighting force, due largely to the determination of General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander. In 1952 the ROK army had been enlarged to 12 divisions and the ROK Marine forces had been similarly expanded. Gradual augmentation resulted in a total of 16 ROK divisions, most of these with organic artillery; by July 1953 ROK troops had assumed responsibility for the majority of the UN line.

Marine Corps experience with its ROK counterpart had been instructive and generally encouraging.[789] Organized in 1949 by the Republic of Korea with assistance from KMAG, the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment had taken part in antiguerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion. With the outbreak of hostilities, the KMCs engaged in UN delaying actions in southwest Korea until September 1950 when the Korean regiment of nearly 3,000 men was attached to the 5th Marines as part of the Inchon assault force. Later the KMCs were involved in defense of Wonsan and the Hamhung-Hungnam beachhead as well as the Pohang patrol. After serving as a maneuver element with the ROK forces in early 1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was attached permanently to the 1st Marine Division in March of that year, participating in the Hwachon Reservoir fighting and performing valuable service in the interrogation of POWs.

[789] See “1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the 1stMarDiv,” “SAR” File (Korea), Type “C” Rpt.

The KMCs modeled themselves after U.S. Marines, particularly emulating the traditional offensive Marine _esprit de corps_ and overriding goal to “close with the enemy and seize the objective” regardless of strong resistance. The combat courage and determination of the KMCs was cited by CG, 1st Marine Division, on several occasions.

During the 1952–1953 period, the KMC/RCT provided the Marine division with nearly a quarter of its combat strength and became the fourth regiment of the division. The ROK Marine Corps also consisted of the 2d KMC Regiment, which furnished personnel for the WCIDU/ECIDU island security forces, and the 5th KMC Battalion, attached to the Marine division in 1952. Classes in infantry tactics for KMC officer and enlisted personnel were conducted at the Korean Marine Corps Training Center at Chinhae. This was patterned after U.S. Marine Corps recruit and officers’ basic schools, under supervision of USMC staff personnel. Coupled with an offensive spirit and desire to attain U.S. Marine Corps standards and combat performance, the Korean Marines largely overcame early major problems resulting from the language barrier, translation of U.S. basic training materials, and the insufficient number of qualified and experienced Korean military instructors. One early recruit class possibly established a record for brevity in training when its members, after only a few weeks, were ordered to participate in the Inchon assault which was the Korean Marines’ first specialized amphibious operation.

Many of the hard lessons of Korea--as well as some of its unique problems--resulted from the fact that this was America’s first major experience in a modern, undeclared, and limited war. Accustomed to the tradition of hard-hitting, all-out war and decisive victory, both the fighting man at the front and Nation tended to view the conflict as well as its ultimate accomplishments as inconclusive.[790]

[790] The course of the war, particularly its protracted and static nature, had led to growing national apathy and opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late 1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the people were in favor of the war and seven months later that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground actions or large scale air attacks. _Washington Post_, dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 1-16.

Most importantly, immediate collective security action by the UNC had prevented another small country from being subdued by direct, armed aggression. And the Communists had failed to attain their objective: the forced unification of Korea, not as a free nation but as a Russian satellite, as was North Korea. The balance sheet for UNC military intervention showed that 22 nations (including the ROK) had provided assistance, either personnel or materiel in defense of South Korea. Many of these countries had supplied token units of battalion-size or less and several had furnished noncombat medical facilities. Despite the fact these detachments from other Allied countries totalled “only 44,000 men they were disproportionately valuable in emphasizing the collective, coalition nature of the Korean war effort.”[791] Major losses, however, had been borne by ROK and American troops.

[791] Rees, _Korea_, p. 33.

UNC casualties numbered 996,937 killed, wounded, and missing. U.S. losses were 136,937, of which 33,629 represented battle deaths and 103,308 wounded in action. A measure of the role that ground forces played in Korea “may be judged from the fact that, of the total United States battle casualties for the entire conflict, the Army and Marines accounted for 97 percent.”[792] Casualties of other UNC countries, exclusive of the U.S. and ROK, totaled approximately 17,000 although no other Allied nation lost as many as 1,000 dead. ROK casualties were listed at 850,000. Communist losses were estimated at 1,420,000 (CCF: 900,000 killed and wounded; NKPA: 520,000 killed and wounded).

[792] Ridgway, _Korean War_, p. viii.

For the Republic of South Korea, the end of the war in some respects represented a _status quo ante bellum_. Korea still remained politically partitioned and geographically divided. Whereas the 38th Parallel had been the territorial boundary prior to the Communist attack of 25 June 1950, the cease-fire line dividing North and South Korea in 1953 was the point of contact between ground forces at the time the armistice was signed. This demarcation line, however, “represented a stronger defense than the 38th Parallel as it possessed a geographical basis all along its approximately 155-mile length.”[793] The new boundary ran above the KANSAS Line, the commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel.

[793] Rees, _Korea_, p. 431. In the three years of war, North Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.

Possibly the single, most important lesson to be drawn from the Korean War is that many of our nation’s military assumptions--and resulting tactical decisions--tended to be based on a lack of appreciation of enemy capabilities. In many instances intelligence evaluations focused on “probable intentions of the enemy rather than on his capabilities.”[794]

[794] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, p. 175.

While America put great military value and reliance on its massive destructive air power, for example, we were confronted by an enemy who practically never employed his own air capability, but instead moved freely at night and hid by day and was thus little deterred by our aerial harassment. And while our own battle summaries regularly cited kill ratios of 1 USMC to 3.75 CCF and substantial Communist losses,[795] we seemed to ignore an enemy mind that thought in terms of numerical superiority and was little concerned about the high human cost of holding key terrain or annexing a desired position. In the last month of the war alone, Eighth Army estimated that CCF casualties numbered 72,000, with more than 25,000 killed.

[795] Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111 estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs) during the Apr 52-Jul 53 period on the western front. For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/RCT.

In both battlefield tactics and high-level strategy, the Korean War revealed a strong tendency on the part of the UNC to predict enemy action by values and ideology largely reflecting our own. Whether because of wishful thinking, basic mistakes in judgment, or international _naiveté_, the 1950–1953 experience repeatedly indicated a need on the part of Allied nations for considerably more hard-headed realism in dealing with a Communist adversary. The original UNC military objective of halting Communist aggression in Korea had been successfully accomplished, without enlarging the conflict into a nuclear war. At the same time, Korea had also provided a sobering lesson. It demonstrated how, in a limited war, overriding political considerations may permit the enemy to operate from a privileged sanctuary and allow him to seize and, in many respects, retain the initiative.

The Korean War had made America more aware of the threat of world Communism and had resulted in the strengthening of our national defense commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe. It had also validated the concept of a balanced defense force. In contrast to the emphasis on air capability and atomic power that had dominated the strategic thinking in the post-World War II era, the Korean hostilities pointed to the requirement for a balanced, diversified military force of sufficient strength and readiness to cope effectively and on short notice with any emergency. Korea had underscored how severe peacetime budgetary cut-backs had led to unpreparedness. The Korean experience had also shown the need for flexibility in mobilization planning. Previously, this had been projected for an all-out, general war, based on America’s role in World War II. The Nation’s post-Korean policy thus sought, for the first time, a military strategy that would effectively deter either a major war or local aggression.

Korean hostilities illustrated another important lesson. South Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant violation of the Cairo Declaration and U.N. Charter. It was apparent that, despite the defense treaties and mutual aid pacts which the United States had signed during and after World War II, “any number of alliances, if not supported by strong military preparedness, would never restrain aggression.”[796] It had taken the Korean War to drive home the harsh reality that military preparedness, possession of superior power, and _the willingness to use that power_ were the only deterrent to enemy aggression throughout the world.

[796] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 2.

The Korean War also caused the Communists to modify their strategy from one of overt aggression to more insidious means of gaining their political and economic objectives. As the Marine Corps Commandant, General Shepherd, warned: “Their tactic is to use war by proxy, war by satellite, war by threat and subversion.”[797] And, although it was not fully apparent at the time, the Korean attack “was to prove to be one of the first in a series of ‘wars of liberation’”[798] that the world would be witness to.

[797] Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.

[798] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, pp. 3–4.

In the final analysis, the Korean War evolved into a prolonged battle of position and attrition in which the Communists, operating close to their base of supply, were fought to a standstill by United Nations forces under unfavorable conditions of climate and logistics. In countering the enemy threat in Korea, the American units committed there initially suffered from the effects of peacetime apathy that had followed the rapid demobilization following World War II. As the Korean War, originally visualized as a “police action” of brief duration, ground on into a major effort spanning a period of three years and one month, loud voices were raised on the home front to protest the expenditure of lives and materiel in a venture that was not always clearly understood by all Americans.

Among the U.S. forces committed on this far flung battlefront, it was once again the Marine Corps component that stood out in its sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. When rushed into the battle during the first desperate weeks and months of the war, the quickly-augmented Marine units helped to restore stability to the shattered EUSAK front line. During the daringly conceived and executed operation at Inchon, Marines accomplished this incredibly complex amphibious operation with their customary spirit and precision. Never was their courage and tenacity more conspicuous than during those bitter days of the Chosin Reservoir campaign following the Chinese Communist intervention.

In the static, or positional, warfare that marked the final operations in Korea, the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing executed their respective missions with professional skill and dispatch, regardless of tactical problems and the dreary monotony that characterized a large part of the Korean War. U.S. Marines had seen combat throughout much of the Korean peninsula. The fighting had taken them from Pusan to Inchon and Seoul, to the Chosin, to Inje and the Hwachon Reservoir in the Punchbowl area, and finally, in 1952–1953, to the critical 35-mile front in West Korea near Panmunjom. In Korea, as in past wars, Marines demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and readiness which has always been a tradition of the Corps.

Marine courage and combat performance went far toward removing the image of Western softness and decadence which the Communists had so mistakenly construed in their own minds. It is a record of which all Americans and the Free World can be proud.

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations

AAA--Antiaircraft Artillery

AA--Antiaircraft

AD--Douglas “Skyraider” Single-Engine Attack Aircraft

ADC--Assistant Division Commander

ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

AO--Aerial Observer

ASP--Ammunition Supply Point

AT--Antitank

AU--Attack model of Vought F4U “Corsair”

BAR--Browning Automatic Rifle

BLT--Battalion Landing Team

Bn--Battalion

Brig--Brigade

Btry--Battery

CAS--Close Air Support

CCF--Chinese Communist Forces

CG--Commanding General

CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East

CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps

CNO--Chief of Naval Operations

Co--Company

CO--Commanding Officer

ComdD--Command Diary (also called Historical Diary, or War Diary)

ComNavFE--Commander, Naval Forces, Far East

ComServPac--Commander, Service Force, Pacific

CONUS--Continental United States

COP--Combat Outpost

CP--Command Post

CPX--Command Post Exercise

CSG--Combat Service Group

CTE--Commander Task Element

CTF--Commander Task Force

CTG--Commander Task Group

CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier

CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier

Div--Division

DMZ--Demilitarized Zone

DOW--Died of Wounds

Dtd--Dated

DUKW--Marine Amphibious Truck

ECIDE(U)--East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)

ECM--Electronic Countermeasures

Engr--Engineer

EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea

F2H-2P--McDonnell “Banshee” Two-Engine Jet Fighter (photo model)

F3D-2--Douglas “Skyknight” Two-Engine Jet Fighter

F4U--Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Fighter

F7F-3N--Grumman “Tigercat” Twin-Engine Night Fighter

F9F-2,4,5--Grumman “Panther” Single-Engine Jet Fighter

F-80--Air Force “Shooting Star” Fighter Aircraft

F-84--Air Force “Thunderjet” Fighter Aircraft

FAC--Forward Air Controller

FAF--Fifth Air Force

FASRon--Fleet Air Service Squadron

FDC--Fire Direction Center

FEAF--Far East Air Forces

FECOM--Far East Command

FMFLant--Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

FO--Forward Observer (artillery)

FY--Fiscal Year

HE--High Explosive

Hedron--Headquarters Squadron

H&I--Harassing & Interdiction

HMR--Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron

H03S-1--Sikorsky Three-Place Observation Helicopter

Hq--Headquarters

HQMC--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

HRS-1--Sikorsky Single-Engine Helicopter

H&S--Headquarters and Service

HTL-4--Bell Two-Place Helicopter

Interv--Interview

JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOC--Joint Operations Center

KCOMZ--Korean Communication Zone (sometimes KComZ)

KIA--Killed in Action

KMAG--Korean Military Advisory Group

KMC--Korean Marine Corps

KMC/RCT--Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team

KPR--Kimpo Provisional Regiment

KSC--Korean Service Corps

LogCom--Logistical Command

Ltr--Letter

LST--Landing Ship, Tank

LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked

M4A3E8--Flame Tank, Medium

M-46--Medium Tank

MAC--Military Armistice Commission

MACG--Marine Air Control Group

MAG--Marine Aircraft Group

Mar--Marine(s)

MARLEX--Marine Landing Exercise

MASRT--Marine Air Support Radar Team

MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing

MBP--Main Battle Position

MDL--Military Demarcation Line

MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron

MIA--Missing in Action

MIG--Russian Single-Seat Jet Fighter-Interceptor

MLR--Main Line of Resistance

MOH--Medal of Honor

MOS--Military Occupation Specialty

Mosquito--Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and for Target Spotting

MP--Military Police

MPQ--Ground Radar-Controlled Bombing

MS--Manuscript

Msg--Message

MSR--Main Supply Route

MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron

MT--Motor Transport

NCAS--Night Close Air Support

NCO--Noncommissioned Officer

NGF--Naval Gunfire

NKPA--North Korean People’s Army

N.d.--Date not given

NNRC--Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

NNSC--Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

N.t.--Title not given

OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA)

OE-1--Cessna Single-Engine Light Observation Plane

OOB--Order of Battle

OP--Observation Post (Sometimes used to refer to an Outpost)

OPLR--Outpost Line of Resistance

OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane

PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report

PO-2--Russian Trainer Aircraft

POW--Prisoner of War

PPSH--Soviet-made 7.62mm Sub-machine (“Burp”) Gun

Prov--Provisional

PUC--Presidential Unit Citation

R4D--Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps designation of C-47)

R5D--Douglas Four-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps designation of C-54)

RCT--Regimental Combat Team

ROK--Republic of Korea

SAR--Special Action Report

SecDef--Secretary of Defense

SecNav--Secretary of Navy

Serv--Service

Sig--Signal

SOP--Standing Operating Procedure

TACC--Tactical Air Coordination Center

TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center

TAFC--Turkish Armed Forces Command

TAO--Tactical Air Observer

TE--Task Element

T/E--Table of Equipment

TF--Task Force

TG--Task Group

Tk--Tank

T/O--Table of Organization

TOT--Time on Target Fuze

TU--Task Unit

UN--United Nations

UNC--United Nations Command

USA--United States Army

USAF--United States Air Force

USMC--United States Marine Corps

USN--United States Navy

VMA--Marine Attack Squadron

VMC--Marine Composite Squadron

VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron

VMF(N)--Marine Night (All-Weather) Fighter Squadron

VMJ--Marine Photographic Squadron

VMO--Marine Observation Squadron

VMR--Marine Transport Squadron

VT--Variable Time Fuze

WCIDE(U)--West Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)

WIA--Wounded in Action

WP--White Phosphorous Shell

YAK--Russian Fighter Aircraft

APPENDIX B

Korean War Chronology

_1950_

25 Jun North Korean People’s Army, with 60,000 troops and 100 Russian tanks, crosses 38th Parallel to invade South Korea.

25 Jun United Nations Security Council calls for end of aggression and withdrawal of NKPA troops.

27 Jun UN, adopting a U.S. resolution, proclaims NKPA attack a breach of world peace. Asks member nations to assist ROK in repelling invasion.

27 Jun Pres Truman orders U.S. air-sea units to support ROK and for U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosan Strait.

28 Jun NKPA captures Seoul, South Korean capital.

29 Jun Pres Truman orders naval blockade of Korean coast; authorizes Far East Commander, Gen MacArthur, to send U.S. ground troops into Korea.

30 Jun Pres Truman receives Congressional authorization to order into active service any or all reserve components of Armed Forces, for a period of 21 months.

2 Jul CNO directs that Marine reinforced regiment with supporting air be prepared for assignment to Far East.

2 Jul CinCFE requests Marine RCT-air unit for Far East. This was inception of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed less than a week later.

3 Jul Inchon captured by North Koreans.

5 Jul-4 Aug UNC fights series of delaying actions in Korea.

7 Jul U.N. Security Council authorizes formation of a United Nations Command as counterforce against NKPA aggression.

7 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig activated at Camp Pendleton, under BGen Edward A. Craig. Basic elements of 6,534-man Brigade are 5th Marines and MAG-33.

8 Jul Gen MacArthur named Commander, UNC.

10 Jul CinCUNC asks Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize expansion of Marine Brigade to full war-strength division.

12–14 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig embarks for Korean theater.

12 Jul LtGen Walton H. Walker named CG, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

19 Jul CinCUNC makes 2d request for Marine division.

19 Jul Pres Truman authorizes Defense Dept to call up reserve units and individuals.

19 Jul CMC alerts Marine Corps organized reserve units for call to active duty following Presidential announcement.

20 Jul CMC, Gen Clifton B. Cates, orders to duty Organized Marine Corps ground reserve units, consisting of 22 units and 4,830 personnel. Partial callup for 6,000 air reservists in 30 Marine VMF and 12 MGCI squadrons.

20 Jul Taejon, temporary ROK capital, captured.

21 Jul CinCUNC makes 3d request for Marine division.

25 Jul UNC defense at Pusan deteriorates. CinCUNC orders 1st ProvMarBrig directly to Korea.

25 Jul JCS directs Marine Corps to build 1stMarDiv to war-strength.

31 Jul Masan and Chinju fall to enemy.

2–3 Aug 1st ProvMarBrig arrives Pusan. Moves to bivouac area near Masan.

3 Aug First Marine air strike launched by VMF-214.

4 Aug Pusan Perimeter established by UNC in southeastern end of Korea.

4 Aug First evacuation of casualties from Pusan by Marine VMO-6 helicopters.

6 Aug First air mission flown by VMF-323.

6–8 Aug CinCUNC confers with U.S. military-diplomatic officials about proposed Inchon amphibious landing.

7–13 Aug Marine Brigade engaged in first combat operations at Chinju.

10 Aug First Marine helicopter rescue made by VMO-6 to recover downed pilot.

10–24 Aug 1stMarDiv units embark for Korea.

16 Aug EUSAK X Corps activated for coming Inchon-Seoul operation. Principal elements are 1stMarDiv and Army 7thInfDiv.

17 Aug Marine Brigade opens battle for Obong-ni (“No Name”) Ridge, leading way to destruction of enemy bridgehead at Naktong and first UNC victory in Korea.

17 Aug 7th Marines activated at Camp Pendleton and on 1 Sep embarks for Far East, arriving 21 Sep.

1–5 Sep NKPA launches all-out offensive to break UNC perimeter defense at Pusan. In Second Naktong Battle, Brigade contains enemy at Yongsan.

13 Sep 1st ProvMarBrig deactivated and absorbed by 1stMarDiv for Inchon operation.

15 Sep D-Day, Inchon amphibious assault, spearheaded by 1stMarDiv.

17 Sep 1stMarDiv (5th Marines) recaptures Kimpo Airfield.

19–25 Sep Enemy resistance at Pusan begins to collapse. NKPA troops in retreat north from Pusan.

27 Sep 1stMarDiv recaptures Seoul. ROK Capital officially liberated 29 Sep.

30 Sep Communist China Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warns: “The Chinese people will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists.”

30 Sep-1 Oct ROK 3d Div crosses 38th Parallel in pursuit of retreating NKPA.

7 Oct UN General Assembly authorizes UNC forces to cross 38th Parallel to defeat NKPA.

10 Oct Wonsan, east coast port at 39th Parallel, captured by ROK troops.

10 Oct Chinese repeat warning of intervention in Korean conflict.

16 Oct First Chinese Communist troops secretly enter Korea from Manchuria.

19 Oct Pyongyang, North Korean Capital at 39th Parallel, captured by EUSAK.

26 Oct Chinese troops attack ROK units at Yalu River and points south of Sino-Korean border.

26 Oct 1stMarDiv lands at Wonsan, establishes security for port, and drives north.

1 Nov UNC forward elements reach positions along Yalu. First Russian-built MIG appears along Yalu to attack U.S. aircraft.

2 Nov Strong Chinese and NKPA forces attack EUSAK at Unsan, causing withdrawal across Chongchon River. First identification of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Korea.

3–7 Nov Initial Marine encounter with CCF. 7th Marines units defeat major elements of 124th CCF Division.

6 Nov MacArthur warns JCS that movement of CCF across Yalu threatens UNC position.

15 Nov Marine units reach Chosin Reservoir area in X Corps drive north.

24 Nov MacArthur announced “win the war” offensive. EUSAK begins advance toward Yalu.

26–27 Nov CCF, 200,000-strong, attack EUSAK troops forcing withdrawal. 1stMarDiv isolated at Yudam-ni, west of Chosin. MSR cut.

28 Nov-3 Dec 1stMarDiv turns back CCF attacks. Prepares to move south. Regroups at Hagaru-ri for drive to Hungnam.

4 Dec Pyongyang recaptured by enemy.

5–7 Dec 1stMarDiv evacuates wounded by air and fights through to Koto-ri.

6 Dec Innovation of using airborne TADC as tactical CP to control air support.

10 Dec First Marine jet squadron to fly in combat, VMF-311, begins operations.

11 Dec 1stMarDiv completes fighting breakout from Chosin entrapment. Begins march to join rest of X Corps at Hungnam.

15 Dec 1stMarDiv deployed from Hungnam to Pusan.

15 Dec UNC establishes new defensive line at 38th Parallel.

18 Dec-27 Jan Marine division routs enemy guerrilla forces in Masan-Pohang-Sondong-Andong area.

23 Dec EUSAK CG Walker killed in jeep accident. Gen Matthew B. Ridgway named to succeed him.

24 Dec Hungnam evacuation completed by X Corps.

29 Dec Large enemy buildup reported north of 38th Parallel, preparing for new attack.

_1951_

31 Dec-1 Jan Enemy launches all-out offensive against UNC across 38th Parallel, pushing EUSAK back 10–12 miles.

4 Jan Seoul recaptured by Communists.

7–15 Jan Enemy offensive halted, UNC sets up new defense line along Pyongtaek-Wonju axis, at 37th Parallel.

25 Jan UNC reassumes offensive. Operation THUNDERBOLT launched by I and IX Corps to regain territory south of Han River.

Jan-Feb 1stMarDiv continues antiguerrilla operations in Masan area.

7 Feb Communists forced north of Han River. UNC retakes Inchon peninsula.

mid-Feb 1stMarDiv reassigned from X to IX Corps.

21 Feb Operation KILLER, a general limited objective advance by U.S. IX and X Corps, ordered by Gen Ridgway. 1stMarDiv reenters frontlines for operation.

7 Mar Operation RIPPER begins in central and eastern zones, with advance across Han by IX and X Corps.

14 Mar Seoul retaken by U.S. Eighth Army for second time.

27–31 Mar 1stMarDiv occupies 28,000-meter sector north of Hongchon. UNC elements reach 38th Parallel.

1–21 Apr 1stMarDiv in general advance north to the Hwachon Reservoir.

8 Apr Operation RIPPER clears enemy troops from South Korea east of Imjin River.

11 Apr Pres Truman relieves Gen MacArthur as CinCUNC, replacing him by Gen Ridgway, CG, EUSAK. LtGen James A. Van Fleet named Commander, EUSAK.

15 Apr UNC establishes defensive line along 38th Parallel, or KANSAS Line. Enemy heavily emplaced in Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonggang (“The Iron Triangle”) assembly area.

22 Apr-8 Jul CCF launches all-out “Spring Offensive.”

23–27 Apr 1stMarDiv halts CCF left flank breakthrough of IX Corps, establishes defense line in Chunchon vicinity.

30 Apr UNC completes withdrawal to new defense line north of Seoul. Intelligence reports indicate CCF plans renewed attack.

1 May 1stMarDiv reassigned to X Corps.

9 May 1st MAW squadrons participate in FAF 300-plane strike on Sinuiju, near Yalu. Biggest raid of war to date.

16 May Second phase of enemy offensive begins. CCF drives south from Iron Triangle area, making penetrations 15–20 miles deep along the front.

20 May FAF launches Operation STRANGLE, massive all-out interdiction effort.

21 May UNC launches counter offensive, pushes enemy north of 38th Parallel again. 1stMarDiv drives toward Yanggu at eastern end of Hwachon Reservoir.

30 May Eighth Army back on KANSAS Line again.

1–16 Jun 1stMarDiv advances northeast from Hwachon Reservoir to Punchbowl. Claws out daily gains of 1,000–2,000 meters, reaching objective despite heavy NKPA fire.

mid-Jun UNC forces consolidate positions at 38th Parallel. UNC front approximately the same line as when Communist spring offensive began.

23 Jun UN Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, proposes cease-fire discussions.

30 Jun UN notifies enemy of its readiness to discuss an armistice.

10 Jul Truce talks begin at Kaesong and fighting dies down along front. UN delegation led by U.S. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. Communists represented by LtGen Nam Il, NKPA.

26 Jul Negotiators at Kaesong agree on preliminary agenda.

5 Aug UNC suspends truce talks because of armed enemy troops in neutral area. Cease-fire talks resumed 10 Aug.

22 Aug Communists halt cease-fire talks, charge UN aircraft has violated neutrality zone.

31 Aug In final UNC offensive action of war, 1stMarDiv opens assault at Punchbowl. UN launches limited attacks to straighten line.

5 Sep 1stMarDiv gains initial objectives in Punchbowl area, new ridgeline to become part of Line MINNESOTA, EUSAK defensive line. Heavy attacks by IX Corps at Heartbreak and Bloody Ridge.

13 Sep HMR-161 effects first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply maneuver, Operation WINDMILL I.

18 Sep Marines advance to Soyang River, north of Punchbowl.

21 Sep Operation SUMMIT, first helicopter deployment of a combat unit, lands 224 fully-equipped troops and 17,772 lbs of cargo in Punchbowl area.

25 Oct Following two weeks of discussion between liaison officers, truce talks resumed at new site, Panmunjom.

28 Oct Cease-fire line agreed upon as present line of contact.

11 Nov HMR-161 conducts first frontline relief of a Marine battalion, in Operation SWITCH.

12 Nov Gen Ridgway, CinCUNC, orders EUSAK Commander, Gen Van Fleet to cease offensive operations and begin active defense of UN front.

Nov-Dec General stalemate along Korean battlefront during truce discussions.

18 Dec Prisoner of war lists exchanged by UN and Communists.

_1952_

2 Jan UNC proposes principle of “voluntary repatriation” in POW exchange.

3 Jan UNC proposal violently rejected by Communists.

Jan-Apr Disorders in UNC prison camps as screening of prisoners begins.

22 Feb Communist Korean Foreign Affairs Minister charges America with renewed bacteriological warfare attacks in North Korea. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai, issues similar statement on 8 Mar, alleging U.S. flyers participate in “germ warfare.”

17 Mar 1stMarDiv reassigned from X Corps eastern-Korea position to I Corps far western end of EUSAK line. Takes over approximately 35 miles of Line JAMESTOWN on 24 Mar.

28 Apr Adm Joy presents UN “final offer,” insists on voluntary repatriation principle.

7–11 May Rioting prisoners at Koje-do camp seize Gen Dodd and hold him hostage, until order restored.

12 May Gen Mark W. Clark succeeds Ridgway as CinCUNC, upon latter’s departure to assume NATO command from Gen Eisenhower.

22 May MajGen William K. Harrison succeeds Adm Joy as chief of UN delegation at Panmunjom.

Jun-Oct General stalemate along battlefront while truce talks deadlocked on POW repatriation question. Sharp limited objective attacks made by enemy against UNC defensive line.

9–16 Aug First major Marine ground action in western Korea, Battle of Bunker Hill (1st Marines).

19–20 Aug HMR-161 Operation RIPPLE introduces tactical innovation of transporting 4.5-inch rocket battery weapons and personnel to new firing position.

29 Aug Largest one-day FAF air assault of entire war, “All United Nations Air Effort” sends 1,403 sorties against North Korean Capital, Pyongyang.

22–26 Sep First resupply of MLR regiment by helicopter in Operation HAYLIGHT.

8 Oct UNC adjourns armistice talks “indefinitely”; complete deadlock on POW question.

26–28 Oct Battle of the Hook (7th Marines).

4 Nov Dwight D. Eisenhower elected President.

17 Nov India introduces compromise truce plan at United Nations.

2 Dec President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour of Korea.

3 Dec UN General Assembly adopts compromise Indian resolution by 54 to 5 vote. _1953_

Jan-Feb Winter lull in fighting. Cease-fire talks remain suspended.

2 Feb President Eisenhower, in State of Union message, ends “neutralization” of Formosa Strait.

11 Feb Gen Maxwell D. Taylor assumes EUSAK command from Gen Van Fleet.

22 Feb UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs, as preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners.

5 Mar Premier Joseph Stalin of Russia dies. Georgi Malenkov named to succeed him.

26–30 Mar 1stMarDiv combat outposts Vegas-Reno-Carson (5th Marines) under heavy attack.

28 Mar Communists accept UN proposal to discuss exchange of sick and wounded POWs.

30 Mar Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian UN compromise proposal. Truce talks to be resumed.

12 Apr 1st MAW flies first night CAS missions, using intersecting searchlight beams to mark enemy targets.

20–26 Apr Exchange of sick and wounded POWs, “Operation LITTLE SWITCH,” takes place at Panmunjom, under direction of Munsan-ni Provisional Command.

26 Apr Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom.

5 May 1stMarDiv relieved by U.S. 25thInfDiv; 1st Division assigned mission of I Corps Reserve.

7 May Communists accept UN proposal that prisoners unwilling to be repatriated be kept in neutral custody within Korea, rather than be removed elsewhere to a neutral nation.

28–30 May Savage fighting while truce details worked out by negotiators. CCF launches regimental-strength attack against I Corps sector. Heavy action in Nevada Cities and Hook area outposts. Marine tanks and artillery in support of defending 25thInfDiv line units.

6 Jun ROK national Assembly demands freedom for anti-Communist North Koreans held in South Korean POW camps. Civilian demonstrations break out in various EUSAK and I Corps localities.

8 Jun Agreement reached on POW question. POW nonrepatriates to be turned over to five-member neutral commission to decide disposition of POW cases. Pres Rhee declares armistice terms unacceptable to South Korea.

9 Jun ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms.

10–17 Jun Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years against ROK II Corps sector in Kumsong area. Heavy penetrations, with ROK II Corps pushed 4000 yards south to new MLR.

18 Jun Breakout of 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist prisoners from South Korean POW camps, assisted by ROK guards. Release ordered by Pres Rhee as protest against proposed armistice.

18–20 Jun Communists accuse UNC of complicity in freeing prisoners; truce talks suspended.

23–25 Jun Pres Rhee continues opposition to truce terms. Walter Robinson, U.S. Asst. Sec. of State for Far East and Gen Mark Clark start confidential talks with Rhee.

7–8 Jul COPs Berlin-East Berlin (7th Marines right regimental sector) under attack during Marine relief of 25thInfDiv.

8 Jul 1stMarDiv assumes operational control of its former MLR sector, relieving 25thInfDiv.

8 Jul Communists agree to resume armistice negotiations; talks reconvened 10 July.

11 Jul Robertson announces that Pres Rhee will no longer oppose truce terms.

11 Jul Maj John F. Bolt, VMF-115, becomes first Marine jet ace with kill of his fifth and sixth MIGs.

13–20 Jul CCF launches even larger offensive than June attack along central Korean front. IX and ROK II Corps MLR reestablished south of Kumsong River.

19 Jul Negotiators at Panmunjom reach agreement on truce.

19 Jul Marine outposts Berlin-East Berlin overrun; I Corps decrees positions should not be retaken.

24–27 Jul Heavy enemy attack in Berlin Complex (“Boulder City”) area held by 7th and 1st Marines.

27 Jul Cease-fire agreement signed at Panmunjom at 1000. Fighting ends. Armistice effective at 2200.

5 Aug-6 Sep Final exchange of prisoners in Operation BIG SWITCH, at Panmunjom.

APPENDIX C

Command and Staff List

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED) AND 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING MARCH 1952-JULY 1953

_1st Marine Division_

Commanding General MajGen John T. Selden (to 28 Aug 1952) MajGen Edwin A. Pollock (from 29 Aug) MajGen Randolph McC. Pate (from 16 Jun 1953) Asst Division Commander BGen William J. Whaling (to 23 Mar 1952) BGen Merrill B. Twining (from 24 Mar) BGen Robert O. Bare (from 13 Jun) BGen Joseph C. Burger (from 31 Mar 1953) Chief of Staff Col Austin R. Brunelli (to 10 Oct 1952) Col Henry W. Buse, Jr. (from 11 Oct) Col Lewis W. Walt (from 15 Jun 1953) G-1 Col Walter N. Flournoy (to 31 Mar 1952) Col John F. Dunlap (from 1 Apr) Col Sidney M. Kelly (from 11 Sep) Col Albert F. Metze (from 1 Jun 1953) Col Wendell H. Duplantis (from 20 Jul) G-2 LtCol James H. Tinsley (to 9 Apr 1952) Col Sidney S. Wade (from 10 Apr) LtCol William R. Watson, Jr. (from 24 Apr) Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from 11 Oct) Col William F. Prickett (from 20 Dec) Col Loren E. Haffner (from 1 Apr 1953) Col James E. Mills (from 10 Jul) G-3 LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (to 22 Apr 1952) LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 24 Apr) Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 15 Jun) Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Dec) Col Lewis W. Walt (from 18 Apr 1953) LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 15 Jun) G-4 Col Robert A. McGill (to 27 Aug 1952) Col Thomas A. Culhane (from 28 Aug) Col Kenneth A. King (from 12 Nov) Col Richard H. Crockett (from 15 Dec) Col Thomas S. Ivey (from 15 May 1953)

_Special Staff_

Adjutant Maj James K. Young (to 5 May 1952) Maj Charles T. Lamb (from 6 May) Maj Clyde W. Shealy (from 24 Feb 1953) Maj George K. Acker (from 1 Jun) Air Officer LtCol Edward V. Finn (to 14 Mar 1952) LtCol Walter F. Cornnell (from 15 Mar) LtCol William E. Abblitt (from 12 Feb 1953) Anti-Tank Officer Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952) Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug) LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov) Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan 1953) Capt William F. Doehler (from 6 Apr) Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952) LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug) LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov) LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from 16 Mar 1953) Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun) Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol John T. O’Neill (to 5 Aug 1952) Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug) LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 Aug) LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec) Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May 1953) LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 Jul) Artillery Officer Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep 1952) Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep) Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953) Col Manley L. Curry (from 5 Jul) Chaplain Cdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN (to 16 Apr 1952) Cdr Edward A. Slattery, USN (from 17 Apr) Cdr Lonnie W. Meachum, USN (from 28 Dec) Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense Officer Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952) Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug) LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov) Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan 1953) Capt Gerald W. Gibson (from 30 Jan) Dental Officer Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (to 26 Apr 1952) Cdr Clifford H. Rice, USN (from 27 Apr) Capt William M. Fowler, USN (from 26 May) Capt James R. Justice, USN (from 12 Mar 1953) Embarkation Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 1 Mar 1952) LtCol James F. Coady (from 2 Mar) LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 5 Sep) Maj Edwin J. St. Peter (from 6 Nov) LtCol John N. Rentz (from 24 Nov) LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 12 May 1953) Engineer Officer Col August L. Vogt (to 5 Jul 1952) (None listed for 6–16 July) Col Robert E. Fojt (from 17 Jul) LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 1 Feb 1953) Col Walter R. Lytz (from 1 Apr) Exchange Officer Capt Benjamin Reed (to 28 Nov 1952) Capt John H. Thomas (from 29 Nov) Food Director 1stLt Herbert E. McNabb (to 15 Jun 1952) Maj Louis P. Penny (from 16 Jun) Maj Francis K. Bernardini (from 23 Apr 1953) Historical Officer 2dLt Francis X. Goss (to 22 Mar 1952) Capt Robert F. Seward (from 23 Mar) Capt William R. Smith (from 16 Jul) 1stLt Virgil S. Price (from 8 Nov) 2dLt John J. Creamer, Jr. (from 7 Dec) Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 6 Apr 1953) 2dLt Thomas A. MacCalla (from 22 Jul) Inspector Col William K. Davenport, Jr. (to 17 Mar 1952) Col Thomas C. Moore (from 18 Mar) Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 18 Jul) Col Clayton O. Totman (from 9 Aug) Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 5 Dec) Col Albert F. Metze (from 29 Apr 1953) Col Manley L. Curry (from 1 Jun) Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 13 Jul) Legal Officer LCdr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (to 12 Jan 1953) Cdr Earl C. Collins, USN (from 13 Jan) LtCol Raymond G. Coyne (from 8 Jul) Motor Transport Officer Maj Walter R. O Quinn (to 14 May 1952) LtCol Kenneth E. Martin (from 15 May) LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 12 Mar 1953) LtCol Jack F. McCollum (from 29 Jun) Naval Gunfire Officer Maj John V. Downs (to 5 Aug 1952) LtCol William P. Pala (from 6 Aug) LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 16 Sep) LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 20 Dec) LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 26 Apr 1953) Capt Robert J. Daeschler (from 15 Jul) Ordnance Officer Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952) LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May) Maj Joseph O. Weist (from 4 Jun) Maj Stanley Tesko (from 21 Oct) LtCol Marshall R. Pilcher (from 1 Apr 1953) LtCol Samuel L. Grigsby (from 1 Jun) Postal Officer CWO George C. Hunter (to 25 Jun 1952) 2dLt Frederick T. McNamara, Jr. (from 26 Jun) 2dLt Rudolph R. Hendrick (from 18 May 1953) CWO Emerson R. Murrell (from 2 Jun) Provost Marshal LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952) LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr) LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 Aug) LtCol Jess P. Ferrill (from 12 Jan 1953) LtCol Harold R. Warner, Jr. (from 18 Apr) Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul) Public Information Officer 1stLt Robert S. Gray (to 5 May 1952) 1stLt Robert F. Coll (from 6 May) Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 5 Jul) Capt Bem Price (from 7 Nov) Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 21 Jul 1953) Shore Party Officer LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul 1952) Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul) LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct) Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec) Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar 1953) Signal Officer LtCol Jino J. D’Allessandro (to 5 Apr 1952) LtCol John E. Morris (from 6 Apr) LtCol Eugene A. Dueber (from 18 Aug) LtCol Ralph M. Wismer (from 14 Nov) LtCol Frank G. Casserly (from 27 Jul 1953) Supply Officer Col Chester R. Allen (to 27 Apr 1952) Col Hawley C. Waterman (from 28 Apr) Col LeRoy Hauser (from 1 Feb 1953) Special Services Officer LtCol John E. Gorman (to 23 Jul 1952) Maj Alfred A. Tillmann (from 24 Jul) Maj William J. Kohler (from 8 Nov) Capt Don H. Blanchard (from 20 Apr 1953) Surgeon Capt Louis P. Kirkpatrick, USN (to 18 Jun 1952) Capt Lawrence E. Bach, USN (from 19 Jun) Capt Walter R. Miller, USN (from 25 Apr 1953) Tank Officer Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 May 1952) LtCol John I. Williamson, Jr. (from 21 May) LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr 1953)

_Headquarters Battalion_

Commanding Officer Col Robert T. Stivers, Jr. (to 5 Jul 1952) Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 6 Jul) LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 12 Jul) LtCol John F. Corbett (from 11 Sep) Col Alexander W. Gentleman (from 21 Nov) LtCol John C. Landrun (from 16 May 1953) Executive Officer Maj Corbin L. West (to 16 Mar 1952) Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 17 Mar) Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 10 Nov) Maj John K. Hogan (from 31 Jan 1953) (None listed for 29Feb-14May) Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 May) Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt “J” E. Hancey (to 9 Mar 1952) Capt Robert J. McKay (from 10 Mar) 1stLt George C. Schatteman (from 6 May) Maj Louis A. Cortright (from 1 Jul) 2dLt Neil O. Snepp (from 17 Jul) Maj Val Price, Jr. (from 29 Aug) Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 Jan 1953) Capt Robert A. Hohmann (from 15 May) Capt Martin S. Hauge (from 28 May) Commanding Officer, Military Police Company LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952) LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr) LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 Aug) LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 12 Jan 1953) LtCol Harold B. Warner, Jr. (from 18 Apr) Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul) Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance Company Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (to 10 Jun 1952) Capt James O. Webb (from 11 Jun) Capt James H. A. Flood (from 11 Sep) Maj Dermott H. MacDonnell (from 3 Dec) Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 21 Jun 1953)

_1st Marines_

Commanding Officer Col Sidney S. Wade (to 9 Apr 1952) Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 10 Apr) Col Walter F. Layer (from 25 Jul) Col Hewitt D. Adams (from 21 Nov) Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 1 May 1953) Executive Officer LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (to 26 Mar 1952) Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from 27 Mar) LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 2 May) LtCol Glenn R. Long (from 16 Sep) LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 4 Feb 1953) LtCol Lowell E. English (from 8 May) LtCol Harold C. Boehm (from 2 Jul)

_1st Battalion, 1st Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 2 Aug 1952) LtCol Louis N. King (from 3 Aug) LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 13 Sep) Col Frederick R. Findtner (from 14 Jan 1953) LtCol Stanley M. Adams (from 5 Jun) Executive Officer Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (to 5 Apr 1952) Maj Leo V. Gross (from 6 Apr) Maj John K. Logan (from 14 Jul) Maj William C. Chip (from 20 Aug) Maj John K. Hogan (from 30 Dec) Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 4 Feb 1953) Maj Roger D. Peterson (from 19 Jun)

_2d Battalion, 1st Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Thell H. Fisher (to 1 Apr 1952) LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 2 Apr) LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr. (from 23 Jun) LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 18 Oct) LtCol George A. Gililland (from 9 Feb 1953) LtCol Frank A. Long (from 1 Jul) Executive Officer Maj Frank J. Harte (to 5 May 1952) Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 6 May) Maj John N. Rentz (from 29 Jul) Maj John P. McNeill (from 21 Aug) Maj Horace C. Reifel (from 9 Mar 1953) Maj John B. Bristow (from 20 Apr) Maj Albert S. Dooley, Jr. (from 1 Jul)

_3d Battalion, 1st Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (to 11 Apr 1952) LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 12 Apr) LtCol Gerard T. Armitage (from 2 May) LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 20 Aug) LtCol Ernest G. Atkin, Jr. (from 6 Dec) LtCol Lowell E. English (from 1 Apr 1953) LtCol Roy D. Miller (from 6 May) Executive Officer Maj Robert V. Perkins (to 2 Jul 1952) Maj Wesley R. Christie (from 3 Jul) Maj Charles S. Robertson (from 27 Oct) Maj Norman C. Smyle (from 3 Jan 1953) Maj Robert D. Thurston (from 26 Mar) Maj Walter L. Williams (from 20 May) Maj John T. Quinn (from 2 Jul)

_5th Marines_

Commanding Officer Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (to 15 Aug 1952) Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Aug) Col Lewis W. Walt (from 10 Dec) Col Harvey C. Tschirgi (from 14 Apr 1953) Executive Officer LtCol John A. Saxten (to 1 Jun 1952) LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 2 Jun) LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 Jul) LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 21 Aug) LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Jan 1953) LtCol James H. Finch (from 23 May) LtCol James Taul (from 18 Jul)

_1st Battalion, 5th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (to 24 May 1952) Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 25 May) LtCol Alexander W. Gentleman (from 15 Jul) LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 11 Nov) LtCol Jonas M. Platt (from 26 Dec) LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield (from 29 Apr 1953) Executive Officer Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (to 4 May 1952) Maj Lyle K. London (from 5 May) Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 29 Aug) Maj William C. Doty, Jr. (from 25 Jan 1953) Maj Thomas W. Pearson (from 2 Apr) Maj George R. Burke (from 11 Jun) Maj Charles E. McPartlin, Jr. (from 22 Jun)

_2d Battalion, 5th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Cushing (to 10 Jun 1952) LtCol Thomas J. Cross (from 11 Jun) LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 Aug) LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 11 Sep) LtCol James H. Finch (from 27 Feb 1953) LtCol Andrew C. Geer (from 14 May) Executive Officer Maj Robert S. Hudson (to 10 Jun 1952) Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 11 Jun) Maj Philip H. McArdle (from 16 Jul) Maj Paul C. Scofield (from 19 Dec) Maj Thomas M. Fields (from 26 Jun 1953)

_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol William S. McLaughlin (to 15 Jul 1952) LtCol Oscar T. Jensen, Jr. (from 16 Jul) LtCol Robert J. Oddy (from 16 Nov) LtCol John T. Hill (from 11 Apr 1953) Executive Officer Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (to 22 May 1952) Maj Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr. (from 23 May) Maj Joseph A. Bruder, Jr. (from 7 Jul) Maj Vernon Burtman (from 1 Nov) Maj Joseph S. Buntin (from 7 Feb 1953)

_7th Marines_

Commanding Officer Col Russell E. Honsowetz (to 10 Jun 1952) Col Thomas C. Moore, Jr. (from 11 Jun) Col Loren E. Haffner (from 5 Nov) Col Glenn C. Funk (from 27 Mar 1953) Executive Officer LtCol John D. Wiggins (to 17 Jul 1952) LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 18 Jul) LtCol Richard D. Strickler (from 24 Nov) LtCol Robert S. Howell (from 22 Mar 1953) LtCol Russell Duncan (from 26 May) LtCol Stanley J. Nelson (from 31 Jul)

_1st Battalion, 7th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (to 2 Aug 1952) LtCol Leo J. Dulacki (from 3 Aug) LtCol James C. Short (from 22 Nov) LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 28 Dec) LtCol Harry A. Hadd (from 18 May 1953) Executive Officer Maj Henry V. Joslin (to 14 Jul 1952) Maj Theodore R. Cathey (from 15 Jul) Maj James C. Short (from 23 Jul) Maj Floyd M. Johnson, Jr. (from 2 Aug) Maj Roy H. Thompson (from 1 Dec) Maj Glenn E. Ferguson (from 3 Jun 1953) Maj Joseph R. Motelewski (from 25 Jun)

_2d Battalion, 7th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Noel C. Gregory (to 18 Jul 1952) LtCol Anthony Caputo (from 19 Jul) LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 12 Nov) LtCol Alexander D. Cereghino (from 19 Mar 1953) LtCol Joseph C. Missar (from 21 Jul) Executive Officer Maj Erwin Madsen (to 19 Apr 1952) Maj William J. Zaro (from 20 Apr) Maj James C. Fetters (from 8 Jun) Maj Richard H. Mickle (from 24 Oct) Maj Littleton K. Smith (from 16 Apr 1953) Maj Ralph E. June (from 17 Jun) Maj Don P. Wyckoff (from 17 Jul)

_3d Battalion, 7th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Houston Stiff (to 26 Apr 1952) Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 27 Apr) LtCol Gerald F. Russell (from 17 Jun) LtCol Charles D. Barrett, Jr. (from 13 Oct) LtCol Russell Duncan (from 14 Mar 1953) LtCol Paul M. Jones (from 26 May) Executive Officer Maj Franklin C. Bacon (to 26 Apr 1952) Maj Richard M. Remington (from 27 Apr) Maj Harold T. Clemens (from 28 Aug) Maj Guy L. Wade (from 13 Oct) Maj Alfred A. Tillman (from 23 Oct) Maj John Mesko (from 25 May 1953)

_11th Marines_

Commanding Officer Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep 1952) Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep) Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953) Col Manly L. Curry (from 5 Jul) Executive Officer LtCol Lewis A. Jones (to 4 Jun 1952) LtCol Robert F. Steidtmann (from 5 Jun) LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 16 Jan 1953) LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. (from 6 May) Maj Joseph E. Fogg (from 6 Jul) LtCol Wade H. Hitt (from 9 Jul) _1st Battalion, 11th Marines_ Commanding Officer LtCol James R. Haynes (to 24 Jun 1952) LtCol David S. Randall (from 25 Jun) LtCol Olin W. Jones, Jr. (from 2 Nov) LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 8 May 1953) Executive Officer Maj Harold E. Nelson (to 21 Jun 1952) Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 22 Jun) Maj Lee P. Vance (from 26 Jul) Maj Harry L. Sherwood, Jr. (from 14 Nov) Maj Thomas L. Randall (from 17 Dec) Maj John J. Jarvis, Jr. (from 25 Mar 1953)

_2d Battalion, 11th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol George B. Thomas (to 2 May 1952) LtCol William P. Pala (from 3 May) LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 6 Aug) LtCol Arthur J. Bachhuber (from 17 Nov) LtCol William H. Atkinson (from 10 Feb 1953) Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 21 May) LtCol Gordon H. West (from 18 Jul) Executive Officer Maj Morris R. Snead (to 10 Jun 1952) Maj Edward L. Fossum (from 11 Jun) LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 1 Jul) Maj Roy E. Moffett (from 10 Aug) Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 2 Sep) Maj Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr. (from 24 May 1953) Maj Herman Poggemeyer, Jr. (from 13 Jul)

_3d Battalion, 11th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Henry E. W. Barnes (to 13 Jul 1952) LtCol Charles O. Rogers (from 14 Jul) LtCol Daniel S. Pregnall (from 27 Nov) LtCol Alfred L. Owens (from 25 Mar 1953) Maj Dale D. Meyers (from 28 Jul) Executive Officer LtCol Charles A. Lipot (to 5 Jul 1952) Maj Joseph S. Gardner (from 6 Jul) Maj William J. Kohler (from 27 Jul) Maj Lawrence L. Graham (from 17 Nov) Maj Robert M. Jenkins (from 15 Dec) Maj Adoph J. Honeycutt (from 28 Mar 1953) Maj Robert C. Hilliard (from 7 May) Maj Leslie L. Page (from 12 Jun to 26 Jul)

_4th Battalion, 11th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol William M. Gilliam (to 11 Apr 1952) LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (from 12 Apr) Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 16 Jun) LtCol Raymond D. Wright (from 16 Jul) Maj William J. Sullivan (from 18 Dec) LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 20 Dec) Maj David L. Moberly (from 23 Apr 1953) LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 27 Apr) Executive Officer LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (to 16 Apr 1952) Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from 17 Apr) Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 11 Jun) Maj Edward E. Davis (from 16 Jun) Maj William J. Sullivan (from 17 Oct) Maj David L. Moberly (from 22 Feb 1953) Maj Johnny Jennings (from 2 May) Maj George W. Carrington, Jr. (from 13 Jun)

_7th Motor Transport Battalion_

Commanding Officer Maj Herbert E. Pierce (to 1 Jul 1952) LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 2 Jul) Maj John H. Faggart (from 27 Jul) Maj Robert S. Anderson (from 16 Jun 1953) Executive Officer Maj Ben Sutts (to 5 May 1952) Maj John J. Howe (from 16 Aug) Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 20 Nov) Maj Alfred G. McCormick (from 26 Apr 1953)

_1st Ordnance Battalion_

Commanding Officer Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952) LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May) Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 26 Aug) Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 25 Mar 1953) Executive Officer Capt Frederick V. Osborn (to 5 May 1952) Maj Harold C. Borth (from 6 May) Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 16 Jul) Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 26 Aug) Maj Allen F. Stockdale (from 1 Sep) Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 15 Sep) Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 4 Nov) Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 21 Dec) Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 25 Mar 1953) Maj Jack G. Fitzgerald (from 4 Jul)

_1st Service Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Bernard W. McLean (to 18 May 1952) LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 19 May) LtCol Edwin A. Law (from 1 Oct) LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 5 Jul 1953) Executive Officer Maj George E. Allison (to 27 Oct 1952) Maj James C. Fetters (from 28 Oct) Maj Robert “J” Vroegindewey (from 19 Mar 1953)

_1st Tank Battalion_

Commanding Officer Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 May 1952) LtCol John I. Williamson (from 21 May) LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr 1953) Executive Officer Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (to 15 Jun 1952) Maj Robert B. Jeter (from 16 Jun) Maj William W. Day (from 21 Feb 1953) Maj Francis C. Hogan (from 6 May)

_1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol John T. O’Neill (to 5 Aug 1952) Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug) LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 Aug) LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec) Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May 1953) LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 Jul) Executive Officer Maj James L. Jones (to 5 Aug 1952) Maj David Young (from 6 Aug) Maj James L. Jones (from 12 Aug) Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 21 Nov) Maj Robert S. Wilson (from 16 May 1953)

_1st Motor Transport Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Howard E. Wertman (to 15 May 1952) Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 16 May) LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 27 Jul) LtCol Robert E. McCook (from 24 Mar 1953) Executive Officer Maj Raymond L. Luckel (to 2 Aug 1952) Maj Marvin D. Grush (from 3 Aug) Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 6 Sep) Maj Gobe Smith, Jr. (from 4 Oct) Maj Robert C. McNab, Jr. (from 17 Feb 1953)

_1st Combat Service Group_

Commanding Officer Col Russell N. Jordahl (to 29 Jun 1952) Col Kenneth A. King (from 30 Jun) LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Nov) Col James T. Wilbur (from 8 Dec) Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 8 Feb 1953) Col James A. Moreau (from 8 Jul) Executive Officer LtCol James G. Kelly (to 20 May 1952) Col Frank M. Reinecke (from 21 May) LtCol William H. Cushing (from 11 Jun) LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Dec) LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 28 Jan 1953) LtCol Tillman N. Peters (from 15 Mar) Maj Harvey B. Atkins (from 11 May)

_1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952) LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug) LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov) LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from 16 Mar 1953) Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun) Executive Officer Maj William L. Eubank (to 3 Jun 1952) Maj George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 4 Jun) Maj William E. Lunn (from 7 Nov) Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 24 Mar 1953) Maj John J. DePalma (from 20 Jun)

_1st Shore Party Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul 1952) Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul) LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct) Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec) Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar 1953) Executive Officer Maj Frederick F. Draper (to 3 Jun 1952) Maj William E. Buron (from 4 Jun) LtCol Clyde P. Ford (from 12 Aug) LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 3 Mar 1953) LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 18 Apr) LtCol James M. Joyner (from 8 Jul)

_1st Engineer Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol John V. Kelsey (to 5 May 1952) LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 6 May) LtCol Francis W. Augustine (from 1 Dec) LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 20 Apr 1953) Executive Officer Maj Grover C. Williams, Jr. (to 5 Jun 1952) Maj Francis W. Augustine (from 6 Jun) Maj George W. Torbert (from 1 Dec) Maj Donald V. Nahrgang (from 26 Jun 1953)

_1st Medical Battalion_

Commanding Officer Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN (to 31 Aug 1952) Cdr William W. Ayres, USN (from 1 Sep) Executive Officer Cdr James C. Luce, USN (to 12 May 1952) (none listed from 13 May to 8 Jun) LCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN (from 9 Jun) Cdr Roald N. Grant, USN (from 24 Aug to 21 Sep) (none listed from 22 Sep to 25 Apr 1953) Lt Roger D. Williams, USN (from 26 Apr)

_1st Signal Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol John E. Morris (to 3 Apr 1952) LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 4 Apr) LtCol Jacob E. Glick (from 3 Aug) LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 16 Feb 1953 to 22 Apr 1953) Executive Officer Maj Ernest C. Bennett (to 4 Apr 1952) Maj Bolish J. Kozak (from 5 Apr) Maj Mauro J. Padalino (from 12 Jul) Maj Frederick J. Cramer (from 30 Dec) Maj John J. Reber (from 8 Feb 1953 to 22 Apr 1953)

(This battalion was disbanded on 22 Apr 1953.)

_1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)_

Commanding General MajGen Christian F. Schilt (to 11 Apr 1952) MajGen Clayton C. Jerome (from 12 Apr 1952) MajGen Vernon E. Megee (from 9 Jan 1953) Asst Commanding General BGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner (to 30 Aug 1952) BGen Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr. (from 31 Aug) Chief of Staff Col Arthur F. Binney (to 30 Apr 1952) Col Frank H. Schwable (from 1 May) Col John Wehle (from 9 Jul) Col Samuel S. Jack (from 8 Sep) Col John C. Munn (from 8 May 1953) Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 Col Robert O. Bisson (to 7 Sep 1952) Col Lewis H. Delano, Jr. (from 8 Sep) LtCol William M. Frash (from 11 May 1953) Col Lawrence B. Clark (from 29 May) Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Col John W. Stage (to 14 May 1952) LtCol Chester A. Henry, Sr. (from 15 May) Maj Donald E. Kramer (from 22 Jul) LtCol Harold Granger (from 16 Sep) Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Jul 1953) Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 Col Stanley W. Trachta (to 8 Apr 1952) Col William R. Wendt (from 9 Apr) Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 2 Sep) Col Charles H. Hayes (from 29 Sep) Col William D. Roberson (from 30 May 1953) Col Frank H. Wirsig (from 5 Jul) Asst Chief of Staff, G-4 Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 Mar 1952) Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 Mar) Col Robert W. Clark (from 24 May) Col Richard D. Hughes (from 11 Feb 1953) Col Richard M. Baker (from 4 Jul)

_Headquarters Squadron, 1st MAW_

Commanding Officer Maj Earl C. Miles (to 29 May 1952) Maj David R. Moak (from 30 May) Maj Charles H. Woodley (from 1 Sep) Maj Lionel D. Hastings (from 26 Sep) Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr. (from 1 Mar 1953) Maj Fred J. Gilhuly (from 1 Jul)

_Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1)_ (Decommissioned 1 Jul 1953) and _Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17)_ (Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Col John Wehle (to 8 Apr 1952) LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 9 Apr) LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 17 Jul) Col Lyle H. Meyer (from 21 Sep) LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 11 May 1953) Col Robert J. Johnson (from 30 Jun) Executive Officer LtCol Birney B. Truitt (to 8 Apr 1952) Maj William L. Woodruff (from 9 Apr) Maj Edward L. Schnettler (from 4 Jun) Maj Franklin L. Kemper (from 26 Aug) LtCol William G. Voss (from 20 Dec) LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 21 Apr 1953) Maj Elswin P. Dunn (from 11 May) LtCol Charles J. Prall (from 6 Jul)

_Headquarters Squadron, MWSG-17_ (Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Capt James D. Ireland (from 1 Jul 1953)

_Marine Air Base Squadron 17 (MABS-17)_ (Activated 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Maj Bryce Howerton (from 1 Jul 1953)

_Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17 (MARS-17)_ (Activated 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Maj Vincent Franano (from 1 Jul 1953) Maj James G. Fox (from 29 Jul)

_Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2)_

Commanding Officer Col Frederick R. Payne (to 18 May 1952) Col John W. Stage (from 19 May) Col Jack R. Cram (from 11 Jul) Col Kenneth D. Kerby (from 16 Feb 1953) Executive Officer LtCol Russell D. Rupp (to 1 May 1952) LtCol Philip “L” Crawford (from 2 May) LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. (from 20 Jun) LtCol Harold L. Lantz (from 11 Aug) LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (from 24 Feb 1953) LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from 23 May) LtCol John S. Flickinger (from 10 Jun) LtCol Morris E. Flater (from 21 Jun)

_Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)_

Commanding Officer LtCol Hensley Williams (to 2 Jun 1952) Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 3 Jun) LtCol William H. Whitaker, Jr. (from 1 Aug) LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from 21 Aug) LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 28 Jan 1953) Col Joseph A. Gerath, Jr. (from 20 Feb) LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from 11 Jun) Executive Officer Maj Clinton E. Jones (to 2 Jun 1952) Capt John F. Driftmier (from 3 Jun) Maj George C. Henshaw (from 28 Aug) Maj Thomas H. Hughes, Jr. (from 25 Sep) LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 20 Feb 1953) (none listed from 15 Mar to 9 Jul) Capt Robert L. Dietrichson (from 10 Jul)

_Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1)_

Commanding Officer Maj Fred A. Steele (to 15 Aug 1952) Maj Henry W. Hise (from 16 Aug) Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 16 Oct) LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 3 Feb 1953) Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 1 Jun) LtCol Harold F. Brown (from 23 Jun) Executive Officer Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr (to 11 Apr 1952) Capt William J. Wachsler (from 12 Apr) Capt Francis K. McManus (from 22 May) Maj William Sloane (from 1 Aug) Maj Romeo F. Bordigon (from 4 Oct) Maj Tolbert T. Gentry (from 2 Nov) Maj Francis F. Rotter (from 8 Jan 1953) Capt John E. Dixon (from 31 May) Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 23 Jun)

_Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3 (MGCIS-3)_

Commanding Officer LtCol Owen M. Hines (to 20 May 1952) Maj James H. Foster (from 21 May) LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 14 Jun) LtCol Kenneth D. Frazier (from 16 Aug) LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 3 Feb 1953) Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 19 May) Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 1 Jul) LtCol Lowell D. Grow (from 27 Jul) Executive Officer Maj James H. Foster (to 1 Jun 1952) Capt Lee B. Swindall (from 2 Jun) Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 21 Jun) Maj Raleigh E. Fletcher (from 5 Sep) Maj Francis E. Lee, Jr. (from 29 Oct) Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 4 Feb 1953) Capt William K. Lebo (from 19 May) Maj Thomas E. Archer (from 20 Jun) Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 27 Jul)

_Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1)_ (Activated 15 Sep 1952)

Commanding Officer LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (to 24 Jan 1953) LtCol Ernest C. Fusan (from 25 Jan) LtCol Thomas “H” Mann, Jr. (from 16 Mar) Maj George H. Linnemeier (from 6 Apr) LtCol Wilbur A. Free (from 1 Jun)

_Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)_

Commanding Officer Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 May 1952) Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 May) Col John P. Condon (from 10 Aug) Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 13 Jan 1953) Col Edward B. Carney (from 1 Apr) Executive Officer LtCol Robert J. Hoey (to 5 Jun 1952) LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 6 Jun) Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 17 Aug) LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 20 Feb 1953) Col Robert J. Johnson (from 19 Mar) Col William F. Hausman (from 30 Jun)

_Headquarters Squadron, MAG-12_

Commanding Officer Capt George Byers, Jr. (to 22 Apr 1952) 1stLt Daniel F. McConnell (from 24 Apr) Maj Godfrey Muller (from 1 Jul) Capt William M. Crooks (from 18 Sep) Capt Edgar F. Remington (from 21 Dec) Capt Bradford N. Slenning (from 15 May 1953)

_Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)_

Commanding Officer LtCol Carl M. Longley (to 31 Mar 1952) Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 1 Apr) LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 25 Aug) LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 11 Oct) LtCol Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Jan 1953) LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 1 Mar) LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 1 Jul) Executive Officer Maj Robert A. Collett (to 31 Mar 1952) Maj LeRoy T. Frey (from 1 Apr) Maj Oscar C. Hauge, Jr. (from 26 May) Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 18 Aug) LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 18 Sep) Maj Frank Hick (from 11 Oct) Maj Harry J. Anderson (from 20 Jan 1953) LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 14 Apr) Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 11 Jul)

_Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12)_

Commanding Officer LtCol Joseph A. Gray (to 31 May 1952) Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 1 Jun) Maj William M. Johnston, Jr. (from 19 Aug) Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 29 Dec) LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 20 Feb 1953) LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 27 Jun) Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 18 Jul) Executive Officer Maj Robert E. Will (to 26 Apr 1952) Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 27 Apr) Capt Robert T. Kinsey (from 1 Jun) Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 19 Aug) Maj Warren L. MacQuarrie (from 1 Sep) Maj John R. Hyneman (from 15 Dec) Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 20 Feb 1953) Maj Alexander Gagyi (from 15 Apr) Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 12 Jul)

_Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)_

Commanding Officer LtCol William Q. Houston, Jr. (to 19 Jun 1952) LtCol Philip “L” Crawford (from 20 Jun) LtCol Wayne M. Cargill (from 11 Sep) LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 7 Dec) LtCol John E. Hughes (from 1 Mar 1953) Maj Richard L. Braun (from 21 Apr) LtCol Harold B. Penne (from 16 Jul) Executive Officer Maj Henry W. Horst (to 31 May 1952) Maj Robert H. Brumley (from 1 Jun) Maj Julius B. Griffin (from 30 Jul) LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 2 Nov) LtCol Roy R. Hewitt (from 11 Dec) LtCol John E. Hughes (from 17 Jan 1953) Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 1 Mar) Maj Robert C. Woten (from 16 Jul)

_Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212)_ redesignated _Marine Attack Squadron 212 (VMA-212)_ on 10 Jun 1952

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Bryson (to 9 Jun 1952) LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 10 Jun) LtCol Maurice W. Fletcher (from 5 Sep) LtCol Charles E. Dobson, Jr. (from 25 Oct) LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 1 Jan 1953) LtCol Louis R. Smunk (from 20 Feb) Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 1 Jun) LtCol James R. Wallace (from 19 Jun) Executive Officer Maj Richard B. Elliott (to 29 Feb 1952) Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 8 Mar) Maj Leslie C. Reed (from 10 Jun) LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 25 Oct) Maj Norman O’Bryan (from 20 Feb 1953) Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 7 Mar) Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 1 Jun) Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 19 Jun) Maj Boris J. Frankovic (from 20 Jul)

_Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323)_ redesignated _Marine Attack Squadron 323 (VMA-323)_ on 30 Jun 1952 (Transferred from operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing on 7 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer LtCol Richard L. Blume (to 25 Apr 1952) Maj William A. Weir (from 26 Apr) LtCol Henry S. Miller (from 1 Jun) LtCol Kenneth R. Chamberlain (from 1 Sep) LtCol Williard C. Lemke (from 20 Nov) LtCol William M. Frash (from 13 Jan 1953) LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 11 Apr to 26 Jun) Executive Officer Maj William A. Weir (to 8 Jun 1952) Maj Richard E. Pryor (from 9 Jun) Maj Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Sep) Maj Thomas M. Forsyth, Jr. (from 20 Nov) LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 2 Jan 1953) LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from 29 Jan) Maj Robert C. Woten (from 3 May to 26 Jun)

_Marine Attack Squadron 332 (VMA-332)_ (Came under the operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing on 29 May 1953)

Commanding Officer LtCol John B. Berteling (from 29 May 1953). Executive Officer Maj Gordon L. Allen (from 29 May 1953)

_Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-251)_ attached to _1st Marine Aircraft Wing_ on 9 Jun 1953

Commanding Officer LtCol Harold A. Harwood (from 9 Jun 1953) Executive Officer Maj James W. Merritt (from 9 Jun 1953)

_Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513)_

Commanding Officer LtCol John R. Burnett (to 11 Jun 1952) Col Peter D. Lambrecht (from 12 Jun) LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 19 Jun) LtCol Homer G. Hutchinson, Jr. (from 9 Sep) LtCol Robert F. Conley (from 20 Jan 1953) LtCol Ross S. Mickey (from 6 May) LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 10 Jul) Executive Officer Maj Frank H. Simonds (to 19 Apr 1952) Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from 23 Apr) LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 15 Aug) Maj Gorden E. Gray (from 20 Aug) LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 8 Sep) LtCol Jack B. Winters (from 14 Sep) Maj Dave E. Severance (from 20 Jan 1953) Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 9 Jun) LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 24 Jun) Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 10 Jul)

_Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33)_

Commanding Officer Col Martin A. Severson (to 23 May 1952) Col John P. Condon (from 24 May) Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 11 Aug) Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 22 Oct) Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 10 May 1953) Col John L. Smith (from 24 Jul) Executive Officer LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (to 13 May 1952) LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 14 May) Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 26 Jul) LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (from 11 Aug) Col John P. Coursey (from 17 Aug) Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Mar 1953) LtCol James K. Dill (from 11 May) LtCol Thomas V. Murto, Jr. (from 26 Jul)

_Headquarters Squadron, MAG-33_

Commanding Officer Capt Allen R. Schutter (to 30 May 1952) Maj Guy M. Cloud (from 1 Jun) Maj Richard J. Collins (from 21 Jul) Maj Reuel H. Pietz (from 1 Nov) Maj Thomas J. Cushman, Jr. (from 14 Apr 1953) Capt Jerry N. Hendershot (from 26 May)

_Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33)_

Commanding Officer Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 9 Jun 1952) Maj John W. Zuber (from 10 Jun) Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from 6 Aug) Maj Kenneth B. Nelson (from 9 Dec) LtCol Bernard McShane (from 21 Apr 1953) LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 1 Jun) LtCol Jack Cosley (from 26 Jul) Executive Officer Maj George K. Harshberger (to 1 May 1952) Maj Summerfield M. Taylor, Jr. (from 2 May) Capt Frederic T. Watts, Jr. (from 11 Aug) Maj Harold N. McLaffey (from 2 Oct) Maj Darwin P. Glaese (from 23 Dec) Capt George J. Collins (from 22 May 1953)

_Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33)_

Commanding Officer Maj Zadik Collier (to 1 Sep 1952) Maj William N. Case (from 2 Sep) Maj Patrick Harrison (from 5 Feb 1953) Maj Julian P. Craigmiles (from 29 Jun) Executive Officer Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 1 Aug 1952) Maj John L. Herndon (from 12 Aug) Maj James Aldworth (from 2 Dec) Capt Marshall S. Austin (from 22 April 1953)

_Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115)_

Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas M. Coles (to 20 May 1952) Maj John W. Zuber (from 21 May) LtCol Robert C. Armstead (from 5 Jun) Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 17 Jul) LtCol Royce W. Coln (from 18 Aug) LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 29 Sep) LtCol Stoddard G. Cortelyou (from 1 Feb 1953) LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 31 Mar) LtCol Lynn H. Stewart (from 5 Jun) Executive Officer Maj Conrad G. Winter (to 26 Apr 1952) Maj John W. Zuber (from 27 Apr) Maj Griffith B. Doyle (from 21 May) Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 10 Jun) Maj Arthur N. Nehf, Jr. (from 5 Aug) LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 19 Nov) LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 2 Feb 1953) Maj Carol Bernard (from 31 Mar) Maj James H. Phillips (from 25 Jun)

_Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (VMF-311)_

Commanding Officer LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (to 2 Jun 1952) Maj Henry W. Hise (from 3 Jun) Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 10 Jun) Maj William J. Sims (from 26 Jun) LtCol Arthur H. Adams (from 1 Oct) LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 1 Feb 1953) LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 21 Apr) LtCol Bernard McShane (from 1 Jun) Executive Officer Maj Jay E. McDonald (to 27 Mar 1952) Maj Henry W. Hise (from 28 Mar) Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 26 Jun) Maj Harold A. Langstaff, Jr. (from 22 Aug) Maj Williams J. Sims (from 1 Oct) LtCol Walter R. Bartosh (from 12 Oct) LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 20 Jan 1953) Maj John Skinner, Jr. (from 21 Apr) Maj William D. Heier (from 3 Jul)

_Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-312)_ (On 16 Jun 1953, this squadron was reassigned to the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.)

Commanding Officer LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (to 8 Apr 1952) LtCol Robert E. Smith, Jr. (from 9 Apr) LtCol George C. Axtell, Jr. (from 11 Jul) LtCol Robert E. Cameron (from 4 Oct) LtCol Winston E. Jewson (from 25 Jan to 15 Jun 1953) Executive Officer Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (to 7 Apr 1952) Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 9 Apr) Maj Walter D. Persons (from 11 Jul) Maj Marshall C. Gregory (from 1 Sep) Maj James W. Baker (from 13 Jan 1953) Maj Grover R. Betzer (from 2 Feb) Maj James L. Cooper (from 4 May to 10 Jun)

_Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1)_

Commanding Officer Maj Robert R. Read (to 13 May 1952) LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 14 May) LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 11 Sep) LtCol Howard L. Walter (from 1 Nov) LtCol William M. Ritchey (from 16 Feb 1953) LtCol Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. (from 15 May) Executive Officer Maj Albert E. James (to 3 Jun 1952) Maj Marion B. Bowers (from 4 Jun) Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 18 Jul) LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 28 Aug) Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 11 Sep) Maj Howard L. Walter (from 2 Oct) Maj Louis Conti (from 6 Nov) LtCol Grant W. McCombs (from 14 Dec) Maj Louis Conti (from 5 Feb 1953) Maj John E. Worlund (from 1 Apr)

_Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161)_

Commanding Officer Col Keith B. McCutcheon (to 7 Aug 1952) LtCol John F. Carey (from 8 Aug) Col Owen A. Chambers (from 15 Mar 1953) Executive Officer Maj James R. Dyer (to 10 May 1952) Maj Zigmund J. Radolinski (from 11 May) LtCol David M. Danser (from 28 May) LtCol Russel R. Riley (from 1 Sep) Maj Gilbert Percy (from 3 Jun 1953) LtCol John H. King, Jr. (from 1 Jul)

_Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)_

Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Herring (to 10 May 1952) Maj Wallace J. Slappey, Jr. (from 11 May) LtCol Elkin S. Dew (from 11 Sep) LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr. (from 2 Feb 1953) LtCol Earl E. Anderson (from 1 Jul) Executive Officer Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from 1 Jul) Maj Lynn E. Midkiff (from 26 Jun) Maj Alton W. McCully (from 5 Feb 1953) Maj John A. Hood (from 15 May)

_1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion_

Battalion Commander Col Max C. Chapman (to 22 Nov 1952) Col Edgar O. Price (from 23 Nov) LtCol Henry S. Massie (from 7 Apr 1953) Executive Officer LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 30 Apr 1952) Maj Thomas J. Matthews (from 1 May) Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 15 Mar 1953) Maj Henry V. Leasure (from 9 Jun)

APPENDIX D

Effective Strength

1ST MARINE DIVISION AND 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING[799]

Listed below are selected dates and figures which represent the effective strength of 1stMarDiv and 1st MAW throughout the 1952–1953 period.

-------------------------------------------------------- Date Officers Enlisted Total -------------------------------------------------------- 31 Mar 52 2,238 30,790 33,028 ground (1,412) (24,811) (26,223) aviation ( 826) ( 5,979) ( 6,805) 30 June 52 2,560 34,509 37,069 ground (1,684) (28,549) (30,233) aviation ( 876) ( 5,960) ( 6,836) 31 Oct 52 2,403 33,726 36,129 ground (1,423) (26,795) (28,218) aviation ( 980) ( 6,931) ( 7,911) 31 Jan 53 2,329 32,976 35,305 ground (1,352) (26,766) (28,118) aviation ( 977) ( 6,210) ( 7,187) 30 Apr 53 2,307 33,995 36,302 ground (1,370) (28,172) (29,542) aviation ( 937) ( 5,823) ( 6,760) 31 Jul 53 2,335 31,881 34,216[800] ground (1,412) (25,299) (26,711) aviation ( 923) ( 6,582) ( 7,505) --------------------------------------------------------

[799] Personnel figures file, Statistics Br., HQMC, 31 May 1950–31 Jan 1955.

[800] In addition, the 1stMarDiv was reinforced throughout this period by other indigenous military and civilian personnel.

APPENDIX E

Marine Corps Casualties

(Ground and Air)

KOREAN WAR 1950–1953[801]

--------------------------------------------------------------- Date KIA[802] Killed WIA Cumulative non-Battle Total --------------------------------------------------------------- Aug-Dec 1950 1,526 30 6,229 7,785

Jan-Dec 1951 960 82 7,924 8,966

Jan-Mar 1952 87 19 600 706 ------------------------------------------- Aug 1950-Mar 1952 2,573 131 14,753 17,457

Apr-Dec 1952 960 66 6,815 7,841

Jan-Jul 1953 729 47 4,470 5,246 ------------------------------------------- Apr 1952-Jul 1953 1,689 113 11,285 13,087

TOTAL:

Aug 1950 to Jul 1953 4,262 244 26,038 30,544 ---------------------------------------------------------------

[801] Abstracted from U. S. Marine Corps Strength in Korea vs Korean Casualties by Month, 25 Jun 1950–27 Jul 1953, based on Korean Operation Report, Statistics Br., HQMC and Log Sheet, dtd 21 Aug 1967.

[802] KIA includes DOW, Captured and Died, and Missing In Action, Presumed Dead.

APPENDIX F

Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War

21Apr51 1stLt Harold D. Daigh (VMF-312, F4U-4, USS _Bataan_) 1 YAK

21Apr51 Capt Phillip C. DeLong (VMF-312, F4U-4, USS _Bataan_) 2 YAKs

30Jun51 [A]Capt Edwin B. Long (VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) 1 PO-2

12Jul51 Capt Donald L. Fenton (VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) 1 PO-2

23Sep51 Maj Eugene A. Van Gundy (VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) 1 PO-2

4Nov51 [B]Maj William F. Guss (VMF-311) 1 MIG

5Mar52 [B]Capt Vincent J. Marzello (VMF-311) 1 MIG

16Mar52 [B]LtCol John S. Payne (1st MAW) 1 MIG

7June52 1stLt John W. Andre (VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) 1 YAK-9

10Sep52 Capt Jesse G. Folmar (VMA-312, F4U, USS _Sicily_) 1 MIG

15Sep52 [B]Maj Alexander J. Gillis (VMF-311) 1 MIG

28Sep52 [B]Maj Alexander J. Gillis (VMF-311) 2 MIGs

3Nov52 [C]Maj William T. Stratton, Jr. (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 YAK-15

8Nov52 Capt Oliver R. Davis (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG

10Dec52 [D]1stLt Joseph A. Corvi (VMF(K)-513, F3D-2) 1 PO-2

12Jan53 Maj Elswin P. Dunn (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG

20Jan53 [B]Capt Robert Wade (MAG-33) 1 MIG

28Jan53 Capt James R. Weaver (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG

31Jan53 LtCol Robert F. Conley (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG

7Apr53 [B]Maj Roy L. Reed (VMF 115) 1 MIG

12Apr53 [B]Maj Roy L. Reed (VMF 115) 1 MIG

16May53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt (VMF-115) 1 MIG

18May53 [B]Capt Harvey L. Jensen (VMF 115) 1 MIG

22Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt (VMF 115) 1 MIG

24Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt (VMF 115) 1 MIG

30Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt (VMF 115) 1 MIG

11Jul53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt (VMF-115) 2 MIGs

12Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn (VMF-311) 1 MIG

19Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn (VMF-311) 1 MIG

20Jul53 [B]Maj Thomas M. Sellers (VMF-115) 2 MIGs

22Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn (VMF-311) 1 MIG

[A] Marines on temporary exchange duty with Fifth Air Force.

[B] First enemy aircraft destroyed at night by UNC.

[C] First enemy jet aircraft destroyed through use of airborne intercept radar equipped fighter.

[D] First enemy aircraft destroyed by means of lock-on radar gear.

APPENDIX G

Unit Citations[803]

[803] For text of previous awards to 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, and 1st ProvMarBrig, see earlier volumes of this series.

PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION _The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in citing for outstanding and superior performance of duty during the period 26 October 1950 to 27 July 1953_[804] THE FIRST UNITED STATES MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED) _for the award of_ PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION

Landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) advanced to Yudam-ni where they engaged the Chinese Communist Forces. The heroic and courageous fighting of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), which was outnumbered but never outfought by the Chinese Communist Forces; coupled with its fight against the terrible winter weather in this return to Hungnam, has added another glorious page to the brilliant history of the United States Marines. After regrouping and retraining, the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) rejoined the United Nations Forces and began the attack to the north which drove the aggressors relentlessly before them. The enemy spring offensive during April 1951 which threatened to nullify the recent United Nations gains was successfully repulsed by the First Marine Division (Reinforced) and when other Republic of Korea Forces were heavily pressed and fighting for survival the timely offensive by this Division gave heart to the peoples of Korea. In March 1952 the First Marine Division (Reinforced) assumed responsibility of defending the western flank of the Eighth Army. In carrying out the responsibilities of this assignment the Marines won everlasting glory at Bunker Hill. Continuing active operations against the Communist enemy until the Armistice, the First Marine Division (Reinforced) inflicted heavy losses upon the aggressors and successfully repulsed their assaults upon strong point Vegas and Reno during March 1953, and during July 1953, just prior to the signing of the Armistice, again threw back the enemy in several days of severe fighting at strong points Berlin and East Berlin. Although suffering heavy losses during these engagements the First Marine Division (Reinforced) was at all times successful in maintaining the integrity of the United Nations’ positions within their assigned sector. The First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), by its unparalleled fighting courage and steadfast devotion to duty, has won the undying affection and gratitude of the Korean people. During its entire campaign the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) remained true to its motto of “Semper Fidelis”. In keeping faith with the highest traditions of its own country the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) kindled new hope in the breasts of all free men and women in the Republic of Korea. This Citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) who served in Korea during the stated period.

/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE _President_

[804] The Korean PUC, for the period 26 Oct 50 to 15 Feb 53, was presented to the 1stMarDiv in March 1953. Later, President Syngman Rhee furnished a second citation extending the period to include 16 Feb-27 Jul 53. The division was thus cited for the overall period 26 Oct 50 to 27 Jul 53, and the entire period is considered one award. Decorations & Medals Br., HQMC.

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION _The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in citing for outstanding and superior performance of duty_ THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

The First Marine Aircraft Wing has distinguished itself in support of United Nations Forces in Korea from 27 February 1951 to 11 June 1953. During this period, Marine Aircraft flew over 80,000 combat sorties braving intense opposition to strike enemy fortifications, weapons and logistical installations throughout North Korea. These extensive combat operations, often conducted in hazardous weather, have provided United Nations’ ground forces with unparalleled close air support and have inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage on enemy forces. Flying from forward Korean bases and from naval aircraft carriers, Marine aircraft have continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems, successfully curtailing the resupply of hostile front line troops. The exceptional achievements of the officers and men of the First Marine Aircraft Wing have materially assisted the Republic of Korea in its fight for freedom. Their outstanding performance of duty reflects great credit upon themselves and is in accord with the highest traditions of military service.

The citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First Marine Aircraft Wing who served in Korea during the stated period.

/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE _President_

PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION _The President of the Republic of Korea takes pleasure in citing_ THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ADVISORY COMPONENT United States Naval Advisory Group

for outstanding service to the people of Korea and for aid in the development of the Korean Marine Corps during the period February 1953 to 27 July 1954.

While attached to the Republic of Korea Marine Corps the United States Marine Advisory Component performed commendable service by giving valuable advice and guidance thus enabling the Korean Marine Corps to attain a ready status for any emergency.

By their initiative and constant attention the officers and men have contributed materially to the effective operation of all offices and departments of the Korean Marine Corps. Their thorough knowledge of techniques and military matters has helped in the practical routine training and in the fitting of the Korean Marine Corps for effective combat duty.

By exemplary conduct and indomitable spirit the United States Marine Corps Advisory Component has left a permanent imprint on the Korean Marine Corps which will assist in the accomplishment of the missions assigned to it in the future.

The outstanding service of the officers and men of the United States Marine Corps Advisory Component is in the best tradition of the United States Naval Service and this Presidential Unit Citation is given in recognition of their significant contribution to the welfare of the Republic of Korea.

/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE _President_

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

“For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and from 7 to 27 July 1953. During these periods the First Marine Division, Reinforced, maintained the integrity of over thirty-five miles of defense line in Panmunjom Truce Area against the constant aggressions of the enemy. During the time the Division was in the lines, it was under fire and attack by a resolute, well-equipped and fanatical hostile force. The Division maintained an raiding defense and constantly kept the enemy off balance by continuously patrolling, probing and raiding enemy positions, accompanied by the full weight of artillery and air support. Commencing in August 1952, and frequently thereafter, during the months of October 1952, March 1953, and July 1953, the enemy launched a series of large scale attacks to capture certain terrain features critical to the defense of friendly lines. The outposts and main defensive positions called Bunker Hill, The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, along with certain smaller outposts, gave title to battles of unsurpassed ferocity in which the full effort of the Marine Division was required to hurl back the attackers at heavy cost to both the Division and the enemy. That the lines in the Division sector remained firm and unbreached at the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953 gave eloquent tribute to the resourcefulness, courage, professional acumen and stamina of the members of the First Marine Division, Reinforced. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to the fulfillment of their vital mission reflects the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service.”

All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Division, Reinforced, during the periods 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and 7 to 27 July 1953, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units of the Division and the following reinforcing units:

FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS: 1st 4.5 Rocket Battery; 1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 7th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; 1st Amphibian Truck Company; Team #1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay Team, 1st Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company; 1st Provisional Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.

UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS: (For such periods not included in Army Unit Awards) 1st Bn, 32nd Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th Truck Co.; 513th Truck Co; 3rd Plt, 86th Engr Searchlight Co (passed to operational control of 11th Marines); 558th Trans Truck Co (Amphibious, was attached to 7th MT Bn, FMF); 196th Field Arty Bn; 92nd Army Engr Searchlight Plt; 181st CIC Det USA; 163rd MIS Det USA (Unit redesignated 1 Sep 1952 to MIS Plt); TLO Det USA; UNMACK Civil Affairs Team USA; 61st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn (155 Howitzer); 623rd Field Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn “C” Btry; 204th Field Arty Bn “B” Btry; 84th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2nd US Div (attached to KPR); Recon Co, 7th US Inf Div; 461st Inf Bn; Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf Div; 204th Field Arty Bn “A” Btry; 69th Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 8th Field Arty Bn; 90th Field Arty Bn; 21st AAA-AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 441st CIC Det, USA; Prov Bn, USA (Dets 31st and 32nd RCTS); Co D, 10th Engr (C) Bn, USA; Tank Co, 31st Inf, USA; Hqr Co, 31st Inf, USA; 2nd Bn, 31st Inf, USA (less Co E); 185th Engr (C) Bn, USA (less Co A); Co B, 1st Bn, 31st Inf, USA.

CHARLES S. THOMAS _Secretary of the Navy_

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, REINFORCED

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

“For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 1 August 1952 to 27 July 1953. Flying more than 45,000 combat sorties against determined opposition during this period, the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, struck repeatedly and effectively at enemy troops, fortifications, logistical installations and lines of communication throughout North Korea. These extensive combat operations provided friendly ground forces with decisive close air support during such battles as Bunker Hill, The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, and inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage upon the enemy. Operating from naval aircraft carriers and from forward Korean bases, Marine aircraft continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems, curtailing the movement of hostile troops to the front lines, and provided the air defense of South Korea. The notable record achieved by the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, is an eloquent tribute to the resourcefulness, courage and stamina of all her gallant officers and men. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to duty in the fulfillment of these vital tasks reflect the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service.”

All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, during the above period, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units and the following reinforcing units: Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 1; 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion; and Ground Control Approach Unit 41M.

CHARLES S. THOMAS _Secretary of the Navy_

EXTRACT

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 16 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

_Washington 25, D.C., 3 March 1954_

DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION--Citation of Unit--Section 1

1--DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION.--As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul, 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, WD Bul 11, 1942), the following unit is cited under AR 220-315 in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

1. The Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and the following attached units: The Turkish Liaison Detachment, 8215th Army Unit; Company B, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division; and Company C, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, are cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy near Munsan-ni, Korea, during the period 28 to 29 May 1953. On the night of 28 May, an assault, supported by a heavy barrage, was launched by a powerful enemy force, determined to wrest outposts “Elko,” “Carson,” and “Vegas” from friendly hands. The valiant troops occupying these positions were soon surrounded and hand-to-hand combat ensued. With great tenacity and courage, the friendly troops fought on until, with only three of them still standing on outpost “Carson,” the first position fell. Despite the tremendous number of casualties they had suffered, the foe intensified the attack on the two remaining terrain features, rushing repeatedly up the slopes only to be hurled back by the gallant defenders. Friendly reinforcements arrived together with concentrated artillery support. All fire power was brought to bear on the charging enemy, as the defending troops fought desperately to hold. The foe came on in seemingly endless numbers and friendly tanks moved into highly vulnerable positions to fire at close range. Friendly casualties were heavy, but the toll of enemy dead was enormous. The determined foe paid apparently no attention to their thousands of casualties and appeared prepared to sacrifice thousands more to gain their objectives. Realizing that these friendly outposts could not hope to stand in the face of the endless waves of hostile troops, the friendly command ordered the outpost defenders to withdraw to the main line of resistance. The extraordinary heroism, singleness of purpose, and magnificent fighting spirit exhibited by the members of the Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and attached units throughout this crucial battle, resulted in the frustration of enemy plans to breach the main line of resistance, thus reflecting the greatest credit on themselves and the military profession.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

OFFICIAL: WM. E. BERGIN Major General, USA The Adjutant General

M. B. RIDGWAY General, United States Army Chief of Staff

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON SIX

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Pioneering in the development of frontline helicopter evacuation of casualties, Marine Observation Squadron Six skillfully carried out unprecedented low-altitude evacuation flights during all hours of the day and night over rugged mountainous terrain in the face of enemy fire and extremely adverse weather, thereby saving untold lives and lessening the suffering of wounded marines. In addition, this valiant squadron completed thousands of day and night artillery spotting, reconnaissance and tactical air control missions, contributing materially to the extensive damage inflicted upon enemy positions, supply lines and troop concentrations. The splendid record achieved by Marine Observation Squadron Six attests to the courage, determination and esprit de corps of the officers and men of this unit and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”

For the President, CHARLES S. THOMAS _Secretary of the Navy_

APPENDIX H

Armistice Agreement

_Volume I_

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

_Agreement between the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea._

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

_Article I_

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

_Article II_

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. _General_

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term “coastal islands,” as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58´N, 124°40´E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50´N, 124°42´E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46´N, 124°46´E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38´N, 125°40´E), and U-DO (37°36´N, 125°58´E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.